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Abstract	  
Since	  the	  first	  substantive	  changes	  to	  Spanish	  immigration	  laws	  in	  the	  1980s,	  immigration	  
to	   Spain	   and	   the	   policies	   designed	   to	   govern	   it	   have	   changed	   greatly.	   The	   pace	   of	   this	  
continuous	   transformation	   has	   recently	   slowed	   down,	   offering	   a	   good	   opportunity	   to	  
reflect	   on	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   irregular	   migration	   has	   been	   governed	   over	   time.	   Taking	  
stock	   of	   more	   than	   three	   decades	   of	   debates	   in	   the	   Spanish	   Congress,	   laws,	   policy	  
documents,	  interview	  findings	  and	  practices,	  this	  dissertation	  offers	  a	  sociological	  analysis	  
of	   the	   messy	   process	   of	   immigration	   governance	   in	   a	   border	   country	   of	   the	   European	  
Union.	  	  
The	   dissertation	   starts	   by	   analyzing	   the	   early	   problematizations	   of	   irregular	  
migration	  in	  Spain,	  understood	  as	  the	  result	  of	  discursive	  and	  non-­‐discursive	  practices	  that	  
provide	   specific	   ways	   of	   thinking	   about	   and	   acting	   upon	   objects.	   Complicating	   the	  
assumption	   that	   policy	   shifts	   are	   a	   straightforward	   result	   of	   changes	   in	   the	   political	  
orientation	  of	  ruling	  parties,	  the	  dissertation	  traces	  the	  existence	  of	  three	  intersecting	  sets	  
of	   logics	   and	   practices	   that	   have	   shaped	   Spanish	   immigration	   policy	   over	   time:	   (1)	  
culturalization:	   a	   set	   of	   logics	   and	   practices	   intimately	   tied	   to	   the	   history	   of	   Spanish	  
colonialism	  and	  governing	  migrants	  as	  cultural	  subjects;	  (2)	  labouralization:	  a	  set	  of	  logics	  
and	  practices	  that	  attempt	  to	  manage	  labour	  migration	  flows	  and	  frame	  irregular	  migrants	  
as	  workers	  who	  contribute	  to	  the	  national	   labour	  market;	  and	  (3)	  securitization:	  a	  set	  of	  
 iii	  
logics	   and	   practices	   focused	   on	   the	   defence	   of	   state	   sovereignty,	   the	   prevention	   of	  
irregular	  entry	  and	  the	  framing	  of	  irregular	  migrants	  as	  potential	  threats.	  
The	  organization	  of	  heterogeneous	  practices	   into	   three	  broad	   categories	   acts	   as	   a	  
heuristic	   device	   to	   show	   how	   various	   complementary	   and	   at	   times	   contradictory	   logics	  
and	  practices	  work	  together	  to	  create	  a	  practical	   regime	  of	  migration	  governance	  based	  
on	  a	  long	  probationary	  period	  during	  which	  irregular	  migrants	  are	  scrutinized	  and	  policed.	  
Ultimately,	   this	   dissertation	   posits	   the	   existence	   in	   Spain	   of	   a	   regime	   governing	  
immigration	   through	   probation.	   This	   regime	   entails	   the	   rescaling	   of	   bordering	   practices	  
across	   space	   and	   time,	   the	   deployment	   of	   a	   space	   of	   legal	   liminality	   in	  which	   irregular	  
migrants	   are	   kept,	   and	   the	   use	   of	   conditionality	   and	   discretion	   in	   the	   assessment	   of	  
desirability.	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We	  need	  balanced	  public	  strategies	  that,	  at	  minimum,	  combine	  
the	  fight	  against	  clandestine	  flows,	  the	  ordering	  of	  arrivals	  	  
according	  to	  the	  capacity	  of	  absorption	  of	  the	  labour	  market,	  
and	  the	  promotion	  of	  integration	  into	  the	  societies	  of	  destination.	  
	  
Consuelo	  Rumí	  	  	  







This	  quote	  by	  the	  former	  secretary	  of	  state	  for	  immigration	  and	  emigration	  highlights	  the	  
three	  main	  concerns	  that	  have,	  to	  varying	  degrees,	  informed	  the	  governance	  of	  migration	  
flows	  and	  immigrants	  in	  Spain	  since	  its	  return	  to	  democracy	  in	  1978.	  While	  politicians	  and	  
policy-­‐makers	  often	  claim	  that	  a	  preoccupation	  with	  social	  and	  cultural	  integration,	  as	  well	  
as	   the	   regulation	  of	   immigration	  based	  on	   the	  needs	  of	   the	   labour	  market,	  has	   recently	  
been	  replacing	  an	  older	  security	  logic,	  these	  three	  dimensions	  have	  all,	  in	  fact,	  historically	  
contributed	   to	   the	   problematization	   of	   irregular	   migration.	   This	   study	   traces	   how	  
culturalization,	   labouralization,	   and	   securitization	   intersect	   in	   historically	   specific	   ways,	  
and	   create	   a	   regime	   of	   immigration	   governance,	   based	   on	   a	   long	   probationary	   period,	  
                                                
1	  See	  Rumí	  2007.	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during	  which	  irregular	  migrants	  who	  successfully	  enter	  Spain	  are	  assessed	  and	  policed	  by	  
a	   broad	   range	   of	   institutional	   actors.	   Analyzing	   the	   dynamics	   of	   Spanish	   immigration	  
governance	   in	  this	  way	  sheds	   light	  on	  the	   logics	  and	  practices	  that	  have	   informed	  policy	  
over	   time	   and	   makes	   visible	   the	   intersections	   of	   programs	   and	   strategies	   that	   may	  
otherwise	  appear	  contradictory.	  	  
At	   first	   sight,	   Spanish	   policies	   regarding	   immigrants	   residing	   in	   the	   country	  
irregularly	   may	   appear	   incoherent.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   Spain	   once	   had	   a	   reputation	   of	  
having	  lax	  and	  generous	  immigration	  policies.	  Indeed,	  since	  1986,	  extraordinary	  processes	  
for	   the	   collective	   regularization	   of	   migrants	   living	   in	   Spain	   without	   authorization	   have	  
played	   an	   important	   part	   in	   the	   regulation	   of	   irregular	   migration	   (Arango	   and	   Finotelli	  
2009;	  Maas	  2010).	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  Spain	   is	  known	   for	   its	   role	   in	  policing	  one	  of	   the	  
southern	  borders	  of	  what	  some	  analysts	  call	  “Fortress	  Europe.”	  Indeed,	  the	  populist,	  anti-­‐
immigrant	   rhetoric	  used	  by	   the	   conservative	  Popular	  Party	   (Partido	  Popular	   -­‐	   PP)	   in	   the	  
early	  2000s	  set	  the	  tone	  for	  a	  decade	  of	  restrictive	  immigration	  policies	  and	  strict	  border	  
control.	   This	   restrictive	   dimension	   seems	   to	   be	   gaining	   ground.	   For	   instance,	   while	  
Socialist	   José	   Luis	   Rodríguez	   Zapatero’s	   first	   government	   (2004-­‐08)	   enacted	   a	   very	  
important	   collective	   regularization	   process	   and	   developed	   institutions	   to	   facilitate	   the	  
integration	   of	   immigrants,	   it	   also	   deported	   more	   migrants	   than	   ever	   before	   and	  
dramatically	   tightened	   control	   over	   the	   southern	   borders	   (Ministerio	   del	   Interior	   2006,	  
2008,	   2009,	   2011,	   2012a).	   During	   the	   2008	   presidential	   election	   campaign,	   the	   Popular	  
Party	  promised	  to	  end	  extraordinary	  collective	  regularization	  (Partido	  Popular	  2008),	  and	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in	  the	  ensuing	  March	  2012	  presidential	  elections,	  which	  it	  won,	  it	  promised	  to	  forbid	  the	  
ordinary,	  case-­‐by-­‐case,	  individual	  regularization	  of	  migrants	  based	  on	  a	  demonstration	  of	  
social	   rootedness	   (arraigo	   social)	   (Rodríguez-­‐Pina	   and	  Pérez	   de	  Pablos	   2011).	  While	   the	  
government	  of	  Mariano	  Rajoy	  did	  not,	  in	  the	  end,	  limit	  this	  last	  means	  of	  regularization,	  in	  
2012	   it	   cancelled	   the	   legal	  provision	  granting	   irregular	  migrants	   living	   in	  Spain	  access	   to	  
healthcare	  services	  (RD-­‐L	  16/2012;	  De	  Benito	  2012).	  
Not	  surprisingly,	  this	  more	  restrictive	  approach	  to	  immigrant	  rights	  has	  come	  hand-­‐
in-­‐hand	  with	  more	  repressive	  techniques	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  irregular	  migration.	  As	  in	  
other	   parts	   of	   the	   world,	   the	   detention	   and	   deportation	   of	   migrants	   have	   become	  
common	   means	   through	   which	   irregular	   migration	   is	   governed	   (Bosworth	   2014;	   Inda	  
2006;	  Pratt	  2005;	  Walters	  2010).	   In	   addition	   to	   collective	   regularization,	  border	   control,	  
and	   “retention-­‐detention-­‐deportation	   dispositifs”	   (Caloz-­‐Tschopp	   2004:53-­‐57),	   a	   new	  
strategy	  to	  govern	  irregular	  migration	  is	  gaining	  popularity.	  It	  involves	  a	  set	  of	  delocalized	  
techniques	   that	   aim	   to	  pre-­‐emptively	   stop	   irregular	  migrants	  before	   they	   reach	   Spanish	  
territory	   or	   to	   force	   third	   country	   governments	   to	   provide	  protection	   to	   those	  who	   are	  
asylum	  seekers.	   This	  upstream	  control	   takes	   the	   form	  of	   joint	   sea	  patrols,	   visa	   regimes,	  
and	   migration	   regulation	   agreements	   with	   third	   countries	   (Belguendouz	   2005;	   García	  
Andrade	   2010).	   This	   extra-­‐territorialization	   of	   migration	   control	   changes	   the	   regional	  
dynamic,	   as	   countries	   like	  Morocco,	  Algeria,	   and	  Mauritania	   collaborate	  with	   Spain	   and	  
the	  European	  Union	  to	  prevent	  irregular	  migration	  to	  Spain.	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At	  first	  sight,	   it	  appears	  that	  there	   is	  a	  clear	  evolution	  toward	  evermore	  repressive	  
policies.	  However,	  the	  policy	  process	  is	  not	  at	  all	  straightforward.	  Indeed,	  these	  measures	  
are	   also	  often	  used	   concomitantly	   in	   a	   seemingly	   contradictory	   and	   yet	   complementary	  
fashion.	  For	  instance,	  in	  2005,	  the	  same	  Socialist	  government	  that	  regularized	  more	  than	  
570,000	   migrant	   workers	   (Arango	   and	   Finotelli	   2009:83-­‐89)	   also	   developed	   integration	  
policies,	  reactivated	  the	  Malaga	  Agreement	  allowing	  Spain	  to	  deport	  sub-­‐Saharan	  African	  
migrants	  to	  Morocco,	  pledged	  to	  build	  highly	  securitized	  border	  fences	  at	  the	  enclaves	  of	  
Ceuta	   and	  Melilla	   (Blanchard	   and	  Wender	   2007;	   Ferrer-­‐Gallardo	   2008;	  Moffette	   2010),	  
and	   created	   several	   joint	   sea	   border	   patrols	   with	   Morocco,	   Mauritania,	   Senegal,	   Cape	  
Verde,	   and	   the	   European	   FRONTEX2	   agency	   to	   surveil	   the	   territorial	   waters	   of	   these	  
countries	   (García	   Andrade	   2010).	   Therefore,	   the	   widespread	   image	   of	   the	   2004-­‐08	  
Socialist	   government	   rule	   as	   a	   time	   of	   implementation	   of	   integration	   policies	   and	  
“labouralization”	  of	  migration	  does	  not	  tell	  the	  whole	  story.	  Similarly,	  since	  the	  right-­‐wing	  
Popular	  Party	  has	  been	  so	  keen	  to	  denounce	  the	  use	  of	  collective	  regularization	  processes	  
as	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  unauthorized	  immigrants,	  one	  might	  reasonably	  assume	  
party	  politics	  is	  a	  key	  determinant	  of	  policy	  choices.	  Yet,	  the	  Popular	  Party	  has	  also	  relied	  
on	  collective	  regularizations	  on	  three	  occasions—in	  1996,	  2000,	  and	  2001—making	  it	  the	  
party	   that	  has	  used	   this	  policy	   tool	  most	  often,	  and	   it	  was	  under	  a	  Popular	  government	  
that	  universal	  health	  care	  was	  made	  available	  to	  all	  immigrants	  in	  2001,	  regardless	  of	  their	  
administrative	  status.	  
                                                
2	   FRONTEX,	   legally	   named	   the	   European	   Agency	   for	   the	  Management	   of	   Operational	   Cooperation	   at	   the	  
External	   Borders	   of	   the	   Member	   States	   of	   the	   European	   Union,	   was	   created	   in	   2004	   and	   started	   its	  
operations	  in	  2005.	  
 5	  
Since	   the	   early	   1980s,	   regardless	   of	   which	   political	   party	   has	   been	   in	   office,	  
government	   officials	   have	   relied	   on	   a	   combination	   of	   repressive	   and	  more	   progressive	  
policies.	  That	  is	  to	  say	  that	  while	  the	  political	  ideology	  of	  the	  ruling	  party	  certainly	  affects	  
policy	  choices,	  the	  latter	  cannot	  be	  deduced	  from	  the	  former.	  Given	  that	  political	  ideology	  
cannot	   adequately	   explain	   the	   choice	   of	   policy	   tools,	   how	   can	   we	   account	   for	   the	  
prevalence	  of	  some	  strategies	  for	  governing	  irregular	  migration?	  And	  given	  the	  complexity	  
of	  the	  elaboration,	  implementation,	  and	  contestation	  of	  immigration	  policies,	  how	  can	  we	  
make	  sense	  of	  the	  different,	  often	  contradictory,	  logics	  and	  practices	  that	  have	  governed	  
migration	  in	  Spain	  since	  the	  1980s?	  	  
Studying	  the	  Problematization	  of	  Irregular	  Migration	  
Drawing	   from	   the	   literature	   in	   governmentality	   studies	   and	   critical	   policy	   analysis,	   this	  
research	  is	  based	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  governmental	  practices	  are	  problem-­‐oriented,	  and	  
that	   policy	   problems	   are	   themselves	   informed	   by	   these	   practices.	   Rather	   than	   regard	  
irregular	   migration	   as	   a	   problem	   that	   preceded	   its	   identification	   by	   policy-­‐makers,	   this	  
study	  considers	  how	  irregular	  immigration	  became	  a	  policy	  problem	  in	  need	  of	  a	  solution.	  	  
Michel	   Foucault	   explained	   that	   his	   was	   an	   attempt	   to	   “produce	   a	   history	   of	  
problematizations;	   that	   is,	   a	   history	   of	   the	   ways	   things	   are	   rendered	   problematic.”3	  
Similarly,	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  research	  is	  to	  trace	  the	  heterogeneous	  elements	  that	  contributed	  
                                                
3	  My	  translation	  of:	  “Je	  dirais	  que	  je	  fais	  une	  histoire	  des	  problématiques,	  c’est-­‐à-­‐dire	  l’histoire	  de	  la	  manière	  
dont	   les	   choses	   font	   problème,”	   in	   the	   documentary	   Foucault	   par	   lui-­‐même	   (director	   Philippe	   Calderon,	  
2003,	  at	  4m30).	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to	  the	  constitution	  of	  irregular	  migration	  as	  a	  problem	  for	  governmental	  intervention.	  As	  
Nikolas	  Rose	  (1999)	  explains,	  this	  approach:	  
seek[s]	   to	   reconstruct	   the	   problematizations	   to	   which	   programmes,	   strategies,	   tactics	   posed	  
themselves	  as	  a	  solution.	  If	  policies,	  arguments,	  analyses	  and	  prescriptions	  purport	  to	  provide	  
answers,	  they	  do	  so	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  set	  of	  questions.	  Their	  very	  status	  as	  answers	  is	  dependent	  
upon	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  questions.	  If,	  for	  example	  imprisonment,	  marketization,	  community	  
care	   are	   seen	   as	   answers,	   to	   what	   are	   they	   answers?	   And	   in	   reconstructing	   the	  
problematizations	  which	  accord	  them	   intelligibility	  as	  answers,	   these	  grounds	  become	  visible,	  
their	  limits	  and	  presuppositions	  are	  opened	  for	  interrogation	  in	  new	  ways	  (P.58).	  
	  
Similarly,	  this	  research	  asks:	  If	  the	  strengthening	  of	  border	  fences,	  the	  implementation	  of	  
processes	   of	   collective	   regularization,	   the	   policing	   of	   urban	   immigrant	   neighbourhoods,	  
the	   building	   of	   new	   detention	   centres,	   the	   ratification	   of	   repatriation	   agreements,	   the	  
development	  of	   joint	  sea	  border	  operations,	  and	  the	  extension	  of	  radar-­‐based	  detection	  
technologies	  on	  Spanish	  coasts	  are	  answers,	  to	  what	  questions	  or	  problems	  are	  they	  the	  
answers?	  Conversely,	  this	  research	  also	  asks:	  How	  do	  these	  practices	  provide	  specific	  ways	  
of	  thinking	  about	   irregular	  migration	  that	  contribute	  to	  its	  problematization	  as	  an	  object	  
of	  knowledge	  and	  government?	  	  
Indeed,	  problematizations	  emerge	  through	  historically	  situated	  discursive	  and	  non-­‐
discursive	  practices	  that	  provide	  specific	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  and	  acting	  upon	  a	  set	  of	  
difficulties	   (Soguk	   1999).	   That	   is	   to	   say	   that	   practices	   do	   not	   simply	   emerge	   as	   policy	  
responses	   to	   a	   predefined	  policy	   problem;	   rather,	   they	   play	   an	   integral	   part	   in	   defining	  
and	  redefining	  this	  problem.	  As	  Foucault	  explained	  with	  respect	  to	  his	  own	  research,	  while	  
“the	  archeological	  dimension	  of	  the	  analysis	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  examine	  the	  forms	  of	  the	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problematizations	   themselves,	   its	   genealogical	   dimension	   enabled	   me	   to	   analyze	   the	  
formation	  out	  of	  the	  practices”	  (cited	   in	  Bacchi	  2012:1).	  To	  make	  sense	  of	  how	  irregular	  
migration	  is	  governed	  in	  Spain,	  this	  research	  thus	  inquires	  about	  the	  logics	  and	  practices	  
that	   inform	   immigration	   policy.	   This	   strategy	   follows	   the	   one	   used	   by	  Nikolas	   Rose	   and	  
Peter	  Miller	  (1993),	  who	  claim	  that	  
Problematics	  of	  government	  may	  be	  analyzed,	  first	  of	  all,	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  political	  rationalities,	  
the	  changing	  discursive	  fields	  within	  which	  the	  exercise	  of	  power	  is	  conceptualised,	  the	  moral	  
justifications	   for	   particular	   ways	   of	   exercising	   power	   by	   diverse	   authorities,	   notions	   of	   the	  
appropriate	  forms,	  objects	  and	  limits	  of	  politics,	  and	  conceptions	  of	  the	  proper	  distribution	  of	  
such	  tasks	  among	  secular,	  spiritual,	  military	  and	  familial	  sectors.	  But,	  we	  suggest,	  problematics	  
of	   government	   should	   also	   be	   analyzed	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   governmental	   technologies,	   the	  
complex	   of	   mundane	   programmes,	   calculations,	   techniques,	   apparatuses,	   documents	   and	  
procedures	   through	   which	   authorities	   seek	   to	   embody	   and	   give	   effect	   to	   governmental	  
ambitions	  (P.175).	  
	  
This	   research	   relies	   on	   the	   analysis	   of	   more	   than	   30	   years	   of	   policy	   documents,	   laws,	  
parliamentary	   debates,	   interviews	   with	   policy-­‐makers	   and	   other	   actors	   involved	   in	  
frontline	  policy	  implementation,	  as	  well	  as	  observations	  of	  police	  practices	  in	  Madrid	  and	  
Ceuta,	   to	   provide	   a	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   the	   logics	   and	   practices	   at	   play	   in	   immigration	  
governance.	  More	  specifically,	  this	  research	  asks	  the	  following	  questions:	  
1) Which	   political	   rationalities	   have	   informed	   the	   problematizations	   of	   irregular	  
migration	   as	   an	  object	   of	   government	   in	   Spain,	   and	  which	  discursive	   regularities	  
and	  changes	  can	  be	  identified	  in	  various	  programs	  of	  government?	  
2) 	  Which	   programmatic	   forms	   has	   the	   governing	   of	   irregular	   migration	   taken	   in	  
Spain,	  and	  what	  are	  the	  similarities	  and	  differences	  between	  different	  historically	  
specific	  programs	  of	  government?	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3) Which	   technologies	   have	   been	  mobilized	   to	   govern	   irregular	  migration	   in	   Spain,	  
and	  how	  do	  these	  technologies	  contribute	  to	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  irregular	  
migration	  is	  problematized?	  
4) What	   are	   the	   power	   dynamics	   at	   play	   in	   policy-­‐making,	   and	  how	   can	   temporary	  
policy	   settlements	   resulting	   from	   these	   struggles	   account	   for	   shifts	   in	   the	  
governing	  of	  irregular	  migration	  since	  the	  early	  1980s?	  
I	   engage	   with	   these	   questions	   diachronically	   and	   synchronically,	   using	   a	   three-­‐tiered	  
methodological	  approach	  developed	  by	  Trevor	  Gale	  (2001)	  for	  Foucauldian	  policy	  analysis.	  
This	  strategy,	  further	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  relies	  on	  a	  policy	  historiography	  (focusing	  on	  
periodization	   and	   historical	   shifts	   in	   the	   immigration	   policy	   agenda),	   an	   archeology	   of	  
policy	   rationalities	   (looking	   at	   discursive	   continuities	   and	   changes	   in	   how	   irregular	  
migration	  is	  framed),	  and	  a	  genealogy	  of	  the	  policy	  process	  (focusing	  on	  power	  dynamics,	  
negotiations,	  and	  tensions	  between	  various	  actors	  involved	  in	  immigration	  governance).	  	  
The	  genealogical	  dimension	  of	  this	  methodological	  strategy	  was	  key	  in	  mapping	  out	  
the	   roles	   of	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   actors	   involved	   in	   governing	   irregular	   migrants	   in	   Spain.	  
Indeed,	  beyond	  its	  usefulness	  for	  studying	  the	  problematization	  of	   irregular	  migration	  as	  
an	  object	  of	  government,	  the	  approach	  used	  in	  this	  research	  also	  allowed	  me	  to	  account	  
for	   the	   “messy	   actualities”	   of	   multi-­‐scalar	   and	   multi-­‐actor	   immigration	   governance	  
(O’Malley,	  Weir,	  and	  Shearing	  1997:504).	   In	  other	  words,	   it	  allowed	  me	  to	  map	  out	  and	  
analyze	  the	  complex	  regime	  governing	  irregular	  migration	  in	  Spain.	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Gregory	  Feldman	  (2011)	  argues	  that	  a	  governmentality	  approach	  to	  migration	  policy	  
should	  engage	  with	  the	  heterogeneous	  dispositifs	  governing	  migration	  and	  try	  to	  account	  
for	   both	   the	   discontinuities	   and	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   “disparate	   elements	   coalesce	   in	  
particular	  conjunctures”	  (p.	  32).	  This	  strategy	  helps	  to	  draw	  a	  more	  complex	  picture	  of	  the	  
interactions,	  tensions,	  and	  negotiations	  involved	  than	  is	  possible	  through	  an	  institutional	  
analysis	  of	  multi-­‐level	  governance.	  Following	  Giuseppe	  Sciortino	  (2004),	  I	  use	  the	  concept	  
of	  regime	  and	  highlight	  the	  idea	  that	  “the	  life	  of	  a	  regime	  is	  the	  result	  of	  continuous	  repair	  
work	  through	  practices”	  (p.32).	  I	  analyze	  the	  governing	  of	  irregular	  migrants	  as	  a	  regime,	  
to	   capture	   “the	   flexible,	   multi-­‐scalar	   nature	   of	   the	   processes	   of	   governmentality	   and	  
governance	  .	  .	  .	  as	  well	  as	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  their	  actors	  and	  the	  growing	  intertwining	  
of	  knowledge	  and	  power	  that	  characterizes	  them”	  (Mezzadra	  and	  Neilson	  2013:179).	  This	  
strategy	   allows	   me	   to	   take	   into	   consideration	   the	   role	   of	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   actors	  
(politicians,	   bureaucrats,	   police	   officers,	   judges,	   migrants),	   situated	   in	   different	  
jurisdictions,	   who	   mobilize	   various	   kinds	   of	   legal	   and	   non-­‐legal	   knowledges	   to	   govern	  
unauthorized	  migrants	  and	  irregular	  migration	  flows.	  
Defining	  “Irregular	  Migration”	  
The	   object	   of	   this	   research	   is	   not	   irregular	   migration,	   its	   characteristics,	   causes,	   or	  
consequences,	  but	  the	  logics	  and	  practices	  involved	  in	  governing	  it.	  Indeed,	  this	  research	  
looks	  at	  how	  this	  object	  is	  rendered	  thinkable	  and	  governable	  by	  policy-­‐makers	  and	  other	  
institutional	  actors.	  Following	  Dvora	  Yanow’s	  (2003)	  ethnographic	  approach	  to	  policy,	  the	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research	  looks	  at	  how	  policy-­‐makers,	  politicians,	  and	  officials	  name,	  define,	  and	  act	  upon	  
this	  particular	  type	  of	  migration,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  legal	  categories	  contribute	  to	  reifying	  it	  as	  
“irregular”	   or	   “illegal.”	   In	   other	   words,	   emic	   categories	   developed	   in	   the	   policy-­‐making	  
process	  are	  more	  important	  here	  than	  etic	  ones.	  	  
This,	  however,	  does	  not	  solve	  the	  problem	  of	  how	  to	  name	  this	  type	  of	  migration	  in	  
the	   study,	   since	   the	   terminology	   used	   by	   policy-­‐makers,	   civil	   servants,	   and	   scholars	   is	  
unstable	  and	  open	  to	  contestation.	  As	  José	  María	  Ruiz	  de	  Huidobro	  (2006:20)	  explains,	  the	  
main	   distinction	   in	   the	   legal	   literature	   revolves	   around	   the	   terms	   extranjero	   and	  
inmigrante.	  Indeed,	  extranjero—foreigner	  or	  stranger—is	  a	  formal	  legal	  category	  referring	  
to	   anyone	   who	   is	   living	   in	   Spain	   and	   who	   is	   not	   a	   Spaniard	   (including	   international	  
students	   and	   tourists,	   for	   instance),	   while	   inmigrante—immigrant—is	   a	   sociological	  
category	   referring	   to	   those	  who	   have	   left	   their	   country	   and	   are	   living	   in	   Spain	  with	   an	  
intention	  to	  stay.	  While	  these	  are	  legal	  and	  somewhat	  objective	  distinctions,	   in	  common	  
parlance,	   Spaniards	   often	   refer	   to	   racialized	   individuals	   who	   work	   in	   agriculture	   or	   in	  
construction	  as	  inmigrantes,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  there	  temporarily,	  while	  white,	  middle-­‐class,	  
immigrants	  or	  retired	  European	  elders	  living	  in	  Spain	  permanently	  are	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  
extranjeros,	  even	  though	  they	  may	  also	  be	  immigrants.	  The	  distinction	  is	  thus	  also	  racially	  
marked	  (Calavita	  1998,	  2005).	  And	  yet,	  as	  will	  be	  examined	  more	  closely	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  the	  
meanings	   of	   these	   categories	   are	   flexible,	   and	   are	   sometimes	   used	   interchangeably	   in	  
political	  discourse	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  situations	  and	  in	  pursuit	  of	  a	  diversity	  of	  aims.	  In	  
some	   instances,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   policy-­‐makers	   do	   not	   pay	  much	   attention	   to	   the	   terms	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used,	  while	  in	  other	  cases	  the	  choice	  of	  expression	  is	  politically	  motivated.	  Indeed,	  when	  
referring	  to	  individuals	  living	  in	  Spain	  without	  proper	  residence	  and	  work	  permits,	  policy-­‐
makers	  also	  use	  a	  diversity	  of	  terms,	  such	  as	  “illegal	  immigrants,”	  “irregular	  immigrants,”	  
“foreign	  citizens,”	  or	  “illegal	  African	  citizens,”	  and	  utilizing	  their	  shifting	  terminology	  in	  this	  
research	  is	  not	  an	  option.	  
The	   scholarship	   on	   irregular	  migration	   proposes	   a	   few	   different	   terms,	   and	   often	  
points	  to	  the	  difficulty	  of	  defining	  this	  object.	  This	  difficulty	  stems	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
category	  of	  irregular	  migration	  is	  a	  negative	  one,	  defined	  in	  contrast	  to	  regular	  migration	  
and	  referring	  to	   individuals	  whose	  status	   is	  often	  unstable.	  As	  Stéphane	  De	  Tapia	  (2002)	  
notes:	  
The	  terms	  “irregular	  migrant,”	  “clandestine	  migrant,”	  and	  “non-­‐documented	  migrants”	  refer	  to	  
categories	   that	  are	  often	   ill-­‐defined	  as	   they	  are	  extremely	   fluid	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  within	   the	  
migratory	   path	   of	   the	   same	   individual.	   Irregular	   migrants	   are	   by	   definition	   illegal,	   but	   not	  
automatically	  clandestine;	   they	  have	  often	  entered	   the	   territory	  of	   residence	  perfectly	   legally	  
(passport	  with	  or	  without	  tourist	  visa	  generally	  allowing	  a	  three	  month	  stay	  [in	  the	  EU],	  asylum	  
seekers,	   fixed-­‐term	   employment	   contract,	   seasonal	   contract,	   student	   status,	   etc.).	   It	   is	   the	  
failure	   to	   leave	   the	   territory	   that	   makes	   them	   irregular	   migrants	   or,	   in	   some	   cases	   .	   .	   .	   the	  
shortcomings	  of	  authorities	  responsible	  for	  controlling	  flows	  (P.17).	  
	  
While	  capturing	   the	  ambiguity	  and	   the	   fluidity	  of	   the	  different	  categories,	  De	  Tapia	  also	  
illustrates	   the	  ease	  with	  which	   the	   illegality	  of	   an	  act	   (being	   in	   the	   country	  without	   the	  
proper	  authorization)	  is	  extended	  to	  the	  individuals	  themselves	  (“irregular	  migrants	  are	  by	  
definition	   illegal,”	   p.	   17).	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	  
administrative	   irregularity	  does	  not	  equate	  neatly	  with	   illegality	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
the	   unlawfulness	   lies	   with	   the	   act,	   not	   the	   subject	   (Bauder	   2013;	   Coutin	   2000,	   2005;	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Goldring	   and	   Landolt	   2013;	   Menjívar	   2006;	   Menjívar	   and	   Kanstroom	   2014).	   “Irregular”	  
tends	   to	   be	   used	   in	   the	   Spanish	   context	   as	   a	   progressive	   alternative	   to	   the	   negatively	  
connoted	   phrase	   “illegal,”	   just	   like	   the	   terms	   “undocumented,”	   “non-­‐status”	   or	   “sans-­‐
papiers”	   in	   other	   contexts.	   However,	   the	   terms	   “irregular,”	   “unauthorized,”	  
“undocumented,”	  or	  “illegalized,”	  when	  applied	  to	  migration,	  migrants,	  or	  immigrants,	  are	  
all	   overly	   generalized.	   Most	   immigrants	   have	   documents,	   papers,	   and	   a	   particular	  
administrative	   status,	   even	  when	   their	   legal	   status	   in	   the	   country	   remains	   uncertain.	   In	  
Spain,	   not	   only	   are	   most	   entries	   lawful	   and	   “regular,”	   but	   also	   people	   who	   become	  
immigrants	   by	   over-­‐staying	   their	   visas	   in	   contravention	   of	   the	   Alien	   Act	   are	   not	   the	  
exception,	   but	   the	   norm.	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   migration	   and	   immigrants	   can	   only	   be	  
considered	   “irregular”	   from	   a	   sociological	   or	   demographic	   perspective	   if	   conditions	   or	  
movements	  do	  not	  correspond	  to	  regular	  patterns,	  what	  we	  call	  irregular	  immigration	  is	  in	  
fact	  one	  of	  the	  most	  regular	  forms	  of	  immigration	  to	  Spain.	  	  
In	   strictly	   legal	   terms,	   the	   phrase	   “migrant	   in	   a	   situation	   of	   administrative	  
irregularity”	  is	  more	  correct.	  To	  render	  this	  specific	  meaning	  explicit,	  some	  scholars	  prefer	  
using	   “unauthorized”	   (Aliverti	   2013;	   Ngai	   2004;	   Varsanyi	   2011;	   Walter	   2010)	   or	  
“illegalized”	  (Bauder	  2013;	  De	  Genova	  2004,	  2013),	  two	  expressions	  that	  are	  more	  useful	  
in	   many	   contexts.	   And	   yet,	   the	   level	   of	   “institutional	   irregularity”	   (Calavita	   2005:45)	  
reminds	  us	   that	   immigrants	  who	  do	  not	   comply	  with	   immigration	   regulation	  have	  been	  
tolerated,	   if	   not	   encouraged.	   Indeed,	   just	   like	   their	   northern	   neighbours	   in	   the	   past,	  
southern	  European	  countries	  such	  as	  Spain,	  Portugal,	  Italy	  and	  Greece	  are	  dependant	  on	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irregular	  immigrant	  labour	  and	  tolerate	  or	  even	  encourage	  irregularity	  (Maas	  2010).	  While	  
it	   is	   true	   that	   the	   policy	   problem	   examined	   in	   this	   research	   emerged	   as	   a	   way	   of	  
addressing	  the	  presence	  and	  movement	  of	  migrants	  whose	  activities	  were	  not	  sanctioned	  
by	   the	   state,	   the	   term	   “unauthorized”	   is	   misleading	   since	   irregularity	   is	   informally	  
encouraged.	  Finally,	  while	  the	  terms	  “illegalized	  immigrants”	  nicely	  conveys	  the	  legal	  and	  
social	   conditions	   of	   immigrants	   whose	   presence	   in	   a	   country	   is	   illegalized	   and	   often	  
criminalized,	  the	  process	  of	   illegalization	  is	   in	  itself	  a	  policy	  response.	  Since	  this	  research	  
studies	  how	   this	  particular	   type	  of	  migration	  became	   illegalized	   in	   the	  1980s,	   using	   this	  
term	  as	  a	  generic	  name	  throughout	   this	   study	  would	  be	  analytically	  problematic.	   In	   this	  
research,	  I	  thus	  rely	  on	  the	  emic	  terminology	  used	  by	  policy-­‐makers	  when	  studying	  their	  
framing	   of	   immigration	   and	   immigrants	   but,	   for	   lack	   of	   better	   terms,	   I	   use	   “irregular	  
migration,”	  “irregular	  migrants,”	  or	  “irregular	   immigrants”	  when	  referring	   to	   immigrants	  
who	  find	  themselves	   in	  a	  situation	  of	  administrative	   irregularity	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  Alien	  
Act.	   The	   most	   widely	   used	   in	   sociological	   scholarship	   on	   immigration	   and	   immigration	  
policies	   in	   Spain,	   this	   terminology	   is	   also	   less	   cumbersome	   than	   the	  more	   exact	   phrase	  
“migrant	  in	  a	  situation	  of	  administrative	  irregularity.”	  
Scope	  of	  Irregular	  Immigration	  in	  Spain	  
The	  magnitude	   of	   the	   phenomenon	   with	   which	   Spanish	   immigration	   policy-­‐makers	   are	  
grappling	   is	   substantial.	   Since	   1996,	   the	   best	   tool	   to	   estimate	   the	   total	   number	   of	  
foreigners	  residing	   in	  Spain	  with	  and	  without	  residence	  permits	   is	   the	  municipal	   registry	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(padrón	   municipal).	   Indeed,	   the	   Law	   Regulating	   Local	   Government	   (LRBRL	   7/1985)	  
requires	  that	  anyone	  living	  in	  Spain	  register	  as	  a	  resident	  at	  the	  municipal	  level	  regardless	  
of	  immigration	  status.	  Before	  1996,	  we	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  number	  of	  residence	  permits	  
issued	  annually	  and	   try	   to	  account	   for	   irregular	   immigrants	  by	  using	  estimates	   from	  the	  
1986	   and	   1991	   regularization	   processes	   (Izquierdo	   Escribano	   1996).	   Using	   these	   two	  
sources,	  we	   can	   estimate	   that	   the	   numbers	   of	   foreigners	   living	   in	   Spain	   increased	   from	  
roughly	   241,971	   in	   1986	   (0.6%	   of	   the	   total	   population)	   to	   542,314	   in	   1996	   (1.4%),	  
1,370,657	  in	  2001	  (3.3%),	  4,144,166	  in	  2006	  (9.3%),	  and	  5,730,667	  in	  2011	  (12.2%),	  before	  
stabilizing	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   economic	   crisis.	  On	   January	   1,	   2014,	   there	  were	   5,023,487	  
foreigners	  registered	  on	  the	  padrón;	  10.7%	  of	  the	  total	  population.4	  According	  to	  Carmen	  
González-­‐Enríquez	   (2010),	   the	  existence	  of	  a	  dynamic	   informal	   labour	  market,	  especially	  
during	  the	  construction	  sector	  boom	  between	  1996	  and	  2007,	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  irregular	  
immigrants	  to	  access	  essential	  social	  services	  such	  as	  education	  and	  healthcare	  from	  2000	  
onward,	   contributed	   greatly	   to	   the	   rapid	   increase	   in	   size	   of	   the	   overall	   immigrant	  
population.	  	  
It	  is	  harder	  to	  measure	  the	  number	  of	  immigrants	  in	  an	  irregular	  situation,	  as	  several	  
authors	  have	  noted	   (Arango	  and	  Finotelli	  2009;	  De	  Tapia	  2002;	  González-­‐Enríquez	  2010;	  
Maas	  2010).	  The	  most	  common	  way	  of	  estimating	  this	  figure	  is	  to	  take	  the	  number	  of	  non-­‐
EU	   foreigners	   registered	   on	   the	   padrón	   in	   a	   given	   year	   and	   subtract	   the	   number	   of	  
                                                
4	  Official	   data	   from	   the	   Instituto	  Nacional	   de	  Estadística	   (www.ines.es).	   It	   is	   important	   to	  note	   that	   these	  
numbers	  refer	  to	  all	   foreigners,	  which	  means	  that	  they	   include	  citizens	  of	  EU	  member	  states	  even	  though	  
they	   do	   not	   need	   residence	   and	   work	   permits	   to	   live	   in	   Spain,	   and	   do	   not	   account	   for	   immigrants	   who	  
obtained	  Spanish	  citizenship	  or	  second-­‐generation	  immigrants	  born	  with	  Spanish	  citizenship.	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residence	  permits	  issued	  that	  year.	  From	  2000	  to	  2012,	  all	  migrants	  had	  access	  to	  health	  
care	   and	   other	   social	   services,	   irrespective	   of	   their	   immigration	   status,	   as	   long	   as	   they	  
registered	  with	  this	  municipal	  census.	  Furthermore,	  to	  access	  a	  program	  of	  regularization,	  
irregular	  immigrants	  need	  to	  document	  the	  length	  of	  their	  stay	  in	  Spain,	  and	  registering	  is	  
still	  by	  far	  the	  best	  way	  to	  do	  so.	  It	  is	  thus	  assumed	  that	  most	  irregular	  immigrants	  chose	  
to	   register	   and	   that	   the	   numbers	   are	   relatively	   accurate.	   As	   with	   any	   method	   for	  
estimating	   the	  number	  of	  unauthorized	   immigrants,	   this	   strategy	  has	   its	   limits.	   Some	  of	  
the	  problems	  often	  mentioned	  with	  respect	  to	  this	  method	  are:	  (1)	  those	  who	  leave	  the	  
country	  may	  not	  remove	  their	  name	  from	  the	  registry,	   leading	  to	   inflated	  numbers	  until	  
the	   obligation	   to	   renew	   one’s	   registration	   was	   implemented	   in	   2005	   (and	   as	   a	   result,	  
around	   300,000	   names	   were	   taken	   off	   the	   registry);	   (2)	   since	   2003,	   police	   forces	   have	  
access	  to	  the	  registry	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  some	  migrants	  practicing	  illegal	  occupations	  might	  
choose	  not	  to	  register	  despite	  the	  incentive	  of	  access	  to	  essential	  services;	  and	  (3)	  some	  
people	   who	   do	   not	   reside	   in	   Spain	  may	   nevertheless	   try	   to	   register	   in	   order	   to	   access	  
health	   care	  when	   they	   visit	   (González-­‐Enríquez	   2010).	   To	   this	   list,	  we	   need	   to	   add	   that	  
immigrants	  living	  irregularly	  in	  Spain	  lost	  their	  access	  to	  health	  care	  in	  August	  2012,	  which	  
has	  significantly	  reduced	  the	  incentive	  to	  register,	  and	  also	  that	  municipalities	  sometimes	  
make	  it	  difficult	  for	  immigrants	  to	  register,	  which	  may	  delay	  the	  process.	  	  
Because	   of	   these	   problems	   and	   attempts	   by	   demographers	   and	   quantitative	  
sociologists	  to	  use	  other	  data,	  such	  as	  statistics	  gathered	  during	  regularization	  processes,	  
to	  adjust	   their	  numbers,	   the	  estimates	  vary	  greatly.	   From	  somewhere	  between	  260,000	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and	  477,500	  irregular	  immigrants	  in	  2001,	  to	  between	  1	  million	  and	  1.65	  million	  in	  2005,	  
until	   the	   numbers	   decreased	   and	   then	   stabilized	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   economic	   crisis	   that	  
started	  in	  2007	  (Cebolla	  Boada	  and	  González	  Ferrer	  2008;	  González-­‐Enríquez	  2010).	  Using	  
the	  most	  recent	  data	  available,	  a	  simple	  estimate	  indicates	  that	  there	  were	  472,217	  more	  
non-­‐EU	  foreigners	  registered	  on	  the	  padrón	  on	  January	  1,	  2014	  than	  there	  were	  non-­‐EU	  
foreigners	   with	   residence	   permits	   on	   December	   31,	   2013.5	   We	   can	   thus	   estimate	   that	  
there	  are	  still	  about	  half	  a	  million	  immigrants	  living	  in	  Spain	  irregularly.	  
Defining	  “Immigration	  Policy”	  
The	  high	  level	  of	  administrative	  irregularity	  was	  a	  central	  concern	  for	  policy-­‐makers	  during	  
the	   boom	   of	   the	   2000s,	   but	   the	   preoccupation	   with	   irregular	   migration	   flows	   and	   the	  
presence	   of	   immigrants	   without	   the	   proper	   authorization	   is	   not	   solely	   related	   to	   the	  
quantitative	   significance	   of	   the	   phenomenon.	   Indeed,	   since	   at	   least	   the	   early	   1980s,	  
politicians,	  bureaucrats,	  and	  police	  officers	  have	  been	  debating	  the	  proper	  way	  to	  define	  
and	  manage	   irregular	  migration.	  This	   research	   takes	  as	   its	  object	  of	  analysis	   the	  various	  
policies	  used	  historically	  in	  attempts	  to	  govern	  irregular	  migrants	  (as	  individuals),	  as	  well	  
as	   irregular	  migration	   (as	   a	   demographic	   phenomenon).	   Since	   “policy”	   is	   taken	   here	   to	  
mean	   something	   much	   broader	   than	   concrete	   policy	   documents	   and	   includes	   logics,	  
programs,	  and	  practices	  involved	  in	  governing	  irregular	  migration,	  a	  brief	  discussion	  of	  this	  
notion	  of	  policy	  is	  in	  order.	  
                                                
5	   Official	   data	   from	   the	   Instituto	   Nacional	   de	   Estadística	   (www.ines.es)	   for	   the	   padrón,	   and	   from	   the	  
Ministerio	  de	  Empleo	  y	  Seguridad	  Social	  (http://extranjeros.empleo.gob.es)	  for	  the	  residence	  permits.	  Both	  
general	  regime	  (régimen	  general)	  permits	  and	  study	  permits	  have	  been	  taken	  into	  account.	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In	  Security,	  Territory,	  Population,	  Foucault	  ([2004]	  2007)	  distinguished	  between	  law	  
and	   “police”	   in	   seventeenth	   century	   France.	   As	   Mitchel	   Dean	   (2007)	   and	   Nikolas	   Rose	  
(1999)	  explain,	  the	  term	  “police”	  was	  then	  used	  in	  a	  sense	  akin	  to	  what	  we	  now	  refer	  to	  as	  
“policy.”	   In	   fact,	   when	   the	   course	   summary	   of	   Security,	   Territory,	   Population	  was	   first	  
published	  in	  English	  in	  a	  collection	  edited	  by	  Paul	  Rabinow,	  the	  French	  term	  “police”	  was	  
translated	  by	  Robert	  Hurley	  as	  “policy”	  (Foucault	  [1994]	  1997:69,	  71).	  It	  was	  only	  with	  the	  
publication	   of	   the	   whole	   course	   in	   a	   translation	   by	   Graham	   Burchell	   that	   the	   term	  
“police,”	   in	   scare	  quotes,	  was	  used.	  Rose	   (1999)	  also	  posits	   that	   in	   seventeenth	   century	  
Europe,	  “police”	  was	  not	  seen	  “as	  a	  negative	  activity	  concerned	  with	  the	  maintenance	  of	  
order	   and	   the	   prevention	   of	   danger,	   but	   as	   a	   positive	   programme	   (close	   to	   our	  
contemporary	   notions	   of	   policy)	   based	   upon	   knowledge”	   (p.24).	   Foucault	   claimed	   that	  
whereas	   laws	   set	   general	   rules	   and	   principles,	   police	   measures	   work	   through	   detailed	  
regulations	   targeting	   specific	   populations	   or	   domains.	   In	   this	   sense,	   from	  a	   Foucauldian	  
framework,	  policies	  can	  be	  distinguished	  from	  laws	  and	  considered	  more	  broadly	  as	  sets	  
of	  tools	  deployed	  to	  intervene	  in	  a	  field	  of	  practices.	  	  
This	   does	   not	   mean,	   however,	   that	   we	   should	   view	   laws	   as	   limited	   to	   formal	  
prohibitions	   that	   are	   antithetical	   to	   the	   logics	   of	   police	   or	   of	   liberal	   regulation.	   Indeed,	  
Foucault	  understands	  government	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  power	  that	  is	  “not	  a	  matter	  of	  imposing	  
laws	  on	  men,	  but	  rather	  of	  disposing	  things,	   that	   is	   to	  say	  to	  employ	  tactics	   rather	   than	  
laws,	  and	  if	  need	  be	  to	  use	  the	  laws	  themselves	  as	  tactics”	  (Hunt	  and	  Wickham	  1994:52).	  
Following	   Alan	   Hunt	   and	   Gary	   Wickham	   (1994),	   this	   research	   does	   not	   reject	   laws	   as	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irrelevant	   to	   governmentality,	   but	   considers	   them	   as	   tactics	   mobilized	   in	   creative	   and	  
flexible	   ways	   by	   various	   actors	   involved	   in	   immigration	   governance.	   Therefore,	   in	   this	  
research,	  “policy”	  includes,	  but	  is	  not	  limited	  to,	  laws,	  regulations,	  and	  other	  legal	  devices.	  
It	  also	  does	  not	  only	  refer	  to	  the	  programmatic	  form	  that	  laws	  and	  regulations	  take	  or	  to	  
their	   implementation	   by	   street-­‐level	   bureaucrats.	   As	   with	  most	   sociological	   analyses	   of	  
policies,	  this	  research	  is	  concerned	  with	  technologies	  of	  both	  a	  legal	  and	  non-­‐legal	  nature,	  
and	  pays	  attention	   to	   the	  ways	  policies	  are	  elaborated,	   legitimized,	  presented,	  adapted,	  
implemented,	  and	  contested	  (Colebatch	  2009;	  Gale	  2001;	  Shore	  and	  Wright	  2011).	  	  
The	   scope	   of	   the	   policies	   studied	   in	   this	   research	   is	   also	   vast,	   since	   irregular	  
migration	   is	   governed	   by	   many	   measures	   that	   are	   not	   always	   developed	   within	   the	  
context	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  “fight	  against	   illegal	  migration”	  (Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	  2008:1).	  
Indeed,	   as	  Willem	  Maas	   (2010)	   explains,	   since	   “irregular	  migration	   is	   a	   function	   of	   the	  
opportunities	  for	  regular	  migration,	  the	  distinction	  between	  authorized	  and	  unauthorized	  
immigration	   is	   murky	   and	   constantly	   being	   transformed	   as	   states	   change	   their	  
immigration	   policies”	   (p.235),	   rendering	   the	   distinction	   between	   policies	   to	   govern	  
irregular	   migration	   hard	   to	   distinguish	   from	   policies	   to	   govern	   migration	   in	   general.	  
Echoing	   this	   position,	   Rosa	   Aparicio	   Gómez	   and	   José	   María	   Ruiz	   de	   Huidobro	   (2010)	  
explain	  that	  they	  use	  “immigration	  policy”	  as	  “a	   ‘conceptual	  construction’	   in	   .	   .	   .	   light	  of	  
the	   sets	   of	   policies	   and	   measures	   adopted	   .	   .	   .	   on	   foreigners	   and	   immigration,	   taking	  
account	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  no	  official	  documents	  that	  expressly	  include	  the	  policy	  
as	   defined”	   (p.24-­‐25).	   Similarly,	   the	   policies	   under	   examination	   do	   not	   appear	   in	   one	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unified	  package	  but	  often	  need	   to	  be	  deduced	   from	  various	   regulations,	   programs,	   and	  
practices	  as	  they	  are	  developed	  and	  applied	   in	  various	   locations	  and	  by	  different	  actors.	  
Indeed,	   policing	   practices,	   labour	   inspection	   raids,	   integration	  programs,	   and	  discourses	  
about	   cultural	   diversity	   are	   considered	   alongside	   border	   control,	   detention,	   and	  
deportation	  as	  policies	  contributing	  to	  the	  governance	  of	  irregular	  migration.	  Policies	  are	  
thus	  studied	  as	  much	  from	  the	  angle	  of	  the	  practices	  through	  which	  they	  are	  enacted	  and	  
the	  technologies	  of	  government	  they	  mobilize	  as	  from	  the	  angle	  of	  the	  rationalities	  that	  
inform	  them	  and	  the	  programmatic	  forms	  they	  have	  historically	  taken	  (Shore	  and	  Wright	  
1997,	  2011).	  
	  
Literature	  on	  Immigration	  Governance	  in	  Spain	  
This	   approach	   to	   the	   study	   of	   immigration	   governance	   in	   Spain	   provides	   an	   original	  
addition	  to	  the	  scholarship	  on	  immigration	  and	  immigration	  policy	  in	  this	  country.	  Indeed,	  
the	  growing	  literature	  on	  immigration	  policies,	  border	  control,	  and	  immigrant	  integration	  
in	  Spain	  provides	  some	  insights	  but	  no	  systematic	  analysis	  of	  the	  rationales,	  justifications,	  
technologies,	   and	   practices	   that	   have	   informed	   immigration	   governance	   in	   Spain	   over	  
time.	  While	  there	  is	  extensive	  scholarship	  on	  irregular	  migration,	  little	  is	  known	  about	  the	  
processes	   of	   policy-­‐making,	   or	   the	   logics	   and	   practices	   informing	   the	   work	   of	   police	  
officers	  who	  patrol	  the	  streets	  of	  immigrant	  neighbourhoods,	  judges	  who	  decide	  whether	  
or	  not	  to	  detain	  someone,	  or	  elected	  officials	  who	  debate	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  issue.	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Since	   the	   pioneer	   works	   on	   migration	   and	   immigration	   policies	   in	   the	   1990s	  
emerged	   (Colectivo	   IOÉ	   1987,	   1989,	   1994;	   Cachón	   Rodríguez	   1995;	   Izquierdo	   Escribano	  
1990,	   1996;	   Calavita	   1998),	   the	   literature	   has	   grown	   exponentially.6	   Originating	   in	   an	  
effort	   to	   understand	   the	   causes	   of	   irregular	   migration,	   take	   stock	   of	   the	   number	   and	  
characteristics	   of	   the	   immigrant	   population,	   and	   document	   policy	   responses,	   this	  
scholarship	   now	   includes	   a	   growing	   interest	   in	   transnationalism,	   the	   experiences	   of	  
immigrants,	  and	  pressing	  questions	  of	  integration	  in	  a	  plural	  society	  (Aparicio	  Gómez	  and	  
Tornos	   2000;	   Bruquetas-­‐Callejo	   et	   al.	   2008;	   De	   Lucas	   and	   Díez	   Bueso	   2006;	   Izquierdo	  
Escribano	   2008;	   Martín	   Rojo	   2003;	   Moreno	   Maestro	   2006;	   Osos	   Casas	   2009;	   Solanes	  
Corella	  2004;	  Solé	  and	  Izquierdo	  2005;	  Suárez-­‐Navaz	  2004).	  There	  is	  also	  a	  long	  tradition	  
of	   documenting	   the	   attitudes	   of	   Spaniards	  with	   regard	   to	   immigration	   and	   cultural	   and	  
racial	   diversity	   (Cea	   D’Ancona	   2005;	   Cea	   D’Ancona	   and	   Valles	   Martínez	   2011;	   Checa,	  
Arjona	  Garrido,	  Checa	  y	  Olmos	  2010;	  Colectivo	  IOÉ	  1994;	  Pérez	  Yruela	  and	  Desrues	  2005;	  
Valles	   Martinez,	   Cea	   D’Acona,	   Izquierdo	   Escribano	   1999).	   However,	   little	   attention	   has	  
been	   paid	   to	   how	   logics	   that	   appeared	   during	   Spanish	   colonial	   and	   nation-­‐building	  
projects	  still	  shape	  particular	  migration	  and	  border	  control	  policies.	  
Many	   reviews	   of	   Spanish	   immigration	   policies	   and	   laws	   exist.	   The	   end	   of	   a	  
legislature,	   elections,	   legal	   reforms,	   and	   anniversaries	   of	   key	   immigration	   laws	   often	  
provide	  the	  occasion	  for	  publishing	  analyses	  of	  policy	  developments	  during	  the	  preceding	  
                                                
6	  For	  an	  annotated	  bibliography	  of	   the	   literature	  published	  between	  the	  1980s	  and	  2006,	  see	  Bardají	  Ruiz	  
2006.	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years	   (Arango	   2005;	   Cebolla	   and	   González	   Ferrer	   2013;	   Moya	   2009;	   Ruiz	   de	   Huidobro	  
2006;	   Santolaya	   2009;	   Solanes	   Corella	   2010).	   Some	   of	   this	   scholarship	   offers	   incredibly	  
systematic	   and	   comprehensive	   historical	   overviews	   of	   immigration	   policies	   and	   laws	  
enacted	  since	  the	  1980s	  (Aja	  2012;	  Ortega	  Pérez	  2011).	  But	  these	  chronicles	  rarely	  offer	  a	  
sociological	  analysis	  of	   the	  different	   logics	  and	  practices	   that	   inform	   immigration	  policy-­‐
making,	  nor	  do	   they	  provide	  a	  micro-­‐political	  analysis	  of	   the	  uncertainties,	  negotiations,	  
and	   struggles	   that	   characterize	   this	  process.	  Or	  when	   they	  do,	   it	   is	  only	  with	   respect	   to	  
specific	   and	   very	   circumscribed	   legal	   reforms,	   such	   as	   the	   debates	   surrounding	   the	  
adoption	  of	  a	  new	  Alien	  Act	  in	  2000	  (Ruiz	  de	  Huidobro	  2006).	  
The	   scholarship	   that	   looks	   at	   the	  demographic	   phenomenon	  of	  migration	   and	   the	  
experiences	   of	   immigrants	   in	   Spain	   tends	   to	   be	   less	   institutional	   and	   to	   focus	   on	   the	  
structural	   causes	   of	   irregular	   migration,	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	   unauthorized	  
population,	   and	   the	   relative	   effectiveness	   of	   various	   policies.	   It	   provides	   a	   necessary	  
assessment	   of	   these	   policies	   and	  discusses	   some	  of	   the	   criteria	   that	   policy-­‐makers	   take	  
into	   consideration,	   but	   without	   providing	   an	   in-­‐depth	   analysis	   of	   the	   premises	   and	  
rationales	   behind	   these	   decisions	   (Finotelli	   2011;	   Finotelli	   and	   Arango	   2011;	   González-­‐
Enriquez	  2009,	  2010;	  Izquierdo	  Escribano	  2012;	  Maas	  2010;	  Sabater	  and	  Domingo	  2012).	  
The	   same	   can	   be	   said	   of	   the	   literature	   that	   focuses	   on	   the	   employment	   of	  
immigrants	   and	   the	   structures	   of	   the	   labour	   market	   (Cachón	   Rodríguez	   2009;	   Calavita	  
2003,	   2005;	   Calavita	   and	   Suárez-­‐Navaz	   2003;	   Cornelius	   2004;	   Márquez	   Domingo	   et	   al.	  
 22	  
2013),	   the	   extra-­‐territorialization	   of	   border	   control	   (Carling	   2007;	   Casas,	   Cobarrubias,	  
Pickles	  2010;	  Ferrer-­‐Gallardo	  2008;	  Ferrero-­‐Turrión	  and	  López-­‐Sala	  2012;	  García	  Andrade	  
2010),	   co-­‐operation	   with	   third	   countries	   (Azkona	   and	   Sagatagoitia	   2011;	   Belguendouz	  
2005;	  Ferrero-­‐Turrión	  and	  López-­‐Sala	  2009;	  Rodríguez	  Mesa	  2007)	  and	  the	  criminalization	  
and	   detention	   of	   irregular	   immigrants	   (Brandariz	   García	   2011;	   Brandariz	   García	   and	  
Iglesias	  Skulj	  2013;	  Martínez	  Escamilla	  2008,	  2014;	  Martínez	  Escamilla	  and	  Sánchez	  Tomás	  
2011).	   This	   scholarship	   is	   very	   valuable	   but	   it	   tends	   to	   compartmentalize	   the	   various	  
dimensions	   of	   immigration	   governance.	   I	   rely	   on	   this	   body	   of	   work	   extensively	   when	  
discussing	   particular	   tendencies	   in	   immigration	   regulation,	   but	   I	   seek	   to	   provide	  
empirically	   and	   historically	   specific	   investigations	   into	   the	   diverse	   and	   sometimes	  
contradictory	   rationales,	   programs,	   and	   practices	   that	   shape	   immigration	   policies	   in	  
particular	   moments.	   This	   research	   thus	   contributes	   to	   this	   scholarship	   by	   shifting	   the	  
attention	   away	   from	   the	   dynamics	   of	   irregular	   migration	   flows,	   the	   socio-­‐cultural	  
characteristics	  of	  irregular	  migrants,	  and	  the	  evaluation	  of	  policy	  results,	  inquiring	  instead	  
into	  the	  specific	  logics	  and	  practices	  that	  have	  informed	  immigration	  policy	  since	  the	  early	  
1980s.	  
At	  the	  level	  of	  logics	  and	  rationalities,	  this	  project	  is	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  scholars	  who	  
study	  political	  discourses	  on	  immigration	  in	  Spain,	  while	  at	  the	  level	  of	  practices	  it	  shares	  
affinities	   with	   those	   who	   attempt	   to	   map	   the	   dynamics	   of	   multi-­‐level	   immigration	  
governance.	  Unfortunately,	   these	   scholars	   rarely	   examine	   logics	   and	   practices	   together.	  
For	   instance,	   I	   found	   great	   inspiration	   in	   the	   work	   of	   Ricard	   Zapata-­‐Barrero	   (2009)	   on	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parliamentary	  debates	  about	  immigration	  between	  1996	  and	  2008,	  but	  I	  was	  unsatisfied	  
with	  his	  neat	  division	  of	   the	  parliamentary	   interventions	   into	  proactive	   (or	  positive)	  and	  
reactive	  (or	  negative)	  discourses.	   I	  also	  wanted	  to	  account	  for	  more	  than	  the	  framing	  of	  
irregular	  migration	  that	  occurs	  in	  Congress	  and	  go	  beyond	  a	  typology	  of	  arguments	  used	  
by	  politicians.	  This	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  impressive	  discursive	  analyses	  conducted	  
by	   Luisa	  Martín	  Rojo	  and	  Teun	  A.	   van	  Dijk	   (Martín	  Rojo	  2000;	  Martín	  Rojo	  and	  van	  Dijk	  
1997;	  van	  Dijk	  2004).	  Their	  approach	  provides	  detailed	  accounts	  of	  the	  rhetorical	  devices	  
utilized	  in	  immigration	  debates,	  but	  can	  hardly	  be	  used	  to	  study	  policy-­‐making	  and	  policy	  
practices	   more	   broadly.	   Similarly,	   while	   the	   literature	   on	   multi-­‐level	   immigration	  
governance	  in	  Spain	  is	  becoming	  more	  prominent	  and	  provides	  important	  insights	  into	  the	  
complexities	   of	   the	   policy	   process,	   it	   tends	   to	   rely	   mostly	   on	   institutional	   analyses	   of	  
networks	  and	  actors	   formally	  acknowledged	  as	  stakeholders	   (Hepburn	  &	  Zapata-­‐Barrero	  
2014;	  Zapata-­‐Barrero	  and	  Pinyol	  2008)	  and	  does	  not	   take	   into	  account	   the	  high	   level	  of	  
contingency	  of	  the	  policy	  process	  (Gale	  2001;	  Shore	  and	  Wright	  2011),	  the	  intervention	  of	  
actors	  who	  are	  not	   institutionally	  entitled	  to	  regulate	   immigration	  (Goldring	  and	  Landolt	  
2013;	  Varsanyi	  2011),	  and	  the	  creative	  deployment	  in	  practice	  of	  laws	  and	  policies	  used	  as	  
flexible	  technologies	  (Valverde	  2009,	  2012).	  	  
I	  thus	  turned	  to	  the	  literature	  in	  critical	  policy	  studies,	  governmentality	  studies,	  and	  
socio-­‐legal	  studies	   to	   find	  the	  tools	   to	  study	  the	   logics	  and	  practices	   involved	   in	  Spanish	  
immigration	  governance.	  The	  point	  of	  departure	  of	  this	  research	  was	  the	  intuition	  that	  if	  
processes	   of	   collective	   regularization,	   retention-­‐detention-­‐deportation	   measures,	   and	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extra-­‐territorialization	  of	  border	  controls	  are	  all	  answers	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  irregular	  
migration,	  they	  were	  answers	  to	  different	  ways	  of	  framing	  the	  problem.	  As	  critical	  policy	  
analysts	   studying	   policy	   problems	   suggest	   (Boswell	   2009;	   Gale	   1999;	   Shore	   and	  Wright	  
1997,	  2011),	  the	  framing	  of	  policy	  problems	  and	  the	  measures	  adopted	  to	  address	  them	  
are	   intrinsically	   linked,	   and	   thus	   need	   to	   be	   studied	   together	   as	   elements	   of	   broader	  
problematizations.	  	  
Key	  Findings	  and	  Structure	  of	  the	  Dissertation	  
Three	   complementary	   and	   intersecting	   sets	   of	   logics	   and	   practices	   have	   informed	   the	  
problematization	   of	   irregular	   migration	   as	   an	   object	   of	   knowledge	   and	   government	   in	  
Spain	   since	   the	   1980s.	   While	   some	   periods,	   parties,	   and	   actors	   rely	   more	   on	   one	  
dimension	  than	  on	  others,	  they	  are	  always	  articulated	  together.	  Culturalization	  refers	  to	  a	  
set	   of	   logics	   and	   practices	   intimately	   tied	   to	   the	   history	   of	   Spanish	   colonialism	   and	   the	  
governing	   of	  migrants	   as	   cultural	   subjects.	   Labouralization	   refers	   to	   a	   set	   of	   logics	   and	  
practices	   that	   attempt	   to	   steer	   labour	  migration	   flows	   and	   frame	   irregular	  migrants	   as	  
workers	  who	   contribute	   to	   the	   national	   labour	  market.	   Securitization	   refers	   to	   a	   set	   of	  
logics	   and	   practices	   focused	   on	   the	   defence	   of	   territorial	   sovereignty,	   blocking	   all	  
migration	  routes	  available	  to	  irregular	  migrants,	  and	  framing	  migrants	  as	  potential	  threats.	  
The	  organization	  of	  heterogeneous	  practices	  into	  these	  three	  broad	  categories	  acts	  
as	   a	   heuristic	   device,	   putting	   some	   order	   to	   the	   complex	  dispositifs	   of	   people,	   objects,	  
legal	   devices,	   and	   practices	   that	   form	   the	   regime.	   This	   dissertation	   traces	   the	  way	   that	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culturalization,	   labouralization,	   and	   securitization	   work	   together	   in	   complementary	   and	  
contradictory	   ways	   and	   create	   a	   practical	   regime	   of	  migration	   governance,	   based	   on	   a	  
long	   probationary	   period,	   during	   which	   irregular	   migrants	   who	   reside	   in	   Spain	   can	   be	  
scrutinized	   and	   policed.	   Ultimately,	   this	   dissertation	   posits	   the	   existence	   in	   Spain	   of	   a	  
regime	  governing	  immigration	  through	  probation	  resulting	  from	  the	  rescaling	  of	  bordering	  
practices	  across	  space	  and	  time,	  the	  deployment	  of	  a	  space	  of	  legally	  produced	  liminality	  
in	  which	  irregular	  migrants	  find	  themselves,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  conditionality	  and	  discretion	  in	  
the	  assessment	  of	  desirability.	  
In	   Chapter	   2,	   “Studying	   the	   Governing	   of	   Irregular	   Migration,”	   I	   present	   the	  
theoretical	   approaches	   that	   inform	  my	   research	   as	  well	   as	   the	  methodological	   strategy	  
utilized.	  Drawing	   from	  scholars	  working	  within	   the	   fields	  of	  governmentality	  studies	  and	  
critical	   policy	   sociology,	   I	   discuss	   a	   set	   of	   theoretical	   propositions	   that	   focus	   on	  how	   to	  
study	   policies	   and	   government,	   more	   than	   substantive	   arguments	   about	  what	   specific	  
contemporary	   governing	   practices	   look	   like.	   This	  means	   that	   despite	   the	   existence	   of	   a	  
rich	   scholarship	   in	   governmentality	   studies,	  which	  makes	   substantive	   claims	   about	   such	  
things	  as	  neoliberal	  modes	  of	  government,	  actuarial	  practices	  of	  risk	  management,	  or	  the	  
role	  of	  community	  in	  governance	  (Rose	  1999),	  I	  tried	  not	  to	  import	  these	  conclusions	  into	  
my	   research	  design,	   keeping	  only	   the	   theoretical	   and	  methodological	   contributions	   that	  
provided	  me	  with	  tools	  to	  ask	  better	  questions.	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  Throughout	   the	   dissertation,	   my	   analyses	   are	   often	   developed	   in	   dialogue	   with	  
many	  theoretical	  debates	  in	  sociology,	  socio-­‐legal	  studies,	  and	  criminology.	  Such	  debates	  
touch	  upon,	  among	  other	   things,	  questions	  of	   illegalization	  and	  precariousness	   (Calavita	  
1998;	   De	   Genova	   2002,	   2004;	   Goldring	   and	   Landolt	   2013;	   Menjívar	   2006),	   the	   role	   of	  
social	  sciences	  and	  statistics	  as	  political	  technologies	  (Inda	  2006;	  Rose	  1999),	  the	  relation	  
between	   regulation	   and	   liberalism	   (Foucault	   [2004]	   2007;	   Rose	   1999),	   the	   extent	   and	  
forms	   of	   the	   criminalization	   of	   immigration	   (Dowling	   and	   Inda	   2013;	   Pratt	   2005;	   Simon	  
1997;	  Weber	   2002),	   the	   displacement	   of	   bordering	   practices	   (Rumford	   2006,	   2008;	   van	  
Houtum	  and	  van	  Naerssen	  2002;	  Varsanyi	  2011),	  the	  racial	  dimension	  of	  securitization	  and	  
governance	  (Amin	  Khan	  2012;	  Bigo	  2002;	  Huysmans	  2006;	  Goldberg	  1993,	  2009;	  Mbembe	  
2003),	   and	   questions	   related	   to	   sovereignty	   and	   sovereign	   power	   (Brown	   2010;	   Butler	  
2004;	  Lippert	  2004,	  2005;	  Mezzadra	  and	  Neilson	  2013;	  Pratt	  2005;	  Walters	  2010).	  At	  the	  
moment	   of	   building	  my	   research	   design,	   however,	   I	   insisted	   on	   thinking	   about	   how	   to	  
study	   the	  governing	  of	  migration,	  not	  what	  had	  been	  said	  about	   it.	  After	  explaining	   the	  
theoretical	   framework,	   I	   present	  my	   research	   questions	   and	   discuss	  my	  methodological	  
strategy,	  which	  engages	  in	  policy	  historiography,	  policy	  archaeology,	  and	  policy	  genealogy	  
(Gale	   2001).	   This	   then	   leads	   to	   the	   more	   concrete	   or	   applied	   methodological	  
considerations	  about	  data	  collection	  and	  interpretation.	  	  
Chapter	   3,	   “The	   Making	   of	   ‘Immigrants,’	   ‘Foreign	   Workers’	   and	   ‘Illegals’:	   Early	  
Problematizations	   of	   Migration	   as	   an	   Object	   of	   Government,”	   questions	   the	   narrative	  
situating	  the	  birth	  of	  Spanish	   immigration	  policies	   in	  1985	  alongside	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	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first	  Alien	  Act.	  This	  chapter	  engages	  with	  debates	  in	  Foucauldian	  socio-­‐legal	  studies	  about	  
the	   role	   of	   law	   in	   governance	   and	   contends	   that	   equating	   the	   origin	   of	   immigration	  
governance	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  first	  Alien	  Act	  contributes	  to	  concealing	  the	  process	  
of	  problematization	  through	  various	  practices.	  I	  trace	  the	  hesitant	  emergence	  of	  irregular	  
migration	  as	  a	  problem	  throughout	  the	  parliamentary	  debates	  and	  policy	  practices	  of	  the	  
1980s,	  and	  document	  the	  crystallization	  of	  the	  policy	  agenda	  in	  1990-­‐91	  around	  the	  three	  
sets	  of	  logics	  and	  practices	  that	  I	  call	  culturalization,	  labouralization,	  and	  securitization.	  
Chapter	   4,	   “Culturalization:	   Race,	   Culture,	   and	   the	   National	   Imaginary,”	   discusses	  
the	  treatment	  of	  migrants	  as	  cultural	  subjects.	  The	  chapter	  uses	  the	  events	  that	  occurred	  
during	  the	  500th	  anniversary	  of	  the	  “Discovery	  of	  the	  Americas”	  in	  1992	  as	  an	  entry	  point	  
for	   an	   inquiry	   into	   the	   role	   played	   by	   the	   notion	   of	   “Hispanic	   community”	   and	   the	  
development	   of	   “Maurophobia,”	   or	   the	   fear	   and	   hatred	   of	   Moors,	   in	   the	   early	  
construction	   of	   Spanish	   national	   identities.	   Drawing	   from	   the	   literature	   on	   racial	  
governmentality	  (Goldberg	  1993,	  2009;	  Hesse	  2004),	  I	  discuss	  the	  importance	  of	  race	  as	  a	  
mode	   of	   thinking	   and	   governing	   constitutive	   of	   the	   juridico-­‐political	   ordering	   of	  
modernity,	   and	   show	   how	   the	   notion	   of	   Hispanic	   community	   and	   the	   historical	  
phenomenon	  of	  Maurophobia	  that	  came	  out	  of	  Spanish	  colonialism	  inform	  contemporary	  
immigration	  policies.	  	  
The	   literature	   on	   race,	   culture,	   and	   immigration	   in	   Spain	   tends	   to	   focus	   on	  
discriminatory	  attitudes,	   racist	  public	  discourses,	  or	  problems	  of	   integration,	  but	   fails	   to	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seriously	  engage	  with	  race	  as	  a	  system	  of	  meaning.	   It	   is	   therefore	  unable	  to	  account	  for	  
the	   profound	   ways	   that	   race	   informs	   immigration	   governance.	   I	   claim	   that	   the	   easier	  
access	   to	   citizenship	   for	   Latin	   American	   and	   other	   culturally	   preferred	  migrants	   that	   is	  
embedded	  in	  the	  Civil	  Code	  of	  1889	  and	  continues	  to	  this	  day,	  their	  differential	  treatment	  
in	   immigration	   law	   until	   recently,	   and	   the	   framing	   of	  Muslim	   immigrants	   as	   impossible	  
Spanish	   subjects	   are	   all	   informed	  by	   cultural	   and	   racial	   logics	   and	  practices	   that	   can	  be	  
traced	  back	  to	  Spanish	  colonialism.	  The	  chapter	  also	  engages	  with	  the	  critical	  literature	  on	  
nationalism,	   official	   multiculturalism,	   and	   the	   liberal	   management	   of	   difference	   to	  
examine	   instances	   when	   influential	   politicians	   present	   Muslims	   as	   “problems	   of	  
integration."	  	  
	  Chapter	   5,	   “Labouralization:	   Flows,	  Workers,	   and	   the	   Labour	  Market,”	   looks	   at	   a	  
second	   logic,	   one	   that	   often	   intersects	   with	   culturalization.	   Labouralization,	   an	   emic	  
concept	  used	  by	  policy-­‐makers,	  refers	  to	  both	  the	  process	  whereby	  immigration	  started	  to	  
be	  managed	  more	  clearly	  as	  a	  labour	  market	  issue	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  2000s,	  and	  to	  
the	   unattainable	   dream	  of	   ordering	  migration	   flows	   in	   the	  most	   optimal	   fashion.	   It	   is	   a	  
logic	  that	  is	  often	  coeval	  with	  a	  preoccupation	  with	  integration	  and	  tends	  to	  be	  presented	  
as	   oppositional	   to	   the	   logic	   of	   securitization.7	   However,	   interestingly,	   labouralization	  
shares	  with	  securitization	  a	  fascination	  with	  the	  mastering	  of	  flows.	  With	  its	  concerns	  for	  
the	  harnessing	  of	  migration	  flows,	  the	  optimization	  of	  the	  economy,	  and	  a	  conception	  of	  
the	  labour	  market	  as	  a	  natural	  entity	  to	  be	  known	  and	  steered,	  the	  labouralization	  logic	  is	  
                                                
7	  Interviews,	  Madrid,	  September	  29	  and	  November	  7,	  2012;	  Barcelona,	  October	  1	  and	  2,	  2012.	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the	  one	  that	  resonates	  most	  strongly	  with	  the	  kind	  of	  regulatory	  governmental	  rationality	  
discussed	   by	   Foucault	   ([2004]	   2007).	   The	   chapter	   inquires	   into	   this	   logic	   through	   an	  
analysis	  of	  the	  labour	  policies	  developed	  to	  try	  to	  reduce	  irregular	  migration	  and	  channel	  
labour	  migration	  flows	  since	  the	  early	  1990s.	  
Chapter	   6	   is	   the	   last	   of	   the	   series	   of	   chapters	   highlighting	   the	   three	   logics.	  
“Securitization:	  Threats,	  Crime,	  and	  State	  Sovereignty”	  covers	  what	  appear	  at	  first	  sight	  to	  
be	   the	   most	   obvious	   set	   of	   logics	   and	   practices.	   I	   begin	   by	   discussing	   the	   concept	   of	  
securitization	  and	  its	  theorization	  in	  critical	  security	  studies,	  questioning	  the	  flagrant	  lack	  
of	   any	   consideration	   for	   the	   role	   of	   race	   in	   the	   securitization	   of	   immigration,	   and	  
reframing	   the	   concept	   in	   a	  way	   that	   not	   only	   locates	   it	   as	   part	   of	   a	   governmentality	   of	  
unease	  (Bigo	  2002)	  but	  more	  broadly	  as	  an	  element	  of	  a	  racial	  governmentality	  (Goldberg	  
1993,	   2009).	   The	   chapter	   then	   provides	   a	   mini	   case	   study	   of	   the	   first	   occurrence	   of	  
securitization	  with	  regard	  to	  irregular	  migration	  at	  the	  land	  borders	  between	  the	  Spanish	  
enclaves	  of	  Ceuta	  and	  Melilla	  and	  Morocco	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  and	  the	  the	  frenetic	  process	  
of	  wall	  building	  that	  ensued.	  Engaging	  with	  the	  desire	  expressed	  by	  many	  policy-­‐makers	  to	  
block	   all	   potential	   routes	   used	   for	   unauthorized	   migration,	   I	   follow	   this	   logic	   from	   the	  
building	  of	  fences	  at	  the	  land	  borders	  to	  the	  diplomatic	  efforts	  aimed	  at	  externalizing	  the	  
policing	  of	  irregular	  migration.	  	  
A	  central	  dimension	  of	  securitizing	  logics	  and	  practices	  is	  the	  reliance	  on	  criminal	  law	  
and	  practices	   traditionally	  associated	  with	   the	  criminal	   justice	   system	  to	   target	   irregular	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migrants	  and	  those	  who	  help	  them	  bypass	  border	  controls.	  Drawing	  from	  the	  literature	  on	  
immigration	  penality	  and	   the	  criminalization	  of	   immigration	   (Aas	  2014;	  Brandariz	  García	  
2011;	  Martínez	   Escamilla	   2008,	   2014;	   Pratt	   2005,	   2011;	  Weber	   2002),	   I	   analyze	   various	  
reforms	   to	   the	   Penal	   Code	   made	   to	   facilitate	   the	   prosecution	   of	   people	   involved	   in	  
smuggling,	  as	  well	  as	  irregular	  migrants	  and	  those	  who	  help	  them	  inside	  the	  country.	  I	  end	  
this	  chapter	  by	  discussing	  the	  surprisingly	  recent	  insistence	  on	  framing	  irregular	  migrants	  
as	   lawbreakers	   and	   on	   presenting	   deportation	   as	   a	   balanced	   and	   targeted	   technique	  
aimed	  at	  excluding	  delinquents.	  	  
Chapter	  7	  studies	  how	  practices	  associated	  with	  culturalization,	  labouralization,	  and	  
securitization	   intersect	   and	   work	   together	   in	   the	   everyday	   governance	   of	   irregular	  
immigrants	   living	   in	   Spain.	   “Multi-­‐Scalar	   Governing:	   Dispersed	   Borderwork	   and	  
Assessment	  of	  Desirability”	  begins	  with	  the	  puzzling	  observation	  that,	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  
securitization	  of	  immigration	  and	  the	  proliferation	  of	  border	  control	  strategies	  in	  the	  early	  
2000s,	   government	   officials	   and	   police	   officers	   allowed	   for	   the	   relatively	   easy	   entry	   of	  
(mostly)	   Latin	   American	   irregular	   migrants	   travelling	   as	   tourists.	   Engaging	   with	   the	  
literature	  in	  critical	  border	  studies	  (Balibar	  2002;	  Gilbert	  2009;	  Salter	  2008;	  Rumford	  2006,	  
2008,	  van	  Houtum	  and	  van	  Naerssen	  2002;	  Varsanyi	  2011),	  I	  suggest	  that	  this	  strategy	  is	  
one	   of	   displacing	   some	   of	   the	   filtering	   work	   performed	   by	   borders	   and	   immigration	  
selection	   across	   space	   and	   time.	   In	   this	   context,	   facilitating	   entry,	   policing	   the	   streets,	  
regularizing	   “deserving	   immigrants,”	   and	   attempting	   to	   deport	   “undesirable	   foreigners”	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are	  analyzed	  as	  complementary	  dimensions	  of	  a	  diffuse	  and	  flexible	  regime	  for	  governing	  
migration	  through	  probation.	  
	  Questioning	   the	   apparent	   contradictory	   logics	   informing	   these	   varied	   practices,	   I	  
claim	  that	  they	  work	  together	  and	  create	  a	  regime	  of	  migration	  management	  based	  on	  a	  
long	  probationary	  period	  during	  which	  migrants	  are	  scrutinized	  and	  policed	  by	  a	  diversity	  
of	   actors	  much	   broader	   than	   those	   readily	   identifiable	   as	   border	   security	   professionals.	  
This	  chapter,	  which	  develops	  one	  of	   the	  central	   theses	  of	   the	  dissertation,	  also	  engages	  
with	   the	   growing	   literature	   on	   the	   criminalization	   of	   immigration	   and	   suggests	   that,	   in	  
Spain,	   how	  promises	   of	   inclusion	  work	   alongside	   practices	   of	   exclusion	   is	   best	   analyzed	  
using	  the	  idea	  of	  probation.	  	  
The	  existence	   in	   Spain	  of	   a	   regime	  of	   immigration	  management	  organized	  around	  
probation	   is	   further	   discussed	   in	   the	   conclusion.	   The	   concluding	   chapter,	   “Governing	  
Immigration	  through	  Probation,”	  summarizes	  some	  of	   the	  main	   findings	  of	   this	   research	  
and	  further	  conceptualizes	  the	  Spanish	  regime	  that	  governs	  migration	  through	  probation.	  
I	  claim	  that	  this	  form	  of	  immigration	  management	  is	  effectively	  produced	  in	  Spain	  by	  the	  
spread	   of	   bordering	   practices	   across	   space	   and	   time,	   the	   production	   of	   an	   extended	  
period	  of	  legal	  liminality,	  and	  the	  reliance	  on	  a	  multi-­‐scalar	  assessment	  of	  desirability.	  This	  
research	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  migrants	  are	  governed	  through	  probation	  by	  a	  diversity	  of	  
actors	   relying	  on	  complementary	  and	  contradictory	   sets	  of	   logics	  and	  practices	  helps	  us	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The	  theoretical	  framework	  and	  methodology	  that	  inform	  my	  research	  design	  are	  inspired	  
by	   the	   work	   of	   Michel	   Foucault	   ([2004]	   2007)	   on	   government,	   by	   the	   subsequent	  
scholarship	   in	   governmentality	   studies	   organized	   around	   the	   concepts	   of	   political	  
rationality,	   program	   of	   government,	   and	   political	   technologies	   (Inda	   2006;	   Rose	   1999;	  
Rose	  and	  Miller	  1992),	  and	  by	  the	  literature	  in	  Foucauldian	  policy	  analysis	  and	  socio-­‐legal	  
studies	  (Ball	  1993;	  Gale	  1999,	  2001;	  Hunt	  and	  Wickham	  1994;	  Scheurich	  1994;	  Shore	  and	  
Wright	   1997,	   2011;	   Valverde,	   Levi,	   and	  Moore	   2005).	   In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   move	   from	   the	  
general	   to	   the	  particular	   in	  presenting	   this	   literature.	   I	  begin	  with	  Foucault’s	   concept	  of	  
government	   and	   consider	   the	   ways	   his	   analytic	   has	   been	   taken	   up	   by	   governmentality	  
scholars,	   paying	   particular	   attention	   to	   the	   early	   and	   important	   contribution	   of	   Nikolas	  
Rose	   and	   Peter	   Miller	   (1992).	   Once	   the	   theoretical	   foundation	   is	   laid,	   I	   present	   my	  
research	   questions,	   and	   explain	   the	  methodological	   strategies	   adopted	   in	   this	   research,	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which	   are	   organized	   around	   what	   Trevor	   Gale	   (1999,	   2001)	   calls	   policy	   historiography,	  
policy	  archaeology,	  and	  policy	  genealogy.	  
Theoretical	  Framework	  and	  Research	  Questions	  
Foucault	  and	  Governmental	  Power	  
In	  the	  seminal	  course	  Security,	  Territory,	  Population,	  Foucault	  ([2004]	  2007)	  discusses	  the	  
emergence	   during	   the	   seventeenth	   and	   eighteenth	   centuries	   of	   a	   new	   modality	   and	  
rationality	   of	   power,	   distinct	   from	   sovereignty	   and	   discipline,	   which	   he	   first	   calls	  
“security,”	  then	  the	  “biopolitics	  of	  populations,”	  and	  eventually	  “governmentality.”	  In	  his	  
attempt	  to	  offer	  a	  relational	  notion	  of	  power	  that	  displaces	  the	  traditional	  top-­‐down	  view,	  
Foucault	  had	  previously	  studied	  disciplinary	  techniques	  concerned	  with	  individuals,	  which	  
he	   considered	   to	  be	  a	  dimension	  of	   the	  emergence	  of	   a	  new	   form	  of	  power	   concerned	  
with	  life.	  This	  dual	  notion	  of	  biopower	  was	  composed	  of	  an	  anatomo-­‐politics	  centered	  in	  
the	  disciplining	  of	  individuals,	  and	  a	  biopolitics	  of	  population	  organized	  around	  logics	  and	  
mechanisms	  of	  security	  (Foucault	  [1997]	  2003).	  It	  is	  this	  latter	  dimension	  of	  biopower	  that	  
Foucault	   sets	   out	   to	   study	   in	   this	   course.	   What	   he	   first	   dubs	   security	   is	   a	   number	   of	  
knowledges	   and	   practices	   that	   aim	   to	   maximize	   the	   general	   health	   of	   a	   population,	  
understood	   as	   a	   demographic	   and	   biological	   object.	   The	   population	   is	   perceived	   as	   a	  
natural	   object	   that	   can	   be	   known	   and	   steered,	   and	   can	   be	   conceived	   “as	   a	   sort	   of	  
technical-­‐political	  object	  of	  management	  and	  government”	  (Foucault	  [2004]	  2007:70).	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Parallel	  to	  his	  inquiry	  about	  security,	  Foucault	  explores	  the	  literature	  on	  government	  
produced	   in	  France	  between	  the	  seventeenth	  and	  nineteenth	  century.	  This	   leads	  him	  to	  
broaden	   the	   scope	   of	   his	   investigation	   from	   the	   dispositifs	   of	   security	   targeting	   the	  
population	  to	  include	  a	  political	  rationality	  concerned	  with	  the	  question	  of	  government	  in	  
general.	  In	  his	  famous	  lecture	  on	  governmentality,	  Foucault	  ([2004]	  2007)	  explains	  that	  in	  
the	  mid-­‐1600s,	   various	  authors	  argued	   that	   the	  art	  of	  government	  had	   to	  be	  applied	  at	  
three	   levels:	   the	   government	   of	   the	   self,	   the	   government	   of	   the	   family,	   and	   the	  
government	   of	   the	   state.	   Just	   as	   the	   head	   of	   a	   religious	   convent	   should	   exhibit	   an	  
exemplary	   governing	   of	   himself,	   and	   govern	   his	   convent	   like	   a	   pater	   familias,	   the	  
government	   of	   the	   state	   should	   be	   similar	   to	   the	   government	   of	   the	   household.	   As	  
Foucault	  ([2004]	  2007)	  explains:	  
In	  any	  case,	  you	  can	  see	  that	  the	  essential	  component,	  the	  central	  element	   in	  this	  continuity,	  
both	   in	   the	  Prince’s	  education	  and	   in	  police,	   is	   the	  government	  of	   the	   family,	  which	   is	   called	  
precisely	  “economy.”	  The	  art	  of	  government	  essentially	  appears	   in	  this	   literature	  as	  having	  to	  
answer	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  introduce	  economy	  –	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  proper	  way	  of	  managing	  
individuals,	  goods,	  and	  wealth,	  like	  the	  management	  of	  a	  family	  by	  a	  father	  who	  knows	  how	  to	  
direct	   his	   wife,	   his	   children,	   and	   his	   servants,	   who	   knows	   how	   to	   make	   his	   family’s	   fortune	  
prosper,	   and	   how	   to	   arrange	   suitable	   alliances	   for	   it	   –	   how	   to	   introduce	   this	   meticulous	  
attention,	  this	  type	  of	  relationship	  between	  father	  and	  the	  family,	  into	  the	  management	  of	  the	  
state?	   The	   essential	   issue	   of	   government	   will	   be	   the	   introduction	   of	   economy	   into	   political	  
practice	  (P.94-­‐95).	  
	  
The	  new	  art	  of	  government	  that	  Foucault	  describes	  is	  thus	  an	  “economic	  government,”	  as	  
presented	   by	   Quesnay	   in	   the	   eighteenth	   century.	   Foucault	   argues	   that	   the	   word	  
“economy,”	   before	   acquiring	   its	   contemporary	   meaning	   as	   an	   aspect	   of	   reality	   to	   be	  
governed,	  referred	  to	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  government	  in	  the	  sixteenth	  century.	  This	  form	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of	   politics,	  much	   closer	   to	   the	   antique	  Greek	   notion	   of	  oeconomia	   than	   to	   the	   antique	  
conception	  of	  politics,	  became	  much	  more	  central	  during	  the	  eighteenth	  century.	  	  
It	   is	   to	   account	   for	   both	   the	   political	   technologies	   that	   are	   used	   to	   know	   and	  
regulate	   population	   and	   flows,	   and	   the	   broader	   political	   rationality	   concerned	  with	   the	  
question	  of	  government,	   that	  Foucault	   reorients	   the	  program	  of	  his	   lectures	  around	  the	  
concept	   of	   governmentality.	   In	   this	   now-­‐famous	   lecture,	   Foucault	   ([2004]	   2007)	   defines	  
governmentality	  in	  this	  way:	  
By	   this	  word	  “governmentality”	   I	  mean	  three	   things.	  First,	  by	  “governmentality”	   I	  understand	  
the	   ensemble	   formed	   by	   institutions,	   procedures,	   analyses	   and	   reflections,	   calculations,	   and	  
tactics	   that	   allow	   the	   exercise	   of	   this	   very	   specific,	   albeit	   very	   complex,	   power	   that	   has	   the	  
population	  as	  its	  target,	  political	  economy	  as	  its	  major	  form	  of	  knowledge,	  and	  apparatuses	  of	  
security	   as	   its	   essential	   technical	   instrument.	   Second,	   by	   “governmentality”	   I	   understand	   the	  
tendency,	  the	   line	  of	  force,	  that	  for	  a	   long	  time,	  and	  throughout	  the	  West,	  has	  constantly	   led	  
towards	  the	  pre-­‐eminence	  over	  all	  other	  types	  of	  power—sovereignty,	  discipline,	  and	  so	  on—of	  
the	  type	  of	  power	  that	  we	  can	  call	  “government”	  and	  which	  has	   led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  
series	  of	  specific	  governmental	  apparatuses	  (appareils)	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  [and,	  on	  the	  other]	  to	  
the	  development	  of	  a	   series	  of	  knowledges	   (savoirs).	   Finally,	  by	  “governmentality”	   I	   think	  we	  
should	  understand	  the	  process,	  or	  rather,	  the	  result	  of	  the	  process	  by	  which	  the	  state	  of	  justice	  
of	  the	  Middle	  Ages	  became	  the	  administrative	  state	  in	  the	  fifteenth	  and	  sixteenth	  centuries	  and	  
was	  gradually	  “governmentalized”	  (P.108-­‐109).	  
	  
This	   oft-­‐cited	   definition	   is	   very	   broad,	   representing	   something	   closer	   to	   a	   vast	   research	  
program	   than	   a	   concrete	   definition.	   Yet,	   as	  Michel	   Sénellart	   ([2004]	   2007)	   explains,	   as	  
early	  as	  1979,	  the	  concept	  “no	  longer	  designates	  the	  governmental	  practices	  constitutive	  
of	  a	  particular	  regime	  of	  power	  (police	  state	  or	  liberal	  minimum	  government)	  but	  ‘the	  way	  
in	   which	   one	   conducts	   people’s	   conduct,’	   thus	   serving	   as	   an	   ‘analytical	   perspective	   for	  
relations	  of	   power’	   in	   general”	   (p.388).	   In	   this	   context,	   government	   “refers	   generally	   to	  
the	  conduct	  of	  conduct—to	  the	  more	  or	   less	  calculated	  and	  systematic	  ways	  of	   thinking	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and	   acting	   that	   proposes	   to	   shape,	   regulate,	   or	  manage	   the	   conduct	   of	   individuals	   and	  
populations	  toward	  specific	  goals	  or	  ends”	  (Inda	  2006:3).	  	  
While	   the	   government	   of	   populations	   is	   “more	   or	   less	   calculated	   and	   systematic”	  
(Inda	  2006:3),	  both	  the	  problematization	  of	  particular	  issues	  as	  objects	  of	  government	  and	  
the	  governing	  of	  these	  objects	  are	  the	  result	  of	  the	  convergence	  of	  a	  diversity	  of	  practices	  
and	   knowledges.	   Governmental	   power	   is	   exercised	   through	   decentralized	   networks	   or,	  
more	  precisely,	  it	  is	  the	  effect	  of	  various	  dispositifs.	  This	  is	  important	  to	  note	  because	  the	  
focus	   on	   the	   rational	   dimension	  of	   governmental	   power	   (through	   its	   reliance	  on	   expert	  
knowledge	   and	   optimization	   of	   population)	   and	   the	   tendency	   of	   research	   in	  
governmentality	  studies	  to	  focus	  on	  rationalities	  and	  programs	  of	  government	  (Rose	  1999;	  
Rose	   and	   Miller	   1992)	   often	   takes	   attention	   away	   from	   the	   indeterminacy	   of	  
governmental	   practices.	   In	   relation	   to	   policy	   processes,	   this	   tendency	   leads	   to	   accounts	  
that	  emphasize	  the	  problematization	  of	  social	  issues	  in	  policy	  problems,	  their	  integration	  
into	  programs,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  political	  technologies,	  while	  downplaying	  the	  discontinuities	  
and	  the	  struggles	  at	  play	  in	  the	  policy	  processes.	  Yet,	  the	  indeterminacy	  of	  governmental	  
power	   is	  also	  present	   in	  Foucault’s	  vague	  definition	  of	  governmentality	  quoted	  above,	  a	  
definition	   whose	   wording	   is	   reminiscent	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   dispositif,	   defined	   as	   “a	  
thoroughly	   heterogeneous	   ensemble	   consisting	   of	   discourses,	   institutions,	   architectural	  
forms,	   regulatory	   decisions,	   laws,	   administrative	   measures,	   scientific	   statements,	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philosophical,	  moral,	   and	   philanthropic	   propositions—in	   short,	   the	   said	   as	  much	   as	   the	  
unsaid”	  (Foucault	  1980:194).8	  
As	   Gregory	   Feldman	   (2011)	   explains	   in	   relation	   to	   his	   anthropological	   analysis	   of	  
European	   migration	   policies,	   a	   governmentality	   approach	   to	   migration	   policy	   should	  
engage	   with	   the	   heterogeneous	   dispositifs	   governing	  migration,	   and	   try	   to	   account	   for	  
both	  the	  discontinuities	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  “disparate	  elements	  coalesce	  in	  particular	  
conjunctures”	   (p.32).	   In	   the	   following	   sub-­‐section,	   I	   introduce	   key	   concepts	   from	   the	  
literature	  in	  governmentality	  studies	  that	  are	  useful	  to	  the	  sociological	  analysis	  of	  policy,	  
and	  that	  account	  for	  both	  the	  discursive	  regularities	  of	  discourse	  and	  the	  heterogeneous	  
dimension	  of	  dispositifs.	  	  
Problematizations,	  Rationalities,	  Technologies,	  Programs	  
In	  their	  seminal	  article,	  Rose	  and	  Miller	  (1992)	  argue	  that	  we	  can	  productively	  draw	  from	  
Foucault’s	   work	   on	   governmentality	   to	   research	   “problematics	   of	   government”	   (p.174).	  
Most	   of	   Foucault’s	   research	   program	   is	   concerned	   with	   particular	   problematics	   or	  
problematizations	   (of	   madness,	   crime,	   sexual	   practices,	   etc.),	   as	   a	   way	   to	   explore	   how	  
objects	   of	   government	   are	   formed,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   relation	   between	   cognition	   and	  
government.	  He	  explains:	  
                                                
8	   The	   concept	   of	  dispositif	   has	   generally	   been	   translated	   as	   “apparatus,”	   a	   term	   that	   conveys	   a	   sense	   of	  
structural	   organization	   and	   risks	   contributing	   to	   an	   “althusserization	   of	   Foucault”	   (Bigo	   2006:35,	   n.40).	   I	  
therefore	   follow	  Didier	  Bigo	   (2006)	  and	  others	   (including	  Dean	  2013)	  who	  prefer	   to	  keep	  the	  French	  term	  
“dispositif.”	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Problematization	   does	   not	  mean	   representation	   of	   a	   pre-­‐existing	   object,	   nor	   the	   creation	   by	  
discourse	   of	   an	   object	   that	   does	   not	   exist.	   It	   is	   the	   totality	   of	   discursive	   and	   non-­‐discursive	  
practices	   that	   introduces	   something	   into	   the	   play	   of	   true	   and	   false	   and	   constitutes	   it	   as	   an	  
object	   for	   thought	   (whether	   in	   the	   form	   of	   moral	   reflection,	   scientific	   knowledge,	   political	  
analysis,	  etc.)	  (Foucault	  1988a:257;	  cited	  in	  Soguk	  1999:16).	  
	  
Problematizations	   emerge	   through	   historically	   situated	   discursive	   and	   non-­‐discursive	  
practices	  that	  provide	  specific	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  and	  acting	  upon	  a	  set	  of	  difficulties.	  
Foucault	   understood	   problematizations	   as	   emerging	   over	   the	   longue-­‐durée	   (Foucault	  
1984;	  Rabinow	  2003)	  but	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  adapt	  his	  concept	  to	  inquire	  into	  the	  ways	  things	  
are	  rendered	  problematic	  over	  shorter	  periods	  of	  time	  (Bacchi	  2012;	  Lippert	  and	  Stenson	  
2010;	  Soguk	  1999).	  Indeed,	  Nevzat	  Soguk	  (1999)	  explains	  that	  he	  uses	  the	  concept	  to	  refer	  
to	   “the	   conceptualization	   of	   difficulties	   as	   amenable	   and	   manageable	   problems	   (as	   in	  
problem-­‐solving	  theory)	  within	  a	  posited	  framework	  of	  practice”	  (p.50).	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  
problematization	  of	   “irregular”	  or	   “illegal”	  migrants	   in	  Spain	   is	  not	   simply	   the	  discursive	  
framing	  of	  groups	  of	  people,	  but	  their	  inscription	  as	  objects	  of	  knowledge	  and	  government	  
into	   grids	   of	   intelligibility.	   Instead	   of	   looking	   at	   a	   policy	   problem,	   or	   a	   problem	   of	  
government,	  as	  something	  that	   is	   first	   identified	  objectively,	  and	   later	  managed	  through	  
various	   strategies	   or	   solutions,	   the	   concept	   of	   problematization	   allows	   us	   to	   see	   these	  
processes	  as	  simultaneous.	  “Irregular”	  or	  “illegal”	  migrants	  are	  constructed	  as	  objects	  of	  
government	   at	   the	   same	   time	   as	   they	   are	   thought	   of	   as	   problems	   to	   be	   addressed	   in	  
practice	  (Bacchi	  2012;	  Foucault	  1984;	  Moffette	  2013).	  Problematizations	  reframe	  a	  variety	  
of	  difficulties	  encountered	  through	  practice	  as	  discrete	  and	  intelligible	  problems	  that	  can	  
be	  acted	  upon.	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Rose	   and	   Miller	   build	   on	   this	   idea	   that	   “government	   is	   a	   domain	   of	   cognition,	  
calculation,	   experimentation	   and	   evaluation”	   (p.175)	   and	   develop	   an	   approach	   that	  
attempts	   to	  account	   for	   these	  discursive	  and	  non-­‐discursive	  practices	   in	  problematics	  of	  
government.	   In	  various	   interviews	  and	   texts,	   Foucault	  explained	   that	  he	  approached	  his	  
investigations	   of	   problematizations	   through	   two	   methodological	   strategies,	   an	  
archaeology	  that	  allows	  for	  the	  study	  of	  the	  discursive	  forms	  of	  problematizations,	  and	  a	  
genealogy	  that	  focuses	  on	  their	  formation	  through	  heterogeneous	  practices	  (Bacchi	  2012;	  
Foucault	  1984;	  Kendall	  and	  Wickham	  1999).	  Rose	  and	  Miller	  translate	  this	  dual	  approach	  
in	  their	  claim	  that	  problematics	  of	  government	  should	  be	  studied	  through	  rationalities	  of	  
government,	  programs	  of	  government,	  and	  political	  technologies.	  	  
Rose	  and	  Miller	  argue	  that	  “political	  discourse	  is	  a	  domain	  for	  the	  formulation	  and	  
justification	  of	   idealised	   schemata	   for	   representing	   reality,	   analyzing	   it	   and	   rectifying	   it”	  
(p.178),	   and	   that	   while	   it	   is	   open	   to	   fluctuation,	   it	   is	   nonetheless	   possible	   to	   identify	  
discursive	   regularities.	   These	   regularities	   are	   what	   form	   political	   rationalities.	   Akin	   to	  
Foucault’s	  concept	  of	  discourse,	  political	  rationalities	  are	  sets	  of	  discursive	  elements	  that	  
shape	  what	  can	  be	  said	  and	  thought	  during	  particular	  historical	  periods.	  According	  to	  Rose	  
and	   Miller,	   political	   rationalities	   present	   three	   characteristics.	   First,	   “they	   are	   morally	  
coloured,	  grounded	  upon	  knowledge,	  and	  made	  thinkable	  through	  language”	  (p.179).	  As	  
they	   explain,	   political	   rationalities	   are	   informed	   by	  moral	   arguments	   about	  who	   should	  
exert	  authority	  and	  how,	  and	  they	  “consider	  the	  ideals	  or	  principles	  to	  which	  government	  
should	  be	  directed—freedom,	  justice,	  equality,	  mutual	  responsibility,	  citizenship,	  common	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sense,	  economic	  efficiency,	  prosperity,	  growth,	  fairness,	  rationality,	  and	  the	  like”	  (p.179).	  
Second,	  they	  are	  intimately	  tied	  to	  knowledge,	  as	  “they	  are	  articulated	  in	  relation	  to	  some	  
conception	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   objects	   governed—society,	   the	   nation,	   population,	   the	  
economy”	  and	   the	  means	   to	  govern	   them.	  Finally,	   they	  are	   formed	  through	   language,	  a	  
language	   that	   is	   seen	   “as	   a	   kind	   of	   intellectual	   machinery	   or	   apparatus	   for	   rendering	  
reality	   thinkable	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   it	   is	   amenable	   to	   political	   deliberations”	   (p.179).	  
Political	   rationalities	   are	   thus	   broad	   historically	   and	   culturally	   situated	   discursive	  
formations	  that	  provide	  the	  discursive	  material	  to	  problematize	  objects	  of	  government.	  	  
While	  Rose	  and	  Miller	  are	  mostly	  concerned	  with	  very	  macro-­‐level	  rationalities	  such	  
as	   liberalism,	   the	   literature	   also	   inquires	   into	   sets	   of	   logics	   developing	   and	  operating	   at	  
lower	   scales.	   As	   Randy	   K.	   Lippert	   and	   Miikka	   Pyykkönen	   (2012)	   explain,	   “Recurring	  
rationalities	   in	   Foucauldian	   governmentality	   studies	   are	   liberalism	   and	   neo-­‐liberalism	  
(broad	   macro-­‐scale	   rationalities	   with	   programmatic	   definitions	   of	   principles	   of	  
governance);	   security,	  wealth	   and	   health	   of	   population	   (broad	   rationalities	   that	   receive	  
their	  precise	  content	  contextually);	  and	  much	  more	  context-­‐specific	   rationalities	  such	  as	  
activeness,	   civility	   and	   sociality	   of	   human	   subjects”	   (p.2).	   In	   this	   research,	   I	   generally	  
engage	  with	   rationalities	   at	   this	  more	   context-­‐specific	   level,	   and	  often	   refer	   to	   them	  as	  
sets	  of	  logics,	  rationales,	  or	  justifications,	  rather	  than	  more	  encompassing	  rationalities.	  It	  
is	   at	   this	   level	   of	   analysis	   that	   one	   can	   study	   how	   programs	   claiming	   to	   “fight	   illegal	  
migration,”	  “promote	  the	  burden-­‐sharing	  model,”	  “oust	  bogus	  refugees,”	  or	  “defend	  our	  
borders”	   are	   informed,	   for	   instance,	   by	   broader	   notions	   of	   legality,	   responsibility,	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economic	  growth,	  deservedness,	   sovereignty,	  belonging,	   culture,	  nation-­‐building,	  and	  so	  
on.	  	  
Indeed,	  programs	  of	  government	  translate	  these	  broader	  ideals	  into	  more	  pragmatic	  
and	   programmatic	   modalities.	   It	   is	   at	   this	   level	   that	   the	   problems	   and	   strategies	   of	  
government	   are	   framed.	   Policies,	   bills,	   laws,	   political	   parties’	   platforms,	   and	   proposals	  
made	   by	   various	   organizations	   and	   NGOs	   are	   all	   programs	   suggesting	   how	   a	   certain	  
problem	  is	  to	  be	  governed	  and,	  as	  such,	  they	  provide	  a	  great	  entry	  point	  into	  the	  analysis	  
of	  political	  rationalities.	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  Foucault’s	  research	  projects	  were	  always	  
organized	   around	   the	   problematizations	   of	   particular	   objects	   and	   the	   programmatic	  
dimension	   of	   these	   problematizations	   was	   central	   (Foucault	   1980,	   1984).	   Indeed,	   the	  
programmatic	  moment	  of	  problematizing	  is	  particularly	  interesting	  to	  study,	  since	  it	   is	  at	  
the	  meso-­‐level	  of	  government	  where	  ideals	  of	  government	  and	  a	  heterogeneous	  array	  of	  
political	  technologies	  are	  organized	  together	  into	  programs.	  
For	   this	   reason,	   Rose	   and	  Miller	   argue	   that	  we	   should	   pay	   close	   attention	   to	   the	  
mechanisms,	  devices,	  and	  techniques	  mobilized	  to	  actually	  govern.	  As	  they	  explain,	  “It	   is	  
through	  technologies	  that	  political	  rationalities	  and	  the	  programmes	  of	  government	  that	  
articulate	   them	   become	   capable	   of	   deployment”	   (p.183).	   Yet,	   as	   critical	   policy	   analysts	  
have	   also	   shown,	   this	   relation	   is	   not	   a	   linear	   and	   rational	   process	   of	   implementation	  
(Shore	   and	   Wright	   1997).	   Indeed,	   policy	   programs	   often	   fail	   and	   have	   unexpected	  
consequences.	  	  Further,	  the	  policy	  process	  does	  not	  start	  with	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  problem,	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followed	   by	   practices	   of	   implementation;	   these	   practices	   also	   contribute	   to	   the	  
construction	   of	   the	   very	   object	   they	   govern	   (Bacchi	   2012;	   Rose	   1999;	   Rose	   and	  Miller	  
1992).	   For	   this	   reason,	   while	   it	   is	   important	   “to	   study	   the	   humble	   and	   mundane	  
mechanisms	  by	  which	  authorities	   seek	   to	   instantiate	  government”	   to	  better	  understand	  
programs	   of	   government	   (Rose	   and	  Miller	   1992:183),	   we	   also	   need	   to	   remember	   that	  
these	   technologies	   are	   not	   the	   realization	   of	   any	   will	   to	   govern,	   and	   we	   ought	   to	   pay	  
attention	  to	  the	  role	  they	  play	  in	  shaping	  objects	  of	  government.	  As	  Rose	  (1999)	  explains,	  
a	   “technology	   of	   government,	   then,	   is	   an	   assemblage	   of	   forms	   of	   practical	   knowledge,	  
with	  modes	  of	  perception,	  practices	  of	  calculation,	  vocabularies,	  types	  of	  authority,	  forms	  
of	   judgment,	   architectural	   forms,	   human	   capacities,	   non-­‐human	   objects	   and	   devices,	  
inscription	   techniques	   and	   so	   forth”	   (p.52).	   It	   is	   thus	   clear	   that	   the	   very	   technologies	  
mobilized	  to	  govern	  also	  contribute	  to	  rendering	  things	  into	  programmatic	  forms.	  	  
The	  unpacking	  of	  some	  of	  Foucault’s	  insights	  into	  the	  concepts	  of	  problematization,	  
political	  rationality,	  program	  of	  government,	  and	  political	  technology	  offers	  a	  particularly	  
useful	  set	  of	  conceptual	  tools	  for	  the	  project	  of	  studying	  migration	  policies.	  For	  instance,	  
Jonathan	   X.	   Inda	   (2006)	   has	   built	   his	   research	   project	   on	   the	   governing	   of	   “illegal”	  
immigration	   in	   the	   United	   States	   around	   these	   three	   concepts,	   while	   Feldman	   (2011,	  
2012)	   recently	   mobilized	   this	   approach	   more	   loosely	   in	   his	   analysis	   of	   European	  
immigration	  policy-­‐making.	  These	  endeavours	  have	  proven	  fruitful	  and	   I	   took	   inspiration	  
from	  them	  as	  I	  developed	  the	  questions	  guiding	  this	  research.	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Research	  Questions	  
As	  I	  have	  already	  mentioned,	  this	  research	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  logics	  informing	  Spanish	  
policies	  aiming	  at	  governing	  irregular	  migration,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  practices	  and	  discourses	  of	  
actors	   involved	   in	   this	   process.	   The	   research	   design	   was	   organized	   to	   map	   out	   the	  
discursive	   regularities	   that	   offer	   a	   kind	   of	   repertoire	   of	   what	   can	   be	   said	   and	   thought	  
about	   irregular	  migration	  at	   a	  particular	   time,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  discontinuities	   that	   can	  be	  
identified	  in	  the	  uneven	  processes	  of	  policy-­‐making	  and	  in	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  
the	   techniques	   mobilized	   to	   govern	   irregular	   migration.	   There	   are	   four	   main	   axes	   of	  
interrogation	  that	  guide	  this	  research:	  
1) Which	   political	   rationalities	   have	   informed	   the	   problematizations	   of	   irregular	  
migration	   as	   an	  object	   of	   government	   in	   Spain,	   and	  which	  discursive	   regularities	  
and	  changes	  can	  be	  identified	  in	  various	  programs	  of	  government?	  
2) 	  Which	   programmatic	   forms	   has	   the	   government	   of	   irregular	  migration	   taken	   in	  
Spain,	  and	  what	  are	  the	  similarities	  and	  differences	  between	  different	  historically	  
specific	  programs	  of	  government?	  
3) Which	   technologies	   have	   been	  mobilized	   to	   govern	   irregular	  migration	   in	   Spain,	  
and	  how	  do	  these	  technologies	  contribute	  to	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  irregular	  
migration	  is	  problematized?	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4) What	   are	   the	   power	   dynamics	   at	   play	   in	   policy-­‐making,	   and	   how	   can	   temporary	  
policy	   settlements	   resulting	   from	   these	   struggles	   account	   for	   shifts	   in	   the	   way	  
irregular	  migration	  has	  been	  governed	  since	  the	  early	  1980s?	  
These	   questions,	   which	   stem	   directly	   from	   the	   theoretical	   literature	   in	  
governmentality	  studies,	  are	  not	  easily	  amenable	  to	  sociological	  enquiry.	  Perhaps	  because	  
Foucault	   took	  social	   sciences	  and	  the	  humanities	  as	  objects	  of	  analysis	  and	  developed	  a	  
methodology	   that	   aimed	   to	   go	   “beyond	   structuralism	   and	   hermeneutics”	   (Dreyfus	   and	  
Rabinow	   1982:xi),	   a	   tension	   always	   remains	   between	   governmentality	   studies	   and	  
sociological	   theories	   and	   methodologies.	   Indeed,	   works	   focusing	   on	   analytics	   of	  
government	   generally	   insist	   on	   the	   difference	   between	   this	   approach	   and	   realist	  
sociologies	   of	   history,	   or	   critical	   realist	   approaches,	   but	   usually	   without	   successfully	  
breaking	  with	  “the	  real,”	  despite	  their	  nominalism	  (Curtis	  1995;	  Lippert	  and	  Stenson	  2010;	  
Power	   2011).	  While	   their	   critique	   is	   officially	   aimed	   at	   the	   “sociological	   philosophers	   of	  
history,”	  not	  sociological	  approaches	  that	  pay	  “attention	  to	  the	  humble,	  the	  mundane,	  the	  
little	   shifts	   in	   our	   ways	   of	   thinking	   and	   understanding,	   the	   small	   and	   the	   contingent	  
struggles,	   tensions	   and	   negotiations	   that	   give	   rise	   to	   something	   new	   and	   unexpected”	  
(Rose	   1999:11),	   governmentality	   scholars	   often	   remain	   skeptical	   of	   sociological	  
methodologies.	   In	   the	   following	   section,	   I	   expose	   the	   strategy	   used	   to	   adapt	   this	  




While	  seriously	  considering	  the	  reservations	  about	  the	  dangers	  of	  naïve	  realism	  expressed	  
in	   governmentality	   scholarship,	   I	   do	   not	   insist	   on	   eschewing	   realist	   descriptions	   and	  
interpretations	  altogether.	  Following	  Randy	  K.	  Lippert	  and	  Kevin	  Stenson’s	  (2010)	  advice,	  I	  
prefer	   privileging	   the	   project	   of	   providing	   a	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   particular	   situations	   to	  
that	  of	  trying	  to	  avoid	  realism	  at	  all	  cost,	  and	  I	  therefore	  borrow	  from	  scholars	  who	  do	  not	  
hesitate	   to	   “sociologize”	   Foucault	   (Gale	   2001;	   Kendal	   and	   Wickham	   1999;	   Shore	   and	  
Wright	  2011;	  Stenson	  2008).	  In	  this	  research,	  I	  draw	  from	  the	  work	  of	  Trevor	  Gale	  (2001),	  
who	   systematized	   the	   methodological	   dimensions	   of	   Foucauldian	   and	   critical	   policy	  
sociology.	   Gale	   developed	   a	   methodology	   based	   on	   policy	   historiography,	   policy	  
archaeology,	   and	   policy	   genealogy,	   three	   approaches	   that	   are	   obviously	   inspired	   by	  
Foucault’s	  methodology,	  but	  have	  been	  substantially	  adapted	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  engaging	  
in	   a	   sociological	   analysis	   of	   policy.	   I	   amend	   and	   complement	   this	   approach	   by	  
incorporating	  insights	  from	  the	  work	  of	  other	  Foucauldian	  policy	  analysts	  and	  socio-­‐legal	  
scholars	  (Feldman	  2012;	  Kendall	  and	  Wickham	  1999;	  Shore	  and	  Wright	  2011;	  Wright	  and	  
Reinhold	   2011).	   The	   result	   is	   a	   somewhat	   unorthodox	   sociological	   take	   on	   Foucault’s	  
methodology,	  which	  has	  proven	  very	  useful.	  
Policy	  Historiography	  
Gale	   (2001)	   suggests	   that	   any	   policy	   historiography	   must	   consider	   policy	   domains	   in	  
relation	  to	  the	  structural	  organization	  of	  society	  at	  various	  historical	  periods,	  and	  question	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the	   nature	   of	   the	   shifts	   from	  one	   period	   to	   another.	   In	   his	   own	   research	   on	  Australian	  
university	   entry	   policies,	   he	   documents	   various	   “historical	   epochs”	   to	  map	   the	   shifts	   in	  
preferred	  policies.	  However,	  he	   insists	   that	   these	   shifts	  are	  not	   self-­‐evident,	   structurally	  
necessary,	  nor	  the	  result	  of	  progress.	  He	  offers	  “a	  critical	  examination	  of	  the	  data	  that	  is	  
concerned	  not	   just	  with	   an	  episode	   in	   the	  history	  of	   ideas	  but	   also,	   and	  more	   crucially,	  
with	   critical	   sociological	   questions	   about	   who	   benefits	   from	   particular	   university	  
arrangements”	  (p.385-­‐386).	  To	  offer	  a	  periodization	  of	  policy	  choices	  while	  also	  grasping	  
the	   struggles	  at	  play	   in	  policy-­‐making,	  he	  develops	   the	   concept	  of	  policy	   settlement.	  As	  
Gale	  explains	  (1999),	  “Understanding	  these	  struggles	  of	  power	  and	  dominance	  involves	  an	  
appreciation	  for	  ‘policy	  as	  settlement’	  and	  for	  the	  strategies	  employed	  in	  its	  formation.	  By	  
policy	   settlement	   I	   mean	   ‘a	   moving	   discursive	   frame’	   (Ball,	   1994a,	   p.	   23)	   which	   at	   a	  
particular	  historical	  and	  geographical	  moment	  defines	  the	  specifics	  of	  policy	  production”	  
(p.400).	  
By	  this,	  he	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  policy	  settlements	  are	  compromises	  or	  truces,	  simply	  
that	  they	  are	  temporary	  settlements	  of	  the	  power	  dynamics	  involved	  in	  making	  policy.	  It	  is	  
in	  this	  sense	  that	  Gale	  (2001)	  understands	  “these	  hegemonic	  settlements	  to	  contain	  crises	  
of	  other	  settlements	  ‘in	  waiting’”	  (p.386).	  He	  presents	  policy	  settlements	  as	  asymmetrical	  
(since	  they	  “are	  defined	  by	  the	  specific	  discursive	  strategies	  of	  dominant	  policy	  actors”),	  
temporary	   (“since	   their	   very	   asymmetry	   or	   imbalance	   is	   likely	   to	   produce	   unsettling	  
effects	   of	   crises”),	   and	   context-­‐dependent	   (Gale	   1999:402).	   When	   discussing	   the	   third	  
dimension,	   context	   dependency,	  Gale	   explains	   that	   settlements	   occur	   around	   particular	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questions,	  and	  that	  we	  can	  distinguish	  between	  broader	  settlement	  parameters,	  such	  as	  
liberalism,	   and	   settlement	   particulars,	   such	   as	   particular	   Keynesian	   economic	   policies.	  
Hence,	   “while	   policy	   settlements	   are	   context-­‐dependent,	   their	   discursive	   and	   strategic	  
framing	   provides	   the	   settlement	   parameters	   (the	   ‘why	   now’	   of	   policy),	   established	  
broadly,	   within	   which	   settlement	   particulars	   (the	   ‘what	   now’	   of	   policy)	   are	   specifically	  
negotiated”	  (Gale	  1999:402).	  
The	   relation	   that	   Gale	   establishes	   between	   broad	   settlement	   parameters	   and	  
various	   settlement	   particulars	   is	   akin	   to	   that	   developed	   by	   Rose	   and	   Miller	   (1992)	  
between	  political	   rationalities	   and	  programs	  of	   government,	   despite	  Gale’s	   depiction	   of	  
policy	  settlements	  as	  hegemonic	  moments	  that	  result	  from	  asymmetrical	  power	  relations.	  
Adapting	  Gale’s	  methodology,	  this	  study	  looks	  at	  policy-­‐making	  as	  a	  field	  of	  struggles	  that	  
can	   lead	   to	   unexpected	   consequences,	  map	   temporary	   policy	   settlements,	   and	   account	  
for	   asymmetry	   and	   individual	   and	   collective	   strategies	   without	   mobilizing	   concepts	   of	  
hegemony	   or	   ideology.	   This	   more	   Foucauldian	   version	   of	   Gale’s	   “historiographical”	  
analysis	  of	  temporary	  policy	  settlements	  follows	  Susan	  Wright	  and	  Sue	  Reinhold’s	  (2011)	  
methodological	  strategy	  of	  “studying	  through,”	  which,	  as	  they	  explain:	  
follows	  a	  discussion	  or	  a	  conflict	  [that	  is	  related	  to	  policy]	  as	  it	  ranges	  back	  and	  forth	  and	  back	  
again	   between	   protagonists,	   and	   up	   and	   down	   and	   up	   again	   between	   a	   range	   of	   local	   and	  
national	  sites	  [and	  one	  could	  add	  other	  levels].	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  follow	  a	  flow	  of	  events	  and	  their	  
contingent	  effects,	  and	  especially	  to	  notice	  struggles	  over	  language,	  in	  order	  to	  analyse	  how	  the	  
meaning	  of	  keywords	  are	  contested	  and	  change,	  how	  new	  semantic	  clusters	   form	  and	  how	  a	  
new	  governing	  discourse	  emerges,	  is	  made	  authoritative	  and	  becomes	  institutionalized.	  What	  is	  
studied	  is	  a	  process	  of	  political	  transformation	  through	  space	  and	  time	  (P.101).	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While	   Wright	   and	   Reinhold	   mention	   change,	   struggles,	   institutionalization,	   and	  
“transformation	   through	   space	   and	   time”	   (p.101),	   they	   do	  not	   break	   down	   this	   process	  
into	  periods	  because	  they	  want	  to	  retain	  the	  fluidity	  and	  messiness	  of	  the	  process	  in	  their	  
accounts.	   I	  prefer	   to	   retain	  Gale’s	  historiographical	  periodization	  as	  a	  device	   that	  allows	  
for	   the	   analysis	   of	   political	   transformations	   in	   a	   somewhat	  orderly	  manner,	   and	   for	   the	  
study	  of	  finite	  temporary	  policy	  settlements	  as	  snapshots	  into	  this	  process,	  while	  avoiding	  
the	   framing	  of	   these	   settlements	   as	   hegemonic.	   As	  will	   be	   evident	   in	   the	   discussion	  on	  
policy	  archaeology	  and	  genealogy,	  the	  possibility	  of	  taking	  a	  snapshot	  of	  a	  political	  process	  
by	  marking	  artificial	  boundaries	  can	  be	  a	  very	  useful	  methodological	  strategy,	  and	  Gale’s	  
policy	  historiography	  certainly	  provides	  some	  good	  tools	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  
Policy	  Archaeology	  	  
The	   second	  dimension	  of	  Gale’s	  methodology	   is	   inspired	   by	   James	   J.	   Scheurich’s	   (1994)	  
policy	   archaeology.9	   Scheurich	   attempts	   to	   study	   “the	   intersection	   or,	   better,	   the	  
constitutive	  grid	  of	  conditions,	  assumptions,	  and	  forces	  which	  make	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  
social	  problem,	  and	  its	  strands	  and	  traces,	  possible—to	  investigate	  how	  a	  social	  problem	  
becomes	  visible	  as	  a	  social	  problem”	  (p.300).	  Scheurich	  is	  strictly	  concerned	  with	  the	  rules	  
of	   formation	   of	   policy	   discourse	   and	   the	   conditions	   of	   their	   realization	   and,	   following	  
Foucault’s	  archaeology,	  develops	  an	  approach	  that	  does	  not	  consider	  conscious	  subjects.	  
For	   instance,	   when	   discussing	   regularities	   in	   the	   framing	   of	   policy	   problems,	   Scheurich	  
                                                
9	  This	  approach,	  developed	  to	  study	  policy,	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  proposed	  by	  Kendall	  and	  Wickham	  (1999:24-­‐34)	  
in	  their	  book	  on	  the	  use	  of	  Foucault’s	  methods	  for	  social	  sciences.	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argues	  that	  “the	  regularities	  are	  not	  intentional;	  that	  is,	  no	  particular	  individual	  or	  group	  
consciously	   creates	   them”	   (p.301).	  While	   not	   intending	   to	   suggest	   that	   no	   individual	   or	  
group	  benefits	   from	  or	   articulates	   the	   regularities,	   this	  point	  highlights	   the	   fact	   that	  his	  
archaeology	  of	  policy	  does	  not	  consider	  the	  active	  struggles	  over	  the	  definition	  of	  policy	  
problems,	  limiting	  itself	  to	  analyzing	  discursive	  formations.	  
While	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  complemented,	  Scheurich’s	  approach	  is	  compelling.	  In	  his	  own	  
research,	   he	   develops	   his	   policy	   archaeology	   to	   encompass	   four	   broad	   arenas	   and	  
corresponding	  sets	  of	  questions,	  which	  Gale	  (2001)	  summarizes	  succinctly	  as	  follows:	  
(1)	  what	  are	  the	  conditions	  that	  make	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  particular	  policy	  agenda	  possible?;	  
(2)	   what	   are	   the	   rules	   or	   regularities	   that	   determine	   what	   is	   (and	   what	   is	   not)	   a	   policy	  
problem?;	  (3)	  how	  do	  these	  rules	  and	  regularities	  shape	  policy	  choices?;	  and	  (4)	  how	  is	  policy	  
analysis	  similarly	  regulated?	  (P.387)	  
	  
Gale	  builds	  upon	  Scheurich’s	  archaeological	  methodology	  but	  modifies	  it.	  For	  instance,	  he	  
includes	  in	  policy	  archeology	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  “licensing	  of	  policy-­‐makers	  and	  their	  
relations	  as	  part	  of	  the	  policy	  formation”	  (p.387).	  While	  Gale	  pays	  close	  attention	  to	  the	  
strategies	  used	   to	   legitimize	  and	  delegitimize	   certain	  policy	  agendas	  and	   types	  of	  policy	  
actors,	  here	  he	  remains	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  a	  policy	  archeology.	   In	  this	  context,	  “what	   is	  
important	  to	  uncover	  is	  not	  so	  much	  who	  speaks	  but	  what	  is	  spoken,	  what	  positions	  it	  is	  
spoken	   from,	   and	   how	   this	   is	   mediated	   by	   the	   speaking	   positions	   of	   others;	   an	  
architecture	  of	  policy	  positions”	  (p.389).	  Gale’s	  modification	  of	  Scheurich’s	  approach	  thus	  
allows	   for	   the	   consideration	   of	   policy-­‐makers	   and	   their	   positions;	   and	   yet	   for	   those	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engaged	   in	  policy	  archeology,	   the	   interests	   lies	  not	   “in	  authorship	  but	   in	   vocality”	   (Gale	  
2001:389).	  
Policy	  Genealogy	  
Because	   of	   this	   focus	   on	   discursive	   regularities,	   an	   archeology	   of	   policy	   needs	   to	   be	  
complemented	  by	  a	  genealogy	  of	  policy,	  according	  to	  Gale	  (2001).	  Not	  that	  a	  genealogical	  
approach	   necessarily	   focuses	   on	   authorship,	   but	   it	   does	   allow	   for	   a	   consideration	   of	  
policy-­‐making	   as	   a	   site	   of	   struggle	  where	   temporary	   alliances	   and	   interests	   play.	  At	   the	  
same	   time,	   a	   genealogical	   account	   of	   policy-­‐making	   differentiates	   itself	   from	  
incrementalist	   approaches	   focusing	   on	   “negotiation,”	   “mutual	   adjustment,”	   and	  
“consensus	   building,”	   since	   it	   does	   not	   aim	   at	   producing	   accounts	   of	   a	   continuous	   and	  
progressive	   process.	   Rather,	   it	   acknowledges	   in	   its	   description	   heterogeneous	   and	  
discontinuous	  moments	  and	  aspects	  of	  the	  struggles	  to	  make	  policy.	  
Before	  abandoning	  the	  concept	  of	  archeology	  altogether,	  Foucault	  saw	  archaeology	  
and	   genealogy	   as	   complementary,	   and	   some	   authors	   even	   see	   genealogy	   “as	   a	   way	   of	  
putting	   archaeology	   to	   work”	   (Kendall	   and	   Wickham	   1999:31).	   The	   main	   difference	  
between	  the	  two	  is	  that	  archaeology	  “provides	  us	  with	  a	  snapshot	  or	  a	  slice	  through	  the	  
discursive	  nexus	  [while]	  genealogy	  pays	  attention	  to	  the	  processual	  aspects	  of	  the	  web	  of	  
discourse”	   (Kendall	   and	   Wickham	   1999:30-­‐31).	   So,	   while	   it	   might	   be	   useful	   to	   map	  
regularities,	  it	  is	  important	  not	  to	  conceive	  them	  as	  abstract	  sets	  of	  rules.	  For	  this	  reason,	  
genealogy	  complements	  the	  snapshot	  provided	  by	  archeology	  by	  highlighting	  the	  fact	  that	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it	   is	   simply	   a	   snapshot	   of	   a	   process	   filled	   with	   discontinuities,	   singularities,	   and	  
uncertainty.	  Genealogy	  is	  thus	  an	  analysis	  in	  terms	  of	  dispositifs,	  one	  that	  considers	  events	  
(a	   specific	   programmatic	   form,	   or	   a	   policy,	   for	   instance)	   as	   effects	   of	   a	   multiplicity	   of	  
power	  relations	  operating	  as	  a	  network	  (Foucault	  1990).	  
As	   Foucault	   ([1997]	   2003)	   explains,	   his	   own	   genealogical	   investigations	   are	  
characterized	   by	   “a	  meticulous	   rediscovery	   of	   struggles	   and	   the	   raw	  memory	   of	   fights”	  
(p.8)	   involved	   in	   the	   construction	   of	   discourse.	   But	   these	   conflicts	   cannot	   simply	   be	  
acknowledged	  as	  a	  memory	  whose	  traces	  appear	  in	  a	  genealogical	  account;	  one	  needs	  a	  
means	  of	  accounting	  for	  the	  way	  these	  conflicts	  unfold.	  At	  a	  conference	  in	  1978,	  Foucault	  
suggested	  completing	  genealogy	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  strategies.	  Genealogical	  analysis	  studies	  a	  
particular	  outcome	  (for	  instance,	  a	  policy)	  not	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  cause	  but	  as	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  
singular	   set	   of	   relations,	   relations	   that	   are	   constituted	   by	   individuals	   and	   collective	  
strategies,	  and	  which	  should	  be	  studied	  as	  such.	  Foucault	  ([1990]	  1996)	  explains:	  	  	  
relations	  that	  allow	  one	  to	  take	  account	  of	  this	  singular	  effect	  are,	  if	  not	  in	  their	  totality,	  at	  least	  
in	  a	  considerable	  part,	  relations	  of	  interactions	  between	  individuals	  or	  groups,	  that	  is,	  that	  they	  
involve	  subjects,	  types	  of	  behaviors,	  decisions,	  choices:	  it	  is	  not	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  things	  that	  one	  
could	  find	  the	  backing,	  the	  support	  of	  this	  network	  of	  intelligible	  relations;	  it	  is	  logic	  proper	  to	  a	  
game	  of	  interactions	  with	  its	  always	  variable	  margins	  of	  noncertitude	  (P.397).	  
	  
In	  this	  sense,	  much	  like	  policy	  studies	  that	  draw	  from	  Actor-­‐Network-­‐Theory	  (Fenwick	  and	  
Edwards	  2010;	  Koyama	  2011),	  inductive	  genealogical	  research	  allows	  one	  to	  map	  out	  the	  
contingent	  “work”	  within	  a	  “net”	  (Latour	  2005:132),	  and	  to	  describe	  the	  types	  of	  relations	  
at	   play	   in	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   particular	   policy.	   For	   instance,	   in	   his	   own	   research	   on	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Australian	  education	  policymaking,	  Gale	  (2001)	  identifies	  patterns	  of	  bargaining,	  arguing,	  
stalling,	  manoeuvring,	   and	   lobbying,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   types	  and	  positions	   of	   policy-­‐makers	  
employing	  them,	  in	  order	  to	  map	  the	  struggle	  of	  policy-­‐making.	  Similarly,	  Feldman	  (2012)	  
develops	   a	   “global	   ethnography”	   approach	   that	   allows	   him	   to	   show	   how	   particular	  
problematizations	  of	  migration	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  are	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  set	  of	  dispersed	  
discursive	  and	  non-­‐discursive	  practices	  of	  various	  actors	  and	  institutions.	  Policy	  genealogy	  
is	  thus	  a	  method	  that	  complements	  policy	  archaeology	  and	  policy	  historiography	  and	  that	  
asks:	   “(1)	   how	   policies	   change	   over	   time.	   But	   it	   also	   seeks	   to	   determine	   (2)	   how	   the	  
rationality	   and	   consensus	   of	   policy	   production	   might	   be	   problematized	   and	   (3)	   how	  
temporary	   alliances	   are	   formed	   and	   reformed	   around	   conflicting	   interests	   in	   the	   policy	  
production	  process”	   (Gale	  2001:389-­‐390).	  These	   three	  approaches	  were	  used	   to	   further	  
operationalize	   the	   concepts	   developed	  by	   governmentality	   scholars	   and	  devise	   some	  of	  
the	   questions	   informing	   this	   research,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   orient	   the	   data	   collection	   and	  
interpretation.	  
Data	  Collection	  and	  Interpretation	  
The	  methodological	   strategy	   of	   data	   collection	   and	   interpretation	   used	   in	   this	   research	  
can	  be	  considered	  a	  form	  of	  “triangulation”	  (Singleton	  and	  Straits	  2010:431-­‐434),	  as	  I	  used	  
a	   balance	   of	   documentary	   information	   (found	   in	   the	   scholarly	   literature,	   newspaper	  
articles,	   and	   NGO	   reports),	   archival	   material,	   interviews,	   and	   observation.	   The	   use	   of	  
multiple	  methods	  of	  data	  collection	  is	  important	  in	  the	  sociology	  of	  policy	  if	  the	  analysis	  is	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to	   focus	   on	   process.	   Indeed,	   as	   Irène	   Bellier	   (2005)	   observes,	   “the	   content	   of	   official	  
documents	   tends	   to	   be	   limited	   to	   what	   has	   been	   agreed,	   letting	   aside	   sources	   of	  
disagreement,”	   and	   while	   “official	   discourses	   are	   available	   for	   analysis,	   internal	  
negotiations	  and	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  practices	  related	  to	  discourse	  production	  or	  to	  the	  policy	  field	  
are	  difficult	  to	  observe”	  (p.256).	  For	  this	  reason,	  she	  argues	  that	   it	   is	   important	  to	  study	  
the	  final	  policy	  texts	  in	  conjunction	  with	  interviews,	  minutes,	  or	  ethnographic	  accounts.	  	  
Similarly,	  Randy	  K.	  Lippert	  (2005)	  claims	  that	  governmentality	  scholars	  can	  gain	  from	  
using	  interviews,	  since	  marginal	  discourses	  may	  not	  make	  it	  to	  the	  written	  form	  and	  may	  
thus	  be	  only	  accessible	  orally	  or	  through	  the	  observation	  of	  practices.	  This	  argument	  also	  
applies	   to	   other	   sources	   of	   oral	   discourses,	   such	   as	   the	   verbatim	   transcriptions	   of	  
parliamentary	   debates.	   Not	   limiting	   the	   analysis	   to	   programmatic	   “tidy	   texts”	   and	  
considering	  the	  oral	  discourses	  and	  everyday	  practices	  of	  various	  actors	  is	  also	  helpful	  in	  
writing	   accounts	   of	   policy-­‐making	   that	   render	   its	   messiness	   (Lippert	   and	   Stensen	  
2010:481).	   Gathering	   material	   from	   various	   sources	   is	   even	   more	   important	   when	  
studying	   projects	   and	   individuals	   linked	   to	   security,	   the	   military,	   corporations,	   or	   state	  
interventions,	  since	  the	  data	  collected	  through	  each	  technique,	  and	  at	  each	  site,	  tend	  to	  
be	   fragmented	   and	   highly	   censored.	   For	   this	   reason,	   anthropologist	   Hugh	   Gusterson	  
(1997)	   recommends	   that	   scholars	   working	   in	   these	   fields	   adopt	   a	   “polymorphous	  
engagement,”	   by	   which	   he	   means	   “interacting	   with	   informants	   across	   a	   number	   of	  
dispersed	  sites”	  and	  “collecting	  data	  eclectically	  from	  a	  disparate	  array	  of	  sources	  in	  many	  
different	  ways”	  (p.118).	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The	   different	  methods	   used	   and	   the	   data	   they	   produce	   do	   not	   all	   hold	   the	   same	  
status.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  polymorphous	  engagement	  is	  not	  to	  gather	  more	  material	  that	  
can	   be	   studied	   as	   one	   big	   corpus,	   but	   to	   use	   the	   data	   produced	   by	   one	   method	   to	  
contrast,	  verify,	  and	  question	  the	  material	  gathered	  through	  another	  (Beaud	  and	  Weber	  
[1997]	   2010).	   During	   the	   active	   inquiry	   and	   throughout	   the	   interpretation	   process,	   this	  
strategy	  allowed	  me	  to	  compare	  what	  politicians	  said	  in	  Congress	  with	  what	  was	  posited	  
by	   legal	   and	   policy	   documents,	   and	   use	   practices	   observed	   in	   the	   streets	   to	   encourage	  
interviewees	  to	  explain	  how	  they	  do	  things	  and	  what	  the	  everyday	  practices	  of	  their	  work	  
consist	  of	  (Beaud	  and	  Weber	  [1987]	  2010).	  	  
Archives	  
In	   this	   research,	  verbatim	  transcriptions	  of	  parliamentary	  debates	  on	   irregular	  migration	  
that	   occurred	   between	   1979	   and	   2013	   provided	   the	   main	   material.	   Verbatim	  
transcriptions	   are	   a	   particular	   kind	   of	   archival	   material,	   since	   they	   provide	   the	   whole	  
discussion	  as	   it	  occurred	  at	  the	  time,	  not	  a	  summary	  of	  what	  was	  considered	  important.	  
Nonetheless,	   when	   we	   analyze	   these	   debates	   for	   the	   insights	   they	   provide	   on	   policy	  
practices	   occurring	   outside	   parliamentary	   sessions,	   we	   cannot	   uncritically	   take	   what	   is	  
described	   in	   parliamentary	   interventions	   as	   representative	   of	   broader	   policy	   processes,	  
especially	   considering	   that	   parliamentary	   debates	   are	   to	   a	   great	   extent	   a	   public	  
performance	  (Abélès	  2000).	  As	  with	  other	  archives,	  it	  is	  therefore	  essential	  to	  study	  them	  
for	   the	   factual	   details,	   arguments,	   and	   rationales	   they	   provide,	   but	   also	   to	   place	   them	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within	  the	  broader	  socio-­‐historical	  moment	  and	  place	  in	  which	  they	  were	  produced	  (Israël	  
2010).	  	  
Table	  1:	  Types	  of	  Parliamentary	  Initiatives	  Analyzed	  and	  Translation	  Used	  





Proyecto	  de	  Ley	  	  
Translation:	  Bill	  
Proposición	  de	  Ley	  
Translation:	  Legislative	  Proposal	  




Function	   of	  
Political	  
Orientation	  	  
Proposición	  no	  de	  Ley	  
Translation:	  Non-­‐Legislative	  Proposal	  	  
Moción	  (de	  interpelación	  urgente	  o	  no	  urgente)	  
Translation:	  Motion	  (from	  an	  urgent	  or	  non-­‐urgent	  interpellation)	  
Comunicación	  del	  Gobierno	  
Translation:	  Communication	  of	  the	  Government	  
Planes	  y	  programas	  
Translation:	  Plans	  and	  Programs	  






Comparecencia	  del	  Gobierno	  en	  Comisión	  
Translation:	  Appearance	  of	  the	  Government	  in	  Commission	  
Comparecencia	  de	  autoridades	  y	  funcionarios	  en	  Comisión	  
Translation:	  Appearance	  of	  Authorities	  and	  Civil	  Servants	  in	  Commission	  
Comparecencia	  de	  otras	  personalidades	  en	  Comisión	  
Translation:	  Appearance	  of	  Other	  Personalities	  in	  Commission	  
Interpelación	  urgente	  
Translation:	  Urgent	  Interpellation	  
	  
Most	   of	   the	   archival	   work	   was	   conducted	   at	   the	   Archivo	   del	   Congreso	   de	   los	  
Diputados	   (Archive	   of	   the	   Congress	   of	   Representatives),	   mainly	   through	   its	   internet	  
database,	  but	  also	  on-­‐site	  at	  the	  Congress	  in	  Madrid	  when	  I	  needed	  to	  access	  documents	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presented	   to	   parliament	   but	   not	   included	   in	   the	   digitalized	  minutes	   of	   sessions	   or	   the	  
official	  bulletin.	  The	  online	  database	  allows	  for	  searches	  of	  parliamentary	  initiatives	  based	  
on	  their	  official	  parliamentary	  category	  or	  function:	  a	  legislative	  function	  (such	  as	  a	  bill),	  a	  
function	   of	   political	   orientation	   (such	   as	   a	  motion),	   or	   a	   function	   of	   control	   (such	   as	   a	  
question	  or	  a	  request	  for	  a	  minister	  to	  appear	  before	  a	  committee).	  	  
In	  his	  analysis	  of	  Spanish	  parliamentary	  discourse	  on	  immigration	  between	  1996	  and	  
2006,	   Ricard	   Zapata-­‐Barrero	   (2009)	   suggested	   that,	   in	   order	   to	   focus	   solely	   on	   relevant	  
interventions,	   it	   made	   sense	   for	   him	   to	   only	   analyze	   initiatives	   serving	   a	   legislative	  
function	   or	   a	   function	   of	   political	   orientation,	   and	   to	   exclude	   those	   with	   a	   function	   of	  
control	   because	   of	   their	   fragmented	   character.	   I	   have	   taken	   inspiration	   from	   his	  
methodological	  strategy,	  but	  since	  I	  was	  not	   looking	  for	  well-­‐formed	  political	  discourses,	  
and	  rather	  for	  the	  process	  of	  problematizing	  migration	  as	  an	  object	  of	  policy,	  I	  have	  also	  
included	   in	   my	   data	   some	   parliamentary	   initiatives	   classified	   as	   having	   a	   function	   of	  
control.	   These	   include	   the	   appearances	   of	   ministers,	   state	   officials,	   or	   experts	   at	  
commissions	   and	   the	   debates	   that	   follow,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   debates	   produced	   by	   “urgent	  
questions.”	   	   For	   the	   earlier	   period	   (1979-­‐89),	   when	   debates	  were	   rather	   limited,	   I	   also	  
included	  written	  and	  oral	  questions	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  map	  out	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  early	  
and	   hesitant	   problematizations	   of	   irregular	   migration	   as	   an	   object	   of	   government.	   I	  
consulted	   the	   Boletín	   Oficial	   del	   Estado	   (Official	   State	   Bulletin)	   for	   the	   text	   of	   the	  
initiatives,	  and	  the	  Boletín	  Oficial	  de	  las	  Cortes	  Generales	  (Official	  Bulletin	  of	  the	  General	  
Courts)	   for	   the	   minutes	   of	   the	   plenary	   sessions	   of	   Congress	   and	   of	   all	   relevant	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commissions.	   In	   examining	   the	   period	   following	   the	   transition	   to	   democracy	   in	   1979	  
(Legislature	   I)	   until	   2013	   (Legislature	   X),	   I	   collected	   and	   analyzed	   the	   initial	   initiatives	  
(along	  with	   associated	   interventions)	   with	   titles	   containing	   any	   of	   the	   following	  words:	  
inmigrante	   (immigrant),	   inmigración	   (immigration),	   extranjero	   (foreigner),	   extranjería	  
(status	  of	  foreigners	  or	  “alien	  affairs”).	  
Whenever	   I	   reference	   a	   parliamentary	   initiative,	   I	   indicate	   the	   number	   of	   the	  
legislature,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  reference	  number	  of	  the	  initiative,	  so	  that	  it	  can	  be	  easily	  found;	  
for	   instance,	   (I	   –	   161/000398)	   stands	   for	   first	   legislature,	   initiative	   type	   161,	   number	  
000398.	  I	  do	  not	  list	  the	  initiatives	  in	  the	  “References”	  section	  of	  the	  dissertation.	  When	  
citing	  an	   intervention	  that	   is	  part	  of	  an	   initiative	  debated	  over	  many	  sessions	   (such	  as	  a	  
bill),	  I	  provide	  a	  more	  detailed	  reference	  to	  facilitate	  the	  location	  of	  the	  intervention	  in	  the	  
Boletín	  Oficial	  de	  las	  Cortes	  Generales.	  Occasionally,	  I	  cite	  interventions	  that	  took	  place	  in	  
the	   Senate	   or	   in	   the	   parliament	   of	   some	  of	   Spain’s	   autonomous	   communities,	   in	  which	  
case,	  I	  provide	  the	  complete	  citation	  in	  a	  footnote.	  At	  the	  physical	  archive	  in	  Madrid,	  I	  also	  
collected	   some	   reports,	   and	   other	   documents	   presented	   to	   representatives	   in	   Congress	  
but	   not	   transcribed	   in	   the	  minutes.	  Whenever	   available,	   I	   also	   collected	   key	  ministerial	  
memos,	   police	   directives,	   and	   governmental	   reports	   available	   online,	   or	   shared	   by	  





In	   addition	   to	   the	   archival	   material,	   this	   study	   also	   relies	   on	   interviews	   and	   informal	  
discussions	  with	  various	  actors	   involved	  in,	  or	  attentive	  to,	   immigration	  governance.	  The	  
interviews	  were	   used	   as	  much	   as	   possible	   as	   a	  means	   to	   obtain	   information	   about	   the	  
“hands-­‐on”	   part	   of	   the	   policy-­‐making	   process,	   which	   the	   policy	   documents	   and	   the	  
parliamentary	   debates	   cannot	   account	   for,	   and	   about	   the	   practices,	   know-­‐how,	   and	  
everyday	   procedures	   of	   police	   intervention	   that	   are	   not	   codified	   in	   law.	   As	   Stéphane	  
Beaud	   and	   Florence	   Weber	   ([1997]	   2010)	   explain,	   interviewees	   who	   hold	   institutional	  
positions	   as	   elected	   officials,	   judges,	   or	   spokespersons	   tend	   to	   speak	   in	   abstract	   terms	  
about	   their	   work.	   Using	   observations	   and	   examples	   drawn	   from	   my	   archival	   material	  
allowed	  me	  to	  ask	  about	  specific	  situations	  and	  about	  the	  details	  of	  how	  the	  work	  is	  done	  
(Gusterson	   1997).	   Interviewing	   people	   with	   political	   skills	   also	  means	   the	   researcher	   is	  
confronted	  by	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  informant	  is	  hiding	  elements	  of	  the	  process	  that	  may	  
not	   be	   legal	   or	   politically	   correct.	   I	   always	   tried	   to	   corroborate	   the	   veracity	   of	   the	  
interviewees’	  claims	  through	  other	   interviews,	  observations,	  and	  the	  available	   literature,	  
but	  I	  tried	  not	  to	  challenge	  interviewees	  during	  the	  interview	  process,	  asking	  instead	  for	  
clarification,	  and	  inviting	  them	  to	  speak	  about	  the	  rationale	  behind	  their	  actions	  and	  the	  
types	  of	  problems	  they	  encounter	  in	  practice	  (Kaufmann	  2006).	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Table	  2:	  	  Interviews	  Conducted	  
Date	   Position	  held	  by	  the	  interviewee	  
	   High-­‐Ranking	  Officials	  
26/09/2012	   Sub-­‐director,	  General	  Direction	  of	  Migrations,	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior;	  
Director,	  General	  Direction	  of	  Migration	  Ordering,	  Ministry	  of	  Labour	  and	  Social	  
Affairs;	  
Senior	  advisor,	  General	  Direction	  of	  Labour	  Inspection	  and	  Social	  Security,	  
Ministry	  of	  Labour	  and	  Immigration	  
01/10/2012	   Director,	  General	  Direction	  of	  Immigration,	  Generalitat	  de	  Catalunya	  
01/10/2012	   Civil	  servant,	  General	  Direction	  of	  Immigration,	  Generalitat	  de	  Catalunya	  
4/10/2012	   Sub-­‐director,	  Office	  of	  Alien	  Affairs,	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	  
7/11/2012	   Head	  of	  staff	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Immigration	  and	  Emigration,	  	  
Ministry	  of	  Labour	  and	  Social	  Affairs	  
	   Politicians	  
29/09/2012	   Elected	  member	  of	  Congress	  (diputado)	  specialized	  in	  immigration	  1	  
24/10/2012	   Elected	  member	  of	  Congress	  (diputado)	  specialized	  in	  immigration	  2	  
	   Law	  Enforcement	  and	  Legal	  Experts	  
16/07/2008	   	  	  	  Spokesperson,	  Sindicado	  Unificado	  de	  Policia	  (SUP),	  Ceuta	  
05/11/2012	   Spokesperson,	  Sindicado	  Unificado	  de	  Policia	  (SUP),	  Madrid	  
20/11/2012	   Immigration	  lawyer	  
27/11/2012	   Juez	  de	  instrucción	  (lower-­‐court	  judge)	  No	  5	  of	  Madrid	  	  
Juez	  de	  control	  (Judge	  of	  control),	  CIE	  of	  Aluche	  (Madrid)	  
	   NGOs	  and	  Unions	  
02/10/2012	   Employee	  1,	  Immigrant	  Workers	  Information	  Centre	  (CITE)	  
Comisiones	  Obreras	  (Barcelona)	  
02/10/2012	   Employee	  2,	  Immigrant	  Workers	  Information	  Centre	  (CITE)	  	  
Comisiones	  Obreras	  (Barcelona)	  
10/11/2012	   Various	  members,	  SOS	  Racismo	  (Madrid)	  
06/11/2012	   Organizer,	  Neighbourhood	  Brigades	  for	  the	  Observations	  of	  Human	  Rights	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I	  conducted	  15	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  (Marvasti	  2004)	  with	  current	  and	  former	  
high-­‐ranking	   civil	   servants,	   elected	   officials,	   union	   representatives,	   a	   judge,	   and	   NGO	  
members.	  The	  interviews	  each	  lasted	  between	  50	  and	  90	  minutes,	  and	  were	  conducted	  in	  
the	   fall	   of	   2012	   during	   five	  months	   of	   fieldwork	   in	   Spain.10	   In	   Table	   2	   on	   the	   following	  
page,	   I	   include	   a	   list	   of	   the	   interviews	   conducted.	   To	   preserve	   the	   anonymity	   of	   the	  
interviewees,	   while	   providing	   their	   positions	   as	   precisely	   as	   possible,	   I	   do	   not	  mention	  
whether	  they	  currently	  hold	  that	  position	  or	  have	  held	  it	  in	  the	  past.	  
As	  a	  means	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  key	  officials	  and	  develop	  my	  understanding	  of	  the	  field	  
of	  immigration	  policy-­‐making	  in	  Spain,	  I	  also	  met	  with	  many	  senior	  academics	  working	  on	  
immigration	   issues	   and	   immigration	   law,	   to	   ask	   for	   their	   advice	   on	   my	   research	   and	  
discuss	  their	  work.	  While	  I	  did	  not	  conduct	  formal	  interviews	  with	  them,	  and	  therefore	  did	  
not	  record	  or	  analyze	  them,	  I	  asked	  specific	  questions	  about	  Spanish	  immigration	  policies	  
and	   legislation,	   and	   the	   information	   gathered	   in	   these	   discussions	  was	   very	   valuable	   in	  
building	  my	   interview	  questions	  and	  developing	  my	  analysis.	   I	   sometimes	   refer	   to	   these	  
personal	  communications	  in	  the	  dissertation.	  
Ethnographic	  Notes	  
While	   most	   of	   the	   data	   on	   the	   governing	   of	   migrants	   and	   migration	   came	   from	  
parliamentary	  debates,	  policy	  documents,	  and	  interviews,	  I	  also	  took	  detailed	  notes	  of	  my	  
                                                
10	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  one	  interview	  conducted	  in	  2008	  with	  the	  spokesperson	  of	  a	  police	  union	  in	  Ceuta,	  
as	  part	  of	  another	  research	  project,	  which	  is	  included	  in	  the	  data	  analyzed	  for	  Chapter	  6.	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observations	  of	  the	  policing	  of	  immigrants	  in	  the	  streets	  of	  Madrid	  during	  the	  five	  months	  
I	   spent	   living	   in	   the	   immigrant	   neighbourhood	   of	   Lavapiés	   and	   visiting	   other	   immigrant	  
neighbourhoods.	   The	  policing	  of	   immigrants	   in	   the	   streets	   and	  public	   spaces	  of	   Spanish	  
cities	  is	  a	  constant	  phenomenon	  that	  takes	  place	  quite	  openly.	  By	  sitting	  in	  public	  plazas	  
for	   hours	   in	   immigrant	   neighbourhoods,	   I	   witnessed	   hundreds	   of	   cases	   of	   immigrants	  
being	  controlled,	  questioned,	  or	  detained	  by	  police;	  I	  observed	  the	  dynamics,	  listened	  to	  
the	   interactions,	   and	   sometimes	   asked	   questions	   of	   these	   immigrants	   or	   their	   friends	  
afterwards.	   This	   was	   not	   participant	   observation,	   nor	   pure	   external	   observation.	   I	  
interacted	  with	  some	  of	   the	   immigrants	  who	  spent	   time	   in	   these	  plazas,	  but	   rarely	  with	  
the	  police	  officers	  whose	  practices	  interested	  me	  the	  most.	  	  
While	   I	  was	   trained	   as	   an	   anthropologist	   and	   have	   never	   abandoned	   the	   habit	   of	  
considering	   all	   events	   as	   potential	   ethnographic	   material,	   the	   addition	   of	   these	  
observations	  to	  the	  research	  strategy	  does	  not	  come	  close	  to	  making	  it	  an	  ethnography.	  I	  
did,	   however,	   take	   systematic	   notes,	   describing	   the	   context	   (space,	   time,	   social	   setting,	  
people	   involved),	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   interaction	   (sometimes	   asking	   immigrants	   for	   their	  
interpretation),	  and	  the	  content	  of	  what	  was	  said	  by	   the	  various	  actors	   involved	   (Beaud	  
and	   Weber	   [1997]	   2010).	   The	   information	   gathered	   through	   these	   observations	   was	  
mostly	  used	  to	  orient	  my	  interviews	  with	  actors	  involved	  in	  immigration	  control	  (a	  judge,	  a	  
police	   union	   representative,	   an	   official	   at	   the	   Ministry	   of	   the	   Interior)	   and	   activists	  
documenting	  these	  practices,	  but	  it	  also	  provided	  very	  useful	  material	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  
street-­‐level	  immigration	  policing	  developed	  in	  Chapter	  7.	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Interpretation	  
The	  methodological	  discussion	  has	  thus	  far	  rendered	  explicit	  this	  study’s	  commitment	  to	  
bridging	  methodologies	  inspired	  by	  governmentality	  studies	  and	  others	  that	  clearly	  belong	  
to	   more	   traditional	   sociological	   inquiry.	   The	   tensions	   reappear	   here	   at	   the	   level	   of	  
interpretation.	   Once	   again,	   the	   “discourse	   analysis”	   performed	   by	   scholars	   inspired	   by	  
governmentality	   studies	   often	   eschew	   positivist	   epistemologies	   without	   providing	   any	  
serious	   alternatives.	   For	   instance,	   Jonathan	   Potter	   and	   Margarett	   Wetherell	   (1994)	  
suggest	  that:	  
One	   of	   the	   difficulties	   in	   writing	   about	   the	   process	   of	   discourse	   analysis	   is	   that	   the	   very	  
category	  ‘analysis’	  comes	  from	  a	  discourse	  developed	  for	  quantitative,	  positivist	  methodologies	  
such	   as	   experiments	   and	   surveys.	   Analysis	   in	   those	   settings	   consists	   in	   a	   distinct	   set	   of	  
procedures;	   aggregating	   scores,	   categorizing	   instances,	   performing	   various	   sorts	   of	   statistical	  
analysis	   and	   so	   on.	   It	   is	   sometimes	   tempting	   to	   think	   that	   in	   discourse	   work	   there	   is	   some	  
analogous	  set	  of	  codified	  procedures	  that	  can	  be	  put	  in	  effect	  and	  which	  will	  lead	  to	  another	  set	  
of	  entities	  known	  as	  ‘the	  results’	  [but	  it	  is	  rarely	  the	  case]	  (P.53).	  
	  
This	   is	  an	  exaggeration.	   In	  fact,	  distinct	  sets	  of	  highly	  technical	  analytical	  procedures	  are	  
used	  for	  qualitative	  textual	  and	  discourse	  analysis	  based	  on	  methodologies	  developed	  in	  
linguistics	  with	  impressive	  results.	  In	  Spain	  alone,	  the	  work	  of	  Teun	  A.	  van	  Dijk	  on	  racism	  
and	  prejudice	  in	  parliamentary	  and	  media	  discourses	  is	  a	  great	  example	  of	  what	  this	  type	  
of	   research	   can	  produce	   (van	  Dijk	   1997,	   2004;	  Martín	   Rojo	   and	   van	  Dijk	   1997).	  Despite	  
Potter	   and	  Wetherell’s	   argument,	   the	  problem	   lies	   not	   in	   the	  understanding	  of	   analysis	  
but	   in	   the	   definition	   of	   “discourse.”	   Foucauldian	   discourse	   analysis	   is	   a	   misnomer	  
inasmuch	   as	   what	   we	   study	   are	   discursive	   formations,	   grids	   of	   intelligibility,	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problematizations,	   technologies,	   and	   practices,	   not	   modes	   of	   argumentation	   and	  
rhetorical	  style	  (Bacchi	  2012;	  Sharp	  and	  Richardson	  2001;	  Jäger	  and	  Maier	  2009).11	  	  
For	  this	  reason,	  the	  interpretation	  strategy	  adopted	  in	  this	  research	  is	  one	  based	  on	  
thematic	   content	  analysis	   and	  on	   the	  mapping	  of	   the	   logics	   and	  practices	   induced	   from	  
parliamentary	   speeches,	   policy	   documents,	   interviews,	   and	   observations.	   This	   strategy	  
allows	  me	  to	  move	  away	   from	  a	  strictly	  discursive	   level	  of	  analysis,	   to	   include	  practices,	  
technologies,	  rationales,	  and	  justifications.	  The	  coding	  and	  analysis	  parts	  of	  the	  research	  
took	   the	   form	   of	   a	   continuous	   process	   of	   interpretation	   and	   production	   of	   data	   that	  
nonetheless	   included	   broad	   thematic	   categorization	   focusing	   on	   discursive	   regularities	  
(Gale	  2001;	  Kendall	  and	  Wickham	  1999).	  I	  classified	  speech	  and	  text	  fragments	  into	  broad	  
categories	   that	   I	   identified	   inductively	   or	   in	   the	   literature,	   and	   studied	   the	   interplay	  
between	   these	   fragments,	   the	   constitution	   of	   various	   discursive	   convergences,	   and	  





                                                
11	  Despite	  some	  additional	  sociological	  or	  linguistic	  discourse	  analyses	  that	  draw	  inspiration	  from	  Foucault	  to	  
varying	  extents	  (see	  Angenot	  1989;	  Leps	  2004;	  Mills	  2004).	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Table	  3:	  	  Analytic	  Themes	  Created	  
Criminality	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  exclusion	  
Criteria	  for	  immigrant	  desirability	  and	  rights	  based	  on	  culture	  
Criteria	  for	  immigrant	  desirability	  and	  rights	  based	  on	  work	  
Control	  and	  order	  as	  a	  demonstration	  of	  state	  sovereignty	  
Discretion	  in	  application	  of	  regulation	  
Implementation	  of	  immigration	  regulation	  for	  other	  purposes	  
Justification	  of	  policies	  based	  on	  EU	  obligation	  or	  other	  countries’	  practices	  
Labour	  market	  as	  a	  manageable	  entity	  
Need	  of	  knowledge	  about	  immigrants	  
Need	  of	  knowledge	  about	  migration	  flows	  
Re-­‐articulations	  of	  race	  in	  cultural	  terms	  +	  “we	  are	  not	  racist”	  
Relations	  between	  culture	  and	  integration	  (or	  lack	  thereof)	  
Relations	  between	  culture/origin	  and	  obligation	  of	  solidarity	  
Relations	  between	  governing/managing	  capacity	  and	  co-­‐operation	  
Relations	  between	  governing/managing	  capacity	  and	  knowledge	  
Relations	  between	  governing/managing	  capacity	  and	  technology	  
Relations	  between	  irregular	  employment	  and	  criminality/exploitation	  
Relations	  between	  irregularity,	  illegality,	  criminality	  
Relations	  between	  labour	  market	  and	  “national”	  economy	  
Relations	  between	  work	  and	  integration	  
Respect	  and	  violation	  of	  laws	  as	  a	  strategy	  
Strategies	  of	  counting	  and	  statistics	  
Tensions	  between	  levels	  of	  government	  
Tensions	  between	  politicians	  and	  civil	  servants	  
Use	  of	  bureaucratic	  categories	  to	  classify	  people/	  Need	  to	  develop	  definitions	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While	   traditional	   thematic	   content	  analysis	  often	  calls	   for	  pre-­‐analysis	   in	   the	   field,	  
categorization,	   codification,	   and	   then	   interpretation	   (Robert	   and	   Bouillaguet	   1997),	   I	  
followed	  a	  less	  linear	  process.	  After	  pre-­‐analysis	  during	  the	  period	  of	  data	  collection,	  I	  had	  
already	  an	  idea	  of	  some	  of	  the	  themes	  that	  I	  would	  use.	  I	  started	  by	  attributing	  codes	  to	  
text,	   interviews,	   and	   fragments	   of	   parliamentary	   debates,	   based	   on	   a	  method	   of	   open	  
coding	  (Bailey	  2007).	  Simultaneously,	  I	  started	  classifying	  some	  of	  these	  codes	  under	  the	  
broader	  themes	  I	  had	  already	  identified,	  while	  other	  codes	  remained	  unclassified.	  	  I	  then	  
went	  back	  to	  the	  material	  to	  refine	  my	  themes	  and	  reduce	  my	  data.	  The	  themes,	  listed	  in	  
Table	   3,	   provided	   a	   fragmented	   picture,	   and	   at	   the	  moment	   of	  writing	   the	   substantive	  
chapters,	  I	  had	  to	  reintegrate	  them	  into	  a	  more	  cohesive	  narrative.	  The	  content	  classified	  
in	  these	  themes	  was	  sometimes	  used	   in	  more	  than	  one	  chapter,	  sometimes	  not	  used	  at	  
all.	  This	  material	  provided	  me	  with	  colours	  as	  I	  painted	  the	  story.	  
Return	  to	  the	  Literature	  
For	  the	  sake	  of	  avoiding	  the	  dangers	  of	  “over-­‐interpretation”	  (Lahire	  2007:43)	  that	  come	  
with	   a	   deductive	   research	   strategy,	   and	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   preserve	   at	   least	   part	   of	   the	  
epistemological	   uncertainty	   that	   characterized	   Foucault’s	   intellectual	   endeavour	   (Latour	  
2005:86,	  n.106),	  I	  chose	  to	  build	  my	  research	  design	  around	  a	  framework	  that	  helped	  me	  
figure	   out	   how	   to	   conduct	   a	   sociology	   of	   policy.	   Indeed,	   by	   focusing	   on	   the	   useful	  
literature	   of	   Foucauldian	   policy	   sociology,	   I	   aimed	   to	   use	   theory	   to	   figure	   out	   how	   to	  
approach	   Spanish	   immigration	   policies	   and	   the	   governing	   of	   irregular	  migration,	   not	   to	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build	  hypotheses	  about	  what	  this	  governing	  looks	  like.	  In	  a	  sense,	  I	  intended	  to	  start	  this	  
research	  by	  adopting	  the	  kind	  of	  critical	  empiricism	  promoted	  by	  Rose	  (1999):	  
An	  empiricism	  closer	  to	  that	  of	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  when	  he	  compares	  the	  work	  of	  his	  philosophy	  in	  
part	   to	  a	  detective	  novel,	   in	  that	   ‘concepts,	  with	  their	  zones	  of	  presence,	  should	   intervene	  to	  
resolve	  local	  situations.	  They	  themselves	  change	  along	  with	  the	  problem	  .	  .	  .’	  Empiricism,	  here,	  
is	   not	   a	   matter	   of	   a	   reaction	   against	   concepts,	   far	   less	   an	   appeal	   to	   the	   primacy	   of	   lived	  
experience.	   It	   is	   a	  method	  of	   lived	   experience.	   It	   is	   a	  method	  of	   inventivity,	   the	   invention	  of	  
concepts	  as	  objects	  of	  an	  encounter,	  a	  here-­‐and-­‐now	  encounter	  (P.12;	  citing	  Deleuze	  1994:xx).	  
	  
No	   research	   is	   truly	   inductive,	  however,	   as	  one	  always	   thinks	  within	  a	   certain	  paradigm	  
(Kuhn	  1962).	  The	  early	  process	  of	  designing	  this	  research	  was	  clearly	  informed	  by	  scholarly	  
works	  that	  make	  substantive	  claims	  about	  nation-­‐building,	  cultural	  racism,	  criminalization	  
and	   securitization,	   borders	   and	   bordering,	   liberalism	   and	   neoliberalism.	   As	   much	   as	  
possible,	   however,	   I	   tried	   to	   bracket	   them	   to	   avoiding	   starting	   the	   research	  with	   these	  
claims	   in	  mind,	  and	  only	  went	  back	  to	  this	   literature	   later,	  during	  the	   interpretation	  and	  
writing	  process.	  During	  this	  process,	  as	  I	  engaged	  with	  the	  data	  and	  tried	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  
the	   patterns	   I	   saw	   emerging,	   I	   went	   back	   to	   this	   literature	   to	   help	   me	   further	  
conceptualize	   the	   processes	   I	   was	   describing.	   I	   found	   it	   very	   productive	   to	   develop	  my	  
analysis	  in	  dialogue	  with	  empirical	  and	  theoretical	  works	  produced	  by	  others.	  Indeed,	  the	  
substantive	   chapters	   that	   follow	   engage	   with	   a	   large	   body	   of	   scholarly	   literature	   on	  
immigration	   policies	   in	   Spain	   and	   elsewhere,	   as	   well	   as	   on	   theoretical	   debates	   in	  
sociology,	  socio-­‐legal	  studies,	  criminology,	  and	  border	  studies. 
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Chapter	  3	  
“Immigrants,”	  “Foreign	  Workers,”	  and	  “Illegals”:	  












This	  chapter	  covers	   the	  emergence	  of	   irregular	  migration	  as	  an	  object	  of	  government	   in	  
Spain	  in	  the	  1980s,	  a	  period	  whose	  pivotal	  moment	  is	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  first	  Alien	  Act	  
(LOE	   7/1985)	   in	   1985.	   More	   specifically,	   it	   analyzes	   the	   problematization	   of	   irregular	  
migration	   in	  Spain—understood	  as	   the	   result	  of	  historically	   situated	  discursive	  and	  non-­‐
discursive	  practices	  that	  provide	  specific	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  and	  acting	  upon	  an	  object	  
of	  government—and	  the	  role	  that	  law	  plays	  in	  this	  process.	  Considering	  Michel	  Foucault’s	  
desire	  to	  develop	  an	  alternative	  conception	  of	  power	  that	  would	  “cut	  the	  King’s	  head	  off”	  
and	  decenter	   the	   analysis	   of	   power	   away	   from	   sovereignty	   and	   law,	   it	  may	  appear	  odd	  
that	   this	   study	   commences	   with	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   Alien	   Act.	   However,	   critical	   legal	  
scholars	  working	  within	  a	  governmentality	   framework	  have	  shown	  that	  paying	  attention	  
to	   law	   can	   be	   very	   productive	   (Hunt	   and	   Wickham	   1994;	   Rose	   and	   Valverde	   1998;	  
Valverde	  2003;	  Valverde,	  Levi,	  and	  Moore	  2005;	  Walby	  2007).	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Foucault	   understands	   government	   as	   a	   mode	   of	   power	   that	   is	   “not	   a	   matter	   of	  
imposing	   laws	   on	  men,	   but	   rather	   of	   disposing	   things,	   that	   is	   to	   say	   to	   employ	   tactics	  
rather	  than	  laws,	  and	  if	  need	  be	  to	  use	  the	  laws	  themselves	  as	  tactics”	  (Hunt	  and	  Wickham	  
1994:52).	  Accordingly,	   law-­‐as-­‐governance	   scholars	   consider	   that	   law	   is	  but	  one	  of	  many	  
tactics	   of	   government	   (Levi	   and	   Valverde	   2001;	   Lippert	   2005;	   Lippert	   and	  Walby	   2014;	  
Valverde	   2012).	   From	   this	   perspective,	   processes	   of	   normative	   regulation	   first	   emerge	  
outside	  of	  law,	  and	  only	  sometimes	  take	  the	  form	  of	  legal	  ordering.	  Therefore,	  in	  the	  law-­‐
as-­‐governance	  approach,	  not	  only	  has	  the	  law	  no	  unity,	  it	  also	  holds	  no	  privileged	  position	  
in	   the	   analysis.	   The	   strategy	   then	   is	   to	   focus	   on	   problematization,	   namely	   the	   ways	   in	  
which	   social	   issues	   are	   constructed	   as	   problems	   in	   need	   of	   some	   regulation,	  which	   can	  
sometimes	  be	  legal.	  As	  Nikolas	  Rose	  and	  Mariana	  Valverde	  (1998)	  explain:	  
While	  it	  might	  seem	  obvious	  to	  begin	  by	  asking	  ‘what	  does	  law	  govern?’,	  from	  the	  perspective	  
of	  government	  we	  would	  not	  start	   from	   law	  at	  all.	   Instead,	  we	  would	  start	   from	  problems	  or	  
problematizations	  (cf.	  Castel,	  1994).	  A	  problematization,	  here,	   is	  a	  way	   in	  which	  experience	   is	  
offered	  to	  thought	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  problem	  requiring	  attention	  (P.545).	  
	  
However,	   decentering	   law	   does	   not	   mean	   abandoning	   it.	   Objects	   and	   problems	   of	  
government	  do	  not,	   indeed,	  “form	  within	  the	  working	  of	   law	  itself,”	  but	  their	   inscription	  
into	  law	  is	  part	  of	  the	  process	  that	  makes	  them	  into	  “problems	  requiring	  attention”	  (Rose	  
and	   Valverde	   1998:545).	   As	   a	   tactic,	   and	   as	   a	   powerful	   site	   for	   the	   construction	   and	  
contestation	   of	   truth	   claims,	   law	   should	   not	   be	   underestimated.	   In	   fact,	   critical	   legal	  
scholars	   have	   convincingly	   demonstrated	   the	   importance	   of	   analyzing	   the	   profound	  
connections	   between	   our	   understandings	   of	   historically	   and	   culturally	   situated	   notions	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such	  as	  race,	  gender,	  responsibility,	  or	  morality,	  and	  how	  they	  have	  been	  constituted	  and	  
regulated	   through	   law	   (Anghie	   1996;	   Haney	   López	   1996;	   Mawani	   2002;	   Scales	   2006).	  
Furthermore,	   considering	   laws	   and	   notions	   of	   legality	   and	   illegality	   is	   of	   particular	  
significance	   when	   one	   analyzes	   objects	   of	   government	   intimately	   tied	   to	   projects	   of	  
statehood	  such	  as	  immigration,	  nationalism,	  or	  colonialism	  (Mawani	  2009;	  Thobani	  2007;	  
Soguk	   1999).	   One	   should	   be	   careful,	   however,	   when	   making	   claims	   about	   the	   legal	  
construction	  of	  social	  phenomena.	  I	  prefer	  analyzing	  this	  process	  as	  a	  social	  construction	  
in	  which	  laws	  and	  notions	  of	  legality	  play	  an	  important	  role,	  and	  inquiring	  into	  the	  logics	  
informing	   law-­‐making,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   effects	   of	   legal	   practices	   on	   broader	   practices	   of	  
governance.	  
While	  it	  is	  common	  to	  situate	  the	  beginning	  of	  Spanish	  immigration	  policies	  in	  1985,	  
when	   Spain	   adopted	   the	   first	   Alien	   Act	   (LOE	   7/1985),	   I	   suggest	   that	   the	   emergence	   of	  
migration	  as	  a	  political	  object	  started	  before	  that	  and	  remained	  unstable	  until	  at	  least	  the	  
early	  1990s.	  The	  period	   leading	  up	   to	   the	  adoption	  of	   the	  second	  decree	  providing	  new	  
regulations	   for	   the	   Alien	   Act	   in	   1996	   (RD	   155/1996)	   was	   filled	   with	   political	   debates,	  
ranging	   from	  discussions	   about	  what	   the	   phenomena	   at	   hand	   should	   be	   called	   to	   legal	  
challenges	   to	   the	   constitutionality	   of	   the	   1985	   law.	   A	   close	   reading	   of	   parliamentary	  
debates	   during	   this	   period	   reveals	   that	   by	   1990,	   political	   parties	   and	   even	   individuals	  
within	  these	  parties	  were	  unable	  to	  agree	  on	  a	  definition	  of	  what	  was	  to	  be	  governed	  and	  
how.	  Acknowledging	  this	  confusion,	  the	  government	  agreed	  to	  produce	  a	  report	  aimed	  at	  
circumscribing	  this	  object	  of	  government	  and	  submitted	  it	  to	  Congress	  in	  December	  1990.	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This	   official	   “communication	   of	   the	   government	   to	   Congress,”	   titled	   Situation	   of	  
Foreigners	   in	   Spain:	   Basic	   Features	   of	   the	   Spanish	   Policy	   on	   Foreigners,	   resulted	   in	  
Congress	   almost	   unanimously	   adopting	   a	   policy	   orientation	   document	   in	   April	   1991.12	  
While	   it	   is	   true	   that	   Spanish	   adhesion	   to	   the	   Schengen	   Agreement	   provides	   the	   main	  
immediate	   context	   for	   the	   policies	   developed	   in	   the	   late	   1980s	   and	   early	   1990s,	   the	  
specificities	   of	   the	   Spanish	   rationales	   for	   governing	   irregular	   migration	   appear	   more	  
clearly	  in	  this	  report	  to	  Congress.	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  problematizations	  of	  irregular	  migration	  
delineated	  in	  the	  report	  inform	  the	  policy	  orientation	  document	  adopted	  by	  Congress,	  but	  
the	  report	  was	  also	   later	  cited	   in	  the	  opening	  sentence	  of	  the	  decree	  providing	  the	  new	  
regulations	   for	   the	   Alien	   Act	   in	   1996	   (RD	   155/1996).	   Following	   Trevor	   Gale	   (1999),	   I	  
consider	  the	  adoption	  of	  this	  1990	  report	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  policy	  settlement,	  a	  moment	  that	  
marks	   the	   end	   of	   the	   first	   series	   of	   debates	   about	   immigration	   in	   Spain,	   soon	   to	   be	  
followed	  by	  more	  passionate	  ones.	  	  
Not	  Everything	  Started	  in	  1985	  
In	  most	  of	  her	  works	  on	  Spain,	  Kitty	  Calavita	  (1998,	  2003,	  2005,	  2006;	  Calavita	  and	  Suárez-­‐
Navaz	  2003)	  uses	  the	  following	  quote	  from	  anthropologist	  Mercedes	  Jabardo	  to	  make	  the	  
case	   that	   the	   LOE	   7/1985	   effectively	   illegalized	   irregular	   migrants:	   “The	   legislation	   .	   .	   .	  
generates	  irregularity	  among	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  immigrant	  community	  .	   .	   .	   In	  other	  
                                                
12	   Report:	   Situación	   de	   los	   extranjeros	   en	   España.	   Líneas	   básicas	   de	   la	   política	   española	   de	   extranjería.	  
Comunicación	   del	   Gobierno	   al	   Congreso	   de	   los	   diputados.	   General	   Archives	   of	   the	   Congress,	   reference	  
number	  18167	  (1990).	  Non-­‐legislative	  proposal:	  Proposición	  no	  de	  ley	  ante	  el	  pleno	  relativa	  a	  la	  situación	  de	  
los	  extranjeros	  en	  España	  (IV	  -­‐	  162/000107).	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words,	   the	   law	   creates	   the	   legal	   category	   of	   the	   immigrant	   and	   thereby	   generates	   the	  
category	  of	  the	  ‘illegal’”	  (Jabardo	  1995:86-­‐87	  cited	  in	  Calavita	  2005:43).	  Calavita	  adds	  that	  
this	   claim	   is	   true	  only	   insofar	   as	   the	   lack	  of	   a	   comprehensive	   immigration	  policy	  before	  
1985	  meant	  that	   irregular	  migration	  was	  not	  technically	  a	  matter	  of	   legality	  or	   illegality.	  
While	   she	   shows	   the	   limits	   of	   this	   statement	   and	  uses	   it	   as	   a	   starting	   point	   for	   a	  more	  
subtle	   analysis	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   Spanish	   immigration	   policies	   regularly	   push	  
immigrants	   into	   irregularity,	   this	   claim,	   repeated	   over	   and	   over,	   ends	   up	   giving	   the	  
impression	  that	  everything	  started	  with	  the	  LOE	  7/1985.	  Calavita	  is,	  of	  course,	  not	  the	  only	  
one	  who	  begins	  the	  story	  in	  such	  a	  way.	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  part	  of	  a	  common	  narrative	  that	  most	  
scholars,	  activists,	  and	  officials	  use	  as	  a	  shortcut	  when	  discussing	  the	  evolution	  of	  Spanish	  
immigration	  policies.	   Indeed,	  many	  other	  prominent	  scholars	  have	  made	  a	  similar	  point,	  
including	  Antonio	   Izquierdo	  Escribano	   (1996),	  who	   famously	   argued	   that,	   prior	   to	   1985,	  
irregular	   immigrants	   living	   in	   Spain	   had	   been	   able	   to	   work	   without	   being	   harassed	   by	  
Spanish	  authorities	   for	  being	   in	   the	  country	  without	   the	  proper	  authorization.	   In	  a	  way,	  
the	  argument	  suggests	  that	  there	  was	  no	   legal	  consciousness	  (Ewick	  and	  Silbey	  1998)	  of	  
illegality	  related	  to	  irregular	  residency	  or	  work	  prior	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  first	  Alien	  Act	  
in	  1985.	  
I	   am	   in	   no	   way	   questioning	   the	   accuracy	   of	   the	   many	   works	   which	   present	   this	  
narrative	   of	   the	   founding	  moment.	   However,	   the	   illegalization	   of	   irregular	  migrants	   did	  
not	   start	   with	   this	   legislation.	   As	   new	   research	   focuses	   on	   more	   recent	   events,	   these	  
narratives	  tend	  to	  solidify	  and	  prevent	  us	  from	  inquiring	  about	  the	  governing	  practices	  in	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place	   before	   1985.	   In	  what	   follows,	   I	   examine	  what	   is	   commonly	   dismissed	   and	   largely	  
ignored	  as	  an	  incoherent	  and	  incomplete	  set	  of	  regulations	  and	  instructions	  existing	  prior	  
to	  the	  LOE	  7/1985.	   I	  contend	  that	  to	  understand	  the	  early	  problematizations	  of	   irregular	  
migration	  as	  an	  object	  of	  government	  in	  the	  1980s—and	  the	  particular	  role	  that	  the	  LOE	  
7/1985	   played	   in	   this	   context—we	   need	   to	   reinscribe	   the	   Alien	   Act	  within	   the	   broader	  
context	  of	  practices	  and	  problems	  from	  which	  it	  emerged.	  	  
Police	  Instructions	  in	  the	  Early	  1980s	  
A	   document	   prepared	   “mainly	   for	   the	   officers	   of	   the	   Superior	   Police	   Corp”	   (Dirección	  
General	  de	  Policía	  1987:9),	  available	  at	  the	  Congress	  library	  in	  Madrid,	  offers	  a	  collection	  
of	  all	  regulations,	  decrees,	  police	  instructions,	  and	  memoranda	  regulating	  police	  practices	  
with	   regard	   to	   borders	   and	   foreigners	   before	   the	   adoption	  of	   the	   decree	   implementing	  
the	  regulations	  of	  the	  Alien	  Act	  in	  1986	  (RD	  1119/1986).	  The	  panoply	  of	  police	  instructions	  
related	  to	  the	  control	  of	  foreigners	  published	  during	  the	  first	  few	  years	  of	  the	  democratic	  
regime	  indicates	  that,	  in	  practice,	  those	  responsible	  for	  the	  governing	  of	  foreigners	  were	  
adapting	   to	   the	  new	  political	  order	  by	  amending	   regulations	  adopted	  during	   the	  Franco	  
dictatorship.	  Many	  of	   these	   instructions	  and	  memos	  clearly	   sought	   to	   fill	   the	   legal	  gaps,	  
stating	   that	   some	   of	   the	   previous	   legislation	   had	   been	   deemed	   unconstitutional	   and,	  
therefore,	  until	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  new	  Alien	  Act,	  police	  actions	  needed	  to	  be	  modified	  in	  
various	  ways.	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The	  main	   tension	  was	  between	   the	  Decree	  522/74,	  of	  February	  14,	   that	  Regulates	  
the	   Regime	   of	   Entry,	   Stay,	   and	   Exit	   of	   Foreigners	   in	   Spain,13	   and	   the	   new	   democratic	  
constitution	  adopted	  in	  1978.	  Article	  30	  of	  the	  Decree	  522/14,	  adopted	  in	  the	  last	  year	  of	  
the	  Franco	  dictatorship,	  allowed	  for	  the	  detention	  of	  foreigners	  in	  jails	  or	  prisons	  until	  the	  
moment	  of	  their	  expulsion.	  This	  disposition	  clashed	  with	  Article	  25.3	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  
1978,	  which	  stated	  that	  “the	  Civil	  Administration	  cannot	  impose	  sanctions	  that,	  directly	  or	  
indirectly,	   lead	  to	  a	  privation	  of	   liberty,”	  a	  provision	  that	  also	  applied	  to	   foreigners	   (Art.	  
13.1).	  When,	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  judges	  started	  ruling	  that	  the	  administrative	  incarceration	  
of	   foreigners	  was	   unconstitutional,	   the	   police	   response	  was	   often	   dismissive.	   In	   a	   1982	  
interview	   with	   El	   País	   (García	   1982),	   then	   general	   chief	   of	   police	   José	   Luis	   Fernández	  
Dopico	  declared:	  
I	   do	   not	   think	   that	   there	   is	   a	   juridical	   gap,	   like	   it	   is	   being	   said,	   and	   since	   there	   aren’t	   other	  
regulations,	   we	   have	   to	   use	   this	   decree	   because	   we	   cannot	   let	   foreign	   delinquents	   and	  
undesirables	   that	   are	  not	  even	  admitted	   in	  by	   their	   countries	  of	  origin	   circulate	   freely	   in	  our	  
country	  [The	  police	  action]	  is	  absolutely	  correct,	  until	  there	  is	  a	  constitutional	  development	  of	  
the	  1974	  decree.	  We	  abide	  by	  the	  law	  and	  when	  they	  develop	  a	  new	  law,	  we’ll	  abide	  by	  it,	  as	  it	  
is	  our	  duty.	  
	  
In	   fact,	   a	   look	   at	   police	   instructions	   from	   the	   months	   prior	   to	   this	   debate	   over	   the	  
constitutionality	  of	  Decree	  522/74	  suggests	  that	  the	  control	  of	  foreigners	  was	  a	  priority	  for	  
police.	  The	  Memorandum	  of	  15-­‐2-­‐82,	  of	  the	  General	  Police	  Directorate,	  on	  the	  Creation	  of	  
Operational	   Groups	   for	   the	   Control	   of	   Foreigners	   ordered	   the	   creation	   of	   police	   units	  
                                                
13	  Decreto	  522/74,	  de	  14	  de	  febrero,	  que	  regula	  el	  régimen	  de	  entrada,	  permanencia	  y	  salida	  de	  extranjeros	  
en	  España.	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“dedicated	   exclusively	   to	   the	   control	   of	   foreigners”14	   in	   Madrid,	   Barcelona,	   Alicante,	  
Malaga,	  Palma	  de	  Mallorca,	  Las	  Palmas,	  and	  Cadiz-­‐Algeciras.	  Beyond	  mining	  databases	  for	  
information	  and	  monitoring	  foreigners	   in	  transit,	  the	  units	  had	  the	  task	  of	  chasing	  down	  
irregular	  immigrants	  and	  deporting	  them:	  
Control	   in	   hotels,	   apartments,	   residences,	   hostels	   and	   other	   similar	   establishments	   used	   by	  
foreign	  travelers,	  picking	  them	  up	  with	  police	  patrol	  cars.	  Whenever	  possible,	  the	  collaboration	  
of	   the	   Computer	   Services	   will	   be	   requested	   to	   process	   their	   identification	   and,	   when	   it	   is	  
appropriate,	  to	  search	  the	  premises	  where	  foreigners	  stay.	  
In	  the	  clubs	  and	  pubs,	  especially	  in	  those	  that	  have	  foreign	  employees,	  effective	  control	  should	  
be	  implemented	  on	  a	  continuous	  basis.	  
	  
The	  memorandum	  adds	  that	  “upon	  confirming	  the	  illegal	  presence	  of	  foreigners,	  a	  request	  
of	  expulsion	  will	  be	  presented	  and	  should	  be	  processed	  urgently.”	  Eventually,	   the	  police	  
responded	  to	  the	  critics	  of	  Decree	  522/74	  by	  making	  pragmatic,	  temporary	  changes.	  Some	  
of	   them	   are	   contained	   in	   the	   Written	   Instruction	   from	   the	   General	   Office	   of	  
Documentation	   of	   27-­‐9-­‐82,	   on	   the	   Problem	   of	   Expulsions,15	   which	   introduces	   the	   new	  
procedures	  with	  this	  justification:	  
In	   relation	   to	   the	   problem	   that	   occurred	   as	   a	   result	   of	   some	   judicial	   resolutions	   on	   the	  
unconstitutionality	  of	  the	  Decree	  522/74,	  of	  February	  14,	  that	  Regulates	  the	  Regime	  of	  Entry,	  
Stay,	   and	  Exit	   of	   Foreigners	   in	   Spain,	   related	   to	   the	  detention	   in	   jail	   of	   the	  above-­‐mentioned	  
foreigners	   while	   their	   expulsion	   order	   is	   being	   processed,	   and	   until	   the	   new	   Alien	   Act	   is	  
approved,	  it	  is	  advisable	  that	  we	  all	  adopt	  the	  following	  measures	  .	  .	  .	  
	  
                                                
14	  Circular	  de	  15-­‐2-­‐82,	  de	  la	  Dirección	  general	  de	  la	  policía,	  sobre	  creación	  de	  grupos	  operativos	  de	  control	  de	  
extranjeros.	  
15	   Escrito	   Circular	   de	   la	   Comisaría	   general	   de	   documentación	   de	   27-­‐9-­‐82.	   Sobre	   problemática	   de	   las	  
expulsiones.	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This	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  list	  of	  alternatives	  to	  detaining	  foreigners.	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  
number	   of	   irregular	   immigrants	   was	   very	   limited	   at	   that	   time	   and	   that	   there	   was	   no	  
coordinated	  effort,	  political	  will,	  or	  amount	  of	  large	  resources	  to	  control	  them,	  policing	  did	  
occur,	   and	   the	   framing	   of	   foreigners	   without	   proper	   documentation—including	  
“clandestine	  workers”—as	  criminals	  was	  underway	  well	  before	   the	  adoption	  of	   the	   first	  
Alien	  Act	  in	  1985.	  The	  period	  between	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1978	  and	  that	  
of	   the	   LOE	   7/1985	   was	   a	   period	   of	   adaptation	   and	   conflicting	   views	   regarding	   the	  
adequate	  problematization	  and	  management	  of	   irregular	  migration.	  This	  appears	  clearly	  
in	  an	  analysis	  of	  police	  actions,	  but	  also	  of	  parliamentary	  initiatives	  submitted	  during	  the	  
First	  Legislature	  (1979-­‐82).	  
Two	  Precursors	  to	  the	  Alien	  Act	  during	  the	  First	  Legislature	  	  
Indeed,	   while	   debates	   about	   migrants	   and	   other	   foreigners	   were	   very	   limited	   prior	   to	  
1985,	  there	  were	  two	  attempts	  to	  define	  this	  object	  to	  be	  governed,	  demonstrating	  that	  
the	   problematization	   of	   irregular	   immigrants	   that	   appeared	   in	   the	   first	   Alien	   Act	   could	  
have	  been	  different.	  The	   first	  parliamentary	   initiative	  related	  to	   immigration	  was	  a	  non-­‐
legislative	   proposal	   submitted	   in	   1980	   by	   the	   Communist	   Parliamentary	   Group	   to	   the	  
Special	  Parliamentary	  Commission	  on	  the	  Problems	  of	  Emigration,	  which	  pretended	  to	  set	  
the	  “basic	  principles	  for	  a	  law	  of	  emigration	  and	  immigration.”16	  The	  text,	  adopted	  by	  the	  
commission,	   presented	   various	   incongruities,	   such	  as	   the	  principle	   that	   “foreigners	  who	  
                                                
16	  Principios	  básicos	  para	  la	  elaboración	  de	  una	  Ley	  de	  Emigración	  e	  Inmigración	  (I	  -­‐	  161/000398)	  presented	  
in	  the	  Comisión	  especial	  de	  los	  problemas	  de	  la	  emigración.	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live	   in	   Spain	   illegally	  will	   only	  have	   their	   residence	  and	  work	  permit	   cancelled	   for	   grave	  
reasons	  related	  to	  public	  safety”17	   (Principle	  43)—which	  is	  clearly	   incongruous,	  since	  one	  
cannot	  live	  in	  Spain	  illegally	  and	  have	  residence	  and	  work	  permits.	  To	  a	  great	  extent,	  the	  
principles	  were	  still	  in	  draft	  form.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  draft	  policy	  document	  is	  interesting,	  as	  
it	   already	   includes	   the	   three	   logics	   that	   come	   to	   inform	  all	   subsequent	  policies,	  which	   I	  
analyze	   in	   detail	   in	   Chapters	   4,	   5,	   and	   6:	   the	   will	   to	   “labouralize”	   migration	   flows	   and	  
consider	   immigrants	   as	   workers;	   the	   securitization	   and	   criminalization	   of	   irregular	  
migration	   and	   the	   focus	   on	   policing	   borders;	   and	   what	   I	   call	   the	   culturalization	   and	  
racialization	   of	   immigration,	   including	   the	   preference	   for	   Ibero-­‐Americans	   and	   other	  
immigrants	  with	  cultural	  and	  colonial	  ties	  to	  Spain.	  
Not	  surprisingly,	  considering	  that	   it	  was	  written	  by	  the	  Communist	  Party,	  this	  non-­‐
legislative	  proposal	  focused	  on	  immigration	  primarily	  as	  a	  labour	  issue,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  
it	  proposed	  to	  tie	  the	  very	  status	  of	  immigrant	  to	  a	  productive	  activity:	  “Will	  be	  considered	  
as	   ‘immigrant’	  any	   foreigner	   that	   resides	   in	  Spain	   legally	  and	   is	  engaged	   in	  a	  productive	  
(labour)	  activity,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  members	  of	  his/her	  family”	  (Principle	  34).	  It	  also	  suggested	  
that	   immigrant	   workers	   be	   granted	   the	   same	   rights	   as	   Spanish	   workers.	   While	   the	  
proposal	   treated	   immigrants	   as	   workers	   entitled	   to	   equal	   rights	   and	   recommended	  
punishing	   employers,	   not	  workers,	   in	   cases	   of	   irregular	   employment,	   it	   also	  made	   clear	  
that	  “the	  Government	  shall	  be	  strict	  in	  making	  sure	  to	  prevent	  any	  type	  of	  clandestine	  or	  
                                                
17	  My	   translation	   of:	   “A	   los	   extranjeros	   que	   residan	   ilegalmente	   en	   España	   sólo	   les	   podrá	   ser	   retirado	   el	  
permiso	  de	  residencia	  y	  trabajo	  por	  motivos	  graves	  que	  afecten	  a	  la	  seguridad	  pública	  por	  decisión	  judicial.”	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fraudulent	   immigration”	   (Principle	   46),	   and	   made	   all	   rights	   conditional	   to	   legal	   status.	  
Finally,	   the	   proposal	   also	   stipulated	   that	   there	   should	   be	   preferential	   treatment	   for	  
workers	  from	  “Ibero-­‐American	  countries	  or	  countries	  that	  have	  had,	  or	  currently	  have,	  a	  
particular	   connection	   to	   Spain”	   (Principle	   39).	   At	   this	   time,	   this	   concern	   existed	   in	   legal	  
form	  only	  in	  provisions	  of	  the	  Civil	  Code	  relating	  to	  the	  acquisition	  of	  Spanish	  nationality,	  
but	  it	  informed	  debates	  about	  immigration	  policies	  in	  subsequent	  years.	  
What	  distinguishes	  this	  1980	  proposal	  from	  subsequent	  ones	  is	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  
“immigrant”	  rather	  than	  “foreigner”	  to	  describe	  non-­‐Spanish	  citizens	  who	  reside	  in	  Spain	  
and,	  despite	  wishing	  to	  exclude	  irregular	  migrants	  to	  protect	  the	  labour	  market,	  that	  it	  did	  
not	   approach	   the	   issue	   primarily	   from	   a	   police	   perspective.	   Here,	   immigrants,	   just	   like	  
Spanish	   emigrants,	  were	   to	   be	   treated	   first	   and	   foremost	   as	  workers.	   This	   changed	   the	  
following	   year,	   when	   the	   Union	   of	   the	   Democratic	   Centre-­‐led	   government	   (Unión	   del	  
Centro	  Democrático	  –	  UCD)	  introduced	  the	  first	  version	  of	  the	  Alien	  Act	  through	  the	  Bill	  on	  
the	  Rights	   and	   Liberties	   of	   Foreigners	   in	   Spain	   (Organic	   Law),18	   four	   years	   before	   a	   very	  
similar	  bill	  led	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  LOE	  7/1985.	  It	  was	  indeed	  in	  April	  1981,	  just	  after	  the	  
adhesion	  of	  Greece	   to	   the	  European	  Economic	  Community	   (EEC),	   and	  while	   France	  was	  
working	  to	  delay	  the	  entry	  of	  Spain,	  that	  the	  first	  draft	  of	  the	  Alien	  Act	  was	  tabled.	  It	  was	  
then	  transferred	  to	  the	  Commission	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  an	  entire	  year	  later,	  and	  died	  with	  
the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  First	  Legislature	  in	  October	  1982,	  without	  ever	  having	  been	  debated	  
in	  Congress.	  The	  document	   thus	  only	   reflected	   the	  perspective	  of	   the	  UCD	  government,	  
                                                
18	  	  Proyecto	  de	  Ley	  de	  Derechos	  y	  Libertades	  de	  los	  Extranjeros	  en	  España	  (orgánica)	  (I	  –	  121/000033).	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and	  especially	  that	  of	  the	  minister	  of	  justice,	  minister	  of	  foreign	  affairs,	  and	  minister	  of	  the	  
interior,	  in	  whose	  names	  it	  was	  submitted.	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  non-­‐legislative	  proposal	  of	  1980,	  this	  bill	  applied	  to	  “foreigners,”	  
not	  “immigrants.”	  Its	  introduction	  clarifies:	  	  
The	   scope	   of	   application	   of	   this	   Law	   is	   delimited	   by	   the	   notion	   of	   foreigner.	   Its	   negative	  
conceptualization,	   in	  opposition	   to	  nationals,	   leads	   to	  a	   concept	  of	   foreigner	   that	  describes	  a	  
complex	  reality,	  based	  on	  the	  ways	  or	  finality	  with	  which	  the	  foreigner	  comes	   in	  contact	  with	  
the	  national	  community	  as	  well	  as	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  this	  foreigner	  belongs	  to	  the	  population	  of	  
another	  state.	  Reflecting	  the	  plurality	  inherent	  to	  the	  status	  of	  alien,	  the	  Law	  .	  .	  .	  establishes	  in	  
Section	  VI,	  under	  the	  title	  “Special	  Regimes,”	  a	  series	  of	  dispositions	  that	  nuance	  its	  application	  
with	  regard	  to	  stateless	  individuals,	  nationals	  of	  specific	  countries	  particularly	  tied	  to	  Spain,	  and	  
students.	  (I	  –	  121/000033).	  
	  
The	  bill	  focused	  primarily	  on	  means	  to	  control	  the	  entry,	  stay,	  and	  exit	  of	  foreigners,	  and	  
although	   it	   provided	   for	   some	   rights,	   it	   already	   contained	   most	   of	   the	   restrictive	  
dispositions	  that	  would	  lead	  many	  authors	  to	  describe	  the	  LOE	  7/1985	  as	  a	  repressive	  law	  
(Aja	   2012;	   Calavita	   1998,	   2005).	   The	  main	   differences	   between	   the	   1981	   and	   the	   1985	  
versions	  are	  contained	  in	  the	  introductory	  section,	  where	  the	  justifications	  for	  the	  law	  are	  
presented.	   The	   most	   significant	   difference	   is	   that	   whereas	   the	   first	   draft	   distinguished	  
between	  types	  of	  foreigners	  based	  on	  the	  length	  of	  their	  stay	  in	  Spain,	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  
they	   planned	   to	   work,	   the	   amended	   version	   submitted	   by	   the	   Socialist	   government	   in	  
1985	  was	  clearly	  structured	  on	  the	  opposition	  between	  those	  who	  reside	  and	  work	  in	  the	  
country	   legally	   and	   those	   who	   do	   so	   illegally.	   Indeed,	   the	   earlier	   version	   made	   clear	  
references	   to	   the	  permits	   that	  one	  needed	   to	  enter,	   reside,	  or	  work	   in	   the	  country	  and	  
included	   provisions	   for	   the	   deportation	   of	   foreigners	   who	   did	   not	   comply,	   but	   the	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terminology	  of	  legality	  and	  illegality	  was	  totally	  absent	  from	  the	  text.	  It	  was	  only	  when	  the	  
Socialist	   government	   reworked	   this	   draft	   almost	   four	   years	   later	   that	   the	   question	   of	  
illegality	  became	  central.	  
Legal/Illegal	  Dichotomy	  in	  the	  LOE	  7/1985	  
The	  bill	   presented	  by	   the	  UCD	   in	  1981	  mentioned	   the	   criterion	  of	   legality	   in	   relation	   to	  
foreigners	   in	  only	  three	  instances,	  two	  of	  which	  confer	  greater	  rights	  or	  privileges	  which	  
are	   not	   granted	   to	   all	   foreigners.	   Firstly,	   in	   Article	   5.2,	   the	   bill	   stated	   that	   although	  
foreigners	   could	   not	   vote,	   those	   who	   had	   resided	   legally	   and	   continuously	   in	   a	  
municipality	   for	   five	   years	   of	  more	   could	   gain	   the	   right	   to	   vote	   at	  municipal	   elections,	  
providing	   that	   their	   country	   of	   origin	   allowed	   Spaniards	   to	   do	   the	   same.	   Secondly,	   in	  
Article	  18.3,	  the	  bill	  conferred	  a	  preferential	  treatment	  in	  the	  allocation	  of	  work	  permits	  to	  
various	   groups,	   including	   those	   born	   in	   Spain	   and	   residing	   legally	   in	   the	   country.	  
Immigrants	  with	  residence	  and	  work	  permits	  were	  thus	  simply	  added	  to	  the	  select	  list	  of	  
special	   guests,	   alongside	   those	   with	   family	   relations	   with	   Spaniards	   and	   the	   culturally	  
preferred	   group	   comprised	   of	   Ibero-­‐Americans,	   Portuguese,	   Filipinos,	   and	   Equatorial	  
Guineans.	   Furthermore,	   in	   this	   first	   iteration,	   most	   rights	   were	   granted	   equally	   to	   all	  
foreigners,	  irrespective	  of	  administrative	  status.	  Finally,	  in	  the	  section	  on	  expulsions,	  there	  
was	   a	   clause	  mentioning	   that	   being	   in	   Spain	   illegally	   was	   one	   of	   the	   reasons	   to	   justify	  
deportation	  (Art.	  23.1.d).	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When	   the	   same	   bill	   was	   resubmitted	   to	   Congress	   by	   the	   Socialist	   government	   in	  
January	  of	  1985,	   it	   included	  an	  entirely	  new	  prologue	   laying	  out	  the	  motivations	   for	   the	  
law.	   In	   less	   than	   two	   pages,	   this	   prologue	   included	   seven	   references	   to	   legality	   and	  
illegality.	  It	  clearly	  and	  repeatedly	  stated	  that	  legality/illegality	  was	  the	  central	  criterion	  in	  
distinguishing	  between	  those	  who	  would	  have	  rights	  and	  those	  who	  would	  not.	  Here	  is	  a	  
translation	  of	  the	  section	  where	  this	  distinction	  appeared	  more	  clearly:	  
In	   intimate	  harmony	  with	  the	  principle	  of	   legal	  certainty,	  we	  locate	  the	  situation	  of	   legality	  of	  
foreigners	  as	  the	  point	  of	  departure,	  not	  only	  for	  the	  full	  exercise	  of	  the	  abovementioned	  rights	  
and	  liberties,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  correct	  treatment	  of	  foreigners.	  
It	   is	   necessary	   to	   differentiate,	   with	   absolute	   clarity,	   situations	   of	   legality	   from	   situations	   of	  
illegality,	   in	   such	   a	  way	   that—although	   in	   all	   instances	   foreigners	   should	  be	   treated	  with	   the	  
consideration	  that	  their	  condition	  as	  persons	  requires—it	  cannot	  be	  forgotten	  that	  while	  those	  
who	  are	  here	  legally,	  sometimes	  for	  many	  years,	  usually	  behave	  peacefully	  and	  even	  adapt	  to	  
our	   social	   environment,	   the	   same	   cannot	   be	   said	   of	   those	  who	   are	   here	   illegally	   since	   their	  
presence,	   in	   numerous	   occasions,	   can	   lead	   to	   an	   alteration	   of	   civic	   life,	   with	   negative	  
consequences	  for	  labour	  relations	  and	  even	  for	  public	  order.19	  
	  
Beyond	  a	  few	  aesthetic	  changes	   in	  the	  second	  paragraph	  of	  this	  excerpt,	  this	   is	  how	  the	  
principle	  of	  the	   law	  was	  stated	   in	  the	  version	  adopted	  by	  Congress	   in	  July	  (LOE	  7/1985).	  
Members	   of	   the	   Socialist	   Party	   also	   amended	   the	   1981	   version	   to	   add	   the	   qualification	  
“who	   are	   in	   Spain	   legally”	   throughout	   the	   document,	   as	   a	   condition	   for	   most	   rights	  
granted	  to	  foreigners.	  After	  the	  prologue,	  there	  are	  eleven	  more	  references	  to	  variations	  
                                                19	  My	   translation	  of:	   “En	   íntima	  armonía	   con	   la	   seguridad	   jurídica	   se	  halla	   el	   respeto	   a	   las	   situaciones	  de	  
legalidad	   de	   los	   extranjeros,	   como	   punto	   de	   partida,	   no	   sólo	   para	   el	   pleno	   ejercicio	   de	   los	   derechos	   y	  
libertades,	   a	   que	   antes	   se	   alude,	   sino	   para	   un	   correcto	   tratamiento	   de	   la	   extranjería.	   Es	   necesario	  
diferenciar,	  con	  absoluta	  claridad,	  las	  situaciones	  de	  legalidad	  de	  las	  de	  ilegalidad,	  de	  modo	  que,	  si	  en	  todos	  
los	  casos,	   los	  extranjeros	  deben	  ser	   tratados	  con	   la	  consideración	  que	  exige	  su	  condición	  de	  personas,	  no	  
debe	  desconocerse	  que,	  mientras	  aquellos	  que	  se	  encuentran	  legalmente,	  a	  veces	  desde	  hace	  muchos	  años,	  
suelen	  desenvolverse	  pacíficamente,	  e	  incluso	  están	  adaptados	  a	  nuestro	  medio	  social,	  no	  sucede	  lo	  mismo	  
con	  quienes	  se	  hallan	  de	  forma	  ilegal,	  pues	  su	  presencia,	  en	  ocasiones	  numerosas,	  puede	  ser	  un	  motivo	  de	  
alteración	   de	   la	   vida	   ciudadana,	   con	   consecuencias	   negativas	   en	   el	   campo	   de	   las	   relaciones	   laborales	   e	  
incluso	  en	  el	  orden	  público.”	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of	   the	   word	   “legality,”	   numbering	   fourteen	   in	   the	   final	   text	   of	   the	   law.	   Of	   these,	   six	  
instances	   appear	   in	   Title	   1	   on	   the	   “Rights	   and	   Liberties	   of	   Foreigners.”	   Provisions	  
guaranteeing	   the	   right	   to	   freely	   circulate	   within	   the	   country	   (Art.6),	   to	   hold	   public	  
meetings	   (Art.7),	   to	   education	  and	   teaching	   freedom	   (Art.	   9),	   as	  well	   as	   to	  be	  part	  of	   a	  
union	  and	   to	  strike	   (Art.10),	  were	  now	  to	  be	   recognized	  only	   for	  “foreigners	  who	  are	   in	  
Spain	  legally.”	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  Law	  on	  the	  Rights	  and	  Liberties	  of	  Foreigners	   in	  Spain,	  as	  
the	   Alien	   Act	   was	   titled,	   contained	   a	   mere	   ten	   articles	   on	   rights,	   compared	   to	   the	   26	  
dedicated	   to	   the	   control	   of	   entry,	   access	   to	   work,	   detention,	   and	   various	   forms	   of	  
deportation—as	  many	  analysts	  have	  pointed	  out	  (Aja	  2012;	  Calavita	  1998,	  2005;	  Cebolla	  
Boado	   and	   González	   Ferrer	   2013)—it	   also	   bordered	   out	   irregular	   migrants,	   preventing	  
them	  from	  accessing	  these	  rights.	  Beyond	  the	  number	  of	  occurrences,	  this	  demonstrates	  
that	  government	  officials	  wanted	  to	  highlight	  their	  main	  priority	  as	  being	  the	  fight	  against	  
irregular	  or	  “illegal”	  migration.	  
How	   can	   we	   explain	   the	   emergence	   between	   1982	   and	   1985	   of	   this	   new	  way	   of	  
framing	   the	   issue?	   Scholars	   have	   pointed	   to	   a	   desire	   to	   please	   Spain’s	   European	  
neighbours	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  negotiations	  to	  join	  the	  EEC	  (see	  Cebolla	  Boado	  and	  González	  
Ferrer	  2013).	  Considering	  that	  irregular	  migration	  was	  not	  a	  preoccupation	  of	  the	  Spanish	  
population	  at	  the	  time	  (Valles,	  Cea	  D’Acona,	  and	  Izquierdo	  Escribano	  1999),	  and	  that	  the	  
period	   was	   marked	   by	   negotiations	   on	   Spanish	   access	   to	   the	   EEC,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
development	  of	  the	  Schengen	  Agreement	  by	  the	  first	  five	  member-­‐states,	   it	   is	  clear	  that	  
the	  Schengen	   logic	   informed	  the	  elaboration	  of	  the	  text	  (Maas	  2005).	   It	   is	   indeed	  telling	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that	   the	   final	   approval	   of	   the	   LOE	   7/1985	   in	   Congress	   occurred	   on	   June	   11,	   1985,	   and	  
Spain’s	   adhesion	   to	   the	   EEC	   was	   ratified	   on	   June	   12,20	   which,	   in	   turn,	   is	   just	   two	   days	  
before	  the	  five	  first	  member-­‐states	  signed	  the	  Schengen	  Agreement.	  	  
However,	  the	  1981	  version	  already	  contained	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  this	  law's	  control	  
measures:	   it	   restricted	   entry	   to	   those	  with	   documentation	   (except	   for	   asylum	   seekers),	  
regulated	  work	   permits,	   and	   provided	   for	   the	   expulsion	   or	   devolution	   of	   those	  without	  
permits.	  The	  idea	  of	  control	  contained	  in	  the	  LOE	  7/1985	  is	  not	  new,	  only	  the	  insistent	  use	  
of	  the	  trope	  of	  illegality.	  This	  trope	  was	  already	  strong	  north	  of	  the	  Pyrenees	  and	  in	  most	  
of	  the	  EEC	  countries,	  and	  it	  is	  probable	  that	  the	  framing	  of	  immigration	  status	  in	  terms	  of	  
legality/illegality	  was	  partly	  informed	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  join	  the	  ECC.	  In	  Spain,	  however,	  this	  
trope	   emerged	   in	   political	   discourse	   during	   the	   Second	   Legislature	   only	   through	  
interventions	  by	  members	  of	  the	  Popular	  Coalition	  (Coalición	  Popular)—comprised	  mainly	  
of	   the	   party	   Popular	   Alliance	   (Alianza	   Popular)—after	   it	   took	   control	   of	   the	   opposition.	  
Popular	   Alliance,	   a	   neo-­‐Francoist	   party	   created	   in	   1976	   to	   ensure	   continuity	   with	   the	  
Franco	   regime	  during	   the	   transition,	  was	   at	   the	   time	  negotiating	   its	   identity,	   navigating	  
between	  an	  extreme-­‐right	   current	   informed	  by	  nostalgia	   for	   the	   Franco	   regime	  and	   the	  
ideology	   of	   the	   racist	   European	   extreme	   right,	   and	   the	   more	   mainstream	   conservative	  
perspective,	  which	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  reformation	  of	  the	  party	  as	  the	  Popular	  Party	  in	  1989	  
(Gallego	  2008).	  
                                                
20	  In	  effect	  as	  of	  January	  1,	  1986.	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Jorge	   Verstrynge	   Rojas,	   a	   controversial	   politician	  whose	   ideology	   at	   the	   time	  was	  
influenced	  by	  French	  neo-­‐fascism	  and	  who	  was	  the	  successor	  to	  Manuel	  Fraga	  as	  general	  
secretary	   of	   the	   Popular	   Alliance,	   was	   the	   first	   to	   make	   an	   intervention	   in	   Congress	  
focusing	  on	  the	  illegality	  of	  immigrants	  in	  1983.21	  His	  question,	  titled	  “Number	  and	  legality	  
of	   foreigners	  who	   reside	   in	   Spain,”	   starts	  with	   the	   claim	   that	   of	   the	   “more	   than	   half	   a	  
million	  foreigners	  living	  in	  Spain,	  only	  65,666	  obtained	  a	  work	  permit,”	  and	  then	  goes	  on	  
to	  accuse	  immigrants	  of	  causing	  all	  problems	  confronting	  Spain.	  He	  denounces	  immigrants	  
as	  “a	  labour	  force	  that	  invades	  us”	  in	  a	  moment	  of	  economic	  crisis,	  and	  seems	  to	  see	  most	  
foreigners	   as	   “illegal,”	   either	   because	   they	   “work	   legitimately	   but	   [live	   in	   Spain]	   in	  
condition	  of	  illegality”	  (and	  he	  refers	  here	  to	  Senegalese,	  Guinean,	  and	  Filipino	  workers),	  
or	   because	   they	   are	   involved	   in	   “forbidden	   activities”	   such	   as	   “prostitution,	   clandestine	  
labour	  market,	  contraband,	  drug	  trafficking,	  etc.”	  As	  a	  response	  to	  the	  Popular	  Alliance’s	  
“detractors	  who	  might	  use	  this	  intervention	  as	  a	  pretext	  to	  say	  [they]	  are	  catastrophist,”	  
he	   suggested	   that	  one	  only	  has	   to	  note	  “the	   social	  problems	   that	  our	  bad	   regulation	  of	  
immigration	   brings	   us:	   underemployment,	   exploitation,	   illegal	   people	   trafficking,	  
delinquency	  .	   .	   .	  and	  occupation	  of	   jobs”	  to	  be	  convinced	  that	  this	   lack	  of	  regulation	  is	  a	  
plague	  (II	  –	  184/001373).	  
Over	   the	  next	   two	  years,	   a	   few	  more	   interventions	  highlighting	   illegality	   followed.	  
Until	   1985,	   the	   only	   members	   of	   Congress	   who	   intervened	   to	   talk	   about	   the	  
                                                
21	   See	   Initiative	   II	   –	  184/001373.	  Prior	   to	   this	   intervention,	  only	   the	  expressions	  “foreigners	  who	   reside	   in	  
Spain	   irregularly,”	   “foreigners	  who	  do	  not	  have	  a	   residence	  permit”	   (I	   –	  184/002950)	  and	   “foreigner	  who	  
resides	  in	  Spain	  legally”	  (I	  -­‐	  161/000398)	  had	  been	  used	  in	  reference	  to	  immigrant	  status.	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legality/illegality	  of	  immigrants,	  generally	  in	  relation	  to	  African	  migrants,	  belonged	  to	  the	  
Popular	  Alliance.	   It	   is	  hard	   to	  know	  to	  what	  extent	   the	   right-­‐wing	  opposition	   influenced	  
the	  Socialist	  government’s	  decision	  to	  add	  this	  clause	  of	   legality	  throughout	  the	  new	  bill	  
before	   it	  was	  even	  submitted	  to	  Congress—again	  the	  desire	   to	  please	  European	  partner	  
states	  cannot	  be	  underestimated—but	  we	  can	  without	  a	  doubt	   locate	  the	  emergence	  of	  
this	  trope	  in	  parliamentary	  debates	  during	  the	  Popular	  Coalition's	  rise	  to	  opposition	  status	  
in	  the	  fall	  of	  1982.	  	  
Legal	  Liminality:	  Inclusion	  through	  Illegalization	  
The	   inscription	  of	   this	   legal/illegal	   dichotomy	   into	   law	   later	   became	   instrumental	   in	   the	  
overall	   illegalization	   of	   irregular	   migration.	   But	   what	   exactly	   did	   this	   process	   of	  
illegalization	  achieve	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  governing	  of	   irregular	  migration?	  While	  we	  need	  to	  
analyze	   the	   process	   of	   early	   illegalization	   throughout	   the	   entire	   decade,	  many	   scholars	  
rightly	   suggest	   that	   the	  1985	  Alien	  Act,	   along	  with	   its	  1986	   regulations	   (RD	  1119/1986),	  
played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  illegalizing	  and	  criminalizing	  irregular	  immigrants.	  And	  yet,	  for	  all	  
its	  focus	  on	  control	  and	  expulsion,	  the	  law	  as	  it	  was	  applied	  then	  and	  is	  applied	  today	  does	  
not	   really	   aim	   to	   get	   rid	   of	   all	   irregular	   migrants.	   Instead,	   as	   Kitty	   Calavita	   and	   Liliana	  
Súarez-­‐Navaz	  observed	  (2003),	  it	  sets	  them	  “apart	  as	  illegal	  ‘others’	  to	  be	  excluded—not	  
so	  much	   from	   the	   territory	   (as	   they	   continue	   to	   play	   an	   important	   economic	   role),	   but	  
from	  the	  social	  and	  moral	  life	  of	  the	  community”	  (p.106).	  Indeed,	  the	  resulting	  exclusion	  is	  
very	  partial.	  There	  was	  certainly	  a	  dramatic	   increase	  in	  detention	  and	  deportation	  in	  the	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years	   following	   the	   adoption	  of	   the	   law,	   especially	   after	   1987	   (Colectivo	   IOÉ	   1989),	   but	  
most	   irregular	  migrants	  present	  on	   the	   territory	  when	   the	   law	  was	  passed	  were	  able	   to	  
remain	   and	   continue	   to	   work.	   The	   regularization	   process	   in	   1986	   provided	   temporary	  
residence	   and	   work	   permits	   to	   38,181	   immigrants	   (Cebolla	   Boado	   and	   González	   Ferrer	  
2013:92),	  while	  others	   continued	   to	   reside	  and	  work	  without	  official	   authorization.	  And	  
while	  the	  law	  did	  not	  prevent	  more	  migrants	  from	  arriving,	  it	  did	  legally	  circumscribe	  the	  
modalities	  in	  which	  migrants	  were	  able	  to	  come.	  	  
This	   process	   of	   illegalization,	   which	   clearly	   allows	   for	   the	   presence	   of	   illegalized	  
migrants	   on	   the	   territory,	   appears	   paradoxical.	   Far	   from	   excluding	   migrants,	   the	   law	  
mainly	   contributed	   to	   “the	   structuring	   of	   strict	   differentiations	   that	   both	   organize	   and	  
make	   common	   sense	   of	   systems	   of	   apartheid”	   (Sharma	   2006:141).	   This	   notion	   of	  
apartheid,	  as	  developed	  by	  Nandita	  Sharma	  (2006),	   is	  useful	   in	  making	  sense	  of	  a	  model	  
that	   allows	   for	   the	   coexistence	   of	   different	   groups	   of	   people	   within	   the	   same	   space,	  
governed	  by	  distinct	  legal	  regimes,	  and	  thus	  legally	  separated.	  Apartheid	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  
radical	   exclusion,	   but	   to	   a	   legally	   sanctioned	   regime	   of	   subordinated	   or	   exclusionary	  
inclusion.	   It	   describes	   a	   situation	   in	   which	   the	   “legal	   technicality”	   that	   is	   jurisdiction	  
(Valverde	  2009:139)	  can	  be	  used	  to	  take	  people	  who	  are	  geographically,	  temporally,	  and	  
socially	  co-­‐present,	  and	  border	  them	  into	  different	  legal	  “spaces.”	  Indeed,	  the	  Alien	  Act	  of	  
1985	   and	   its	   1986	   regulations	   did	   not	   simply	   exclude,	   nor	   even	   illegalize	   all	   irregular	  
migrants:	   It	   did	   make	   them	   illegal,	   but	   it	   also	   opened	   up	   avenues	   for	   temporary	  
regularization	  and	  access	  to	  precarious	  immigration	  status.	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  most	  useful	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to	   analyze	   the	   way	   the	   Alien	   Act	   provided	   a	   form	   of	   differential	   inclusion	   through	  
illegalization	  (De	  Genova	  2002,	  2004),	  organized	  around	  the	  deployment	  of	  a	  time-­‐space	  
of	  legally	  produced	  liminality,	  and	  through	  which	  migrants	  are	  governed	  (see	  Chap.	  7).	  	  
I	   borrow	   the	   concept	   of	   liminality	   from	   Cecilia	   Menjívar	   (2006),	   who	   uses	   it	   to	  
describe	  what	   she	   calls	   “uncertain	   status—not	   fully	   documented	   or	   undocumented	   but	  
often	   straddling	   both”	   (p.1001).	   Menjívar	   insists	   that	   she	   uses	   the	   expression	   “liminal	  
legality”	   in	   an	  attempt	   “to	  express	   the	   temporariness	  of	   this	   condition,	  which	   for	  many	  
[migrants]	  has	  extended	  indefinitely	  and	  has	  come	  to	  define	  their	  legal	  position”	  (p.1008).	  
Building	  on	  the	  possible	  extension	  of	  this	  condition	  over	  time,	  she	  adds	  that	  “a	  situation	  of	  
‘liminal	   legality’	   is	   neither	   unidirectional	   nor	   a	   linear	   process,	   or	   even	   a	   phase	   from	  
undocumented	  to	  documented	  status,	  for	  those	  who	  find	  themselves	  in	  it	  can	  return	  to	  an	  
undocumented	  status	  when	  their	  temporary	  statuses	  end”	  (p.1008).	  	  
This	  second	  dimension	  is	  particularly	  insightful,	  as	  it	  frames	  liminal	  legality	  not	  only	  
as	   an	   individual	   condition	   that	   is	   precarious	   and	   transitional,	   but	   also	   as	   a	   dynamic	  
situation	   in	  which	  migrants	  find	  themselves.	  This	  second	  meaning,	  which	  takes	  her	  away	  
from	   a	   Turnerian	   notion	   of	   transitional	   liminality,	   is	   the	   most	   useful	   with	   which	   to	  
conceptualize	   the	   role	   of	   liminal	   legality	   in	   the	   governing	   of	   irregular	  migrants	   in	   Spain	  
since	  the	  mid-­‐1980s.	  By	  focusing	  on	  the	  situation,	  we	  open	  up	  the	  possibility	  of	  theorizing	  
not	  the	  liminal	  legality	  of	  migrants,	  but	  legal	  liminality	  as	  a	  zone	  of	  indistinction	  between	  
legal	  exclusion	  and	  inclusion,	  linked	  to	  a	  spatial	  and	  temporal	  rescaling	  of	  borderwork	  and	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thus	  dependent	  on	   the	  practices	  of	   various	  actors	   interacting	  with	  migrants.	   The	  use	  of	  
jurisdiction	  as	  a	   technology	  of	   legal	  bordering	   that	  creates	  overlapping	  but	  distinct	   legal	  
regimes	  within	  the	  same	  geographic	  and	  temporal	  space,	  as	  captured	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  
apartheid,	   is	   a	   central	   dimension	  of	   this	   legally	   produced	   liminality.	   Building	  on	   Sharma	  
(2006)	  and	  Menjívar	  (2006),	  I	  therefore	  use	  legal	  liminality	  not	  as	  a	  transitional	  condition,	  
but	   as	   a	   legal-­‐temporal	   space	   that	   is	   deployed	   through	   various	   tactics,	   including	   the	  
illegalization	  of	  certain	  situations	  and	  actions	  that	  the	  LOE	  7/1985	  enables.	  
This	   conceptual	  move	   is	   key	   to	  analyzing	  how	   the	  Alien	  Act	  and	   its	   regulations	  do	  
not	  exclude	  or	  cast	  out	   irregular	  migrants,	  but	  rather	   include	  them	  by	  allocating	  them	  a	  
particular	  place	  and	  role.	  By	  analyzing	  the	  extended	  space	  and	  time	  of	   legal	   liminality	  as	  
central	   to	   the	  governing	  of	   immigration	   in	  Spain,	   I	  wish	   to	  highlight	  how	  those	  who	  are	  
deemed	  “out	  of	  place”	  (as	  illegals)	  are	  actually	  very	  much	  attributed	  a	  particular	  place	  (as	  
subordinated	   workers).	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   the	   illegalization	   of	   some	   immigration	  
situations	   does	   not	   prevent	   them	   from	   occurring,	   and	   considering	   that	   irregular	  
immigrants	   have	   the	   possibility	   of	   regularizing	   their	   status,	   what	   we	   often	   refer	   to	   as	  
illegalization	   is	  more	   like	  a	  process	  of	   legal	   liminalization	  that	  actively	  captures	  migrants	  
through	   a	   form	   of	   subordinated	   inclusion	   (Mezzadra	   and	   Neilson	   2013).	   Drawing	   from	  
works	   by	   feminist	   scholars	   (Crenshaw	   1991;	   Federici	   2004;	   Pateman	   1988),	   Sandro	  
Mezzadra	   and	   Brett	   Neilson	   (2013)	   use	   this	   phrase	   to	   highlight	   the	   extent	   to	   which	  
“exclusion	  always	  operates	   in	   tandem	  with	  an	   inclusion	   that	   is	   never	   complete”	   (p.161)	  
and	  capture	  how	  partial	  inclusion	  can	  serve	  a	  disciplining	  function,	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fragmented	  regulation	  of	  the	  labour	  market.	  They	  situate	  this	  differential	  inclusion	  at	  the	  
junction	  of	  the	  legal	  liminality	  produced	  by	  restrictive	  immigration	  policies	  and	  precarious	  
incorporation	   into	   the	   labour	  market.	   This	  way	   of	   conceptualizing	   legal	   liminality	   partly	  
echoes	  Nicholas	  De	  Genova’s	  (2004)	  understanding	  of	  “illegality,”	  a	  term	  which	  he	  defines	  
as	   “a	   simultaneously	   spatialized	   and	   racialized	   social	   condition”	   that	   “is	   lived	   through	   a	  
palpable	  sense	  of	  deportability”	  (p.161).	  Legal	  liminality	  as	  it	  operates	  in	  Spain	  should	  thus	  
be	   understood	   as	   a	   tactic	   that	   is	   partly	   produced	   through	   law,	   is	   mobilized	   to	   govern	  
migrants,	  is	  negotiated	  and	  resisted	  by	  them,	  and	  is	  premised	  upon	  deportability—that	  is,	  
the	   possibility	   of	   deportation	   rather	   than	   deportation	   itself.	   De	   Genova’s	   (2002,	   2004)	  
concept	  of	  deportability	  points	  precisely	  to	  the	  situation	  of	  precariousness	  created	  at	  the	  
point	   of	   junction	   where	   legal	   liminality	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   border	   and	   immigration	  
enforcement	  meet.	  	  
By	   insisting	  on	  marking	   a	  difference	   in	   law	  between	  nationals	   and	   foreigners,	   and	  
among	   them	   between	   “legals”	   and	   “illegals,”	   Spanish	   politicians	   contributed	   to	  
reclassifying	  existing	  race-­‐	  and	  class-­‐based	  distinctions	  in	  immigrants’	  ability	  to	  remain	  and	  
work	   in	   the	   country	   on	   seemingly	   neutral	   legal	   terms.	   The	   organization	   of	   the	   debate	  
around	  the	  legal	  character	  of	  foreigners	  was	  a	  good	  strategy	  since,	  as	  Sara	  Ahmed	  (2000)	  
reminds	  us,	  “By	  defining	  ‘us’	  against	  any-­‐body	  who	  is	  a	  stranger,	  what	  is	  concealed	  is	  that	  
some-­‐bodies	  are	  already	  recognised	  as	  stranger	  and	  more	  dangerous	  than	  other	  bodies”	  
(p.3-­‐4).	   Through	   this	   process,	   concerns	   that	   were	   specific	   to	   the	   presence	   of	   Guinean,	  
Senegalese,	   Moroccan,	   Filipino,	   and	   Dominican	   immigrants,	   and	   the	   place	   they	   should	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occupy,	  were	  reframed	   in	   the	   legal	   terminology	  of	   foreigners	  and	  nationals,	   legality	  and	  
illegality,	  without	  erasing	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  racial	  referents	  attached	  to	  the	  social	  figure	  of	  
the	  extranjero	  (stranger	  or	  foreigner).	  
Unstable	  Terminology	  for	  an	  Object	  under	  Construction	  
Despite	  this	  reframing	  of	  the	  issue,	  the	  association	  of	  illegality	  with	  African	  migrants	  in	  the	  
debates	  of	   the	  1980s,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   importance	   granted	   to	   the	   regulation	  of	   residence	  
and	  work	  permits	  in	  the	  LOE	  7/1985,	  demonstrates	  that	  it	  was	  not	  the	  presence	  of	  mere	  
foreigners	  that	  the	  law	  was	  meant	  to	  regulate,	  but	  that	  of	  racialized	  immigrants.	   In	  fact,	  
the	   law	   includes	   a	   brief	   acknowledgment	   that	   its	   main	   object	   is	   immigration	   when	   it	  
stipulates:	  “The	  preoccupation	  of	  the	  Law	  to	  accord	  the	  respect	  of	  the	  rights	  and	  liberties	  
of	   foreigners	   with	   an	   adequate	   treatment	   of	   immigration	   reaches	   one	   of	   its	   most	  
significant	   levels	   in	  the	  regulation	  of	  stay.”22	  Despite	  some	  preoccupation	  with	  members	  
of	  international	  mafia	  organizations	  operating	  in	  Spain—and	  brief	  reference	  to	  European	  
retirees—the	   real	   “problem”	   that	  politicians	  discuss	   in	   the	  1980s	   is	   clearly	   immigration,	  
primarily	   from	   Latin	   America	   and	  Western	   Africa.	   But	   the	   debates	   and	   text	   of	   the	   LOE	  
7/1985	  are	  effectively	  bracketed	  from	  the	  rest	  of	   the	  political	  and	  public	  debates	   taking	  
place	  throughout	  the	  1980s	  and	  are	  organized	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  pretend	  they	  concern	  all	  
foreigners.	   In	   all	   the	   debates	   about	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   Alien	   Act	   in	   Congress	   (both	  
                                                22	  My	  translation	  of:	  “La	  preocupación	  de	  la	  Ley	  por	  conjugar	  el	  respeto	  de	  los	  derechos	  y	  libertades	  de	  los	  
extranjeros	  con	  el	  adecuado	  tratamiento	  de	  la	  inmigración,	  alcanza	  uno	  de	  sus	  puntos	  mas	  significativos	  en	  
la	  regulación	  de	  la	  permanencia”	  (LOE	  7/1985;	  Preámbulo).	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Plenum	  and	  Constitutional	  Commission)	  and	  in	  the	  Senate,	  there	  are	  only	  two	  references	  
to	  immigration,	  including	  one	  particularly	  revealing	  comment	  by	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Mixed	  
Parliamentary	  Group,	  who	  acknowledges	  that	  when	  he	  talks	  about	  “the	  problem	  of	  access	  
to	  the	  Spanish	  territory	  for	  a	  portion	  of	  foreigners,”	  he	  is	  in	  fact	  referring	  to	  “the	  problem	  
of	  immigration	  and	  of	  controlling	  this	  immigration.”23	  
This	   statement	   reveals	  what	  many	   people	   understood	   to	   be	   the	   real	   issue	   at	   the	  
time:	  the	  presence	  of	  immigrants,	  determined	  to	  live	  and	  work	  in	  Spain,	  and	  often	  coming	  
from	  Africa	  and	  Latin	  America.	  In	  many	  of	  the	  debates	  around	  the	  LOE	  7/1985,	  “foreigner”	  
is	  a	  misnomer.	  Indeed,	  as	  Calavita	  and	  Suárez-­‐Navaz	  (2003)	  explain:	  
A	  terminological	  curiosity	  reveals	  the	  disproportionate	  weight	  of	  third-­‐world	  immigration	  in	  the	  
public	  discourse.	  The	  official	  term	  for	  all	  foreign	  residents	  in	  Spain—regardless	  of	  how	  long	  they	  
intend	  to	  stay—is	  extranjero	  (foreigner).	  But,	  in	  popular	  parlance	  a	  distinction	  is	  made	  between	  
extranjeros,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  inmigrantes,	  on	  the	  other,	  with	  the	  latter	  category	  reserved	  
for	  those	  who	  come	  from	  the	  third	  world	  seeking	  work.	  Thus,	  when	  the	  “immigration	  problem”	  
is	  discussed	  in	  government	  circles,	  in	  the	  media,	  among	  academics,	  or	  in	  public	  opinion	  surveys,	  
it	  invariably	  refers	  to	  third-­‐world	  immigration,	  leading	  one	  commentator	  to	  refer	  to	  first-­‐world	  
immigrants	  as	  “authentic	  desaparecidos”	  (Izquierdo	  1996,	  71)	  (P.100).	  
	  
It	  is	  indeed	  the	  “problem	  of	  immigration”	  that	  is	  being	  addressed	  in	  these	  debates,	  not	  the	  
situation	  of	  all	  foreigners.	  The	  tension	  between	  the	  legal	  category	  of	  “foreigner”	  and	  the	  
sociological	  notion	  of	  “immigrant,”	  which	  does	  not	  have	  a	  legal	  definition	  in	  Spain,	  led	  to	  
an	  obvious	  confusion	  in	  parliamentary	  debates,	  with	  elected	  officials	  often	  using	  the	  two	  
terms	  within	   the	   same	   intervention	   (see	  Table	  4	  on	  p.93).	  While	   the	   choice	  of	  words	   is	  
partly	   an	   ideological	   issue,	   the	   fact	   is	   that	  many	  members	   of	   Congress	   do	   not	   seem	   to	  
                                                
23	  Diario	  de	  Sesiones,	  Pleno,	  No	  200,	  April	  23	  1985,	  p.	  2903.	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know	  what	   to	   call	   the	   non-­‐Spaniards	   living	   in	   Spain,	   nor	   how	   to	   govern	   their	   presence.	  
Besides	  the	  director	  of	  the	  Institute	  of	  Emigration,	  Raimundo	  Aragón	  Bombín,	  who	  made	  
an	   appearance	   before	   the	   Commission	   on	   Social	   Policies	   and	   Employment	   in	   1985	   (II	   –	  
211/000358),	   no	   one	   who	   spoke	   in	   Congress	   appeared	   to	   grasp	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	  
phenomenon.	  In	  fact,	  when	  asked	  to	  clarify	  the	  “fundamental	  axes,	  objectives	  and	  tasks	  of	  
the	  immigration	  policy”	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1986,	  the	  government	  responded	  by	  saying	  that	  the	  
first	  thing	  it	  needed	  to	  develop	  such	  a	  policy	  was:	  
A	  study	  and	  knowledge	  of	  the	  social	  reality	  unto	  which	  we	  pretend	  to	  act.	  This	  study	  engages	  
with	  the	  topic	  from	  a	  global	  perspective	  that	  includes	  the	  diverse	  contexts	  in	  which	  immigration	  
occurs	   in	  our	   country:	   The	  economic/labour	   context,	   the	   specific	   ethnic	   and	   cultural	   context,	  
and	  the	  political-­‐institutional	  context,	  all	  of	  which	  determine	  the	  climate	  in	  which	  the	  problem	  
at	  hand	  is	  forged	  as	  well	  as	  the	  frame	  for	  the	  possible	  ways	  to	  deal	  with	  it.	  (II	  -­‐	  184/000668)	  
	  
After	  a	  decade	  of	  debates	   in	  Congress,	  negotiations	  with	  European	  neighbours,	   the	   first	  
Alien	   Act,	   a	   decree	   providing	   the	   regulations	   of	   this	   law,	   the	   regularization	   of	   38,181	  
immigrants	   in	   1986	   (Cebolla	   Boado	   and	   González	   Ferrer	   2013),	   and	   a	   constitutional	  
challenge	   of	   the	   law	   by	   Spain’s	   ombudsman	   leading	   to	   the	   cancellation	   of	   some	   of	   its	  
provisions,24	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Third	  Legislature,	  politicians	  still	  did	  not	  know	  how	  to	  name	  
or	  act	  upon	  the	  problem.	  	  
	  
	  
                                                
24	  Decision	  STC	  115/1987	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Tribunal	  struck	  down	  parts	  of	  Art.	  7,	  8,	  and	  26	  and	  imposed	  a	  
constitutional	  interpretation	  of	  Art.	  26.2.	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Table	  4:	  Terminology	  Used	  in	  the	  1980s	  (Legislatures	  I-­‐III)	  
Spanish	  Expressions	   Translation	  
Extranjeros	   Foreigners	  
Extranjeros	  que	  residen	  ilegalmente	  en	  
España	  
Foreigners	  who	  reside	  in	  Spain	  illegally	  
Extranjeros	  que	  se	  encuentran	  
irregularmente	  en	  nuestro	  país	  
Foreigners	  who	  are	  in	  our	  country	  
irregularly	  	  
Extranjeros	  sin	  legalizar	   Foreigners	  who	  have	  not	  been	  legalized	  
Extranjeros	  en	  forma	  ilegal	   Foreigners	  [in	  the	  country]	  in	  an	  illegal	  
manner	  
Extranjeros	  indeseables	   Undesirable	  foreigners	  
Extranjeros	  indocumentados	   Undocumented	  foreigners	  
Extranjeros	  clandestinos	   Clandestine	  foreigners	  
Extranjeros	  dedicados	  a	  la	  delincuencia	   Foreigners	  involved	  in	  delinquency	  (often	  
associated	  with	  African	  migrants	  or	  
international	  mafia)	  
Mano	  de	  obra	  extranjera	   Foreign	  labour	  force	  
Trabajadores	  ilegales	   Illegal	  workers	  
Trabajadores	  extranjeros	  en	  condición	  de	  
ilegalidad	  
Foreign	  workers	  in	  a	  condition	  of	  illegality	  
Trabajadores	  en	  situación	  irregular	   Workers	  in	  an	  irregular	  situation	  
Inmigrantes	  extranjeros	   Foreign	  immigrants	  
Inmigrantes	  clandestinos	   Clandestine	  immigrants	  	  
Inmigrantes	  legales	  e	  ilegales	   Legal	  and	  illegal	  immigrants	  
Los	  indocumentados	   The	  undocumented	  
Indocumentados	  delincuentes	   Undocumented	  delinquents	  	  
Ciudadanos	  no	  españoles	   Non-­‐Spanish	  citizens	  
Ciudadanos	  extranjeros	   Foreign	  citizens	  
Los	  africanos	   The	  Africans	  	  (often	  mentioning	  Gambians,	  
Senegalese,	  Nigerians)	  
Flujos	  clandestinos	  y	  situaciones	  ilegales	   Clandestine	  flows	  and	  illegal	  situations	  
Inmigración	  clandestina	  o	  fraudulenta	   Clandestine	  or	  fraudulent	  immigration	  




Problematizations	   always	   form	   through	   heterogeneous	   discursive	   and	   non-­‐
discursive	  practices	  (Bacchi	  2012)	  and	  we	  study	  them	  as	  a	  temporarily	  stabilized	  result	  of	  
these	  contradictory	  and	  dispersed	  practices	  (Gale	  1999).	  The	  focus	  on	  debates	  that	  took	  
place	  in	  the	  Spanish	  Congress	  is	  analytically	  useful,	  as	  it	  provides	  an	  interesting	  entry	  point	  
from	  which	  to	  observe	  traces	  of	  the	  object	  in	  formation	  over	  time.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  is	  clear	  
that	  many	  competing	  ways	  of	  problematizing	  irregular	  migration	  were	  articulated	  outside	  
of,	  but	   in	  dialogue	  with,	   the	  parliamentary	  debates	  which	  took	  place	  over	  a	  decade.	  For	  
instance,	   a	   civil	   servant	   I	   interviewed	   explained	   how	   bureaucrats	   involved	   in	   the	   1986	  
regularization	   process	   started	   developing	   firsthand	   knowledge	   of	   the	   demographic	   and	  
qualitative	  dimensions	  of	   irregular	  migration	   through	   their	   administrative	  practices,	   and	  
how	  higher-­‐level	  civil	  servants	  co-­‐ordinating	  the	  regularization	  process	  ended	  up	  knowing	  
much	  more	  about	  irregular	  migration	  than	  politicians.25	  This	  informant	  also	  explained	  how	  
civil	   servants	  who	  had	  gained	  experience	   regulating	   the	   temporary	   circular	  migration	  of	  
Spanish	  agricultural	  workers	   to	  France	  and	  Germany	   in	   the	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s	  were	  
using	  this	  experience	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  new	  migration	  to	  Spain	  and	  to	  propose	  a	  similar	  
model	   of	   labour	   migration	   regulation.	   Minutes	   from	   parliamentary	   debates	   in	   regions	  
most	  affected	  by	  the	  arrival	  of	   irregular	  migrants	  such	  as	  the	  Canary	   Islands26	  and	  Ceuta	  
and	  Melilla	  (Gold	  1999)	  also	  reveal	  that	  local	  politicians	  were	  framing	  the	  issue	  differently	  
than	  those	  in	  Madrid	  and	  trying	  to	  convince	  the	  central	  government	  of	  the	  validity	  of	  their	  
knowledge.	   The	   construction	   of	   irregular	   migration	   as	   an	   object	   of	   government	   thus	  
                                                
25	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  September	  26,	  2012.	  	  
26	  See,	  for	  instance,	  the	  debates	  on	  delinquency	  in	  the	  Parliament	  of	  the	  Canaries	  in	  Diario	  de	  Sesiones	  del	  
Parlamento	  de	  Canarias,	  No	  31,	  March	  15,	  1989.	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occurred	  in	  various	  sites	  and	  institutions,	  and	  through	  the	  practices	  of	  many	  officials,	  not	  
solely	  in	  the	  Congress	  in	  Madrid.	  	  
Parallel	   problematizations	   were	   also	   emerging	   at	   this	   time	   from	   a	   handful	   of	  
scholars	  who	  were	  providing	  the	  first	  reliable	  studies	  on	  the	  numbers	  and	  characteristics	  
of	   irregular	  migrants	   (Colectivo	   IOÉ	  1987,	  1989;	   Izquierdo	  Escribano	  1990;	  Muñoz-­‐Pérez	  
and	   Izquierdo	  Escribano	  1989;	  Roque	  1990),	   as	  well	   as	  NGOs	  and	   trade	  unions,	   such	  as	  
Workers'	   Commissions	   (Comisiones	   Obreras)	   in	   Barcelona,	   which	   worked	   directly	   with	  
immigrants	   and	   were	   also	   developing	   an	   early	   expertise	   through	   their	   practices	   at	   the	  
time.	   In	  the	  plenum	  of	  Congress	  and	  the	  offices	  where	  bureaucrats	   tried	  to	  develop	  the	  
first	  policies,	  the	  early	  work	  of	  these	  scholars	  became	  essential	   in	  providing	  an	  informed	  
understanding	   of	   the	   phenomenon.	   Most	   notably,	   politicians	   often	   mobilized	   statistics	  
and	  other	  strategies	  of	  enumeration	  used	  by	  academic	  and	  other	  experts	  to	  circumscribe	  
their	   object,	   and	   deployed	   them	  as	   resources	   to	  make	   irregular	  migration	  more	   visible.	  
Indeed,	   as	   Jonathan	   X.	   Inda	   (2006)	   explains	   in	   the	   US	   context,	   official	   statistics,	   expert	  
practices	  of	  enumeration,	  and	  media	  representations	  are	  the	  three	  key	  elements	  involved	  
in	  the	  process	  of	  making	  “illegal”	  immigrants	  visible	  in	  the	  public	  arena.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  
systematic	  official	  statistics	  on	  migration,	  and	  with	  a	  limited	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  available,	  
Spanish	   politicians	   relied	   heavily	   on	   these	   early	   reports	   to	   quantify	   the	   problem	   in	   an	  
attempt	  to	  make	  it	  real	  and	  tangible.	  Since	  numbers	  “are	  integral	  to	  the	  problematizations	  
that	   shape	   what	   is	   to	   be	   governed,	   to	   the	   programmes	   that	   seek	   to	   give	   effect	   to	  
government	   and	   to	   the	   unrelenting	   evaluation	   of	   the	   performance	   of	   government	   that	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characterizes	  modern	  political	  cultures”	  (Rose	  1999:199),	  it	  is	  logical	  that	  politicians	  were	  
then	   number-­‐hungry	   and	   somewhat	   troubled	   by	   a	   phenomenon	   hard	   to	   count.	   These	  
early	  academic	  reports,	  along	  with	  the	  knowledge	  emerging	  from	  bureaucratic	  practices,	  
provided	  the	  fundamental	  scientific	  basis	  to	  circumscribe	  a	  segment	  of	  the	  population,	  a	  
part	  of	  human	  mobilities,	  and	   to	  provide	  positive	  empirical	  demographic	  content	   to	   the	  
legal	  category	  of	  migrant	  irregularity.	  	  
Saying	  that	  this	  knowledge	  allowed	  for	  the	  very	  constitution	  of	  irregular	  migration	  as	  
an	   object	   of	   government	   is	   not	   to	   say,	   however,	   that	   academics	   and	   elected	   officials	  
worked	   hand	   in	   hand.	   These	   reports	   also	   highlighted	   particular	   difficulties	   faced	   by	  
individuals	   without	   stable	   immigration	   status,	   denounced	   precarious	   employment	  
conditions,	  and	  generally	  argued	  that	  the	  government	  needed	  to	  put	   in	  place	  policies	  to	  
alleviate	   these	   problems.	   They	   provided	   qualitative	   analyses	   essential	   to	   any	   policy,	  
including	   progressive	   ones.	   But	   at	   this	   point	   in	   time,	   elected	   officials	   were	   primarily	  
looking	  to	  elaborate	  categories	  and	  typologies	  to	  allow	  for	  effective	  governmental	  action.	  
And	  despite	  these	  emerging	  knowledges,	  one	  cannot	  say	  that	  immigration	  in	  general,	  and	  
irregular	  migration	  in	  particular,	  formed	  a	  stable	  and	  well-­‐defined	  object	  of	  government	  at	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s.	  This	  was,	  once	  again,	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  government	  and	  most	  
members	   of	   Congress	   during	   the	   first	   meaningful	   debate	   on	   immigration	   in	   1990.	   This	  
debate,	  however,	   led	  to	  the	  preparation	  of	  a	  report	   that	  clearly	   resulted	   in	  a	  process	  of	  
categorization	   and	   typification,	   and	   which	   would	   act	   as	   a	   temporary	   policy	   settlement	  
(Gale	  1999),	  defining	  how	  immigration	  should	  be	  understood	  and	  governed.	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The	  1990	  Report	  as	  Temporary	  Policy	  Settlement	  
In	   June	   1990,	   the	   parliamentary	   group	   formed	   by	   the	   United	   Left	   and	   Initiative	   for	  
Catalonia	   (Izquierda	   Unida	   –	   Iniciativa	   per	   Catalunya,	   IU-­‐IxC)	   presented	   an	   Urgent	  
Interpellation	   on	   the	   Immigration	   Policy	   Measures	   that	   the	   Government	   is	   Thinking	   of	  
Adopting	   to	   Promote	   the	   Regularization	   of	   the	   Situation	   of	   Foreigners	   in	   Spain.27	   This	  
intervention	   led	   to	   an	   extensive	   debate	   and	   the	   first	   temporary	   policy	   settlement	   on	  
immigration.	   In	   this	   initiative	   and	   the	   motion	   that	   followed	   (IV	   –	   173/000018),	   IU-­‐IxC	  
denounced	  what	   it	  considered	  to	  be	  a	   failed	   immigration	  policy,	  unsuccessful	  because	   it	  
was	  focused	  on	  police	  control	  and	  a	  “wall	  mentality.”	  Speaking	  for	  IU-­‐IxC,	  a	  congressman	  
claimed:	  
It	  would	  be	  profoundly	  negative	  and	  mistaken,	   from	  a	  perspective	  of	  progress,	   to	  erect	   .	   .	   .	  a	  
wall	   between	   the	   world	   that	   is	   comfortable,	   the	   rich	   and	   developed	   world,	   and	   the	  
underdeveloped—third	   or	   fourth—world	   that,	  with	   a	   demographic	   growth	  much	  higher	   than	  
the	   European	   one,	   may	   create	   a	   pressure	   that—if	   you’d	   allow	   the	   analogy—would	   appear	  
similar	   to	   the	   one	   that	   the	   “Barbarians,”	   in	   scare	   quotes,	   imposed	   on	   the	   borders	   of	   the	  
[Roman]	  Empire.	  (IV	  –	  173/000018)	  
	  
Notwithstanding	   this	   racist	   way	   of	   framing	   the	   issue,	   IU-­‐IxC	   actually	   called	   for	   more	  
regularization,	  easier	  access	  to	  family	  reunification,	  better	  protection	  for	  asylum	  seekers,	  
and	  extended	  rights	  for	  all	  immigrants.	  The	  minister	  of	  the	  interior	  opposed	  this	  position,	  
and	   argued	   that	   while	   it	   was	   important	   to	   provide	   protection	   to	   refugees,	   and	   give	  
preferential	   treatment	   to	   immigrants	   from	   countries	   with	   which	   Spain	   has	   a	   special	  
                                                
27	  Interpelación	  urgente	  sobre	  medidas	  de	  políticas	  general	  y	  de	  inmigración	  que	  piensa	  adoptar	  el	  Gobierno	  
para	  promover	  la	  regularización	  de	  la	  situación	  de	  los	  inmigrantes	  extranjeros	  en	  España.	  (IV	  –	  172/000031)	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connection,	   there	   should	   also	   be	   strict	   control	   of	   irregular	   migration,	   especially	   from	  
Africa.	  He	  said:	  
I	   don’t	   think	   that	   the	   solution	   is	   to	   allow	   that	   there	  be	   a	  wave	  of	   illegal	   immigration,	  mainly	  
from	  North	  Africa,	   that	  would	  put	  us—not	  only	  Spain	  but	  also	   the	  whole	  European	  Economic	  
Community—in	  a	  situation	  to	  which	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  provide	  a	  positive	  solution.	  We’ll	  
have	   to	  help	   these	  people	   so	   that	   they	   can	   satisfy	   their	   needs	   and,	  without	   a	  doubt,	   control	  
illegal	  stays	  in	  our	  country.	  (IV-­‐	  172/000031)	  
	  
Beside	   these	   opposing	   views,	   there	   is	   one	   thing	   that	   all	   political	   parties	   involved	   in	   the	  
debate	   seemed	   to	   agree	   on:	   no	   one	   knew	   what	   they	   were	   talking	   about.	   The	   IU-­‐IxC	  
motion	  referred	  to	  foreigners,	  immigrants	  with	  and	  without	  residence	  and	  work	  permits,	  
and	  the	  two	  legal	  categories	  of	  refugees	  existing	  at	  the	  time	  (refugiado	  and	  asilado),	  and	  
was	   quite	   vague	   and	   confused.	   This	   chaos	  was	   denounced	   several	   times	   by	   those	  who	  
opposed	   the	   motion,	   but	   the	   opposing	   views	   were	   also	   not	   exempt	   of	   confusion.	   For	  
instance,	  the	  representative	  of	  Convergence	  and	  Union	  (Convergencia	  i	  Unió	  –	  CiU)	  asked	  
what	   the	   object	   of	   the	   debate	  was	   and	   attempted	   to	   provide	   his	   own	  definition	   of	   the	  
various	   categories.	  He	   agreed	   that	   immigrant	   rights	   should	   be	  defended—as	   IU-­‐IxC	   had	  
argued—but	  claimed	  that	  irregular	  immigrants	  could	  not	  be	  considered	  immigrants.	  This	  is	  
how	  he	  suggested	  the	  distinction	  should	  be	  understood:	  
I’m	   convinced	   that	  we’re	   not	   talking	   about	   foreign	   citizens	  who	   enter	   and	   live	   here	   illegally,	  
because	   otherwise	   we	   wouldn’t	   be	   talking	   about	   immigrants.	   Foreign	   immigrants	   are	   those	  
who	  enter	  Spain	  according	  to	  the	  rules	   .	   .	   .	   if	  they	  are	   immigrants,	  then	  the	  problem	  is	  other,	  
the	  problem	  is	  the	  humanitarian	  consideration	  that	  this	  topic	  deserves,	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  
of	  social	  programs.	  (IV	  –	  172/000031)28	  
                                                
28	  My	  translation	  of:	  “Estoy	  convencido	  que	  tampoco	  estamos	  hablando	  de	  los	  ciudadanos	  extranjeros	  que	  
entran	   o	   residen	   ilegalmente	   en	   España.	   Este	   es	   otro	   tema	   porque,	   sino,	   no	   estaríamos	   hablando	   de	  
inmigrantes.	  Inmigrantes	  extranjeros	  son	  aquellos	  que	  entran	  en	  España	  en	  condiciones	  reglamentarias	  .	  .	  .	  ,	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Overall,	   the	  Catalan	  parliamentary	  group	   regarded	   the	   regularization	  of	   immigrants	  as	  a	  
paradoxical	   proposal	   because	   immigrants	   are	   those	  who	   enter	   legally	   and	   therefore	   do	  
not	   need	   to	   be	   regularized,	   while	   those	   who	   enter	   illegally	   are	   by	   definition	   not	  
immigrants	   and	   therefore	   the	   government	  has	   no	   responsibility	   toward	   them.	   Similarly,	  
the	  Popular	  parliamentary	  group	  rejected	  the	  motion,	  claiming	  that	  it	  did	  not	  make	  sense:	  
“You	  keep	  confusing	  different	  concepts.	  An	  immigrant	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  a	  legal	  resident,	  
or	   an	   illegal	   resident,	   or	   a	   convention	   refugee,	   or	   a	   person	  who	   received	   asylum	   from	  
Spain,	   and	   you	   keeping	   confusing	   all	   the	   measures	   as	   though	   they	   apply	   to	   all”	   (IV	   –	  
173/000018).29	  Once	  again,	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  debate	  was	  that	  there	  was	  not	  enough	  
information	  about	  the	  phenomenon	  to	  make	  decisions.	  	  
Using	   the	   language	  of	  disease,	   the	  Socialist	  group	   (then	   in	  power)	  argued	   that	  “to	  
seriously	  attempt	  to	  find	  a	  solution	  to	  this	  problem	  .	  .	  .	  we	  previously	  need	  a	  diagnosis,	  a	  
sufficient	  amount	  of	  precise	  and	  detailed	   information	  on	  all	   these	   situations	  and	  all	   the	  
different	   categories	   that	   appear	   in	   the	   motion”	   (IV-­‐	   173/000018).	   In	   the	   interest	   of	  
accurate	  diagnosis,	  they	  presented	  an	  amendment	  replacing	  the	  whole	  motion,	  proposing	  
instead	   that	   the	  government	  present	  a	   report	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  year	   to	   clarify	  all	   these	  
terms.	   In	   a	   curious	   inversion	  of	   causality,	   the	   amended	  motion	  was	  premised	  upon	   the	  
idea	  that	  to	  fight	  the	  rise	  of	  xenophobia	  and	  racism	  in	  the	  country,	  the	  government	  had	  to	  
                                                                                                                                               
si	   son	   inmigrantes,	  el	  problema	  es	  otro,	  el	  problema	  es	   la	  consideración	  humanitaria	  que	  el	   tema	  merece	  
desde	  el	  punto	  de	  vista	  de	  las	  medidas	  sociales.”	  
29	  My	  translation	  of:	  “siguen	  ustedes	  mezclando	  conceptos	  diferentes.	  No	  es	  lo	  mismo	  un	  inmigrante	  que	  un	  
residente	   legal,	   o	   un	   residente	   ilegal,	   o	   un	   refugiado,	   o	   un	   asilado,	   y	   ustedes	  mezclan	   todas	   las	  medidas	  
como	  si	  fueran	  buenas	  para	  todos.”	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control	   immigration,	   since	   “migratory	   pressure	   worsens	   xenophobia”	   (IV-­‐	   173/000018),	  
and	   that,	   to	   do	   so,	   the	   government	   needed	   more	   information.	   Produce	   a	   report	   that	  
would	  clarify	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  debate,	  present	  empirical	  data,	  and	  outline	  an	  immigration	  
policy	  to	  control	  migration	  to	  limit	  racism	  and	  fulfill	  Spain’s	  obligation	  toward	  its	  European	  
partners—this	   was	   the	   mandate	   given	   to	   the	   government.	   This	   amended	   motion	   was	  
passed	  and	  the	  report,	  which	  was	  submitted	  to	  Congress	  in	  December	  1990,	  was	  the	  first	  
of	  its	  kind	  to	  map	  out	  what	  the	  object	  to	  be	  governed	  was.	  
Situation	  of	  Foreigners	  in	  Spain:	  Basic	  Features	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Policy	  on	  Foreigners	  	  
The	   report	   starts	  by	  presenting	   immigration,	  dividing	   it	   into	   regular	  and	   irregular	   forms,	  
and	  placing	  it	  within	  broader	  “demographic	  tendencies”	  and	  the	  existing	  legal	  framework,	  
before	   outlining	   the	   fundamental	   features	   of	   a	   policy	   on	   foreigners.30	   This	   report	  
represents	  a	  good	  synthesis	  of	   the	  problematizations	  emerging	   in	   the	  1980s	  and	  can	  be	  
understood	   as	   a	   temporary	   policy	   settlement	   that	   provided	   the	   blueprint	   for	   programs	  
aimed	  at	  governing	  immigration	  throughout	  the	  following	  decade.	  
The	  report	  states	  that,	  in	  1990,	  60%	  of	  the	  regular	  foreign	  population	  is	  not	  working,	  
since	   a	   large	   percentage	   is	   comprised	   of	   retired	   European	   nationals	   enjoying	   the	   good	  
weather	   in	   touristic	   areas.	   Europeans	   represent	   66%	   of	   all	   regular	   foreigners,	   Ibero-­‐
American	   19%,	   Asians	   7.6%,	   and	   although	   Africans	   form	   the	   smallest	   group,	   the	   report	  
                                                
30	  Situación	  de	  los	  extranjeros	  en	  España.	  Líneas	  básicas	  de	  la	  política	  española	  de	  extranjería.	  Comunicación	  
del	   Gobierno	   al	   Congreso	   de	   los	   diputados.	   General	   Archives	   of	   the	   Congress,	   reference	   number	   18167	  
(1990).	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insists	   that	   the	  African	  proportion	  of	   the	  total	  number	  of	   regular	   foreigners	  “has	  almost	  
tripled	  over	   the	   last	   decade,	   going	   from	  2.5%	   in	  1980	   to	  6.5%	   in	  1990.”	  A	  much	   longer	  
section	   dedicated	   to	   irregular	   migration—the	   real	   policy	   problem—follows.	   The	   report	  
observes	   that	   irregular	   administrative	   status	  used	   to	  be	  a	   temporary	   situation	   for	   some	  
foreigners	  but	  that	   it	  now	  often	  extends	  over	  many	  years.	  This,	   it	  explains,	   is	  due	  to	  the	  
fact	   that	   irregular	   migration	   is	   now	   mostly	   the	   result	   of	   the	   “flows	   of	   clandestine	  
immigrants,”	   and	   that	   70%	   to	   80%	   of	   the	   90,000	   to	   170,000	   estimated	   irregular	  
immigrants	  are	   from	  developing	  countries.	   In	  a	   subsection	  on	  “geographic	  distribution,”	  
the	   report	  describes	   “the	   illegal	  African	  population”	   (who	  have	  a	   low	   level	  of	  education	  
and	   less	   than	   a	   fifth	   of	   whom	   speak	   Spanish),	   “the	   population	   of	   illegal	   Portuguese	  
workers,”	   “illegal	  Asian	   immigrants”	   (two	   thirds	  of	   them	  Filipinos	  working	   in	   the	   service	  
industry,	   as	   well	   as	   Chinese,	   Koreans,	   and	   Indians),	   and	   finally	   “the	   Ibero-­‐Americans”	  
(without	  the	  word	  “illegal”),	  who	  are	  presented	  as	  “a	  well-­‐integrated	  emigration	  [sic]	  that	  
is	   semi-­‐skilled	  and	  whose	   irregularity	   tends	   to	  only	   represent	   a	  more	  or	   less	  protracted	  
period	  of	  transition”	  (p.4-­‐5).	  
The	  government	  dedicates	  the	  longest	  part	  of	  this	  section	  on	  irregular	  immigration	  
to	  the	  “abusive	  use	  of	  the	  asylum	  system,”	  which	  it	  considers	  to	  be	  “probably	  the	  principal	  
means	  of	  entry	  of	   irregular	   immigration	  to	  Spain	  today.”	  Asylum	  seekers	  can	  stay	   in	   the	  
country	  while	   their	  claim	   is	  being	  processed,	  according	   to	  a	  principle	   that	   is	  consequent	  
with	  the	  logic	  of	  asylum,	  but	  that,	  according	  to	  the	  report,	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opens	   the	   door	   to	   a	   fraudulent	  means	   of	   entry	   in	   the	  majority	   of	   developed	   countries	   for	   a	  
portion	  of	   the	   foreigners	  who	  would	  not	  be	  able	   to	  access	   them	   if	   they	  applied	  as	  economic	  
immigrants	   and	   who	   therefore	   do	   it	   as	   refugees	   and	   that,	   because	   of	   the	   administrative	  
paralysis	   resulting	   from	   the	   great	   volume	   of	   demands,	   are	   guaranteed	   to	   stay	   in	   the	   host	  
country	  for	  a	  period	  that	  may	  extend	  to	  several	  years	  and	  can	  later	  apply	  for	  regularization	  for	  
humanitarian	  reasons.	  (P.6)	  
	  
While	   the	   numbers	   of	   asylum	   seekers	   are	   still	   low	   in	   Spain,	   the	   report	  mentions	   other	  
European	   countries	   where	   the	   “phenomenon	   has	   reached	   massive	   proportions”	   and,	  
based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  rate	  of	  success	  is	  only	  7%	  in	  Spain,	  concludes	  that	  most	  claims	  
are	  abusive.	  
The	   section	   on	   “demographic	   tendencies”	   makes	   the	   assumption	   that,	   “in	   the	  
medium	   term,	   the	   EEC	   will	   not	   need	   an	   immigrant	   population	   in	   absolute	   quantitative	  
terms”	   (p.8),	   a	   claim	   contested	   by	   most	   research	   tracking	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   old-­‐age	  
dependency	  ratio	  available	  at	  the	  time	  (King	  1993;	  McIntosh	  1981;	  OECD	  1988,	  1991).	  The	  
rationale	  presented	  in	  the	  report	  is	  that	  the	  pre-­‐1973	  economic	  growth	  will	  probably	  not	  
happen	  again,	  thus	  limiting	  the	  need	  for	  external	  labour	  power,	  and	  that	  if	  ECC	  countries	  
made	  better	  use	  of	  the	  labour	  power	  of	  the	  youth,	  women,	  and	  those	  over	  55	  years	  old,	  it	  
could	  cover	  all	   the	  needs	  of	   the	   labour	  market:	   “The	  rationalization	  and	  optimization	  of	  
European	   labour	   markets	   could	   reduce	   even	   more	   the	   need	   for	   foreign	   labour	   force”	  
(p.8).31	  But	  while	  Europe	  can	  do	  without	  immigrants,	  the	  report	  claims,	  the	  demographic	  
growth	  in	  African	  countries	  (and	  especially,	  with	  respect	  to	  Spain,	  in	  the	  Maghreb),	  as	  well	  
                                                
31	  While	  the	  report	  does	  not	  provide	  any	  reference,	   this	  argument	  echoes	  that	  of	  researchers	  who,	  at	   the	  
time,	  acknowledged	  a	  demographic	  deficit	  but	  argued	  that	  government	  should	  develop	  policies	  that	  address	  
this	  issue	  without	  recurring	  to	  immigration,	  which	  they	  see	  as	  problematic.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Coleman	  1992.	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as	   political	   liberalization	   in	   Eastern	   Europe,	   is	   bound	   to	   increase	   the	   “immigration	  
pressure.”	  
This	  is	  the	  context	  that	  made	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  LOE	  7/1985	  essential,	  according	  to	  
the	   report.	   Five	   years	   after	   the	   debates	   surrounding	   the	   adoption	   of	   this	   law,	   the	  
government	  is	  more	  straightforward	  in	  stating	  its	  objectives:	  
a) To	   systematize,	   in	   the	   interest	   of	   legal	   certainty,	   the	   legislation	   related	   to	   the	   entry	   and	  
stay	  of	  foreigners	  in	  Spain.	  
b) To	  protect	  the	  national	  labour	  market	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  increasing	  presence	  of	  foreign	  job	  
seekers,	  given	  the	  high	  level	  of	  unemployment.	  
c) To	   guarantee	   that	   the	   foreigners	   who	   settle	   among	   us	   do	   it	   in	   dignified	   conditions	   and	  
according	   to	   the	   legal	   requirements,	   in	   order	   to	   prevent	   the	   creation	   of	   pockets	   of	  
marginalization	   and	   the	   generation	   of	   xenophobic	   sentiments	   and	   racism	   and	   prevent	  
situations	   of	   illegality,	   that	   fundamentally	   harm	   foreigners	   themselves,	   supporting	   the	  
integration	  of	  those	  who	  want	  to	  stay	  in	  Spain	  legally	  and	  enforcing	  a	  strict	  regime	  against	  
those	  who	  attempt	  to	  evade	  the	  law	  in	  order	  to	  stay.	  
d) To	  harmonize	  our	  legislation	  with	  that	  of	  the	  other	  countries	  of	  the	  European	  community,	  
as	  the	  process	  of	  adhesion	  to	  the	  ECC	  made	  necessary	  (P.10-­‐11).	  
	  
The	   report	   then	   concludes	   its	   overview	   of	   this	   issue	   by	   stating	   that	   the	   law	   clearly	  
responded	   to	  a	  challenging	  situation	  and	  was	  appropriate,	  but	   that	   the	  means	   to	   tackle	  
the	  problem	  were	  too	  weak.	  In	  so	  doing,	  it	  responds	  to	  the	  critique	  levelled	  by	  NGOs	  and	  
echoed	   by	   IU-­‐IxC	   in	   its	   motion	   contending	   that	   the	   law	   is	   racist	   and	   harsh.	   The	   last	  
paragraph	  before	   the	  exposition	  of	   the	  policy	  orientation	  makes	   this	  clear.	   It	   concludes:	  
“Therefore,	  the	  problems	  with	  which	  we	  are	  actually	  confronted	  do	  not	  originate,	  as	  some	  
argue,	  from	  the	  supposedly	  repressive	  or	  even	  ‘racist’	  character	  of	  the	  Law,	  but	  in	  the	  lack	  
of	  an	  effective	  management	  of	  immigration	  flows	  and	  of	  a	  global	  policy	  on	  foreigners”	  (p.	  
12).	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This	   global	   policy	   would	   have	   eight	   axes,	   six	   of	   which	   are	   oriented	   toward	  more	  
control.	  This	  is	  not	  surprising,	  since	  “controlling	  the	  volume	  of	  the	  flows	  and	  channelling	  at	  
the	  same	  time	  the	  increasing	  demographic	  pressure”	  is	  the	  overall	  objective	  of	  the	  whole	  
policy.	  As	  presented	  in	  the	  report,	  the	  main	  orientations	  are:	  
a) Control	  of	  Entry,	  Visa,	  and	  Border	  Control	  
b) Fight	  against	  Clandestine	  Work	  
c) Promotion	  and	  Social	  Integration	  Policies	  
d) Reinforcement	  of	  Police	  Action	  
e) Better	  Administrative	  Coordination	  and	  Centralization	  
f) Reform	  of	  the	  Asylum	  Process	  
g) European	  Dimension	  of	  the	  Policy	  on	  Aliens	  
h) Strengthen	  Spanish	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development	  Aid	  
	  
More	  precisely,	  for	  Axis	  A,	  this	  means	  the	  reintroduction	  of	  the	  visa	  requirement	  for	  
Algeria,	  Morocco,	  and	  Tunisia,	  soon	  to	  join	  the	  other	  113	  countries	  on	  the	  tourist	  visa	  list,	  
while	   maintaining	   the	   visa	   exemption	   for	   Ibero-­‐American	   countries;32	   an	   increase	   in	  
control	   at	   the	   southern	   border	   and	   the	   border	   with	   Portugal	   (to	   prevent	   the	   entry	   of	  
African	  migrants);	  and	  the	  negotiation	  of	  a	  readmission	  agreement	  with	  Morocco.	  Axis	  B	  
focuses,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  on	  higher	  sanctions	   for	  employers	  who	  hire	  an	  “illegal	   labour	  
force”	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  on	  an	  active	  policy	  to	  recruit	  migrant	  workers.	  It	  plans	  to	  
“direct,	   orient	   and	   fix	   a	   quota	   on	  migration	   flows,	   programing	   in	   advance	   the	   size	   and	  
essential	  variables	  [of	  the	  quota]	  such	  as	  origin,	  temporal	  dimension,	  professional	  profile,	  
possibility	  of	   integration,	   etc.,	   all	   of	  which	   in	   collaboration	  with	   the	   countries	  of	   origin”	  
                                                
32	  This	  commitment	  to	  upholding	  the	  visa	  exception	  for	  Ibero-­‐American	  countries	  did	  not	  last	  long.	  Around	  
the	  time	  Spain	  ratified	  the	  Schengen	  Agreement,	  visas	  were	  reintroduced	  for	  Dominicans	  and	  Peruvians.	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and	  will	  also	  “facilitate	  particularly	  the	  arrival	  of	  groups	  who,	  for	  linguistic,	  cultural,	  social	  
and	  professional	  reasons,	  can	  achieve	  a	  higher	   level	  of	   integration	  in	  a	  shorter	  period	  of	  
time”	  (p.17).	  	  
This	   association	   of	   good	   integration	  with	   the	   cultural	   and	   social	   characteristics	   of	  
immigrants	   seems	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   cultural	   preference	   for	   Ibero-­‐American	  migrants,	   but	  
also	   provides	   a	   means	   to	   justify	   the	   exclusion	   of	   North	   and	   West	   African	   immigrants.	  
Indeed,	  Axis	  C	  on	  integration	  is	  surprisingly	  restrictive	  and	  denounces	  the	  inability	  of	  some	  
immigrants	  to	  integrate.	   It	  starts	  by	  mentioning	  that	  Spain	  faces	  problems	  of	   integration	  
with	  respect	  to	  those	  who	  migrate	  from	  less-­‐developed	  countries	  “with	  social	  habits	  quite	  
different	   from	   ours”	   and	   that,	   although	   the	   law	   allows	   foreigners	   who	   reside	   in	   Spain	  
legally	  “a	  full	  integration	  into	  the	  national	  community	  without	  any	  type	  of	  discrimination”	  
(which	   is,	   of	   course,	   an	   exaggeration),	   there	   is	   a	   need	   for	   some	   programs	   to	   address	  
questions	  of	  unemployment,	  education,	  housing,	  and	  health	  care.	  The	  government	  is	  also	  
looking	   at	   ways	   to	   regularize	   irregular	   migrants,	   so	   that	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   “justify	   their	  
insertion	   into	   the	   national	   community,”	   as	   well	   as	   agreements	   to	   allow	   Dutch,	   Danish,	  
Norwegian,	   Swedish,	   and	   Irish	   citizens	   living	   in	   Spain	   to	   vote	   in	   the	   upcoming	   local	  
elections.	  This	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  content	  deals	  with	  integration,	  before	  the	  policy	  
document	  goes	  back	  to	  questions	  of	  control.	  
With	  regard	  to	  this	  objective,	  Axis	  D	   is	  key.	   It	   focuses	  on	  an	   increase	   in	  policing	  to	  
eradicate	  “delinquency,”	  a	  problem	  that	  the	  government	  contends	  has	  spread	  “as	  a	  result	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of	  the	  situation	  of	  illegality	  and	  marginality	  that	  characterizes	  clandestine	  immigration.”	  It	  
announces	   that	   the	  government	  will	  encourage	   judges	   to	  apply	  Article	  21.2	  of	   the	  Alien	  
Act,	  which	  allows	  for	  the	  expulsion	  of	  foreigners	  as	  a	  substitute	  sentence	  for	  crimes,	  and	  
pursue	   the	   creation	   of	   immigration	   detention	   centres.	   To	   this	   increase	   in	   police	   action,	  
Axis	  E	  adds	  a	  consolidation	  of	  administrative	  structures	  to	  coordinate	  the	  decision-­‐making	  
process,	  as	  requested	  by	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  Ombudsman	  of	  Spain.	  These	  include	  an	  Inter-­‐
Ministerial	   Commission,	   the	   creation	   of	   Foreigners	   Offices	   in	   every	   province	   to	   permit	  
migrants	   to	   perform	   administrative	   formalities,	   as	   well	   as	   an	   Immigration	   Service	   that	  
would	   design	   and	   implement	   integration	   programs.	   While	   the	   two	   former	   institutions	  
were	   indeed	   created	   soon	   thereafter,	   the	   latter,	   concerned	  with	   integration,	  was	  never	  
created.	   Certainly,	   the	   Institute	   of	   Emigration	   was	   transformed	   into	   the	   General	  
Directorate	  of	  Migrations	  in	  1992,	  but	  it	  was	  charged	  with	  managing	  migration	  flows,	  not	  
with	  developing	  integration	  strategies.	  
Axis	  F	  of	  the	  policy	  document	  announces	  a	  reform	  of	  asylum	  procedures	  that,	  as	  in	  
many	   other	   countries,	   is	   mainly	   preoccupied	   with	   distinguishing	   between	   those	   the	  
government	  deems	  “deserving	  victims”	  and	  those	  it	  casts	  as	  “masters	  of	  confusion”	  (Pratt	  
and	  Valverde	  2002).	  In	  accordance	  with	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  Dublin	  Convention	  signed	  on	  
June	   15	   of	   that	   year,	   the	   report	   suggests	   accelerating	   the	   treatment	   of	   asylum	   claims,	  
“with	   the	   objective	   that	   clearly	   unfounded	   claims	   can	   be	   rejected	   in	   a	   relatively	   short	  
period	  of	  time,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  organize	  the	  departure	  of	  abusive	  asylum	  seekers	  
from	   the	   country,”	   while	   also	   “protecting	   the	   true	   political	   refugees	   that	   are	   really	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persecuted	   in	   their	   countries	   of	   origin”	   (p.23).	   This	   preoccupation	   with	   supposedly	  
“abusive”	  asylum	  claims,	  so	  central	  in	  this	  report	  and	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  will	  disappear	  in	  
the	  following	  years	  as	  irregular	  migration	  continues	  to	  increase	  and	  the	  number	  of	  asylum	  
claims	  continues	  to	  be	  very	  low	  compared	  to	  other	  European	  countries.	  Finally,	  under	  its	  
Axis	  G,	  the	  report	  simply	  reasserts	  that	  all	  nationally	  designed	  immigration	  policies	  should	  
follow	  the	  criteria	  and	  orientations	  that	  inform	  the	  Schengen	  project.	  
The	   report	   concludes	   that,	   as	   the	   decade	   of	   the	   1990s	   is	   beginning,	   Spain	   is	  
becoming	  a	  country	  of	  immigration	  and	  has	  to	  develop	  a	  policy	  that	  would	  “preserve	  our	  
economic	  interests	  and	  social	  cohesion,	  take	  into	  consideration	  our	  historical	  and	  cultural	  
relations,	   and	   guarantee	   .	   .	   .	   the	   complete	   integration	   of	   foreign	   residents	   who	   have	  
chosen	  to	  live	  and	  work	  in	  our	  country,”	  (p.10)	  provided,	  one	  assumes	  based	  on	  the	  rest	  
of	  the	  document,	  that	  they	  are	  in	  Spain	  regularly.	  
Temporary	  Policy	  Settlement	  
In	  1991,	  all	  parties	  except	  IU-­‐IxC	  collectively	  submitted	  a	  non-­‐legislative	  proposal	  using	  the	  
exact	  wording	  of	  the	  report	  to	  orient	  government	  action.	  The	  proposal	  (IV	  –	  162/000107)	  
was	   adopted	   with	   219	   votes	   in	   favour	   and	   11	   abstentions,	   and	   the	   government	  
congratulated	  itself	  for	  having	  reached	  such	  a	  broad	  consensus.	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  moment	  
represented,	   as	   Gale	   (1999)	   would	   put	   it,	   a	   policy	   settlement.	   As	   he	   explains,	   policy	  
settlements	  are	  temporary	  agreements	   informed	  by	  broad	  “settlement	  parameters”	  and	  
organized	   around	   more	   concrete	   “settlement	   particulars”	   (p.203-­‐204).	   In	   terms	   of	   the	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particulars	   of	   the	   1990	   report	   and	   subsequent	   1991	   proposal,	   there	   was	   a	   general	  
agreement	  that	  actions	  should	  be	  organized	  around	  (1)	  border	  control,	  police	  action,	  and	  
the	   imposition	   of	   visas;	   (2)	   the	   channelling	   of	   migrant	   labour,	   an	   effective	   control	   of	  
workplaces,	   and	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   national	   labour	   market;	   (3)	   the	   integration	   of	  
regular	  immigrants	  and	  the	  regularization	  of	  some	  irregular	  migrants;	  and	  (4)	  an	  increased	  
co-­‐operation	  with	   third	   countries	   in	   terms	  of	   coordination	  of	   flows,	  border	   control,	   and	  
development	  aid.	  These	  were	  still	   rather	  broad	  categories	  of	  policy	  orientation,	  and	   the	  
task	  of	  developing	  the	  details	  of	  these	  particulars	  fell	  upon	  high-­‐level	  officials	  who	  ended	  
up	  prioritizing	  the	  first	  two	  dimensions	  in	  the	  1990s:	  border	  control	  and	  the	  management	  
of	   labour	   flows.	   Indeed,	   while	   the	   need	   for	   integration	   and	   international	   co-­‐operation	  
policies	  was	  acknowledged	  early	  on,	  policies	  seriously	  tackling	  these	  issues	  did	  not	  appear	  
until	  the	  mid-­‐2000s.	  
Through	   these	   policy	   particulars,	   we	   can	   identify	   broader	   policy	   settlement	  
parameters	  or	   general	   criteria	   that	   inform	  particular	  policy	   actions.	  While	   it	   is	   true	   that	  
the	  Spanish	  adhesion	  to	  the	  Schengen	  Agreement	   in	  1991	  provides	  the	  main	   immediate	  
context,	  the	  specificities	  of	  the	  Spanish	  rationales	  for	  governing	  irregular	  migration	  appear	  
more	  clearly	   in	   this	   report.	  The	   temporary	  policy	  settlement	   that	   this	   report	  documents	  
exposes	   three	   complementary	   and	   sometimes	   contradictory	   logics,	   or	   premises,	   that	  
would	  orient	  any	  policy	  action	  in	  the	  future:	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1)	   A	   police	   logic	   of	   control	   that	   governs	   irregular	   migrants	   as	   threats	  
(strengthening	  borders,	  fighting	  delinquents,	  deporting	  illegals	  and	  false	  refugees);	  
2)	   A	   labour	   management	   logic	   that	   governs	   irregular	   migrants	   as	   workers	  
(managing	  flows,	  protecting	  the	  national	  labour	  market,	  inspecting	  workplaces);	  
3)	   A	   cultural	   preference	   logic	   that	   treats	   irregular	   migrants	   as	   more	   or	   less	  
compatible	   cultural	   subjects	   (integrating	   immigrants,	   prioritizing	   Ibero-­‐Americans	  
and	  Europeans;	  attributing	  particular	  work	  permits	  to	  particular	  groups).	  	  
These	   three	   broad	   logics,	   which	   I	   refer	   to	   as	   securitization,	   labouralization,	   and	  
culturalization,	   will	   provide	   the	   underlying	   grammar	   of	   all	   subsequent	   programs	   of	  
government,	   including	   those	   related	   to	   integration	   or	   international	   co-­‐operation.	   These	  
logics	  were	  not	  invented	  in	  1990,	  nor	  did	  they	  appear	  in	  exactly	  the	  same	  form	  thereafter,	  
but	  we	  can	  nonetheless	   identify	  this	  report	  as	  representative	  of	  a	  policy	  settlement	  that	  
occurred	  around	  that	  time	  and	  that	  gave	  institutional	  legitimacy	  to	  these	  ways	  of	  looking	  
at	  and	  intervening	  on	  migration.	  
Questioning	   the	   usefulness	   of	   reifying	   1985	   as	   the	   natural	   point	   of	   departure	   of	  
inquiries	   about	   Spanish	   immigration	   policies,	   this	   chapter	   traced	   the	   hesitant	  
problematizations	  of	   irregular	  migration	  as	   an	  object	  of	   government	   in	   the	  early	  1980s,	  
showing	   that	   the	   terms	   through	   which	   it	   is	   understood	   today	   did	   not	   always	   appear	  
obvious.	  Careful	  not	  to	  downplay	  the	  importance	  of	  laws,	  the	  chapter	  discussed	  the	  role	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that	  the	  inscription	  of	  this	  object	  into	  law	  played	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  institutional	  regime	  
that	  maintains	   irregular	   immigrants	   in	   a	   situation	  of	   legal	   liminality.	   This	   chapter	   traced	  
the	  emergence	  and	  consolidation,	  around	  1990,	  of	  the	  three	  sets	  of	   logics	  and	  practices	  
under	   investigation	   in	   the	   following	   chapters.	   It	   would	   have	   been	   possible	   to	   analyze	  
these	   three	   broad	   logics	   as	   parts	   of	   a	   macro-­‐level	   political	   rationality	   informed	   by	  
liberalism	  (Rose	  and	  Miller	  1992),	  although	  in	  the	  Spanish	  context,	  it	  is	  a	  form	  of	  liberalism	  
that	   is	   deeply	   intertwined	  with	  Catholicism	  at	  both	   the	  philosophical	   and	  practical	   level	  
(Vásquez	  García	  2009).	  But	  instead	  of	  trying	  to	  generalize	  about	  the	  thesis	  of	  a	  liberal	  or	  
neoliberal	  mode	  of	  governance,	  or	  study	  rationalities	  at	   this	   level	   in	  Spain,	   this	   research	  
looks	  at	  how	  the	  three	  logics	  identified	  in	  the	  1990	  report	  inform	  other	  historically	  specific	  
policies	  developed	  since	  then.	  	  
Indeed,	  most	   governmental	   practices	   targeting	   irregular	  migration,	   then	   and	  now,	  
have	   drawn	   upon	   these	   three	   complementary	   and	   sometimes	   contradictory	   logics	   to	  
various	   degrees.	   For	   this	   reason,	   it	   is	   often	   hard	   to	   separate	   them	   analytically.	   For	  
instance,	   the	   framing	   of	  Muslim	   immigrants	   as	   a	   potential	   threat	   to	   national	   identities	  
(Spanish	  and	  Catalan)	  is	  informed	  in	  Spain	  by	  both	  securitizing	  and	  culturalizing	  logics,	  just	  
like	   the	   allocation	   of	   quotas	   for	   the	   recruitment	   of	   foreign	   workers	   based	   on	   cultural	  
preference	   combines	   the	  management	   of	   labour	   flows	  with	   assumptions	   about	   cultural	  
criteria	   of	   assimilability.	   The	   ways	   in	   which	   these	   complementary	   and	   sometimes	  
contradictory	   logics	  and	  practices	  are	  assembled	   together	   in	  Spain	  will	   appear	  clearly	   in	  
Chapter	  7,	  where	  I	  analyze	  this	  regime	  governing	  immigration	  through	  probation	  and	  pay	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close	  attention	  to	  the	  intersecting	  logics	  and	  practices	  of	  various	  actors	  on	  the	  ground.	  In	  
the	  next	  three	  chapters,	  however,	  I	   isolate	  these	  logics	  for	  analytic	  purposes,	   in	  order	  to	  
highlight	  their	  specificities,	  trace	  their	  genealogies,	  and	  discuss	  the	  policies	  in	  which	  each	  
of	  them	  appears	  more	  centrally.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  chapters	  considers	  culturalization.  
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Chapter	  4	  









In	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  I	  discussed	  the	  ways	  that	  irregular	  migration	  was	  thought	  of	  and	  
acted	  upon	  as	  an	  object	  of	  government	  during	  the	  1980s.	  I	  also	  identified	  three	  logics	  that	  
were	   emerging,	   still	   poorly	   articulated	   in	   these	   early	   and	   hesitant	   political	   debates	   and	  
that	  I	  identify	  as	  securitization,	  labouralization	  and	  culturalization.	  In	  this	  chapter	  and	  the	  
two	  that	  follow,	  I	  discuss	  each	  of	  these	  logics	  along	  with	  the	  practices	  they	  inform,	  as	  they	  
appear	   in	   specific	   immigration	   policies	   since	   the	   1980s.	   While	   the	   securitizing	   and	  
criminalizing	   logic	   is	   the	   most	   obvious,	   and	   the	   desire	   to	   manage	   migration	   flows	   and	  
migrants	  as	  a	  labour	  issue	  the	  most	  popular,	  culturalization—the	  framing	  and	  governing	  of	  
migrants	   as	   cultural	   subjects—appears	   to	   be	   the	   logic	   that	   runs	   the	   deepest	   and	   that	  
informs	  them	  all.	  The	  previous	  chapter	  mentioned	  that	  the	  most	  obvious	  manifestation	  of	  
the	  cultural	  logic	  in	  early	  policy	  debates	  was	  the	  preferential	  treatment	  that	  policy-­‐makers	  
considered	  was	  owed	  to	  immigrants	  from	  Ibero-­‐American	  countries.	  The	  present	  chapter	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starts	   by	   going	   back	   in	   time	   and	   tracing	   the	   genealogy	   of	   this	   preference	   through	   a	  
discussion	  of	  the	  differential	  treatment	  of	  Muslims	  and	  Latin	  Americans	  historically.	  Briefly	  
revisiting	   Spanish	   colonial	   history	   as	   well	   as	   political	   texts	   from	   the	   early	   twentieth	  
century,	   I	   discuss	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   notion	   of	   Hispanic	   community	   and	   the	   role	   it	  
played	   in	   Spanish	   nation-­‐building.	   I	   also	   analyze	   the	   complementary	   development	   of	  
Maurophobia,	   the	   fear	   and	   hatred	   of	   “Moors,”	   as	   a	   cultural	   thread	   that	   continues	   to	  
inform	   contemporary	   policies.	   The	   chapter	   then	  moves	   on	   to	   an	   analysis	   of	   how	   these	  
cultural	   logics	   informed	   the	   Civil	   Code	   and	   the	   regulations	   of	   the	   Alien	   Act,	   granting	  
preferential	   treatment	   to	   Latin	   Americans	   (and	   a	   few	   other	   groups)	   in	   the	   access	   to	  
Spanish	   nationality	   and	   to	   work	   permits.	   The	   last	   section	   of	   this	   chapter	   deals	   more	  
specifically	   with	   the	   framing	   of	   migrants	   as	   cultural	   subjects	   and	   the	   understanding	   of	  
integration	   as	   a	   cultural	   problem	  by	  policy-­‐makers	   especially	   since	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  
twenty	  first	  century.	  
Before	  delving	   into	  history,	   however,	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   start	   this	   genealogical	   analysis	  
where	   the	   last	   chapter	  ended,	   in	  1991-­‐92,	   and	  use	   the	  events	   that	  occurred	  during	   the	  
500th	   anniversary	   of	   the	   “Discovery	   of	   the	   Americas”	   in	   1992	   as	   an	   entry	   point	   for	   an	  
inquiry	   into	   the	   role	   that	   the	   notion	   of	   “Hispanic	   community”	   and	   the	   development	   of	  
“Maurophobia”	  played	   in	  the	  early	  construction	  of	  Spanish	  national	   identities.	  Following	  
the	   1990	   report	   on	   immigration	   and	   the	   subsequent	   adoption	   of	   the	   non-­‐legislative	  
proposal	   on	   immigration	  policy	   in	  April	   1991,	   the	   three	   logics	   identified	   in	   the	  previous	  
chapter	  became	  more	  explicit.	  The	  1991-­‐93	  period	  marked	  a	  turning	  point.	  As	  assessed	  by	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Antonio	  Izquierdo	  Escribano	  (1996),	  “With	  regard	  to	  the	  question	  of	  foreigners,	  1992	  was	  
a	  decisive	  year	  for	  Spain.	  It	  marks	  the	  end	  of	  hesitation	  on	  this	  issue	  and	  opens	  the	  era	  of	  
immigration	  policies”	   (p.239).	   It	  was	   indeed	   a	   frenetic	   time:	   the	   government	   created	  or	  
reorganized	  various	  institutional	  structures	  to	  study	  and	  manage	  migration,	  implemented	  
a	  regularization	  process	  in	  1991	  that	  issued	  permits	  to	  109,000	  workers	  and	  7,000	  of	  their	  
relatives	  (Izquierdo	  Escribano	  1996:134),	  and	  in	  the	  same	  year	   imposed	  a	  tourist	  visa	  on	  
Moroccans,	  Algerians,	  Tunisians	  and	  Peruvians.	  The	  government	  also	  signed	  a	  repatriation	  
agreement	  with	  Morocco	  in	  1992	  allowing	  Spain	  to	  deport	  any	  irregular	  migrant	  who	  has	  
transited	  through	  this	  country.33	  With	  regard	  to	  labour,	  Spanish	  officials	  increased	  labour	  
inspections	   to	   detect	   irregular	   employment	   as	   of	   1991,	   created	   a	   system	  of	   quota	   (the	  
contingent	  system)	  to	  hire	  migrant	  workers	  in	  1992	  and	  used	  it	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  1993.	  
Significantly,	  Spain	  also	  ratified	  the	  Schengen	  Agreement	  in	  June	  1991.34	  	  
	   With	   the	   signing	   of	   the	  Maastricht	   Treaty	   in	   January,	   1992	   is	   also	   an	   important	  
year	  for	  the	  European	  community,	  and	  for	  Spain’s	  new	  identity	  as	  a	  European	  state	  on	  par	  
with	  its	  northern	  neighbours.	  The	  year	  1992	  is	  also	  symbolically	  charged	  since	  it	  marks	  the	  
500th	  anniversary	  of	  the	  Reconquista,	  a	  “process	  of	  de-­‐Africanization,	  de-­‐Judaization	  and	  
cultural	  Europeanization”	  of	  Spain	  (Milhou	  1991:39-­‐40)	  that	  included	  the	  expulsion	  of	  the	  
Jews	   and	   the	   take-­‐over	   of	   the	   last	  Moor	   stronghold	   in	  Granada	   in	   1492,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  
subsequent	   Christianization	   and	   eventual	   expulsion	   of	   Muslims	   and	   Moriscos	   (Fuchs	  
                                                
33	  Acuerdo	  entre	  el	  Reino	  de	  España	  y	  el	  Reino	  de	  Marruecos	  relativo	  a	  la	  circulación	  de	  personas,	  el	  tránsito	  
y	  la	  readmisión	  de	  extranjeros	  entrados	  ilegalmente.	  Signed	  on	  February	  13,	  1992.	  
34	  Acuerdo	  de	  adhesión	  del	  Reino	  de	  España	  al	  Convenio	  de	  aplicación	  del	  Acuerdo	  de	  Schengen.	  Signed	  on	  
June	  25,	  1991.	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2009).	  Of	  course,	  1492	  is	  also	  the	  year	  of	  the	  arrival	  of	  Columbus	  to	  the	  Americas	  and	  the	  
beginning	  of	   the	  Spanish	  colonial	  expansion	   that	  will	  provide	   the	  basis	   for	   the	   idea	  of	  a	  
transatlantic	   Hispanic	   community.	   It	   also	   coincides	   with	   the	   publication	   of	   the	   first	  
grammar	  codifying	  Castilian	  as	  a	  language	  distinct	  from	  Latin	  by	  Antonio	  de	  Nebrija.	  Taken	  
together,	  these	  events,	  mythologized	  and	  symbolized	  by	  the	  year	  1492	  have	  been	  central	  
to	   the	   historical	   development	   of	   Spanish	   (Castilian)	   national	   identity.	   These	   are	   the	  
historical	  events	  that	  Spaniards	  celebrated	  in	  1992,	  a	  year	  marked	  by	  so	  many	  changes	  in	  
immigration	   policy.	   Parliamentary	   debates	   of	   the	   time	   remind	   us	   that	   the	   historical	  
present	   is	   always	   deeply	   informed	   by	   the	   historical	   past,	   and	   that	   to	   understand	  
contemporary	   notions	   of	   nationhood,	   one	   needs	   to	   inquire	   into	   notions	   bearing	   the	  
weight	  of	  history.	  One	  such	  notion	  is	  that	  of	  hispanidad.	  
The	   Franco	   dictatorship	   (1939-­‐75)	  made	   such	   an	   extensive	   use	   of	   the	   expressions	  
“nation”	  and	  “hispanidad”	  (Hispanity	  or	  Spanishness)	  in	  its	  populist	  rhetoric	  that	  political	  
elites	  avoided	  using	  the	  phrase	  “the	  Spanish	  nation”	  in	  the	  first	  years	  of	  the	  democracy.	  In	  
spite	  of	   this,	   the	  Congress	  passed	  a	   law	   in	  1987	  making	  October	  12—the	  day	  Columbus	  
landed	  on	  the	  island	  of	  Guanahani—Day	  of	  National	  Celebration,	  continuing	  the	  tradition	  
set	   during	   the	   Franco	  dictatorship	   under	   the	  name	  Día	   de	   la	  Hispanidad	   (Ley	   18/1987).	  
The	  text	  of	  the	  law	  does	  not	  mention	  hispanidad,	  preferring	  instead	  to	  frame	  this	  day	  as	  a	  
celebration	   of	   cultural	   diversity,	   but	   it	   justifies	   the	   choice	   of	   this	   day	   by	   arguing	   that	  
October	   12,	   1492	   “initiated	   a	   period	   of	   linguistic	   and	   cultural	   projection	   beyond	   the	  
European	  limits.”	  According	  to	  various	  authors	  (Aguilar	  Fernandez	  and	  Humlebaek	  2002;	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Rein	  and	  Weisz	  2002),	  the	  decision	  to	  choose	  this	  date	  as	  national	  holiday	  instead	  of	  other	  
competing	   dates—such	   as	   the	   day	   the	   democratic	   constitution	   was	   signed—is	   directly	  
related	  to	  the	  upcoming	  500th	  anniversary.	  	  
In	   the	   words	   of	   the	   secretary	   of	   state	   for	   international	   co-­‐operation	   and	   Ibero-­‐
America,	  as	  well	  as	  president	  of	  the	  National	  Commission	  for	  the	  Commemoration	  of	  the	  
Vth	  Centenary	  of	  the	  Discovery	  of	  America,35	  Juan	  Antonio	  Yáñez-­‐Barnuevo,	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  
event	  was	  to:	  
highlight	  the	  accomplishments	  of	  Spain	   in	  America	  that	  are	   less	  known	  than	  other	  deeds	  that	  
are	  traditionally	  covered,	  including	  by	  Spanish	  historians—the	  epic	  accomplishments,	  or	  those	  
related	   to	   conquest—forgetting	   or	   giving	   less	   importance	   to	   something	   we	   have	   wanted	   to	  
highlight	  in	  this	  commemoration,	  that	  is	  the	  scientific	  work,	  mainly	  during	  the	  reign	  of	  Carlos	  III,	  
in	  the	  18th	  century,	  and	  the	  civil	  work	  of	  urbanization	  of	  Spain	  in	  America.	  (IV	  –	  212/000397).	  
	  
This	  celebration	  was	  also	  the	  occasion	  to	  launch	  the	  now	  well-­‐known	  Cervantes	  Institutes,	  
centres	  whose	  mission	  was	  to	  become	  not	  simply	  “a	  network	  of	  language	  academies,	  but	  
instead,	   like	   in	  other	  countries	   that	  are	   linguistic	  and	  cultural	  powers,	  authentic	   centres	  
for	  the	  projection	  of	  Spanish	  language	  and	  culture”	  (IV	  –	  212/000397).	  	  
While	   this	   celebration	   is	   not	   directly	   related	   to	   the	   signing	   of	   the	   readmission	  
agreement	  with	  Morocco,	  the	  imposition	  of	  a	  visa	  for	  citizens	  of	  states	  from	  the	  Maghreb,	  
or	  the	  preference	  for	  Ibero-­‐Americans	  and	  nationals	  of	  other	  countries	  with	  colonial	  ties	  
to	   Spain,	   it	   helps	   us	   see	   that	   in	   the	   1990s	   this	   idea	  of	  Hispanic	   community	   (comunidad	  
                                                
35	  This	  is	  a	  translation	  of	  Comisión	  Nacional	  para	  la	  Conmemoración	  del	  V	  Centenario	  del	  Descubrimiento	  de	  
Ámerica,	  the	  oficial	  name	  of	  the	  commission.	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hispánica)	  still	  informed—albeit	  discreetly	  and	  in	  a	  more	  progressive	  fashion—the	  cultural	  
preference	  for	  Latin	  American	  immigrants	  in	  Spanish	  immigration	  and	  citizenship	  policies.	  
By	   juxtaposing	   new	   immigration	   policies	   with	   manifestations	   of	   a	   Spanish	   identity	  
informed	   by	   the	   Reconquista,	   the	   year	   1992	   made	   the	   relationships	   between	   these	  
elements	  manifest.	  As	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  this	  chapter,	  the	  idea	  of	  Hispanic	  community,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  persistence	  of	  Maurophobia	  are	  central	  elements	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  culturalization	  
in	  Spanish	  immigration	  policies	  to	  this	  day.	  
Comunidad	  Hispánica,	  Maurophobia	  and	  Racial	  Governance	  
Spaniards’	   relationship	   to	   the	  Muslim	   and	   Ibero-­‐American	   communities	   is	   complex	   and	  
cannot	   be	   simply	   presented	   in	   dichotomous	   terms.	   While	   progressive	   Spaniards	   are	  
usually	  more	  open	   to	  Muslims	   than	  conservative	  ones,	   the	   framing	  of	  North	  Africans	  as	  
conservative	  and	  pious	  by	  Franco	  also	  led	  to	  a	  historical	  prejudice	  against	  them	  by	  the	  Left	  
(Aguilar	  Fernandez	  and	  Humlebaek	  2002).	  Similarly,	  while	  there	  is	  a	  preference	  for	  Ibero-­‐
Americans	  in	  immigration	  policies	  (Izquierdo	  Escribano,	  López	  de	  Lera,	  and	  Martínez	  Buján	  
2003;	  Pérez	  Yruela	  and	  Desrues	  2005),	  the	  treatment	  they	  receive	  is	  not	  exempt	  of	  racism	  
and	   discrimination	   (Domingo	   2005).	   The	   repression	   of	   Indigenous	   protests	   during	   the	  
500th	  anniversary	  of	  1492	  in	  Spain	  clearly	  exposed	  the	  colonial	  relations	  that	  formed	  the	  
basis	   of	   the	   idea	   of	  hispanidad	   and	   of	   the	   now	   exalted	  Organization	   of	   Ibero-­‐American	  
States.	   In	   fact,	   Walter	   Mignolo	   (2006,	   2010)	   traces	   back	   the	   existence	   of	   both	  
contemporary	   Islamophobia	   and	   Hispanophobia	   in	   the	   United	   States	   to	   the	   imperial	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rationality	   that	   informed	  colonial	  modernity,	   starting	  with	  1492.	  The	  racist	  assassination	  
of	  Lucrecia	  Pérez,	  a	  black	  Dominican	  immigrant,	  by	  an	  agent	  of	  the	  Guardia	  Civil	  and	  three	  
other	   men	   in	   Madrid	   in	   November	   1992	   also	   dramatically	   illustrated	   that	   anti-­‐Latino	  
discrimination	  and	  violence	  is	  present	  in	  Spain.36	  	  
Nonetheless,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  Hispanic	  community	  as	  it	  developed	  
through	   the	   concept	   of	   hispanidad	   contributed	   to	   the	   development	   of	   a	   preferential	  
treatment	   for	   immigrants	   from	   Ibero-­‐American	   countries.	   This	   preference	   for	   Latin	  
American	   over	   other	   non-­‐European	   immigrants	   should	   not	   be	   understood	   as	   resulting	  
from	  a	  simple	  binary	  logic	  opposing	  the	  culturally	  good	  and	  bad	  immigrants.	  Instead,	  the	  
ambiguity	   in	   the	   treatment	   of	   Latin	   American	   migrants	   helps	   us	   understand	   that,	   as	  
Enakshi	  Dua	  (2007)	  puts	  it,	  “producing	  a	  racialized	  nation	  can	  take	  place	  not	  only	  through	  
practices	   of	   exclusion,	   but	   also	   through	   practices	   of	   inclusion”	   (p.446).	   The	  
reinterpretation	   of	   Spanish	   imperialism	   in	   the	   Americas	   and	   the	   anti-­‐Muslim	   and	   anti-­‐
Jewish	  dimensions	  of	   the	  Reconquista	   are	   central	  dimensions	  of	   the	  national	   imaginary,	  
and	   they	   provide	   a	   substantial	   underlying	   discourse	   that	   informs	   the	   contemporary	  
treatment	  of	  immigration.	  
	  
	  
                                                
36	   The	   assassination	   of	   Lucrecia	   Pérez	   in	   the	   Madrid	   neighbourhood	   of	   Aravaca,	   where	   raids	   targeting	  
irregular	  migrants	  were	  frequent,	  was	  the	  first	  to	  be	  publically	  recognized	  as	  a	  racist	  anti-­‐immigrant	  murder.	  
For	  an	  in-­‐depth	  analysis,	  see	  Calvo	  Buezas	  [1993]	  2012.	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The	  Concept	  of	  Hispanidad	  
The	   concept	   of	   hispanidad	   (Hispanity	   or	   Spanishness)	   emerged	   both	   as	   an	   attempt	   to	  
recast	  the	  Spanish	  sphere	  of	   influence	  in	  cultural	  terms	  after	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  last	  Spanish	  
colonies	  in	  1898,	  and	  as	  a	  way	  of	  reclaiming	  the	  superiority	  of	  the	  Spanish	  “spirit”	  in	  the	  
face	  of	  a	  Europe	  that	  treated	  Spain	  with	  disdain.	  Ricardo	  Pérez	  Montford	  (1992)	  associates	  
the	  concept	  with	  the	  project	  of	  building	  a	  spiritual	  empire	  to	  replace	  the	  territorial	  one,	  
and	  describes	  the	  early	  Hispanism	  of	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  in	  this	  way:	  
Combining	   imperial	   ideas	   .	   .	   .	   with	   the	   integration	   of	   the	   foundations	   of	   a	   mother	   culture	  
elaborated	  by	  Marcelino	  Menéndez	  Pelayo,	  Hispanism	  is	  based	  on	  a	  principle	  that	  considers	  the	  
existence	  of	  a	   transatlantic	  “great	   family”	  or	  “community”	  or	  “race”	   that	  distinguishes	  all	   the	  
peoples	   that	   belonged	   to	   the	   Spanish	  Crown	  at	   some	  point.	   This	  Hispanic	   identity	   lies	   in	   the	  
conviction	  that	  Spaniards	  developed,	  in	  the	  process	  of	  empire	  formation,	  a	  series	  of	  particular	  
life	  and	  cultural	   forms	  that	  differentiate	  them	  clearly	   from	  all	   the	  other	  peoples	  on	  the	  globe	  
(P.15).	  
	  
In	  this	  sense,	  it	  was	  also	  a	  representation	  of	  the	  spiritual	  superiority	  of	  Spain	  that	  aimed	  to	  
oppose	  the	  Black	  Legend,	  this	  historiographical	  tradition	  of	  depicting	  Spanish	  colonialism	  
as	  cruel	  and	  Spanish	  culture	  as	  underdeveloped	  and	  influenced	  by	  Islam.	  Who	  coined	  the	  
term	  “Hispanism”	   is	   the	  subject	  of	  much	  debate,	  and	   it	   is	  clear	   that	   there	  existed	  many	  
visions	  of	  the	  concept	  (García	  de	  Tuñón	  Aza	  2004;	  Lombardero	  Álvarez	  1999).	  It	  is	  through	  
the	  work	  of	  Ramiro	  de	  Maeztu	  that	  the	  concept,	  in	  its	  conservative	  Catholic	  variation,	  was	  
integrated	   into	   the	  National-­‐Catholic	   ideology	  of	   the	   Franco	  era.	   The	   ideas	  published	   in	  
1934	  in	  his	  In	  Defence	  of	  Hispanity	  were	  used	  by	  the	  Franco	  regime	  to	  construct	  a	  “White	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Legend”	  of	  the	  missionary	  effort	  of	  Spanish	  imperialism,	  develop	  ties	  with	  Ibero-­‐America	  
in	  a	  time	  of	  European	  exclusion,	  and	  fight	  national	  minorities	  in	  the	  country.37	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  it	  took	  several	  years	  after	  the	  return	  to	  democracy	  for	  the	  term	  to	  
begin	  to	  be	  used	  again	  by	  political	  elites,	  and	  when	  it	  returned	  the	  emphasis	  was	  put	  on	  
the	   Ibero-­‐American	   community,	   not	   on	   the	   spiritual	   glory	   of	   Spain.	   The	   Día	   de	   la	  
Hispanidad	   (Day	   of	   Hispanity)	  was	   renamed	  Día	   de	   la	   Fiesta	   Nacional	   (Day	   of	   National	  
Celebration)	   and	   the	   festivities	   of	   1992	   insisted	   on	   the	   theme	  of	   the	   re-­‐encounter.	   The	  
idea	  of	  an	   Ibero-­‐American	  or	  Hispanic	  solidarity	  takes	  various	   forms	  today:	  many	  policy-­‐
makers	  and	  politicians	   locate	  the	   justification	  for	  a	  preferential	   treatment	  toward	   Ibero-­‐
Americans	  in	  the	  generosity	  they	  showed	  when	  Spaniards	  had	  to	  emigrate	  for	  political	  or	  
economic	  reasons,	  while	  others	  insist	  on	  the	  civilizational	  ties	  between	  these	  nations.	  For	  
instance,	  a	  high-­‐level	  official	   for	   immigration	  at	   the	  Ministry	  of	   the	   Interior	  explained	  to	  
me	   that	   while	   his	   ministry	   wanted	   to	   impose	   tourist	   visas	   on	   various	   Latin	   American	  
countries	   in	  2000-­‐02,	   it	  was	  hard	   for	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Exterior	  Affairs	   to	   implement	   them	  
“because	  of	  the	  great	  Spanish	  policy	  with	  regard	  to	   Ibero-­‐America,	  countries	  with	  which	  
we	   have	   an	   extraordinary	   proximity,	   a	   common	   culture	   and	   civilization.”38	   Whether	  
politicians	  and	  civil	  servants	  insist	  on	  Spain’s	  obligation	  to	  be	  generous	  to	  the	  peoples	  that	  
have	  welcomed	  them	  during	  hard	  times,	  or	  on	  the	  civilizational	  alliances	  that	   links	  Spain	  
to	  Ibero-­‐America,	  most	  mention	  the	  historical	  and	  cultural	  ties	  that	  link	  Ibero-­‐America	  to	  
                                                37	  On	  the	  White	  Legend,	  see	  Molina	  Martínez	  2012.	  
38	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  October	  14,	  2012.	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Spain,	   a	   connection	   that	  does	  not	  extend	   to	  Moroccans	  despite	   the	  existence	  of	   similar	  
ties.	  
Maurophobia	  
In	  the	  versions	  of	  hispanidad	  that	  mobilize	  religious	  and	  civilizational	  arguments	  to	  explain	  
the	  proximity	  between	  Spaniards	  and	  Ibero-­‐Americans,	  Spanish	  identity	  is	  often	  presented	  
as	  opposed	  to	  Islam.	  In	  recent	  years,	  the	  Popular	  Party	  has	  been	  particularly	  concerned	  to	  
highlight	  the	  Christian	  dimension	  of	  both	  the	  Hispanic	  community	  and	  Europe.	  José	  María	  
Aznar	  (Spanish	  president	  from	  1996	  to	  2004)	  represents	  the	  values	  and	  ideas	  of	  a	  Spanish	  
Catholic	   right	   that	   has	   reinvented	   itself	   through	   a	   commitment	   to	  neoliberalism	  and	   an	  
alignment	  with	  American	  neoconservatives	   in	   the	  1990s	   (Carmona,	  García,	   and	   Sánchez	  
2012).	   In	   2003-­‐04,	   Aznar	   lobbied	   intensely	   for	   the	   inclusion	   of	   a	   reference	   to	   “the	  
Christian	   heritage	   of	   Europe”	   in	   the	   text	   of	   the	   European	   Constitution,	   claiming	   that	  
“without	  the	  Christian	  heritage,	  Europe	  cannot	  be	  explained.	  Not	  only	  for	  its	  religion,	  but	  
for	  all	  that	  has	  been	  achieved	  in	  freedom,	  equality	  and	  human	  rights”	  (cited	  in	  El	  País;	  see	  
Schwartz	  2003:n.p.).	  He	  received	  the	  support	  of	  several	  heads	  of	  state	  and	  Pope	  John	  Paul	  
II	   congratulated	   him	   for	   his	   efforts,	   but	   the	   Spanish	   initiative	   was	   controversial	   among	  
European	  officials	  and	   the	  mention	  did	  not	  make	   it	   in	   the	   final	   version	  of	   the	  European	  
Constitution	  (El	  País	  2004).	  
This	   defence	   of	   the	   Christian	   heritage	   is	   not	   detached	   from	   the	   understanding	   of	  
Spanish	   identity	  and	  culture	  as	   resulting	   from	  a	  Catholic	  war	  against	  “Muslim	   invaders.”	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Already	   in	   Defence	   of	   Hispanity,	   De	   Maeztu	   ([1934]	   1941)	   insisted	   on	   the	   positive	  
dimension	  of	  Hispanism,	  but	  located	  the	  emergence	  of	  Spanish	  spiritual	  superiority	  in	  the	  
Reconquista.	  He	  claimed:	  
The	  Spanish	  character	  has	  formed	  in	  the	  multi-­‐secular	  struggle	  against	  Moors	  and	  Jews.	  Against	  
Muslim	  fatalism,	  the	  Hispanic	  persuasion	  in	  the	  liberty	  of	  man	  became	  solidified	  .	  .	  .	  In	  front	  of	  
the	  Jews,	  which	  is	  the	  most	  exclusivist	  people	  in	  the	  world,	  we	  forged	  our	  Catholic	  sentiment	  of	  
universality	   .	   .	   .	   The	   fundamental	   traits	   of	   the	   Spanish	   character	   are	   due,	   therefore,	   to	   the	  
struggle	  against	  Moors	  and	  Jews	  and	  to	  its	  secular	  contact	  with	  them	  (P.210,	  211,	  213).	  
	  
One	  might	  assume	  that	  the	  anti-­‐Muslim	  and	  anti-­‐Semitic	  conception	  of	  Hispanity	  is	  a	  relic	  
of	  early	   twentieth	  century	  National-­‐Catholicism	  and	  racism,	  but	   it	   reappears	   regularly	   in	  
the	  ideology	  of	  a	  branch	  of	  the	  Spanish	  right	  nowadays.	  While	  there	  has	  been	  a	  decrease	  
in	   openly	   anti-­‐Semitic	   discourses	   by	   politicians	   since	   the	   return	   to	   democracy,	   and	   the	  
inclusion	   in	  1982	  of	  Sephardic	   Jews	  on	   the	   list	  of	  persons	  who	  have	  an	  easier	  access	   to	  
Spanish	   nationality,	   anti-­‐Muslim	   sentiments	   are	   still	   regularly	   expressed	   and	   the	   fight	  
against	  the	  Moors	  is	  still	  mentioned	  as	  a	  founding	  moment	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  Spanish	  
identity.	   This	   is	   not	   surprising	   since,	   as	   many	   scholars	   have	   shown	   (Goode	   2009;	  
Grosfoguel	   and	   Mielants.	   2006;	   Hentsch	   [1989]	   1992;	   Mignolo	   2006;	   Said	   1979),	   this	  
expulsion	  is	  a	  central	  dimension	  of	  the	  relational	  and	  historical	  processes	  of	  Spanish	  and	  
European	  identity	  formation.	  	  
Once	  again,	   former	  president	  Aznar	  provides	  a	  good	  example	  of	  how	  this	  othering	  
contributes	   to	   contemporary	   notions	   of	   Spanish	   identity.	   Just	   after	   losing	   the	   2004	  
elections,	  he	  was	  appointed	  Distinguished	  Scholar	  in	  the	  Practice	  of	  Global	  Leadership	  at	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Georgetown	   University	   where	   he	   delivered	   a	   talk	   titled	   “Seven	   Theses	   on	   Today’s	  
Terrorism.”	   The	   speech	   provides	   an	   Islamophobic	   twist	   on	   the	   rhetoric	   of	   the	   clash	   of	  
civilizations	  by	  tracing	  the	  connections	  between	  the	  War	  on	  Terror	  and	  the	  Reconquista.	  
He	  explains	   that	   to	  understand	   the	   fight	   against	   Islamist	   terrorism	   today:	   “You	  must	   go	  
back	  no	  less	  than	  1,300	  years,	  to	  the	  early	  eighth	  century,	  when	  a	  Spain	  recently	  invaded	  
by	  the	  Moors	  refused	  to	  become	  just	  another	  piece	  in	  the	  Islamic	  world	  and	  began	  a	  long	  
battle	  to	  recover	  its	  identity”	  (Aznar	  2004:n.p.).	  In	  an	  address	  to	  the	  right-­‐wing	  think-­‐tank	  
European	  Ideas	  Network	  in	  2005,	  Aznar	  argued	  that	  Europe	  would	  change	  dramatically	  if	  
there	  were	  to	  be	  a	  shift	  from	  a	  Christian	  majority	  to	  a	  Christian	  minority,	  but	  assessed	  that	  
“this	   is	  the	   inevitable	  path	  of	  the	  demographic	  catastrophe	  that	  we	  live.”	  Therefore,	  the	  
former	   president	   added,	   it	  would	   be	   appropriate	   to	   implement	   “a	   strong	   policy	   for	   the	  
recuperation	   of	   values	   based	   on	   the	   classic	   values	   of	   our	   Western	   civilization,	   on	   the	  
Christian	   character	   of	   our	   roots	   and	   our	   origins,	   and	   based	   also	   on	   the	   intent	   of	  
transmitting	   to	   people	   [the	   idea	   that]	   when	   our	   civilization	   is	   threatened,	   we	   have	   to	  
know	  how	  to	  defend	  it	  and	  we	  have	  to	  fight	  for	  it”	  (Aznar	  2005:6,	  7).	  	  
Because	   of	   the	   historical	   significance	   of	   anti-­‐Muslim	   sentiments	   in	   Spain,	   Ricard	  
Zapata-­‐Barerro	   (2006)	   argues	   that	   the	   contemporary	   treatment	   of	   Muslims	   cannot	   be	  
explained	  through	  a	  generic	  notion	  of	  Islamophobia,	  and	  suggests	  that	  Maurophobia	  (the	  
fear	   and	  hatred	  of	  Moors)	   is	   a	  more	   appropriate	   concept.	  He	   contends	   “that	   there	   is	   a	  
Maurophobia	  in	  Spain	  that	  has	  been	  constructed	  throughout	  history	  and	  that	  this	  picture	  
is	   not	   a	   contingent	   fact	   but	   a	   substantive	   element	   of	   the	   process	   of	   Spanish	   identity	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building,	   without	   which	   Spanish	   citizenship	   cannot	   be	   understood”	   (Zapata-­‐Barerro	  
2006:144).	   Despite	   a	   crystallization	   of	   the	   Spanish	   debate	   on	   the	   hijab	   at	   a	   particular	  
moment	   echoing	   French	   politics	   and	   legislation,	   the	   civilizational	   dimension	   of	   Spanish	  
Islamophobia	  is	  not	  informed	  by	  a	  similar	  colonial	  experience	  and	  commitment	  to	  laïcité.	  
Similarly,	   the	  global	  War	  on	  Terror	   rhetoric	  and	   the	  cultural	   racism	   that	   informs	  politics	  
targeting	  Muslims	   in	  other	   European	   countries	   also	  play	   a	   central	   role	   in	   contemporary	  
Islamophobia	   in	  Spain,	  but	  North	  African	  Muslims	  are	  primarily	  understood	   through	   the	  
figure	  of	  the	  Moor.	  	  
Racial	  Governance	  
Beyond	  the	  direct	  references	  to	  the	  Hispanic	  community	  in	  policy	  documents	  and	  obvious	  
contemporary	  expressions	  of	  Maurophobia,	  we	  also	  need	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  the	  centrality	  of	  
this	  double	  process	  of	  the	  colonization	  of	  the	  Americas	  and	  the	  expulsion	  of	  the	  Moors	  for	  
the	   constitution	   of	   race	   as	   a	   mode	   of	   governing	   constitutive	   of	   the	   juridico-­‐political	  
ordering	  formed	  under	  colonial	  modernity	  (Grosfoguel	  and	  Mielants	  2006;	  Mariscal	  1998;	  
McKinley	  2012;	  Mignolo	  1995,	  2006,	  2010).	  Not	  only	   is	  1492	  a	  symbolic	  marker	  of	  early	  
modernity,	   a	   period	   that	   saw	   the	   emergence	   of	   social	   subjects	   problematized	   and	  
governed	  in	  explicitly	  racial	  terms,	  but	  Spanish	  colonialism	  was	  central	  in	  the	  elaboration	  
of	   racial	   schemas	   that	   were	   “necessary	   for	   the	   demarcation	   of	   racial	   exclusions	   and	  
inclusions	  enabled	  under	  colonial	   rule	  and	  [that]	   relied	  upon	  the	  demarcation	  of	  certain	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bodies	  as	  inferior	  and	  incapable	  of	  reason,	  morality	  and	  self-­‐determination”	  (Moffette	  and	  
Vadasaria	  2014:4-­‐5).	  	  
This	   double	   process	   whose	   traces	   are	   captured	   here	   through	   an	   analysis	   of	  
Maurophobia	  and	  the	  Hispanic	  community	  contributed	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  particular	  
Spanish	   conception	   of	   race,	   simultaneously	   organized	   around	   the	   notions	   of	   purity	   of	  
blood	  (pureza	  de	  sangre)	  and	  of	  mixing	  and	  hybridity	  (mestizaje).	  In	  his	  study	  of	  notions	  of	  
race	   from	   the	   eighteenth	   to	   the	   twentieth	   century	   Spain,	   Joshua	   Goode	   explains	   that	  
Spanish	   racial	   thought	   is	   premised	  upon	   a	   celebration	  of	   hybridity	   that	  marked	   Spanish	  
nationalism.	  Quoting	  George	  Frederickson	  (2002),	  Goode	  (2009)	  argues:	  
One	  might	  say	  that	  the	  Spanish	  version	  [of	  the	  notion	  of	  race],	  the	  idea	  of	  fusion,	  is	  a	  racism	  of	  
inclusion,	   “incorporating	   groups	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   rigid	   hierarchy	   justified	   by	   a	   belief	   in	  
permanent,	  unbridgeable	  differences	  between	  associated	  groups.”	  Yet,	  Spanish	  notions	  of	  race	  
prove	  that	  a	  simple	  bifurcation	  of	  inclusive	  or	  exclusive	  racial	  thought	  is	  unnecessary.	  Modern	  
Spanish	  racial	  thought	  rooted	  in	  fusion	  was	  in	  a	  sense	  inclusive,	  while	  the	  purposes	  to	  which	  it	  
was	  put	  always	  led	  to	  [a]	  divisive	  sense	  of	  ethnic	  isolation.	  There	  is	  nothing	  benign	  or	  surprising	  
in	   the	   Spanish	   notion	   of	   fusion	   or	   its	   social	   use	   or	   deployment.	   Inclusive	   racism	   does	   not	  
preempt	  the	  creation	  of	  crude	  racist	  practices	  (P.14).	  
	  
Indeed,	   the	   notion	   of	  mestizaje	   does	   not	   exclude	   the	   fascination	   for	   racial	   purity,	   nor	  
should	   it	  be	  separated	  “from	  the	  historical	   realities	  of	  genocide,	  domination,	  and	  sexual	  
violence	  that	  brought	  about	  multiracial	  beings”	  (McKinley	  2012:118).	  	  While	  the	  notions	  of	  
Hispanic	   community	   and	   Hispanic	   race	   (raza	   hispana)	   that	   made	   their	   way	   into	   the	  
twentieth	   century	   were	   framed	   more	   in	   cultural	   and	   spiritual	   terms	   than	   in	   biological	  
ones,	  they	  cannot	  be	  understood	  without	  the	  historical	  specificity	  of	  a	  concept	  of	  race	  as	  
inclusive	  and	  hierarchical	   that	  was	  also	   influenced	  by	   the	  notion	  of	  purity	  of	  blood	   that	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excluded	   Jews	   and	  Muslims.	  Furthermore,	   as	   I	   have	   argued	   elsewhere	   (Moffette	   2013),	  
the	   notion	   of	   mestizaje	   and	   the	   fantasy	   of	   medieval	   Spanish	   tolerance	   that	   has	  
accompanied	   the	   historical	   debates	   over	   the	   religious/racial	   living-­‐together	   in	  medieval	  
Iberia	   continue	   to	   inform	   the	   contemporary	   notion	   of	   convivencia,	   or	   positive	   living-­‐
together,	  that	  is	  the	  Spanish	  version	  of	  official	  state	  multiculturalism.	  
Indeed,	   in	  a	  European	  context	  that	  sees	  a	  decrease	   in	  biological	  discourses	  of	  race	  
and	  a	  diffusion	  of	  what	  David	  Theo	  Goldberg	  (2009:152)	  calls	  “European	  racial	  denial,”	  the	  
notion	  of	  Hispanic	  hybridity	  and	  the	  nationalist	  myth	  of	  a	  historically	  tolerant	  Spain	  (Soifer	  
2009)	  organized	  around	  the	  concept	  of	  convivencia	  plays	  a	  role	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  official	  
multiculturalism	  in	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  countries.	  It	  provides	  for	  a	  way	  of	  governing	  and	  pacifying	  
differences	   through	   a	   racism	   of	   inclusion	   that	   is	   recast	   in	   cultural	   terms	   (Balibar	   1991;	  
Bannerji	   2000;	  Bonilla-­‐Silva	  2006;	  Meer	  and	  Modood	  2009).	   Indeed,	   as	  Goldberg	   (2009)	  
explains,	   “this	   is	   a	   wishful	   evaporation	   that	   is	   never	   quite	   enacted,	   never	   satisfied.	   A	  
desire	  simultaneously	  frustrated	  and	  displaced.	  As	  diffuse	  as	  they	  are,	  racist	   implications	  
linger,	   silenced	   but	   assumed,	   always	   already	   returned	   and	   haunting.	   Buried,	   but	   alive.	  
Odorless	  traces	  but	  suffocating	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  their	  nevertheless	  denied	  diffusion”	  (p.152).	  
The	  rationalities	  through	  which	  Maurophobia	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  Hispanic	  community	  
have	  been	  articulated	  historically	  cannot	  be	  separated	  from	  race	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  governing,	  
a	  mode	  of	  thinking	  about	  and	  acting	  upon	  subjects,	  that	  is	  constitutive	  of	  modernity.	  And	  
this	   is	   true	  as	  much	   in	   its	  early	   colonial	  manifestations	  as	   in	   the	   contemporary	   versions	  
marked	  by	  a	  desire	  for	  racial	  evaporation.	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In	   the	   two	  remaining	  sections,	   I	  examine	   the	   logics	   informing	  Spanish	   identity	  and	  
immigration	  policies,	  showing	  how	  they	  draw	  simultaneously	   from	  an	   identification	  with	  
Europe	   (and	   the	  West)	   as	   civilization,	   a	   commitment	   to	   Ibero-­‐America	  based	  on	  Spain’s	  
role	  as	  head	  of	   the	  Hispanic	  community,	  and	  the	  real	  and	  symbolic	  expulsion	  of	  Muslim	  
heritage.	  I	  explain	  how	  the	  traces	  of	  Maurophobia	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  Hispanic	  community	  
continue	   to	  haunt	   the	  present.	   In	  what	   follows,	   I	   focus	  on	  how	   these	   elements	   directly	  
inform	  Spanish	  immigration	  and	  citizenship	  policies.	  
Preferential	  Treatment	  for	  Access	  to	  Nationality	  and	  Work	  Permits	  
As	   an	   immigration	   lawyer	   commented	   to	  me,	   “the	   preference	   for	   Ibero-­‐Americans	   is	   a	  
central	   feature	  of	  the	  Spanish	   legislation:	   it	  appears	   in	  the	  Civil	  Code	  of	  1889	  and	   in	  the	  
Constitution	  of	  1978	  with	  reference	  to	  nationality,	  and	  made	  its	  way	  into	  the	  Alien	  Act	  in	  
various	  forms.”39	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  trace	  the	  ways	  this	  preferential	  treatment	  was	  effected	  
through	  the	  regulations	  of	  the	  Alien	  Act	  governing	  the	   legal	  selection	  of	   immigrants	  and	  
the	  Civil	  Code	  provisions	  on	  naturalization.	  I	  also	  discuss	  the	  traces	  of	  this	  preference	  that	  
persisted	   after	   2000	   when	   legal	   reforms	   removed	   explicit	   references	   to	   preferential	  
treatment	  based	  on	  cultural	  proximity	  from	  the	  Alien	  Act.	  
	  
	  
                                                
39	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  November	  2012.	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Civil	  Code	  and	  Access	  to	  Nationality	  
The	   first	   legal	   codification	   of	   preferential	   treatment	   for	   the	   acquisition	   of	   Spanish	  
nationality	  dates	  back	  to	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Republic	  of	  1931,	  which	  provided	  
that	   “based	   on	   international	   reciprocity	   .	   .	   .	   citizenship	   will	   be	   granted	   to	   citizens	   of	  
Portugal	   and	   the	   Hispanic	   countries	   of	   America,	   including	   Brazil	   [sic],	   as	   long	   as	   they	  
request	  it	  and	  are	  residing	  in	  Spain,	  without	  modifying	  or	  losing	  their	  citizenship	  of	  origin”	  
(Art.	  24).	  This	  provision	  thus	  recognized	  the	  possibility	  of	  dual	  citizenship	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  
The	  same	  year,	  a	  decree	  clarified	  that	  foreigners	  living	  in	  Spain	  for	  10	  years	  would	  be	  able	  
to	   apply	   for	   naturalization,	   a	   situation	   that	   was	   reduced	   to	   2	   years	   for	   nationals	   of	  
“Hispano-­‐American	  republics,	  Portugal,	  Brazil,	  and	  those	  that	  are	  native	  of	  the	  Moroccan	  
Zone	  under	  Spanish	  Protectorate.”40	  	  
With	  the	  end	  of	  the	  civil	  war,	  Franco	  abolished	  the	  constitution,	  reinstated	  the	  Civil	  
Code	   of	   1889	   and	   started	   promoting	   his	   vision	   of	   the	   Hispanic	   community.	   Diplomatic	  
efforts	   to	   develop	   relationships	   with	   Latin	   America	   intensified	   after	   the	   newly	   formed	  
Organization	  of	  United	  Nations	   refused	   to	   include	  Spain	   in	  1945,	   to	   the	  extent	   that	   the	  
most	  important	  discourses	  pronounced	  by	  the	  minister	  of	  foreign	  affairs	  of	  the	  time	  have	  
been	  published	  under	  the	  title	  Toward	  an	  Hispanic	  Community	  of	  Nations	  (Martín	  Artajo	  
1956).	  It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  Franco,	  despite	  what	  he	  owed	  to	  the	  Moroccan	  troops	  from	  
the	  Protectorate,	  decided	  in	  1954	  to	  reform	  the	  Civil	  Code	  to	  include	  a	  preference	  only	  for	  
                                                40	  Decreto	  disponiendo	  se	  ajuste	  en	  lo	  sucesivo	  a	  las	  reglas	  y	  condiciones	  que	  se	  establecen	  la	  justificación	  y	  
declaración	  de	  haber	  ganado	  vecindad	  los	  extranjeros	  en	  España.	  Published	  in	  Gaceta	  de	  Madrid	  No	  120,	  
April	  30,	  1931,	  p.408.	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Ibero-­‐Americans	   and	   Filipinos.	   The	   new	   iteration	   thus	   excluded	   inhabitants	   of	   occupied	  
northern	  Morocco.	  The	  legislation	  established	  the	  possibility	  of	  double	  nationality	  and	  the	  
acquisition	  of	  Spanish	  nationality	  after	  only	  two	  years	   for	  the	  preferred	  group,	   justifying	  
this	  clause	  “as	  a	  tribute	  to	  the	  profound	  social	  reality	  derived	  from	  the	  particular	  condition	  
of	  a	  person	  who	  pertains	  to	  the	  community	  of	  Ibero-­‐American	  and	  Filipino	  peoples,	  and	  in	  
order	  to	  strengthen	  the	  ties	  [between	  these	  peoples].”41	  	  
Finally,	  with	  the	  return	  to	  democracy	   in	  1978,	  there	  was	  a	  new	  reform	  of	  the	  Civil	  
Code	   that	   expanded	   this	   list	   to	  other	   groups	   that	   could	   claim	  belonging	   in	   the	  Hispanic	  
community	   (Andorrans,	   Portuguese,	   and	   Equatorial	   Guineans)	   but	   also	   Sephardic	   Jews	  
(Ley	  51/1982).	  Because	  the	  1982	  law	  does	  not	  contain	  a	  prologue	  outlining	  the	  motivation	  
of	   the	   legislator,	   no	   justification	   is	   given	   for	   the	   addition	   of	   Sephardic	   Jews	   but	   not	   of	  
Moriscos,	   the	  Christianized	  Moors	   expelled	   from	  Spain	   in	  much	   greater	   number	   around	  
the	  same	  period.	  Despite	  attempts	  by	  the	  progressive	  United	  Left	  party	  to	  modify	  the	  list,	  
it	  remains	  the	  same	  to	  this	  day.42	  In	  the	  current	  version	  of	  the	  Civil	  Code	  (valid	  23/07/2011	  
to	  15/07/2015),	  these	  provisions	  fall	  under	  Article	  22.1.	  The	  standard	  number	  of	  years	  of	  
residency	  is	  established	  at	  ten	  years,	  reduced	  to	  five	  for	  refugees	  and	  two	  years	  for	  Ibero-­‐
Americans,	   Filipinos,	   Andorrans,	   Portuguese,	   Equatorial	   Guineans	   and	   Sephardic	   Jews.	  
                                                
41	  Prologue	  of	  Ley	  de	  15	  de	  Julio	  de	  1954	  por	  la	  que	  se	  reforma	  el	  Título	  Primero	  del	  Libro	  Primero	  del	  Código	  
Civil,	  denominado	  “De	  los	  españoles	  y	  extranjeros.”	  	  
42	  Unlike	  for	  other	  members	  of	   this	  group,	  however,	   the	  Civil	  Code	  does	  not	  allow	  Sephardic	   Jews	  to	  hold	  
dual	  citizenship.	  A	  bill	  currently	  before	  the	  Justice	  Commission	  (May	  2015)	  and	  soon	  to	  be	  adopted	  will	  lift	  
this	   prohibition	   of	   dual	   citizenship	   and	   allow	   Sephardic	   Jews	   who	   can	   provide	   some	   proof	   that	   they	   are	  
descendents	   of	   Jews	   expelled	   from	   Spain	   access	   to	   citizenship	   without	   having	   to	   reside	   in	   Spain	   (X	   –	  
121/000099).	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Putting	   an	   end	   to	   debates	   about	   whether	   these	   “years	   of	   residency”	   meant	   legal	  
residency,	  Article	  22.3	  now	  explains	  that	  “in	  all	  cases,	  the	  residency	  will	  have	  to	  be	  legal	  
and	  immediately	  prior	  to	  the	  request	  [for	  naturalization].”	  	  
While	   these	  dispositions	  do	  not	  concern	  the	  treatment	  of	   irregular	  migrants—who	  
cannot	  apply—they	  do	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  irregularity.	  As	  detailed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  
the	   legal	   liminality	   in	  which	  migrants	   are	   kept	   is	   linked	   to	   their	   precarious	   immigration	  
status	  and	  their	  inability	  to	  renew	  their	  permit.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  longer	  they	  are	  forced	  
to	   renew	   short-­‐term	   permits,	   the	   more	   likely	   they	   are	   to	   fall	   into	   administrative	  
irregularity	  and	  be	  deported.	  Therefore,	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  two-­‐year	  and	  a	  ten-­‐year	  
legal	  residency	  requirement	  to	  apply	  for	  citizenship,	  while	  it	  is	  based	  on	  a	  legal	  distinction	  
that	   applies	   only	   to	   regular	   immigrants,	   also	   contributes	   to	   maintaining	   non-­‐privileged	  
groups	   in	   longer	   periods	   of	   legal	   liminality	   and	   is	   thus	   implicated	   in	   the	   governing	   of	  
irregular	  migrants.	  	  
Preferential	  Treatment	  in	  the	  Regulations	  of	  the	  Alien	  Act	  and	  Beyond	  
The	  cultural	  preference	  inscribed	  in	  the	  Civil	  Code	  can	  also	  be	  found	  in	  all	  iterations	  of	  the	  
Alien	  Act	  and	  its	  regulations,	  thus	  affecting	  migrants	  at	  almost	  every	  step	  from	  their	  entry	  
into	   the	   country	   to	   their	   naturalization.	   Even	  when	   a	   permanent	   residence	   permit	  was	  
added	   in	   1996	   to	   the	   list	   of	   permits	   available	   under	   the	   regulations	   of	   the	  Alien	  Act	   to	  
provide	  migrants	   with	   greater	   stability	   (RD	   155/1996),	   the	   cultural	   preference	   criterion	  
made	  it	  very	  hard	  for	  anyone	  from	  the	  non-­‐preferred	  groups	  to	  ever	  obtain	  it.	  Indeed,	  to	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acquire	  permanent	  residency,	  one	  needs	  to	  obtain	  and	  renew	  many	  short-­‐term	  permits,	  
and	  non-­‐preferred	  immigrants	  were	  discriminated	  against	  throughout	  the	  complex	  system	  
of	  work	  permits	  (see	  Table	  5).	  	  
Table	  5:	  Work	  Permits	  as	  Regulated	  by	  RD	  155/1996	  
Year	  1	   Year	  2	   Year	  3	   Year	  4	   Year	  5	   Year	  6	   Year	  7	  
Class	  A	  
Seasonal	  
Max	  9	  months	  
After:	  

























Max	  1	  year	  
After:	  







Max	  2	  years	  
After:	  	  
Get	  a	  C,	  or	  Exit	  or	  Irregular	  
At	  Year	  2:	  Preferred	  group	  
can	  apply	  for	  naturalization	  




Need	  a	  3	  year	  contract	  









needs	  to	  be	  
renewed	  every	  5	  
years	  
	  
If	  permit	  C	  or	  D	  
was	  obtained	  for	  2	  
years,	  those	  of	  the	  
preferred	  groups	  
can	  get	  it	  at	  Year	  6	  
	  
At	  Year	  10,	  those	  
of	  the	  non-­‐
preferred	  groups	  




Max	  1	  year	  
After:	  







Max	  2	  years	  
After:	  	  
Get	  a	  E,	  or	  Exit	  or	  Irregular	  
	  
At	  Year	  2:	  Preferred	  group	  
can	  apply	  for	  naturalization	  




Need	  a	  3	  year	  contract	  




Get	  a	  Permanent	  Permit,	  or	  Exit	  
or	  Irregular	  
Source:	  RD	  155/1996,	  Chapter	  IV.	  	  
Article	   77.2	   stated	   that	  preferential	   treatment	   for	   the	  emission	  of	   the	   initial	  work	  
permit	   could	   be	   accorded	   to	   citizens	   of	   Ibero-­‐American	   countries,	   Filipinos,	   Andorrans,	  
Equatorial	  Guineans	  and	  Sephardic	  Jews.	  Migrant	  workers	  without	  preferential	  treatment	  
could	  also	  obtain	  initial	  permits.	  Initial	  permits	  included	  class	  “A”(seasonal	  employee),	  “b”	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(employee),	  “d”	  (self-­‐employed)	  and	  “F”	  (for	  trans-­‐border	  workers	  working	   in	  Ceuta	  and	  
Melilla	  but	  residing	  in	  Morocco).	  From	  outside	  the	  country	  or	  while	  living	  in	  Spain	  without	  
status,	  one	  could	  apply	  and	  obtain	  a	  Permit	  A,	  used	  specifically	  for	  seasonal	  work,	  valid	  for	  
the	  duration	  of	  the	  contract	  (maximum	  9	  months)	  and	  not	  renewable.	  This	  person	  would	  
then	  leave	  the	  country	  or	  remain	  in	  the	  country	  irregularly.	  Often	  throughout	  the	  1990s,	  
irregular	   migrants	   would	   obtain	   this	   permit	   through	   the	   temporary	   work	   permit	   quota	  
system,	  work	  the	  season,	  lose	  their	  status	  when	  the	  permit	  ended	  but	  stay	  in	  the	  country,	  
and	  start	  over	  the	  next	  year.	  This	  situation	  would	  be	  the	  same	  for	  all	  migrants,	  except	  for	  
the	  privileging	  of	  those	  of	  the	  preferred	  groups	  in	  the	  granting	  of	  this	  initial	  permit.	  	  
The	   same	   is	   true	   for	   the	   two	   other	   initial	   permits	   that	   were	   renewable.	   Class	   b	  
(employee)	  and	  d	  (self-­‐employed)	  permits	  were	  initially	  valid	  for	  a	  maximum	  of	  a	  year,	  but	  
then	  renewable	  for	  up	  to	  two	  years	  as	  permits	  B	  and	  D	  respectively	  (Art.	  75;	  Para.	  I	  and	  II).	  
After	   two	   years,	   those	   on	   the	   preferred	   list	   for	   obtaining	   citizenship	   became	  eligible	   to	  
apply	   for	   naturalization	   if	   their	   country	   of	   origin	   accepted	   double	   citizenship	   or	   if	   they	  
agreed	  to	  give	  up	  their	  original	  nationality	  (this	  is	  still	  the	  case	  today).	  Those	  from	  groups	  
not	   deemed	   culturally	   and	   historically	   tied	   to	   Spain	   would	   need	   to	   continue	   renewing	  
these	   permits—if	   the	   conditions	   for	   the	   permits	   persisted—or	   lose	   status.	   Through	   this	  
mechanism,	  “culturally	  similar”	  migrants	  are	  granted	  a	  way	  out	  of	  precariousness	  earlier.	  
At	  the	  end	  of	  their	  renewed	  permits,	  migrants	  with	  a	  renewed	  class	  B	  (employee)	  or	  
D	  (self-­‐employed)	  permit	  could	  apply	  for	  the	  more	  stable	  class	  C	  or	  class	  E,	  respectively.	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The	  coveted	  permanent	  permit	  was	  only	  available	  to	  holders	  of	  a	  class	  C	  or	  E	  permit,	  so	  
following	   this	   renewal	   chain	   was	   the	   fastest	   way	   for	   non-­‐preferred	  migrants	   to	   secure	  
their	  permanence	  in	  the	  country.	  But	  to	  change	  a	  renewed	  B	  permit	  for	  a	  C,	  or	  a	  renewed	  
D	  permit	   for	  an	  E,	  one	  needed	  to	  present	  a	   three-­‐year	  contract	  or	  business	   investment.	  
The	  requirement	  was	  nevertheless	  reduced	  for	  the	  preferred	  cultural	  groups	  as	  well	  as	  for	  
British	   nationals	   from	   Gibraltar,	   who	   only	   needed	   to	   have	   a	   two-­‐year	   contract	   or	  
investment	  plan	  (Art.	  79).	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  C	  or	  E	  permit—which	  lasted	  two	  years	  for	  the	  
preferred	  groups	  and	  three	  for	  the	  others—migrants	  could	  finally	  apply	  for	  a	  permanent	  
work	   permit,	   renewable	   every	   five	   years	   (Art.	   75;	   Para.	   IV).	   After	   ten	   years	   of	   legal	  
residency	  in	  Spain,	  non-­‐preferred	  migrants	  could	  finally	  apply	  for	  citizenship.	  
This	   dizzyingly	   complex	   regime	   of	   work	   permits—further	   complicated	   by	   the	  
necessity	  to	  obtain	  both	  residence	  and	  work	  permits—made	  it	  easy	  for	  migrant	  workers	  to	  
fall	   into	   administrative	   irregularity	   and	   resulted	   in	   years	   of	   very	   precarious	   immigration	  
status	   that	   included	   periods	   of	   regularity	   and	   irregularity.	   Despite	   various	   changes	   to	  
immigration	   law	   and	   regulations,	   this	   institutionally	   created	   precariousness	   continues	  
today.43	   What	   is	   significant	   about	   this	   regime	   as	   it	   operated	   in	   the	   1990s	   is	   that	   it	  
produced	  a	  greater	  level	  of	  precariousness	  for	  those	  who	  were	  not	  qualified	  as	  culturally	  
preferable.	  	  
                                                43	  While	  the	  number	  of	  years	  of	  legal	  residency	  necessary	  to	  access	  permanent	  residency	  has	  been	  reduced	  
to	  five,	  the	  permit	  has	  also	  been	  renamed	  “authorization	  for	  long-­‐term	  residency,”	  highlighting	  that	  it	  is	  not	  
in	  fact	  permanent	  and	  that	  conditions	  apply.	  Clauses	  preventing	  migrants	  already	  living	  in	  Spain	  irregularly	  
from	  applying	   for	  work	   permits	   also	   prolong	   the	   period	  of	   legal	   liminality	   of	   those	  who	   lose	   their	   status,	  
although	  avenues	  for	  regularization	  do	  exist.	  For	  current	  regulations	  on	  work	  permits	  for	  immigrants,	  see	  RD	  
557/2011,	  Titles	  IV,	  V,	  and	  VI.	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The	  inscription	  of	  cultural	  preference	  in	  law	  during	  the	  1990s	  also	  reflected	  a	  more	  
complex	  framing	  of	  migrants	  as	  cultural	  subjects	  informed	  by	  race,	  language,	  gender	  and	  
class.	  This	  is	  especially	  visible	  in	  the	  attribution	  of	  permits	  for	  seasonal	  work	  through	  the	  
quota	  system	  (or	  system	  of	  contingents).	  As	  I	  discuss	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  
this	   tool	  was	  developed	  mainly	   to	  provide	  workers	  with	  papers	   to	  employers	  who	  were	  
using	   irregular	   migrants,	   either	   by	   replacing	   them	   with	   regular	   workers	   coming	   from	  
outside	  of	  Spain,	  or	  by	  granting	  irregular	  migrants	  living	  in	  Spain	  a	  temporary	  A	  permit.	  	  
The	   contingent	   program	   was	   based	   on	   a	   system	   of	   quotas	   that	   were	   divided	   by	  
country	  of	  origin	  and	  sector,	  based	  on	  the	  needs	  and	  preferences	  of	  the	  labour	  market.	  As	  
a	   high-­‐level	   official	   involved	   in	   developing	   and	   implementing	   the	   contingents	   program	  
explained,	   “the	   two	   variables	   were	   supposed	   to	   be	   kept	   separate:	   we	   established	   the	  
number	  of	  permits	  per	  sector	  based	  on	  need,	  and	  we	  broadly	  divided	  the	  overall	  number	  
between	  the	  countries	   that	  provided	  the	  bulk	  of	   irregular	  migration.”44	  But	   for	   the	  1995	  
contingent,	   the	  government	  was	  more	  transparent,	   linking	  specific	  countries	  of	  origin	  to	  
specific	  sectors,	  attributing	  the	  quotas	  as	  follow:	  
1.	  A	  quota	  of	  up	  to	  2,500	  work	  permits	  for	  the	  domestic	  and	  care	  sector,	  to	  be	  issued	  preferably	  
to	  nationals	  of	  Ibero-­‐American	  countries	  and	  Filipinos,	  as	  follows:	  
Republic	  of	  Peru:	  900	  
Dominican	  Republic:	  900	  
Republic	  of	  the	  Philippines:	  400	  
Other	  countries:	  300	  
	  
	  
                                                
44	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  September	  26,	  2012.	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2.	  A	  quota	  of	  up	  to	  5,500	  work	  permits	  for	  the	  realization	  of	  seasonal	  agricultural	  work,	  to	  be	  
issued	  preferably	  to	  countries	  of	  the	  Maghreb,	  as	  follows:	  
Morocco:	  4,500	  
Other	  countries:	  1,000	  45	  
	  
Considering	   the	   increasing	   importance	   of	   immigrant	  women	   in	   domestic	   and	   care	  work	  
during	   this	   period	   (Oso	   Casas	   2009),	   the	   1995	   quota	   clearly	   expresses	   the	   cultural	   and	  
gendered	  preferences	  of	  the	  labour	  market:	  Peruvian,	  Dominican	  and	  Filipina	  women	  who	  
speak	  Spanish	  well	  to	  clean	  houses	  and	  care	  for	  the	  elderly,	  and	  Moroccan	  men	  to	  work	  in	  
the	  strawberry	  greenhouses	  and	  to	  fulfill	  other	  needs	  in	  agriculture.	  During	  a	  conversation	  
in	  the	  fall	  of	  2012,	  Lorenzo	  Cachón	  Rodríguez,	  a	  sociologist	  of	  labour	  and	  immigration	  who	  
acted	   as	   director	   of	   the	   Forum	   for	   the	   Integration	   of	   Immigrants	   from	   2006	   to	   2010,	  
explained	  to	  me	  that	  this	  intersection	  of	  nationality	  with	  the	  sector	  of	  activity	  was	  widely	  
criticized	  and	  as	  a	  result	  was	  never	  again	  explicitly	  mentioned.46	  But	  as	  a	  high-­‐level	  official	  
explained,	  “listing	  it	  this	  way	  was	  a	  political	  mistake,	  and	  also	  absolutely	  unnecessary:	  this	  
is	  how	  the	  work	  permits	  ended	  up	  distributed	  anyway	  because	  they	  were	  based	  on	  labour	  
market	  tendencies.	  It	  was	  distributed	  that	  way	  with	  irregular	  employment,	  and	  therefore	  
in	  a	  similar	  way	  with	  the	  quotas.”47	  	  
The	   new	   Alien	   Act	   that	   was	   adopted	   in	   2000,	   and	   amended	   many	   times	   since,	  
abandoned	   any	   clear	   reference	   to	   this	   list	   of	   culturally	   preferred	   workers,	   choosing	  
                                                
45	  Resolución	  de	  9	  de	  junio	  de	  1995,	  de	  la	  Subsecretaría,	  por	  la	  que	  se	  dispone	  la	  publicación	  del	  Acuerdo	  del	  
Consejo	  de	  Ministros	  de	  9	  de	  junio	  de	  1995,	  por	  el	  que	  se	  fija	  el	  contingente	  de	  autorizaciones	  para	  el	  empleo	  
de	  ciudadanos	  extranjeros	  no	  comunitarios	  en	  el	  año	  1995.	  Published	  in	  the	  Boletín	  Oficial	  del	  Estado	  No	  141	  
of	  14	  July	  1995.	  
46	  Personal	  communication,	  Madrid,	  October	  23,	  2012.	  
47	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  September	  26,	  2012.	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instead	   to	   give	   priority	   to	   countries	   that	   would	   sign	   global	   immigration	   management	  
agreements.	  Because	  the	   first	  agreements	  were	  signed	  with	  Ecuador	  and	  Colombia,	  and	  
not	  with	  Morocco,	  at	  a	   time	  when	  Spain	  was	   letting	  hundreds	  of	   thousands	  of	   irregular	  
Latin	  American	  migrants	  enter	  as	  tourists	   (see	  Chap.	  7),	  activists	  and	  scholars	  concluded	  
that	   excluding	  Moroccans	   was	   a	   way	   to	   limit	   immigration	   from	   this	   country	   (Izquierdo	  
Escribano,	   López	   de	   Lera,	   and	  Martínez	   Buján	   2003).	   In	   fact,	   an	   agreement	  was	   signed	  
with	  Morocco	   just	   a	   few	  months	   later.	   As	   table	   6	   below	   shows	   however,	   key	   symbolic	  
distinctions	  in	  the	  preamble	  make	  clear	  that	  Morocco	  is	  treated	  differently.	  For	  instance,	  
unlike	   in	   the	   agreements	  with	  Colombia	   and	  Ecuador,	   the	  preamble	  does	  not	   contain	   a	  
reference	   to	   historical	   and	   cultural	   links,	   or	   to	   the	   positive	   character	   of	   immigration.	  
Further,	  among	  the	  rights	  granted	  to	  workers	  in	  the	  agreements	  signed	  with	  Colombia	  and	  
Ecuador	   is	   a	   right	   to	   family	   reunification	   (Art.	   6),	   whereas	   the	   agreement	   signed	   with	  







Table	  6:	  Labour	  Regulation	  Agreements	  with	  Colombia,	  Ecuador,	  and	  Morocco	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Colombia	  and	  Ecuador	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Morocco	  
[The	  parties,]	  
Driven	  by	  their	  common	  desire	  to	  reaffirm	  
their	   special	   historical	   and	   cultural	   ties	  
through	   the	   fluid	   and	   permanent	   contact	  
of	  their	  populations	  .	  .	  .	  
Wishing	   to	   regulate	   in	   an	   ordered	   and	  
coordinated	   manner	   the	   migration	   flows	  
that	   exist	   between	   [Colombia	   or	   Ecuador]	  
and	  Spain;	  
Driven	  by	  the	  objective	  that	  [Colombian	  or	  
Ecuadorian]	   workers	   that	   arrive	   to	   Spain	  
effectively	   enjoy	   the	   rights	   recognized	   by	  
the	   international	   instruments	   to	   which	  
both	  states	  are	  parties;	  
Convinced	   that	   migration	   is	   an	   enriching	  
social	  phenomenon	  .	  .	  .	  that	  can	  contribute	  
to	   economic	   and	   social	   development,	  
promote	   cultural	   diversity	   and	   encourage	  
the	  transfer	  of	  technologies;	  
Conscious	   of	   the	   necessity	   to	   respect	   the	  
rights,	  obligations	  and	  guarantees	   that	  are	  
present	  in	  their	  national	  legislations	  and	  in	  
the	   International	   Convents	   of	   which	   they	  
are	   parties;	   with	   the	   objective	   of	  
deepening	   the	   general	   framework	   of	   co-­‐
operation	  and	  friendship	  between	  the	  two	  
contracting	   parties;	   adding	   their	   efforts	   to	  
those	  taking	  place	  at	  the	  international	  level	  
to	   promote	   the	   respect	   of	   human	   rights,	  
prevent	   clandestine	   migration	   and	   the	  
labour	   exploitation	   of	   foreigners	   in	  
irregular	   situation,	   regulate	   readmission;	  
and	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   common	   Ibero-­‐
American	  interests,	  





Wishing	   to	   regulate	   in	   an	   ordered	   and	  
coordinated	   manner	   the	   migration	   flows	  









Conscious	   of	   the	   necessity	   to	   respect	   the	  
rights,	   obligations	   and	   guarantees	   that	  
exist	   in	   their	   respective	   national	  
legislations.	  
Remembering	   the	   International	   Convents	  
of	  which	  they	  are	  parties.	  
Wishing	   to	   deepen	   the	   links	   of	   co-­‐
operation	   and	   friendship	   existing	  between	  
the	   two	   contracting	   parties,	   and	   add	   their	  
efforts	   to	   those	   realized	   at	   the	  
international	   level	   to	   prevent	   the	   labour	  
exploitation	   of	   foreigners	   in	   irregular	  
situation;	   and	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	  
common	  Mediterranean	  interests,	  
Have	  agreed	  to	  the	  following	  .	  .	  .	  
	  
	  
Source:	  Acuerdo	   entre	   España	   y	   Colombia	   relativo	   a	   la	   regulación	   y	   ordenación	   de	   los	   flujos	   migratorios	  
laborales;	  Boletín	  Oficial	  del	  Estado,	  No	  159	  on	  July	  4,	  2001.	  Acuerdo	  entre	  España	  y	  la	  República	  del	  
Ecuador	  relativo	  a	  la	  regulación	  y	  ordenación	  de	  los	  flujos	  migratorios	  laborales;	  Boletín	  Oficial	  del	  
Estado,	  No	  164	  on	  July	  19,	  2001.	  Acuerdo	  sobre	  mano	  de	  obra	  entre	  el	  Reino	  de	  España	  y	  el	  Reino	  de	  
Marruecos;	  published	  in	  Boletín	  Oficial	  del	  Estado,	  No	  226	  on	  September	  20,	  2001.	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Not	   only	   do	   the	   contrasting	   tones	   and	   substance	   of	   the	   agreements	   suggest	   that	  
Ibero-­‐Americans	  continue	  to	  be	  the	  preferred	  immigrants,	  but	  administrative	  practices	  in	  
the	  early	  twenty	  first	  century	  confirm	  this	  tendency	  (Izquierdo	  Escribano,	  López	  de	  Lera,	  
and	  Martínez	  Buján	  2003;	  Izquierdo	  Escribano	  and	  Martínez-­‐Buján	  2014).	  For	  instance,	  the	  
rate	  of	  successful	  applications	  to	  regularization	  under	  the	  process	  that	  accompanied	  the	  
new	  Alien	  Act	  in	  2000	  is	  explicit.	  As	  Table	  7	  below	  shows,	  the	  acceptance	  rates	  were	  much	  
higher	  for	  Latin	  Americans	  and	  Europeans	  than	  for	  Africans,	  with	  a	  rate	  of	  only	  51.02%	  for	  
Moroccans	  who	  presented	  the	  highest	  number	  of	  regularization	  files	  by	  far.	  
Table	  7:	  Rate	  of	  Success	  in	  the	  2000	  regularization	  per	  nationality	  
Country	  of	  Origin	   Applications	  
Submitted	  
Permits	  Granted	   Rate	  of	  Success	  
Brazil	   2,985	   2,261	   89.14%	  
Argentina	   2,927	   2,349	   80.25%	  
Colombia	   14,271	   11,023	   77.24%	  
Equator	   20,666	   15,840	   76.74	  %	  
Poland	   3,636	   2,571	   70.71%	  
Bulgaria	   2,839	   1,805	   63.58%	  
Romania	   9,044	   5,679	   62.79%	  
Ukraine	   3,551	   2,125	   59.84%	  
China	   10,492	   6,265	   59.71%	  
Algeria	   8,318	   4,449	   53.49%	  
Mauritania	   2,959	   1,535	   51.88%	  
Morocco	   63,170	   32,229	   51.02%	  
Senegal	   6,684	   3,104	   46.44%	  
Pakistan	   6,241	   2,285	   36.61%	  
Nigeria	   5,005	   1,586	   31.69%	  
Source:	  	  Delegación	  del	  Gobierno	  para	  Extranjería	  e	  Inmigración,	  Ministerio	  del	  Interior.	  Table	  provided	  by	  a	  
high-­‐level	  official	  during	  an	  interview	  in	  Madrid,	  October	  4,	  2012.	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While	  we	  cannot	  conclude	  from	  these	  results	  alone	  that	  they	  were	  informed	  by	  an	  
attempt	  to	  prioritize	  Ibero-­‐American	  and	  European	  immigrants	  over	  Moroccans,	  Algerians	  
and	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africans,	  they	  also	  coincide	  with	  statements	  made	  in	  the	  early	  2000s	  by	  
the	  government	  delegate	   (delegado	  del	  gobierno)	   for	   immigration	   in	   the	  Ministry	  of	   the	  
Interior,	  the	  president	  of	  the	  Forum	  for	  the	  Social	  Integration	  of	  Immigrants,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
Spanish	   ombudsman,	   all	   claiming	   that	   Spain	   should	   encourage	   culturally	   compatible	  
immigration.	   I	   discuss	   some	   of	   these	   statements	   in	   the	   following	   section	   and	   offer	   an	  
analysis	   of	   this	   framing	   of	   immigrants	   as	   cultural	   subjects	   whose	   ability	   to	   conduct	  
themselves	   ethically	   cannot	   be	   separated	   from	   their	   cultural	   practices	   and	   beliefs.	   The	  
section	  considers	  this	  problematization	  in	  relation	  with	  debates	  about	  the	  appropriate	  use	  
of	   governing	   practices	   associated	   with	   the	   regularization	   and	   integration	   of	   irregular	  
immigrants.	  
Cultural	  Subjects	  and	  “Problems	  of	  Integration”	  	  
Throughout	  the	  1990s,	   integration	   is	  a	  word	  that	  appears	   in	  every	  policy	  document,	  but	  
never	  results	  in	  any	  concrete	  programs.	  This	  changes	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century,	  with	  the	  
debates	  related	  to	  the	  adoption	  of,	  and	  the	  many	  reforms	  to,	  the	  new	  Alien	  Act	  in	  2000.	  
The	   arrival	   of	   integration	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   political	   discussion	   coincides	  with	   a	   period	  
marked	  by	  an	  attempt	  by	  the	  Popular	  Party	  to	  capitalize	  on	  anti-­‐immigrant	  sentiments	  to	  
satisfy	   its	  electorate	   (2000-­‐04).	   Interestingly,	   the	  politicization	  of	   immigration	  decreased	  
after	  the	  election	  of	  a	  Socialist	  government	  in	  2004.	  This	  is	  somewhat	  surprising	  since	  the	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elections	  occurred	  just	  after	  the	  bombing	  of	  four	  trains	  by	  Islamist	  militants	  in	  2004,	  and	  a	  
survey	   commissioned	   by	   the	   government	   that	   year	   showed	   that	   49.3%	   of	   respondents	  
said	  that	  immigrants	  from	  the	  Arab	  world	  did	  not	  inspire	  trust	  and	  70.7%	  considered	  that	  
immigration	   in	   general	   increased	   delinquency	   “a	   lot	   or	   quite	   a	   bit”	   (Pérez	   Yruela	   and	  
Desrues	  2005:41,	  71).	  It	  is	  only	  with	  the	  electoral	  campaign	  of	  2008	  that	  topics	  such	  as	  the	  
use	  of	  various	  forms	  of	  Islamic	  veils	  and	  integration	  contracts	  for	  immigrants	  resurfaced	  in	  
the	   public	   debates.	   But	   even	   integration	   plans	   that	   offered	   progressive	   views	   of	  
immigration	   treated	  migrants	  as	   cultural	   subjects.	   This	   situation	   is	   clearly	  demonstrated	  
by	   the	   struggles	  over	   the	   right	   to	  assess	   the	  degree	  of	   social	  and	  cultural	   integration	  of	  
irregular	   migrants	   applying	   for	   regularization	   as	   well	   as	   arguments	   about	   integration,	  
regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  are	  expressed	  in	  clearly	  xenophobic	  policies	  and	  discourses	  or	  
in	  more	  progressive	  ones.	  
Integration	  as	  a	  Cultural	  Problem	  in	  the	  Early	  2000s	  
As	   discussed	   above,	   the	   notion	   of	   cultural	   affinity	   first	   informed	   Spanish	   immigration	  
policy	   through	   the	   establishment	   of	   groups	   that	   received	  preferential	   treatment.	   In	   the	  
late	  1990s,	  the	  notion	  also	  started	  to	  influence	  the	  debates	  about	  integration	  when	  some	  
politicians	  claimed	  that	  cultural	  proximity	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  migrants’	  ability	  to	  integrate.	  
Just	  after	  the	  regularization	  process	  of	  2000-­‐01	  that	  seemed	  to	  favour	  Latin	  Americans,	  it	  
is	   Enrique	   Múgica,	   a	   Socialist	   and	   former	   minister	   of	   justice	   who	   had	   recently	   been	  
appointed	   ombudsman	   of	   Spain	   by	   President	   Aznar,	  who	   first	   linked	   cultural	   affinity	   to	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integration.	   He	   argued	   that	   Spain	   should	   prioritize	   immigration	   from	   Latin	   America	   for	  
reasons	  of	  cultural	  affinity	  (El	  País	  2000).	  Later,	  Enrique	  Fernández-­‐Miranda,	  the	  delegate	  
of	   the	  government	   for	  alien	  affairs	  and	   immigration	  who	  was	  described	  as	  “defending	  a	  
very	   hard	   line”	   by	   two	   officials	   I	   interviewed,	   became	   the	   main	   figure	   making	   cultural	  
practices	  a	  question	  of	  integration.48	  	  
In	   a	   2001	   radio	   interview	   that	   created	   much	   controversy,	   Fernández-­‐Miranda	  
claimed	  that	  “In	  addition	  to	  a	  common	  language	  and	  culture,	  practicing	  Catholicism	  is	  an	  
element	  that	  facilitates	  the	  integration	  of	  foreigners	  in	  Spain”	  (cited	  in	  El	  País	  2001).	  This	  
statement	  was	  made	  less	  than	  a	  month	  before	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Global	  Program	  on	  the	  
Regulation	  and	  Coordination	  in	  Matters	  Related	  to	  Foreigners	  and	  Immigration	  (or	  GRECO	  
Plan)	  that	  highlighted	  the	   importance	  of	   integration	  and	  linked	   it	  to	  freedom	  of	  religion.	  
Later	   that	   year,	   Fernández-­‐Miranda	  named	  Mikel	  Azurmendi	  president	  of	   the	  Forum	  on	  
the	  Social	   Integration	  of	   Immigrants,	  a	  consultative	  body	  composed	  of	  NGOs,	   immigrant	  
organizations,	  and	  various	  governmental	  representatives.	  This	  professor	  of	  anthropology	  
in	  the	  Basque	  Country	  had	  just	  published	  a	  controversial	  book	  on	  the	  situation	  in	  El	  Ejido	  
in	  which	  he	  defended	  his	  assimilationist	  views	  on	   integration.49	   In	  an	  appearance	  before	  
the	  Senate	  Commission	  on	  Immigration,	  Azurmendi	  explained	  his	  position:	  
                                                
48	  Interviews,	  Madrid,	  September	  26,	  2002	  and	  November	  7,	  2012.	  
49	  The	  incident	  of	  El	  Ejido	  is	  infamous:	  Upon	  learning	  that	  a	  local	  woman	  had	  been	  killed	  by	  a	  Moroccan	  who	  
had	  mental	  health	  problems,	  thousands	  of	  residents	  of	  this	  town	  that	  relies	  heavily	  on	  migrant	  workers	   in	  
agriculture	   started	   to	   protest.	   On	   February	   5,	   6	   and	   7,	   2000,	   racist	   violence	   against	   Moroccan	   workers	  
reached	  extreme	  proportions	  with	  protesters	  chasing	  and	  beating	  immigrants.	  At	  least	  22	  had	  to	  be	  taken	  to	  
the	  hospital,	  and	  no	  one	  was	  charged.	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The	  problem	  of	  immigration	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  a	  disintegration	  of	  civil	  society	  [as	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  Nationalist	  violence	   in	   the	  Basque	  country],	   it	  needs	   to	  be	   reintegrated	   in	  a	  new	  way	  
and	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  reinsert	  people—the	  foreigners—associate	  them	  in	  a	  civic	  project.	  They	  
are	   people	   that	   generally	   come	   from	   cultural	   horizons	   where	   human	   rights,	   pluralism	   and	  
tolerance	  do	  not	  rule	   .	   .	   .	   I	  spent	  a	  month	   in	  the	  United	  States	  (because	  my	  Department	  sent	  
me),	  seeing	  between	  the	  123[th	  street]	  and	  the	  north	  of	  Manhattan	  up	  to	  the	  Bronx,	  the	  black	  
ghetto	   and	   I’ve	   been	   frightened	   by	   the	   books	   I’ve	   read.	   That’s	   to	   say	   that	   I	   saw	   that	  
multiculturalism	  is	  a	  gangrene	  for	  a	  democratic	  society.50	  
	  
He	  explained	  that	  he	  believes	  in	  assimilation,	  and	  considers	  that	  multiculturalism	  was	  the	  
foundation	  of	  apartheid	  South	  Africa.	  While	  his	  comments	  were	  met	  with	  criticism	  from	  
all	  senators	  who	  spoke	  during	  this	  session,	  they	  were	  nonetheless	  in	  sync	  with	  the	  views	  
of	   the	  government	  delegate	   for	   immigration	  who	  named	  him.	   In	  his	   speech,	  Azurmendi	  
explains	   that	   he	  was	  working	   on	   an	   integration	   plan	   for	   the	   province	   of	   Alicante	  when	  
Fernández-­‐Miranda	  came	  to	  recruit	  him	  for	  his	  ideas,	  a	  claim	  corroborated	  by	  the	  highest	  
official	   on	  matters	   of	   immigration	   himself	   when	   he	   stated	   that	   he	   shared	   Azurmendi’s	  
view.	   In	   an	   intervention	   in	   the	  parliamentary	   Justice	  and	   Interior	  Commission	  where	  he	  
was	   asked	   to	   clarify	   his	   position	   with	   regard	   to	   Azurmendi’s	   comments,	   Fernández-­‐
Miranda,	  further	  elaborated	  this	  argument	  at	  length.	  	  
First,	  Fernández-­‐Miranda	  presented	  multiculturalism	  as	  a	  Neo-­‐Marxist	  conspiracy	  to	  
attack	  the	  foundation	  of	  liberal	  societies,	  ignoring	  that	  despite	  some	  anti-­‐liberal	  critiques	  
(Parekh	  2000),	   the	  most	   important	   theorists	  of	  multiculturalism	  at	   the	  time	  are	  strongly	  
grounded	   in	   the	   liberal	   tradition	   (Kymlicka	   1989,	   1995;	  Modood	   1998),	   including	   in	   its	  
                                                
50	   Diario	   de	   Sesiones	   del	   Senado.	   Comisión	   especial	   sobre	   la	   inmigración	   y	   la	   extranjería.	   Legislature	   IV,	  
No236,	  February	  18,	  2002,	  pp.	  235-­‐236.	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conservative	   communitarian	   version	   (Taylor	   1992).	   Citing	   Giovanni	   Sartori	   (2001),	  
Fernández-­‐Miranda	  claimed:	  
[I	  will]	  say	  that	  we	  speak	  of	  principles,	  values,	  norms	  of	  living-­‐together,	  norms	  embedded	  in	  our	  
culture;	  and	  our	  social	  culture,	  our	  culture	  of	  living-­‐together,	  our	  political	  culture	  are	  written	  in	  
our	   Constitution	   and	   are	   written	   in	   identical	   manner	   in	   all	   other	   constitutions	   of	   European	  
Union	  member	  states,	  and	   in	  all	  democratic	  societies,	   in	  all	   free	  societies,	   in	  all	  societies	  with	  
liberal	  roots.	  And	  maybe	  here	  is	  the	  problem.	  Mr.	  Sartori	  claims	  in	  his	  book	  .	  .	  .	  that	  it	  is	  known	  
that	  after	  the	  attempt	  of	  changing	  liberal	  societies	  through	  class	  struggles	  had	  failed,	  given	  that	  
Marxism	   as	   an	   ideology	   has	   not	   been	   useful	   in	   its	   time,	   these	   Neo-­‐Marxist	   or	   Post-­‐Marxist	  
professors	   from	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   have	   brought	   up	   the	   confrontation	   of	   cultures	   as	   an	  
instrument	   to	  change	   liberal	   societies	  and	  go	  once	  again	   toward	   the	  paradise,	  well	  protected	  
by,	  for	  instance,	  the	  Berlin	  wall,	  that	  have	  fallen	  on	  us	  all	  but	  some	  still	  haven’t	  realized.	  (VII	  –	  
212/000847)	  	  	  
	  
This	  rejection	  of	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  multiculturalism	  is	  thus	  presented	  as	  a	  defence	  of	  liberalism,	  
but	   it	   is	   also	   clearly	   a	   defence	   of	   conservative	   values.	   Furthermore,	   this	   opposition	   to	  
multiculturalism	   doubled	  with	   a	   support	   for	   a	  multi-­‐ethnic	   convivencia	   (living-­‐together)	  
presented	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  his	  intervention	  shows	  similarities	  with	  the	  French	  republican	  
position	  on	  cultural	  difference,	  Charles	  Taylor’s	  (1992)	  view	  of	  multiculturalism,	  and	  more	  
significantly,	   with	   the	   Quebec	   intercultural	   model	   (which	   has	   now	   been	   taken	   up	   by	  
Catalan	   politicians).51	   Indeed,	   while	   there	   is	   no	   clear	   rejection	   of	   cultural	   and	   racial	  
difference,	  the	  defence	  of	  common	  civic	  values,	  majority	  culture	  and	  a	  conservative	  view	  
of	   liberalism	   is	   tainted	   with	   obvious	   racist	   undertones.	   As	   Fernández-­‐Miranda’s	   speech	  
reveals:	  
	  
                                                
51	   For	   a	   recent	   discussion	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   interculturalism,	   see	   Bouchard	   2011,	   Taylor	   2012	   as	   well	   as	  
Modood’s	  (2014)	  commentary	  on	  these	  articles.	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If	  we’re	   talking	  about	  principles,	  about	  values	  and	  norms	   for	   living	   together,	   it	  has	   to	  be	  said	  
that	  there	  are	  cultures	  that	  are	  simply	  irreconcilable	  .	  .	  .	  If	  our	  Constitution	  says	  that	  Spain	  is	  a	  
social	   and	   democratic	   state	   governed	   by	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   tell	   me	   how	  we	   can	   reconcile	   this	  
definition	   of	   our	   Constitution	   and	   our	   culture	   with	   a	   theocratic	   state	   governed	   by	   clerics	   of	  
various	   religions	   .	   .	   .	  How	  do	  we	  combine	   [the	   right	   to	  physical	  and	  moral	   integrity]	  with	   the	  
death	  sentence?	  Because	  it	  has	  been	  abolished.	  And	  I’m	  not	  even	  talking	  about	  the	  stoning	  of	  
women,	  not	  to	  keep	  talking	  about	  women	  .	  .	  .	  How	  do	  we	  combine	  it	  with	  physical	  punishment,	  
with	   lashing?	  They	  are	  a	  part	  of	   these	  cultures.	  A	   representative	  of	  a	  Moroccan	  organization,	  
when	  commenting	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  dowry	  was	  paid	   in	   the	  case	  of	   the	  girl	   from	  Almeria,	  
said:	  No,	  this	  in	  Morocco	  is	  perfectly	  regulated,	  it	  even	  has	  a	  name	  .	  .	  .	  This	  is	  not	  reconcilable	  
with	  our	  culture.	  (VII	  –	  212/000847)	  
	  
The	  diatribe	  goes	  on	  much	  longer,	  regularly	  coming	  back	  to	  examples	  explicitly	  referring	  
to	  Moroccans	   and	   to	   Islam,	   and	   claiming	   that	   these	   cultural	   practices	   are	   incompatible	  
with	   Spanish	   cultural	   and	   civic	   values.	   These	   positions	   render	   explicit	   the	   type	   of	  
problematizations	   through	  which	   integration	   is	  approached	  as	  a	  necessary	  dimension	  of	  
immigration	  governance	  during	  this	  period.	  The	  debates	  that	  took	  place	  during	  the	  reform	  
of	   the	   Alien	   Act	   in	   2000	  made	   it	   clear	   that	  while	   conceptions	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   the	  
wellbeing	  of	  immigrants	  were	  central	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  effective	  integration	  plans,	  the	  
Popular	   Party	   government	   considered	   the	   issue	   differently.	   An	   official	   of	   the	   Socialist	  
party	  told	  me	  that	  the	  Popular	  Party	  never	  cared	  about	  integration,	  but	  I	  disagree.52	  Since	  
2000,	   the	   Popular	   Party	   has	   indeed	   been	   thoroughly	   concerned	   with	   problems	   of	  
integration,	   but	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   the	   “receiving	   society.”	   The	   main	   object	   of	  
integration	   discourses	   and	   practices	   is	   not	   the	   immigrant	   population,	   but	   the	   nation.	  
Indeed,	   the	   Popular	   Party’s	   primary	   concern	   lies	   with	   maintaining	   and	   transmitting	  
Spanish	   values,	   “assimilating”	   immigrants	   as	   Azurmendi	   put	   it,	   and	   rejecting	   any	   policy	  
that	   may	   call	   into	   question	   traditional	   Spanish	   identity.	   The	   unacceptable	   behaviours	  
                                                
52	  Interview,	  November	  11,	  2012.	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listed	   by	   Azurmendi	   and	   Fernández-­‐Miranda,	   most	   of	   which	   associated	   with	   negative	  
stereotypes	   of	   Islam,	   show	   the	   importance	   of	   Muslims	   as	   historical	   others	   in	   the	  
construction	  of	  this	  particular	  understanding	  of	  Spanish	  culture,	  and	   is	  representative	  of	  
the	  way	  they	  are	  portrayed	  as	  a	  cultural	  threat	  to	  the	  constitutional	  order.	  
Inspired	  by	  the	  French	  Contrat	  d’accueil	  et	  d’intégration	  implemented	  progressively	  
between	  2003	   and	   2006,	   the	   Popular	   Party	  made	   the	   adoption	  of	   a	   similar	   contract	   an	  
electoral	  engagement	   in	   the	  national	  elections	  of	  2008	  and	  2011.	  The	  Popular	  Party	  did	  
not	  win	  the	  2008	  elections	  but	  tried	  to	  pass	  its	  idea	  through	  a	  non-­‐legislative	  proposal	  in	  
Congress.	  According	  to	  the	  proposal	  (IX	  –	  162/000070),	  the	  contract	  was	  to	  be	  voluntary	  
but	  necessary	  for	  the	  first	  renovation	  of	  a	  work	  and	  residence	  permit,	  and	  would	  include	  
the	  following	  engagement:	  
a) The	   immigrant	   will	   commit	   to	   follow	   the	   norms,	   respect	   the	   constitutional	   principles	   and	  
values	  of	  the	  Spaniards,	   learn	  the	  language,	  pay	  his/her	  taxes	  and	  deductions,	  work	  actively	  
to	  integrate,	  and	  return	  to	  his/her	  country	  if	  for	  a	  time	  he/she	  lacks	  work	  or	  resources.	  
b) The	  Spanish	  administration	  will	  commit	  to	  guarantee	  him/her	  the	  same	  rights	  and	  benefits	  as	  
a	  Spaniard	  to	  the	  extent	  provided	  by	  the	  laws,	  to	  help	  him/her	  in	  his/her	  integration,	  respect	  
his/her	  values	  and	  beliefs—as	  long	  as	  they	  are	  not	  contrary	  to	  Spanish	  laws,	  human	  rights	  and	  
equality	  enshrined	  in	  our	  Constitution—,	  facilitate	  the	  learning	  of	  our	  language,	  help	  him/her	  
find	  work,	  and	  collaborate	  in	  his/her	  return	  if	  he/she	  lacks	  work	  or	  resources.	  	  	  	  
	  
The	   logic	   informing	   the	   desire	   to	   impose	   this	   contract	   is	   telling.	   The	   congressman	  who	  
presented	  the	  proposal	  to	  Congress	  clearly	  defended	  it	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  govern	  immigrants	  as	  
cultural	   subjects,	   and	  made	   the	   argument	   that	   Latin	  American	   immigrants	   are	   the	   least	  
problematic	  of	  all:	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Many	  of	  them,	  almost	  half	  from	  Ibero-­‐America,	  have	  the	  good	  fortune	  of	  knowing	  and	  sharing	  
our	   language,	   our	   values,	   our	   customs,	   even	   our	   norms	   and	   laws,	   which	   without	   a	   doubt	  
contribute	   to	   their	   integration,	   but	   many	   others	   no.	   Therefore,	   it	   is	   necessary	   that	   the	  
Administration	  develop	  measures	  that	  favours	  the	  integration	  of	  these	  people	  into	  our	  society	  
and	  allow	  them	  to	   learn	  our	   language	  and	  know	  our	   institutions,	  norms,	  customs	  and	  values,	  
because	  integration	  will	  be	  easier	   if	  based	  on	  the	  mutual	  respect	  and	  understanding	  between	  
foreign	  citizens	  and	  Spanish	  citizens.	  Spain	  is	  an	  open	  country,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  country	  that	  respects	  
the	  democratic	   and	   constitutional	   rights	   and	   freedoms	   that	  we	  have	  obtained	  over	   time	  and	  
that	   now	   are	   social	   gains	   that	   we	   have	   assimilated,	   that	   are	   a	   part	   of	   our	   system	   and	   our	  
cultural	   and	   normative	   heritage,	   and	   that	   we	   should	   not	   abandon	   in	   the	   name	   of	   an	   inane	  
multiculturalism	   that	   appears	   sometimes	   in	   support	   of	   those	   who	   promote	   anti-­‐democratic	  
values	  (IX	  –	  162/000070,	  debate	  in	  Diario	  de	  Sesiones).	  
	  
Seemingly,	   Ibero-­‐American	   immigrants	  could	  not	  possibly	  be	  posing	  problems	  since	  they	  
share	   not	   only	   the	   language	   and	   the	   culture	   but	   also	   the	   values	   and	   norms	   of	   Spanish	  
society.	  During	  the	  election	  campaign,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Popular	  Party	  and	  former	  minister	  
of	  the	  interior	  Mariano	  Rajoy	  had	  mentioned	  that	  his	  contract	  would	  help	  combat	  genital	  
mutilation	   and	   would	   include,	   among	   other	   customs,	   an	   obligation	   to	   maintain	   good	  
hygiene	  (Bárbulo	  and	  Guarriga	  2008;	  El	  País	  2008).	  The	  referent	  objects	  of	  this	  discourse	  
appear	  to	  be	  African	  and	  Muslim	  immigrants	  who—in	  opposition	  to	  the	  Ibero-­‐Americans	  
who	  allegedly	  share	  similar	  values—are	  clearly	  framed	  as	  barbaric.	  The	  dichotomy	  of	  good	  
and	   bad	   immigrants	   clearly	   falls	   on	   this	   cultural	   divide	   in	   the	   proposal	   presented	   to	  
Congress.	   The	   Popular	   Party	   could	   not	   gather	   the	   support	   needed	   from	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  
opposition	  for	  their	  proposal	  to	  be	  adopted.	  Indeed,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  interventions	  
from	  the	  opposition	  denounced	  these	  essentialist	  claims	  as	  simplistic	  and	  dangerous,	  and	  
this	  type	  of	  overtly	  xenophobic	  discourse	  in	  mainstream	  politics	  has	  so	  far	  generally	  been	  
limited	  to	  the	  Popular	  Party.	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Just	   before	   the	   Spanish	   elections,	   the	   Popular	   Party	   of	   Catalonia	   had	   presented	   a	  
similar	   project—this	   time	   a	   bill—in	   the	   Catalan	   Parliament,	   a	   bill	   that	   has	   also	   been	  
rejected.53	  This	  time	  Islam	  was	  named	  directly:	  
The	  principal	  question	  is:	  Do	  we	  have	  problems	  of	  integration	  in	  our	  house?	  And	  the	  answer	  is:	  
yes	  .	  .	  .	  We	  have	  problems	  when	  we	  see	  burkas	  on	  our	  streets	  that	  harm	  and	  violate	  the	  dignity	  
and	   freedom	   of	   women	   .	   .	   .	   We	   have	   problems	   when	   the	   Wikileaks	   papers,	   the	   famous	  
Wikileaks	  papers,	  said	  that	  that	  our	  house	  is	  a	  nest	  of	  radical	  Islamism	  .	  .	  .54	  
	  
A	  law	  on	  integration	  that	  included	  a	  “commitment	  to	  integrate”	  had	  also	  been	  approved	  
in	   the	   Parliament	   of	   the	   Valencian	   Community	   in	   2008,	   but	   without	   the	   repressive	  
dimension	  that	  the	  Popular	  Party’s	  proposal	  in	  Catalonia	  and	  in	  the	  Spanish	  Congress	  had	  
(Ley	  15/2008).	  	  
Problems	  of	  Integration	  and	  the	  Impossibility	  of	  a	  Muslim	  Spanish	  Subject	  
While	   the	   proposals	   put	   forth	   by	   the	   Popular	   Party	   were	   never	   adopted	   and	   never	  
received	   support	   from	   the	   other	   parties,	   they	   should	   not	   be	   considered	   insignificant	   or	  
anecdotal.	  The	  Popular	  Party	  is	  not	  an	  extreme-­‐right	  party	  like	  the	  French	  Front	  National,	  
it	  has	  run	  the	  country	  from	  1996	  to	  2004	  and	  again	  since	  2011,	  and	  has	  otherwise	  been	  
the	  main	  opposition	  party	  since	  1983.	  These	   interventions	  about	  an	   integration	  contract	  
also	   occurred	   during	   a	   decade	   that	   saw	   President	   Aznar	   demand	   that	   a	   reference	   to	  
Christian	  heritage	  be	   integrated	   in	   the	   text	  of	   the	  European	  Constitution	  and	  explain	   in	  
                                                53	   Proposició	   de	   llei	   del	   contracte	   d’integració	   de	   les	   persones	   nouvingudes	   a	   Catalunya	   (202-­‐00027/09),	  
published	  in	  Butlletí	  oficial	  del	  Parlament	  de	  Catalunya,	  No	  37,	  March	  15,	  2011.	  54	  Diari	  de	  Sessions	  del	  Parlament	  de	  Catalunya,	  Series	  P,	  No	  14,	  May	  4,	  2011,	  p.	  51-­‐52.	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Washington	   how	   Spanish	   national	   identity	  was	   recovered	   through	   the	   expulsion	   of	   the	  
Moors.	  Furthermore,	  since	  2010,	  at	  least	  30	  Catalan	  municipalities	  have	  voted	  on	  motions	  
to	   ban	   the	   burka,	  motions	   that	  were	   adopted	   in	   17	   of	   them	   (Baquero	   2014),	  while	   the	  
debate	  over	  whether	  or	  not	  Muslim	  girls	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  wear	  the	  hijab	  at	  school	  in	  
the	   Community	   of	  Madrid	   led	  many	   elected	   officials	   to	   take	   position	   for	   and	   against	   a	  
prohibition	  (El	  País	  2010).	  In	  a	  country	  where	  many	  old	  Catholic	  women	  cover	  their	  head	  
for	   traditional	  and	  religious	  reasons,	   the	   focus	  on	  hijab	  appears	  particularly	  hypocritical.	  
These	  policies,	  even	  when	  not	  adopted	  or	  rarely	  enforced,	  are	  nonetheless	  effective	  at	  a	  
performative	  level	  and	  contribute	  to	  framing	  Spanish	  Muslims	  as	  impossible	  subjects.55	  	  
The	  historical	   narrative	   that	   is	   constitutive	   of	   Spanish	   identity	   now	   recognizes	   the	  
contribution	   and	   presence	   of	   Islam	   in	   the	   past,	   but	   not	   as	   Spanish.	   The	   jurist	   and	   legal	  
scholar	   Javier	   de	   Lucas	   told	  me	   that	   he	   has	   been	   asking	   for	   years	   during	   talks	   that	   his	  
audience	   name	   some	   of	   the	   most	   important	   Spanish	   scholars	   that	   have	   made	   great	  
contributions	  to	  humanity.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  he	  told	  me,	  people	  do	  not	  think	  of	  Ibn	  Rushd	  
(Averroes)	   because	   he	   is	   not	   considered	   to	   be	   Spanish.56	   Just	   as	   medieval	   Spain	   is	  
understood	  as	  non-­‐European	  because	  it	  was	  mostly	  Muslim	  (Asad	  2000),	  so	  is	  Al-­‐Andalus	  
viewed	   as	   non-­‐Spanish.	   Cultural	   influences	   are	   acknowledged,	   but	   only	   as	   traces.57	  
Conversely,	   in	  the	  common	  historical	  narrative	  that	  Aznar	  champions,	  Catholic	  kingdoms	  
                                                
55	   For	   a	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   the	   Spanish	   take	   on	   the	   affaire	   du	   foulard,	   the	   protests	   against	  mosques	   in	  
Catalan	  cities,	  and	  the	  revival	  of	  “Moors	  and	  Christians”	  festivals	  reenacting	  and	  reinterpreting	  the	  historical	  
relationships	  between	  the	  two	  communities,	  see	  Zapata-­‐Barerro	  2006,	  2011.	  For	  a	  study	  of	  the	  framing	  of	  
Muslims	  as	  threats	  in	  the	  enclave	  city	  of	  Ceuta,	  see	  Moffette	  2010,	  2013.	  
56	  Personal	  communication,	  Valencia,	  November	  12,	  2012.	  
57	  See	  also	  Hentsch	  [1989]	  1992,	  Kabbani	  1989,	  Labanyi	  2002.	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were	  already	  essentially	  Spanish.	  Similarly,	  there	  is	  a	  broad	  recognition	  of	  the	  contribution	  
of	   Moroccan	   immigrants	   to	   contemporary	   Spain,	   but	   they	   are	   rarely	   considered	   as	  
Spaniards.	  The	  two	  processes	  are	  related.	  As	  Sarah	  Ahmed	  (2000)	  explains:	  
The	  encounters	  we	  might	  yet	  have	  with	  other	  others	  hence	  surprise	  the	  subject,	  but	  they	  also	  
reopen	  the	  prior	  histories	  of	  encounter	   that	  violate	  and	  fix	  others	   in	  regimes	  of	  difference	   .	   .	   .	  
The	   particular	   encounters	   hence	   always	   carries	   traces	   of	   those	   broader	   relationships.	  
Differences,	   as	  markers	   or	   power,	   are	   not	   determined	   in	   the	   ‘space’	   of	   the	   particular	  or	   the	  
general,	  but	  in	  the	  very	  determination	  of	  their	  historical	  relation	  (a	  determination	  that	  is	  never	  
final	  or	  complete,	  as	  it	  involves	  strange	  encounters)	  (P.8-­‐9).	  
	  
In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Jo	  Labanyi	  (2002),	  drawing	  from	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  has	  argued	  that	  
theorizing	  Spanish	  culture	  means	  engaging	  with	  ghosts,	  highlighting	  the	   importance	  of	  a	  
past	  that	  is	  haunting	  the	  present	  and	  contributes	  to	  contemporary	  identity	  formation.	  This	  
double	  bind	  of	  Muslim	  absence	  and	  presence	  contributes	  to	  the	  difficulty	   in	  considering	  
Islam	  as	  constitutive	  of	  Spanishness	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  not	  articulated	  around	  the	  purging	  of	  
the	  Islamic	  culture(s)	  of	  Moors.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  we	  can	  consider	  Spanish	  Muslims	  as	  
impossible	   subjects,	   borrowing	   from	  Mae	  M.	  Ngai’s	   (2004)	   analysis	   of	   the	  ways	   former	  
colonial	   subjects	   become	   undesirable	   aliens	   through	   a	   historical	   process	   in	   which	  
conquest,	  racialization,	  illegalization,	  and	  nation-­‐building	  are	  coextensive.	  	  	  
Governing	  Cultural	  Subjects	  and	  Building	  the	  Nation(s)	  
Thus	   far,	   I	   have	  mapped	  out	   some	  of	   the	   traces	  of	   this	   process	   and	  demonstrated	   that	  
Maurophobia	  and	  hispanidad	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  constitution	  of	  Spanish	  identity	  and	  still	  
inform	   the	   treatment	   of	   immigrants	   as	   cultural	   subjects	   to	   this	   day.	   The	   governing	   of	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immigrants	   as	   cultural	   subjects	   is	   also	   evident	   in	   policies	   that	   aim	   to	   foster	   social	   and	  
cultural	  inclusion.	  
Indeed,	   it	   appears	   that	   the	   preferential	   treatment	   for	   Ibero-­‐Americans	   at	   the	  
institutional	   level	  has	  now	  diminished,	  or	  at	  least	  has	  become	  more	  informal	  than	  in	  the	  
1990s	  and	  the	  early	  2000s.	  Despite	  the	  debates	  about	  the	  prohibition	  of	  various	  types	  of	  
Muslim	  veils	  and	  the	  efforts	  by	  the	  Popular	  Party	  to	   impose	   integration	  contracts,	   there	  
has	   been	   strong	   opposition	   from	   policy-­‐makers	   and	   politicians.	   With	   regard	   to	  
immigration	   policy,	   the	   preference	   is	   now	   only	   formally	   recognized	   in	   the	   Civil	   Code	   in	  
relation	   to	   access	   to	   citizenship.	   The	   framing	   and	   governing	   of	   immigrants	   as	   cultural	  
subjects	   continues	   but,	   at	   least	   officially,	   the	   tendency	   is	   toward	   a	   decoupling	   of	  
adaptability	   and	   origin.	   The	   governing	   of	   irregular	   migrants	   as	   cultural	   subjects	   is	  
nonetheless	  still	  evident	   in	  the	  cultural	  criteria	  used	  to	  assess	   integration	  when	  irregular	  
migrants	  apply	  for	  regularization.	  	  
Indeed,	  we	  can	  consider	  various	  measures	  involved	  in	  regularization	  programs	  as	  a	  
form	   of	   what	   Barbara	   Cruikshank	   (1999)	   calls	   citizenship	   technologies,	   that	   is,	  
technologies	   “that	   endeavour	   to	   reinsert	   the	   excluded	   into	   circuits	   of	   responsible	   self-­‐
management,	   to	   reconstitute	   them	   through	   activating	   their	   capacity	   for	   autonomous	  
citizenship”	  (Inda	  2006:19).	  These	  involve	  a	  mix	  of	  pedagogical	  and	  assessment	  tools	  that	  
aim	  to	  contribute	  to	  subject	  formation.	  Indeed,	  as	  Aihwa	  Ong	  (1996)	  explains,	  we	  need	  to	  
consider	  citizenship	  as	  “a	  cultural	  process	  of	  ‘subject-­‐ification,’	  in	  the	  Foucaldian	  sense	  of	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self-­‐making	  and	  being-­‐made	  by	  power	  relations	  that	  produce	  consent	  through	  schemes	  of	  
surveillance,	   discipline,	   control,	   and	   administration”	   (p.737).	   Despite	   the	   tone	   of	   Ong’s	  
representation,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   this	   process	   is	   also	   organized	   around	   a	  
discourse	  of	  help,	  self-­‐help,	  and	  empowerment	  (Cruikshank	  1999;	  Rimke	  2000).	  
Indeed,	   since	   2000,	   the	   Alien	   Act	   includes	   the	   possibility	   for	   irregular	  migrants	   to	  
achieve	   regularization	   based	   on	   their	   “rootedness”	   (arraigo)	   in	   Spanish	   society	   (LO	  
8/2000;	  Art.	  31.4.)	  The	  2004	  regulations	  (RD	  2393/2004;	  Art.	  45-­‐46)	  set	  the	  criteria	  for	  this	  
type	   of	   regularization	   for	   the	   first	   time.	   Three	   forms	   currently	   exist:	   arraigo	   laboral	  
(seldom	   used	   because	   it	   implies	   denouncing	   the	   employer	   who	   has	   hired	   the	   migrant	  
irregularly),	   arraigo	   familiar	   (only	   available	   to	   descendants	   of	   Spaniards),	   and	   arraigo	  
social	  (based	  on	  family	  ties	  or	  an	  integration	  report).	  Of	  these,	  the	  most	  popular	  form	  is	  
the	   arraigo	   social.	   In	   its	   current	   version,	   the	   regulations	   stipulate	   that	   regularization	  
through	  arraigo	  social	  is	  accessible	  to	  “foreigners	  who	  can	  demonstrate	  a	  continuous	  stay	  
in	  Spain	  for	  a	  period	  of	  at	   least	  three	  years,”	  provided	  that	  they	  “do	  not	  have	  a	  criminal	  
record	   in	  Spain,	   in	   their	  country	  of	  origin,	  or	   in	  any	  country	  where	  they	   lived	  within	   the	  
last	  five	  years,”	  that	  they	  have	  a	  “work	  contract	  signed	  by	  the	  worker	  and	  employer	  at	  the	  
moment	  of	  the	  request	  and	  whose	  duration	  should	  not	  be	  for	  less	  than	  a	  year,”	  that	  they	  
can	  prove	  “family	  relations	  with	  foreigners	  with	  residence	  permits”	  (husband,	  wife,	  child,	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mother,	   father)	   or	   “present	   a	   report	   of	   social	   insertion	   provided	   by	   the	   autonomous	  
community	  where	  they	  reside.”58	  	  
The	   report	  of	   social	   insertion,	   though	  not	  a	   contract	  per	   se,	   is	   a	  process	  aimed	  at	  
verifying	  various	  criteria	  of	   integration.	   It	   is	  produced	  by	  municipal	   civil	   servants	  and,	   in	  
some	  cases,	  reviewed	  and	  formally	  approved	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  autonomous	  community	  
before	  being	  processed	  by	   the	   Spanish	  Ministry	   of	   the	   Interior.	   As	   I	   analyze	   in	   detail	   in	  
Chapter	  7,	   the	  ability	   to	  determine	  and	  assess	   the	  criteria	  of	  desirability	   is	   the	  object	  of	  
power	   struggles	  between	   the	  various	   levels	  of	  government.	  At	  play	   in	   these	   struggles	   is	  
the	   capacity	   to	   determine	   to	   what	   extent	   irregular	   migrants	   have	   to	   speak	   regional	  
languages	  to	  be	  able	  to	  access	  regularization.59	  	  
Officially,	   cultural	   criteria	   of	   desirability	   have	   been	   decoupled	   from	   questions	   of	  
ethnic	  preference:	  throughout	  the	  country,	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  civic	  values,	  a	  commitment	  to	  
Spanish	   laws,	   and	   the	   knowledge	   of	   one	   or	  more	   of	   the	   official	   languages	   of	   the	   area	  
where	  one	  lives.	  The	  question	  remains	  to	  what	  extent	  does	  ethnic	  origin	  play	  a	  role	  when	  
frontline	   municipal	   civil	   servants	   evaluate	   an	   irregular	   migrant’s	   commitment	   to	   civic	  
values,	   participation	   in	   social	   life	   and	   languages	   ability.	   Officials	   I	   interviewed	   at	   the	  
General	   Directorate	   of	   Immigration	   in	   Catalonia	   told	   me	   they	   consider	   that	   Latin	  
Americans	  are	  not	  the	  best	  candidates	  for	  Catalonia	  because	  they	  already	  speak	  Spanish	  
                                                
58	  The	  conditions	  for	  the	  arraigo	  social	  are	  described	  in	  Title	  V,	  Chapter	  I,	  Art.	  124.1	  of	  the	  latest	  Regulations	  
of	  the	  Alien	  Act	  (RD	  557/2011).	  
59	  Interviews,	  Madrid	  September	  26,	  2012	  and	  Barcelona,	  October	  1st,	  2012.	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(Castilian)	   and	   are	   thus	   less	   likely	   to	   learn	  Catalan.60	   Since	   the	   evaluation	  of	   integration	  
assesses	  current	  language	  knowledge	  and	  past	  efforts	  to	  learn	  it,	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  
courses	   taken,	   there	   is	  no	  evidence	   that	   this	   assumption	  about	   Latin	  Americans’	   lack	  of	  
desire	   to	   learn	   Catalan	   affects	   their	   ability	   to	   achieve	   regularization	   in	   Catalonia,	   but	   it	  
does	  suggest	  that	  cultural	  background	  is	  still	  relevant.	  In	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  country	  where	  
Castilian	   is	   the	   only	   official	   language,	   being	   Latin	   American	   provides	   a	   clear	   advantage	  
since	  knowledge	  of	  Spanish	   is	  considered	  a	  key	   indicator	  of	   integration.	  More	  revealing,	  
however,	  is	  the	  high	  value	  given	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  set	  the	  criteria	  of	  desirability	  and	  the	  tug-­‐
of-­‐war	   between	   various	   levels	   of	   government	   for	   the	   control	   of	   this	   competence.	   This	  
struggle—further	  analyzed	   in	  Chapter	  7—shows	  that	   the	  governing	  of	   irregular	  migrants	  
as	  cultural	  subjects	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  part	  of	  competing	  projects	  of	  nation-­‐building.	  	  	  	  	  	  
However,	   nation-­‐building	   and	   the	   national	   management	   of	   territories	   and	  
populations	  do	  not	  rely	  only	  on	  what	  I	  called	  “culturalizing	  logics.”	  Indeed,	  the	  capacity	  of	  
the	   state—or	   regional	   government—to	   control	   a	   territory	   (understood	   as	   national),	  
protect	   a	   culture	   (also	   framed	   as	   national),	   and	   regulate	   a	   labour	  market	   (interestingly	  
imagined	   as	   national	   as	   well)	   are	   central	   components	   of	   the	   national	   management	   of	  
immigration	   (Hage	   [1999]	   2000;	   Sharma	   2006).	   If	   nationalism	   is	   not	   only	   an	   idea	   about	  
who	  belongs	  in	  the	  nation,	  but	  also	  a	  set	  of	  practices	  that	  aims	  to	  govern	  various	  spaces	  
deemed	  national,	   it	  ensues	  that	  the	  governing	  of	  migrants	  as	  cultural	  subjects	   is	  not	  the	  
only	   set	   of	   logics	   and	   practices	   addressing	   the	   place	   of	   irregular	   migrants	   within	   the	  
                                                
60	  Two	  interviews,	  Barcelona,	  October	  1st,	  2012.	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nation(s).	   This	   cultural	   dimension—informed	   as	   it	   is	   by	   a	   long	   process	   of	   identity	  
formation—is	   central	   to	   understanding	   the	   positioning	   of	   irregular	   migrants	   in	   the	  
national	   imaginary	   but	   it	   is	   not	   the	   only	   one.	   In	   the	   following	   chapter,	   I	   continue	   my	  
exploration	  of	  the	  three	  broad	  logics	  influencing	  Spanish	  immigration	  policy-­‐making	  with	  
an	  analysis	  of	  “labouralization.”	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Chapter	  5	  






In	   2009,	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   Immigration	   and	   Emigration	   Consuelo	   Rumí	  wrote:	   “We	  
need	  balanced	  public	  strategies	  that,	  at	  minimum,	  combine	  the	  fight	  against	  clandestine	  
flows,	   the	   ordering	   of	   arrivals	   according	   to	   the	   capacity	   of	   absorption	   of	   the	   labour	  
market,	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	   integration	   in	  the	  societies	  of	  destination”	  (Rumí	  2009:7).	  
This	   statement,	   combining	   concerns	   for	   security,	   culture,	   and	   the	   labour	   market,	   was	  
published	  in	  an	  issue	  of	  the	  Journal	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Labour	  and	  Immigration	  reviewing	  
immigration	   policies	   of	   the	   Eighth	   Legislature	   (2004-­‐08),	   a	   legislature	   celebrated	   for	  
having	   achieved	   a	   “labouralization”	   of	   immigration	   policies.	   Broadly	   defined,	   the	   term	  
laboralización	   is	   often	  used	   to	  describe	   the	  process	   that	   leads	   to	   the	  management	  of	   a	  
sector	  of	  employment	  according	   to	   the	   logics	  and	   laws	   that	   regulate	   the	   labour	  market.	  
For	   instance,	   the	   labouralization	   of	   public	   sector	   jobs	   refers	   to	   their	   privatization.	  
According	  to	  Pablo	  Santolaya’s	  (2009)	  analysis	  of	  the	  Eighth	  Legislature	  in	  the	  same	  issue	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of	   this	   journal,	   the	   labouralization	   of	   immigration	   governance	   can	   be	   seen	   at	   various	  
levels:	   (1)	   institutionally,	   the	   responsibility	   for	   immigration	   is	   transferred	   from	   the	  
Ministry	   of	   the	   Interior	   to	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Labour	   and	   Social	   Affairs,	   accompanied	   by	  
greater	   involvement	   of	   trade	   unions	   and	   employers’	   associations	   in	   the	   policy-­‐making	  
process;	  (2)	  at	  the	  level	  of	  policy,	  more	  complex	  mechanisms	  are	  developed	  to	  assess	  the	  
needs	   of	   the	   national	   labour	   market	   and	   recruit	   migrant	   workers	   based	   on	   this	  
assessment;	   and	   (3)	   symbolically,	   there	   is	   a	   shift	   in	   discourse	   that	   tends	   to	   frame	  
immigrants	  as	  workers	  entitled	  to	  rights.	  	  
According	  to	  a	  high-­‐level	  official	  and	  close	  collaborator	  of	  Consuelo	  Rumí,	  all	  policy	  
initiatives	  related	  to	  migration	  in	  the	  2004-­‐08	  period—even	  those	  more	  closely	  linked	  to	  
integration,	  policing,	  or	  co-­‐operation	  with	  autonomous	  communities	  or	  third	  countries—
were	   understood	   as	   contributing	   to	   this	   general	   project	   of	   labouralization.	   He	   insisted:	  
“What	  I	  really	  want	  to	  emphasize	  is	  that	  there	  was	  a	  necessity	  to	  achieve	  a	  labouralization	  
of	  immigration.	  [The	  various	  programs]	  were	  not	  isolated	  steps	  .	  .	  .	  the	  idea	  that	  brought	  
all	  our	  policies	  together	  was	  the	  concept	  of	  labouralization.”	  He	  also	  argued	  that	  this	  logic	  
was	  absolutely	  novel:	  “All	  of	  this	  had	  a	  unity	  that	  was	  labouralization,	  and	  this	  didn’t	  exist	  
before;	   until	   then,	   there	   were	   only	   contingents	   [of	   migrant	   workers]	   that	   provided	  
businesspeople	   with	   sporadic	   and	   urgent	   solutions,	   no	   real	   integration	   of	   immigration	  
with	  labour	  market	  dynamics.”61	  
                                                
61	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  November	  7,	  2012.	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While	   it	   is	  true	  that	  the	  Eighth	  Legislature	  (2004-­‐08)	  marked	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  
populist,	   anti-­‐immigrant	   discourse	   being	   put	   forth	   by	   the	   Popular	   Party	   since	   2000	   and	  
saw	  the	  development	  of	  policy	  tools	  and	   integration	  programs	  that	  did	  not	  exist	  before,	  
the	   change	  was	  not	   as	   important	   as	   insisted	  upon	  by	   this	   Socialist	   official.	  Nor	  was	   the	  
attempt	  to	  manage	  irregular	  migration	  according	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  labour	  market	  new.	  
As	   analyzed	   in	   Chapter	   3,	   this	   objective	  was	   a	   central	   dimension	  of	   the	   1990	   report	   on	  
migration	   and	   the	   policies	   that	   ensued	   over	   the	   next	   decade.	   Further,	   the	   heightened	  
focus	   on	   the	   labour	   market	   in	   the	   mid-­‐2000s	   did	   not	   represent	   a	   radical	   shift	   from	  
cultural-­‐	  and	  security-­‐based	  preoccupations.	  Once	  again,	  the	  logics	  are	  more	  intertwined	  
than	  it	  appears.	  	  
The	  Dream	  of	  Labouralizing	  and	  Steering	  Migration	  Flows	  
In	  industrialized	  countries,	  the	  association	  of	  immigration	  with	  work	  is	  socially	  and	  legally	  
anchored.	  Indeed,	  the	  need	  for	  labour	  is	  often	  the	  primary	  criterion	  for	  the	  acceptance	  of	  
both	  permanent	  and	  temporary	  immigrants.	  In	  this	  model,	  family	  reunification	  appears	  as	  
a	  corollary	  of	  this	  primary	  function,	  and	  entry	  based	  on	  asylum	  is	  seen	  as	  an	  exceptional	  
measure	   to	   alleviate	   suffering	   or	   respond	   to	   international	   obligations.	   In	   Spain,	   like	  
elsewhere,	   even	   before	   there	   was	   any	   immigration	   policy	   in	   place,	   migrants	   were	  
attracted	  by	  the	  availability	  of	  work.	  There	  has	  always	  been	  a	  clear,	   if	  not	  always	  direct,	  
relationship	  between	  the	  two	  variables	  (Cachón	  Rodriguez	  2009).	  But	  in	  Spain	  in	  the	  1980s	  
and	   1990s,	   the	   capacity	   to	   steer	   migration	   flows	   in	   a	   way	   that	   was	   optimal	   for	   the	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economy	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  feature	  of	  developed	  countries,	  not	  of	  a	  country	  still	  affected	  by	  
decades	   of	   dictatorship	   like	   Spain.	   In	   early	   debates	   on	   immigration,	   France,	   Germany,	  
Canada,	   and	   the	   United	   States	   are	   often	   mentioned	   as	   examples	   of	   respectable,	  
developed	  countries	  that	  learned	  how	  to	  harness	  the	  potential	  of	  immigration	  to	  develop	  
their	  economy.	  This	  ability	  to	  steer	  migration	  flows	  according	  to	  economic	  needs	  was	  seen	  
as	  a	  symbol	  of	  modern	  statehood,	  and	  Spanish	  politicians	  dreamed	  of	  achieving	  it.	  
To	  a	  great	  extent,	  the	  labouralizing	  logic	  resonates	  strongly	  with	  the	  naturalism	  that	  
Michel	  Foucault	   ([2004]	  2007,	   [2004]	  2008)	  associates	  with	   liberalism.	   It	   is	  based	  on	  the	  
idea	   that	   if	   one	   can	   understand	   the	   natural	   processes	   that	   create	   various	   phenomena,	  
then	  one	  can	   intervene	   to	   influence	   their	  progression.	  While	   the	  dream	  of	   labouralizing	  
migration	   flows	   involves	   a	   fantasy	   of	   control,	   it	   is	   not	   primarily	   a	   project	   for	   exerting	  
control.	  The	  problem	  is	  framed,	  time	  and	  again,	  as	  a	  problem	  of	  knowledge.	  The	  inability	  
to	  understand	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  labour	  market	  and	  the	  push	  and	  pull	  factors	  driving	  labour	  
migration	   are	   seen	   to	   prevent	   the	   government	   from	   being	   able	   to	   effectively	   manage	  
migration	   flows.	   This	   preoccupation	   echoes	   Foucault’s	   ([2004]	   2008)	   analysis	   of	   the	  
naturalist	  logic	  adopted	  by	  the	  Physiocrats,	  who	  claimed	  that	  the	  government	  should	  
arm	  its	  politics	  with	  a	  precise,	  continuous,	  clear	  and	  distinct	  knowledge	  of	  what	  is	  taking	  place	  
in	  society,	  in	  the	  market,	  and	  in	  the	  economic	  circuits,	  so	  that	  the	  limitation	  of	  its	  power	  is	  not	  
given	  by	  respect	  for	  the	  freedom	  of	  individuals,	  but	  simply	  by	  the	  evidence	  of	  economic	  analysis	  




Policy-­‐makers	   considered	   that	   the	   challenge	  was	   to	  understand	  both	   the	   labour	  market	  
and	  migration	  patterns,	  and	  to	  try	  to	  make	  them	  coincide.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  they	  tried	  to	  
manage	   migration	   flows	   to	   support	   the	   labour	   market	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   they	  
wanted	   to	   utilize	   job	   offers	   as	   a	   means	   to	   regulate	   economic	   migration.	   This	   second	  
dimension	  was	  expressed	   clearly	  by	   a	  high-­‐level	   civil	   servant	   involved	   in	  developing	   the	  
various	  generations	  of	  annual	  migrant	  worker	  contingents.	  He	  explained:	  	  
The	  basic	  necessary	  condition	  to	  organize	  migration	  is	  that	  there	  be	  available	  jobs.	  If	  they	  don’t	  
exist,	   there	   is	   nothing	   that	   you	   can	  do,	   you	  have	  nothing	   to	  offer	   and	   you	   can’t	   channel	   the	  
flows.	  People	  use	  their	  own	  networks,	  and	  it’s	  not	  good.	  So	  [a]	  condition	  is	  that	  employers	  get	  
involved	  and	  reserve	  some	  jobs	  for	  us,	  so	  that	  we	  can	  use	  them	  to	  organize	  migration.62  
 
This	  management	   of	   economic	  migration	   is	   linked	   to	   the	   governing	   of	   the	   overall	  
population	   within	   a	   territory,	   and	   migration	   becomes	   an	   object	   of	   government	   only	  
inasmuch	   as	   it	   is	   seen	   as	   a	   variable	   in	   this	   broader	   situation.	   The	   desire	   to	   labouralize	  
migration	  flows	  comes	  from	  a	  concern	  with	  limiting	  the	  negative	  impact	  they	  could	  have	  
on	  the	  population	  as	  a	  whole,	  while	  optimizing	  their	  positive	  economic	  contributions.	  It	  is	  
tied	   to	   an	   effort	   to	   intervene	   in	   the	   division	   of	   labour,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	  
multiplication	  of	  labour	  (Mezzadra	  and	  Neilson	  2013).	  This	  desire	  to	  steer	  migration	  flows	  
in	   a	   way	   that	   would	   be	   optimal	   to	   the	   economy	   is	   what	   guided	   efforts	   to	   develop	   a	  
program	  of	  temporary	  work	  permits	  in	  the	  1990s.	  
	  
                                                
62	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  September	  26,	  2012.	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The	  Quota	  System	  of	  the	  1990s	  
This	   desire	   to	   labouralize	   migration	   flows	   became	   central	   to	   the	   1990	   report	   on	  
immigration	  and	  the	  first	  policy	  plan	  put	  forth	  in	  1991.	  Indeed,	  the	  report	  insisted	  on	  the	  
importance	   of	   “protect[ing]	   the	   national	   labour	   market	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   increasing	  
presence	  of	  foreign	  job-­‐seekers,	  given	  the	  high	  level	  of	  unemployment”	  (p.	  10)	  and	  listed	  
the	  control	  of	  “clandestine	  work”	  as	  one	  of	  the	  key	  policy	  axes.	  This	  led	  to	  the	  elaboration	  
of	   a	   system	   of	   yearly	   quota	   for	   the	   hiring	   of	   foreign	   workers	   mentioned	   briefly	   in	   the	  
previous	   chapter.	   A	   high-­‐level	   official	  who	  was	   instrumental	   in	   the	  development	   of	   this	  
system	   and	   in	   the	   negotiation	   of	   the	   yearly	   quota	   throughout	   the	   1990s	   explained	   the	  
logic	  that	  informed	  this	  first	  attempt	  at	  a	  policy	  focusing	  on	  labouralizing	  migration	  flows:	  
In	  our	  view,	  and	  the	  view	  of	  people	  in	  successive	  governments,	  the	  real	  border	  is	  located	  in	  the	  
business.	  When	   there	   is	  a	   job	   that	  workers	  can	  access	  without	  being	   in	  a	   regular	   situation,	   it	  
produces	   this	   flow.	   Right?	   This	  means	   that	   someone	   obtains	   a	   job	   outside	   the	   law,	   and	   this	  
happens	  with	  any	  aspect	  of	  our	  daily	   lives	   .	   .	   .	  With	   traffic	   control,	  people	  go	   too	   fast,	   if	   you	  
don’t	  try	  to	  catch	  anyone,	  they	  keep	  going	  too	  fast.	  You	  can’t	  prevent	  all	  speeding,	  but	  you	  can	  
find	   mechanism	   to	   reduce	   it.	   In	   this	   way,	   there	   is	   no	   difference	   with	   any	   other	   type	   of	  
regulation.	  Our	  idea	  was	  that	  we	  had	  to	  find	  a	  hole,	  a	  way,	  so	  that	  people	  who	  are	  outside	  of	  
the	  country	  and	  want	  to	  come	  work	  in	  Spain	  could	  do	  so	  legally.	  That	  these	  businesses	  that	  are	  
willing	  to	  hire,	  that	  they	  are	  the	  border	  really,	  that	  they	  leave	  at	  least	  a	  part	  to	  us—as	  small	  as	  it	  
may	  be—so	  that	  people	  who	  want	  to	  come	  work	  wouldn’t	  have	  to	  go	  through	  family	  networks,	  
trafficking	  networks,	  or	  through	  the	  risks	  that	  [irregular]	  migration	  involves.	  This	  is	  really	  what	  
we	  wanted.63	  	  	  
	  
This	   quota	   program,	   also	   known	   as	   a	   “system	  of	   contingents”	   (sistema	  or	  programa	  de	  
contingentes),	  was	  based	  on	  negotiation	  between	  employers’	  associations,	  trade	  unions,	  
politicians,	  and	  civil	  servants,	  in	  which	  the	  interests	  of	  migrant	  workers	  counted	  for	  little.	  
                                                
63	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  September	  26,	  2012.	  The	  following	  quotes	  are	  also	  from	  this	  interview.	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For	  the	  bureaucrats	  involved,	  to	  govern	  meant	  having	  the	  capacity	  to	  regulate	  migration	  
flows	  based	  on	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  labour	  market,	  and	  this	  could	  only	  be	  achieved	  through	  
negotiation	  with	   institutional	   actors	  who	  had	  vested	   interests	   in	   the	  acceptable	   level	  of	  
yearly	  quotas.	  Officially,	  this	  regime	  was	  described	  as	  a	  program	  of	  yearly	  contingents	  of	  
migrant	   workers,	   but	   all	   actors	   involved	   used	   the	   term	   quota,	   because	   it	   really	   was	  
centred	  in	  establishing	  quotas	  for	  each	  sector	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  each	  country	  of	  origin.	  
They	  were	  in	  effect	  asking	  employers	  to	  commit	  to	  hiring	  some	  of	  their	  workers	  regularly	  
through	  this	  program.	  As	  explained	  further	  by	  the	  senior	  official	  quoted	  above,	  “We	  had	  
to	  struggle	  with	  a	  series	  of	  factors,	  fundamentally	  with	  businesses	  that	  want[ed]	  to	  count	  
with	  an	  important	  lubricant,	  that	  want[ed]	  to	  have	  more	  flexibility,	  that	  [were]	  not	  ready	  
to	   sacrifice	   even	   a	   small	   part	   of	   their	   profit	   to	   organize	  migration	   flows.”	   At	   the	   time,	  
NGOs	   and	   trade	   unions	   were	   also	   involved.	   Before	   2000,	   the	   system	   allowed	   irregular	  
migrant	  workers	  in	  Spain	  to	  get	  their	  employer	  to	  request	  a	  permit	  for	  them,	  and	  this	  gave	  
an	  important	  role	  to	  NGOs	  whose	  missions	  were	  to	  support	  these	  immigrants.	  According	  
to	  this	  same	  official:	  	  
NGOs	  were	  also	  part	  of	  the	  balance,	  and	  the	  client	  that	  interested	  them	  most	  was	  the	  one	  that	  
was	  already	  here	  irregularly.	  The	  client	  who	  was	  in	  America	  or	  Morocco	  was	  not	  on	  their	  mind.	  
So	   there	  were	  a	   series	  of	   interests,	   including	  of	  businesses,	   irregular	  migrants,	  NGOs,	  unions,	  
which	  foreclose	  the	  willingness	  to	  facilitate	  the	  orderly	  arrival	  to	  Spain	  of	  those	  who	  want[ed]	  
to	  work	  with	  a	  permit.	  
	  
In	   effect,	   the	  negotiated	   system	  of	   quotas	   led	   to	   a	   certain	   level	   of	   agreement	  between	  
government	  officials,	  trade	  unions,	  and	  employer	  associations,	  a	  situation	  that	  prompted	  
some	  analysts	   to	  describe	   them	  as	   “strange	  bedfellows”	   (Watts	  1998),	  but	   the	  program	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failed	   in	   its	   ability	   to	  manage	   labour	  migration	   flows.	   Indeed,	   in	   an	   intervention	   in	   the	  
Congress	  Commission	  on	  Social	  Policy	  and	  Employment	  in	  1997,	  the	  general	  secretary	  of	  
social	  affairs	  acknowledged	  that	  on	  average	  “over	  the	  years,	  only	  10	  percent	  of	  those	  who	  
solicit	   a	  work	  permit	   [through	   this	   system]	   come	   from	  outside”	   (VI	   –	   213/000198).	  As	   I	  
explain	  in	  Chapter	  7,	  however,	  such	  a	  policy	  failure	  can	  be	  productive	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  
maintains	  the	  precarious	  situation	  of	  migrant	  workers.	  
Table	  8:	  Quotas	  Announced	  During	  the	  1993-­‐1999	  Contingent	  Program	  







1993	   10,000	   1,110	   	  6,000	   3,500	   	   20,600	  
1994	   5,000	   1,000	   11,000	   3,600	   	   20,600	  
Extra	   	   	   	   	   17,000	   17,000	  
1995	   5,500	   	   2,500	   	   8,000	  
1996	   No	  contingent	  due	  to	  a	  regularization	  process	   0	  
1997	   5,820	   600	   5,620	   2,940	   	   15,000	  
Extra	   	   	   	   	   9,690	   9,690	  
1998	   9,154	   1,069	   16,836	   941	   28,000	  
1999	   	   	   	   	   30,000	   30,000	  
Source:	  Annual	  contingent	  agreements	  and	  instructions,	  published	  in	  the	  Boletín	  Oficial	  del	  Estado.	  	  See	  BOE	  
1993,	  No	  144;	  BOE	  1994,	  No	  180;	  BOE	  1995,	  No	  141;	  BOE	  1997,	  No	  31	  and	  247;	  BOE	  1998,	  No	  63;	  BOE	  
1999,	  No	  14.	  
	  
Beyond	  problems	  related	  to	  the	  negotiation	  process,	  various	  elected	  and	  appointed	  
officials	   I	   interviewed	   pointed	   to	   a	   lack	   of	   adequate	   knowledge	   as	   a	   limit	   to	   effective	  
governance.64	   The	  basis	   for	  deciding	  on	   the	  quota	   appeared	  anything	  but	   scientific.	   The	  
first	  quota	  was	  established	  at	  20,600	   for	  1993,	  but	  only	  5,220	  people	  applied.	  Realizing	  
                                                
64	  Interviews,	  Madrid,	  September	  26,	  November	  11,	  and	  October	  10,	  2012;	  Barcelona,	  October	  2,	  2012.	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that	   the	   applications	   from	  migrant	   workers	   were	   concentrated	   in	   the	   domestic	   service	  
sector,	  and	  much	   less	   so	   in	  agriculture,	  officials	  decided	   to	   readjust	   the	  proportions	  but	  
keep	  the	  total	  quota	  at	  20,600	  for	  the	  following	  year.	  The	  national	  origin	  of	  workers	  also	  
changed.	   In	  1993,	  preference	  was	  explicitly	  given	  to	  migrants	  from	  countries	  with	  which	  
Spain	   had	  migration	   agreements,	   as	  well	   as	   to	   those	  who	   had	   a	   family	  member	   legally	  
residing	   in	   Spain,	   while	   the	   quota	   became	   more	   specific	   in	   1994:	   Ibero-­‐Americans,	  
Filipinos,	   and	   North	   Africans,	   as	   well	   as	   those	   with	   family	   members	   in	   Spain,	   were	  
preferred.	   That	   year,	   the	   estimates	   were	   not	   better:	   The	   number	   of	   applications	   was	  
almost	  double	  the	  total	  set	  quota	  and,	  in	  June	  1995,	  officials	  announced	  that,	   instead	  of	  
opening	  a	  1995	  program,	  it	  would	  retroactively	  accept	  an	  extra	  17,000	  permits,	  in	  order	  to	  
process	   the	   backlog	   of	   applications	   made	   in	   1994.	   Since	   almost	   half	   of	   the	   1994	  
contingent	  was	   going	   to	   be	   in	   effect	   in	   1995,	   the	   1995	   program	  only	   issued	   8,000	   new	  
permits.	  	  
Cultural,	  racial	  and	  gender	  preferences	  also	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  1995	  program,	  in	  an	  
attempt	  to	  reflect	   the	  biases	  already	  present	   in	  patterns	  of	  employment,	  demonstrating	  
how	  culturalizing	  and	  labouralizing	  logics	  intersect.	  Types	  of	  work	  were	  directly	  associated	  
with	  nationalities:	  Most	  of	   the	  2,500	  permits	   for	  domestic	   service	  were	  pre-­‐assigned	   to	  
Peruvians,	   Dominicans,	   and	   Filipinas	   (mostly	   women	   who	   could	   speak	   Spanish),	   while	  
4,500	   of	   the	   5,500	   permits	   in	   agriculture	   were	   reserved	   for	   Moroccans	   who	   had	  
traditionally	  worked	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  southern	  Spain.	  With	  the	  shift	  in	  government	  in	  1996,	  
a	   new	   regularization	   process	   was	   launched	   and	   since	   the	   quotas	   were	   mainly	   used	   to	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regularize	  irregular	  migrants,	  no	  further	  quota	  was	  deemed	  necessary	  for	  that	  year.	  When	  
new	  openings	  were	  announced	   in	  1997,	   the	  government	  decided	   to	   stop	   legislating	   the	  
type	   of	   work	   that	   should	   be	   taken	   by	   migrants	   of	   specific	   origins,	   a	   strategy	   that	   had	  
attracted	  much	   criticism	   from	   advocates	   claiming	   that	   the	   practice	   was	   discriminatory.	  
Explaining	  the	  logic	  that	  led	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  15,000-­‐permit	  quota	  for	  1997,	  the	  
general	   secretary	  of	   social	   affairs	   demonstrated,	   once	  more,	   that	   the	  methodology	  was	  
weak:	  
This	  year	  the	  criterion	  of	  the	  Government	  has	  been	  to	  establish	  the	  contingent	  at	  15,000.	  The	  
reason,	  which	  appears	  sensible,	  is	  that	  if	  in	  1995	  a	  quota	  of	  8,000	  was	  established,	  then	  taking	  
into	   account	   that	   we	   are	   in	   a	   regularization	   process	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   [taking	   into	  
account]	  the	  decision	  for	  the	  1995	  quota,	  the	  number	  of	  15,000	  appears	  right	  or,	  at	  least,	  exact	  
and	  rigorous	   in	  the	  sense	  that	   it	  reflects	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  market.	  As	  the	  year	  passes,	  we	  can	  
study	  what	  modifications	  would	  be	  necessary	  [through	  various	  governmental	  commissions].	  (IV	  
–	  213/000198)	  	  
	  
Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  numbers	  needed	  to	  be	  adjusted	  again.	  In	  November,	  the	  government	  
announced	  that	  “From	  the	  study	  of	  the	  [job]	  offers	  submitted	  and	  the	  existing	  data	  on	  the	  
evolution	   of	   the	   labour	   market,	   it	   is	   deduced	   that	   the	   number	   of	   authorizations	  
anticipated	   for	   1997	   are	   insufficient	   if	   we	   are	   to	   continue	   .	   .	   .	   with	   the	   progressive	  
channelling	  of	  the	  unfilled	  job	  offers.”65	  The	  quota	  of	  15,000	  was	  thus	  extended	  to	  a	  total	  
of	  24,690.	  In	  1998	  and	  1999,	  the	  established	  quota	  finally	  seemed	  to	  match	  the	  demand	  
for	  permits,	  with	  numbers	  of	  permits	  actually	  issued	  slightly	  under	  the	  28,000	  and	  30,000	  
                                                65	  Resolución	   de	   14	   de	   noviembre	   de	   1997,	   de	   la	   Subsecretaría,	   por	   la	   que	   se	   dispone	   la	   publicación	   del	  
Acuerdo	   del	   Consejo	   de	   Ministros	   de	   7	   de	   noviembre	   de	   1997	   por	   el	   que	   se	   adecua	   el	   contingente	   de	  
autorizaciones	   para	   el	   empleo	   de	   ciudadanos	   extranjeros	   no	   comunitarios	   en	   el	   año	   1997,	   fijado	   en	   el	  
Acuerdo	  del	   Consejo	  de	  Ministros	  de	  24	  de	  enero	  de	  1997.	   Published	   in	  Boletín	  oficial	   del	   Estado,	  No	   274,	  
November	  15,	  1997,	  p.	  33606.	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quotas.	  Despite	  better	  results	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  program,	  most	  migrant	  workers	  continued	  
to	  work	  without	  permits	  and	  those	  who	  obtained	  a	  permit	  were	  generally	  already	  living	  in	  
Spain	   irregularly.	   We	   thus	   have	   to	   conclude	   that	   the	   dream	   of	   channelling	   labour	  
migration	  flows	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  1980s	  could	  not	  be	  fulfilled	  through	  this	  program	  in	  
the	  1990s.66	  
I	   have	   mentioned	   that	   policy-­‐makers	   attempted	   to	   understand	   the	   patterns	   and	  
characteristics	   of	   the	   labour	   market	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   the	   dynamics	   of	   labour	  
migration	  flows	  on	  the	  other,	  and	  tried	  to	  make	  them	  coincide.	  In	  the	  1990s,	  the	  primary	  
object	  to	  be	  governed	  appeared	  to	  be	  the	  labour	  market,	  and	  programs	  of	  work	  permits	  
for	  migrant	  workers	  were	  a	  way	  to	  provide	  a	  legal	  work	  force	  to	  employers.	  This	  was	  not	  
the	  only	   reason,	  but	   it	  was	   clearly	   a	   central	  one.	   In	  1999-­‐2000,	  policy-­‐makers	   reflecting	  
upon	   their	   inability	   to	   successfully	   channel	  migration	   flows	   during	   the	   1990s	   started	   to	  
reverse	   this	   logic.	   The	   question	   became	   how	   to	   use	   job	   offers—that	   is,	   a	   structural	  
demand	   for	   workers	   in	   the	   labour	   market—as	   a	   means	   to	   regulate	   and	   steer	   labour	  
migration.	  To	  understand	  this	  shift	   in	  the	  ways	  policy-­‐makers	  thought	  about	  the	  relation	  
between	   migration	   and	   the	   labour	   market	   after	   2000,	   we	   first	   need	   to	   consider	   the	  
evolution	   in	   the	   ways	   policy-­‐makers	   engaged	   with	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   “national	   labour	  
situation.”	  
	  
                                                
66	  This	  is	  also	  the	  conclusion	  reached	  by	  various	  policy-­‐makers	  I	  talked	  to	  (Interviews:	  Madrid,	  September	  26;	  
Madrid,	  September	  29;	  Madrid,	  October	  24;	  and	  Madrid,	  November	  7,	  2012).	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Managing	  a	  Labour	  Market	  Constructed	  as	  a	  National	  Object	  
As	   Foucault	   explained,	   liberalism	   is	   based	   on	   an	   economy	  of	   power	   aimed	   at	   balancing	  
interests	   and	   is	   premised	   upon	   the	   idea	   that,	   to	   ensure	   freedom,	   various	   strategies	   of	  
security	  need	  to	  be	  deployed	  to	  reduce	  the	  dangers	  inherent	  to	  it.	  Foucault	  ([2004]	  2008)	  
states:	  
Liberalism	   turns	   into	   a	  mechanism	   continually	   having	   to	   arbitrate	   between	   the	   freedom	   and	  
security	   of	   individuals	   by	   reference	   to	   this	   notion	   of	   danger.	   Basically,	   if	   on	   one	   side	   .	   .	   .	  
liberalism	  is	  an	  art	  of	  government	  that	  fundamentally	  deals	  with	   interests,	   it	  cannot	  do	  this—
and	   this	   is	   the	   other	   side	   of	   the	   coin—without	   at	   the	   same	   time	  managing	   the	   dangers	   and	  
mechanisms	   of	   security/freedom,	   the	   interplay	   of	   security/freedom	  which	   must	   ensure	   that	  
individuals	  or	  the	  community	  have	  the	  least	  exposure	  to	  danger	  (P.66).	  
	  
In	   the	   context	   of	   labour	  migration,	   the	   referent	   object	   of	   these	   security	  mechanisms	   is	  
what	  is	  often	  called	  the	  “national	  labour	  market;”	  that	  is,	  a	  labour	  market	  which	  is	  framed	  
as	  national.	  The	  labouralizing	  logics	  and	  practices	  are	  primarily	  oriented	  toward	  regulating	  
the	   input	   of	  workers	   into	   a	   labour	  market	   always	   imagined	   as	   already	   constituted,	   and	  
therefore	  having	  a	  limited	  capacity	  of	  incorporation.	  Thus	  conceived,	  the	  “national	  labour	  
market”	  is	  the	  product	  of	  a	  process	  of	  enclosure,	  of	  a	  nationalization	  of	  spaces,	  subjects,	  
and	  markets.	  Since,	  as	  Nandita	  Sharma	  (2006)	  argues,	  “The	  common	  sensical	  character	  of	  
notions	   of	   national	   entitlement	   is	   found	   in	   the	   idea	   that	   labour	   markets	   are	   naturally	  
national”	   (p.144),	   it	   is	  essential	   to	   interrogate	   this	  notion,	  and	   inquire	   into	   the	  different	  
roles	  it	  plays	  at	  different	  moments	  in	  labour	  migration	  governance.	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Taking	  the	  “National	  Labour	  Situation”	  into	  Account	  
While	  the	  Alien	  Act	  of	  1985	  was	  implicitly	  taking	  the	  labour	  market	  into	  consideration,	  it	  is	  
in	   the	  1986	  Regulation	  of	   the	  Alien	  Act	   (RD	  1986/119)	   that	  a	   reference	   to	   the	  “national	  
labour	   situation”	   was	   included.	   In	   the	   1986	   and	   1996	   regulations,	   however,	   the	  
consideration	  of	   the	  “national	   labour	   situation”	  appeared	  primarily	  as	  a	   corollary	   to	   the	  
logic	  of	  cultural	  preference	  based	  on	  origins.	  It	  simply	  granted	  the	  government	  the	  power	  
to	   refuse	  any	  work	  permit	   to	  a	   foreigner	   “if	   the	  national	   situation	   recommends	   it”	   (Art.	  
37.4.a),	  a	  strange	  formulation	  that	  seems	  to	  consider	  the	  labour	  market	  as	  an	  actor	  itself.	  
In	   fact,	   the	   regulation	   identified	   “the	   labour	   authorities”	   as	   those	   responsible	   for	  
considering	   the	   labour	   situation,	   but	   provided	   little	   information	   about	   how	   any	  
assessment	  should	  be	  done.	  	  
Later,	  with	   the	   increasing	   importance	   of	   the	   labouralizing	   logic	   that	   considers	   the	  
labour	   market	   a	   natural	   entity,	   the	   notion	   that	   policy-­‐makers	   need	   to	   understand	   the	  
empirical	   reality	   of	   the	   “national	   labour	   situation”	   in	   order	   to	   manage	   immigration	  
became	  more	  prominent.	  The	  very	  notion	  of	  quotas	  developed	  through	  the	  1990s	  guest	  
worker	  program	  was	  premised	  upon	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  threshold	  of	  tolerance	  exists	  beyond	  
which	  a	  positive	  input	  of	  immigrants	  becomes	  negative,	  but	  the	  yearly	  quota	  was	  seen	  as	  
more	   representative	  of	   the	  balance	  of	   interests	  between	   stakeholders,	   rather	   than	  as	   a	  
scientific	  calculation	  based	  on	  the	  objective	  reality	  of	  the	  market.	  In	  2001,	  the	  logic	  took	  a	  
slightly	   different	   form	   in	   the	   section	   of	   the	   Plan	   GRECO	   concerned	   with	   “Regulating	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Migration	   Flows	   to	   Guarantee	   a	   [Positive]	   Coexistence	   in	   Spanish	   Society.”	   This	   policy	  
document	  states:	  
But	   we	   cannot	   forget	   that	   Spain	   has	   some	   of	   its	   own	   citizens	   without	   work	   and	   2,000,000	  
emigrants	  many	  of	  whom	  want	  to	  return	  to	  work	   in	   their	  country,	   [and]	  a	   limited	  capacity	   to	  
welcome	  [immigrants]	  that	  must	  be	  based	  on	  a	  strict	  calculation	  of	  the	  jobs	  that	  it	  can	  offer	  to	  
foreigners	  who	  migrate	  for	  economic	  reasons	  seeking	  among	  us	  opportunities	  that	  they	  do	  not	  
find	   in	   their	  own	  country.	  Precisely	  because	  we	  have	   to	   respond	  with	   jobs	   to	   the	  demand	  of	  
these	  persons,	   clandestine	   immigration	  and	   illegal	   stays	  among	  us	  of	   these	  people	  cannot	  be	  
permitted.67	  
	  
This	   document,	   published	   during	   a	   period	   in	   which	   immigration	   policies	   and	   the	  
quota	  system	  were	  being	  revamped,	  clearly	  poses	  what	  the	  French	  right	  calls	  préférence	  
nationale	  (Le	  Gallou	  and	  Le	  Club	  de	  l’Horloge	  1985)	  as	  the	  basic	  principle	  from	  which	  any	  
immigration	   policy	   should	   unfold.	   This	   notion	   is	   often	   invoked	   in	   the	   case	   of	   cultural	  
integration,	   but	   it	   reappears	   here	   under	   the	   guise	   of	   mathematical	   objectivity.	   This	  
principle	  is	  not	  new,	  but	  as	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  “national	  labour	  situation”	  becomes	  a	  central	  
component	   of	   the	   legal	   regulation	   of	   labour	   migration	   in	   2000,	   it	   contributes	   to	   the	  
naturalization	  of	  the	  national	  character	  of	  the	  labour	  market.	  
Since	   the	   first	   reform	   of	   the	   Alien	   Act	   in	   2000	   (LOE	   4/2000,	   and	   later	   in	   all	   the	  
versions	  of	  the	  LOE	  8/2000),	  the	  law	  clearly	  states	  that,	  in	  relation	  to	  immigration	  policies,	  
all	   levels	   of	   government	   “will	   base	   the	   exercise	   of	   their	   competences	   related	   to	  
immigration	  in	  line	  with	  [among	  other	  principles]	  the	  ordering	  of	  labour	  migration	  flows	  in	  
accordance	  with	  the	  necessities	  of	  the	  national	  labour	  situation”	  (LOE	  8/2000;	  Art.	  2	  bis).	  
                                                
67	  Plan	  Global	  de	  Regulación	  y	  Coordinación	  de	  la	  Extranjería	  y	  la	  Inmigración	  (GRECO);	  published	  in	  Boletín	  
Oficial	  del	  Estado,	  No	  101,	  April	  27,	  2001,	  p.	  15327.	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Article	  38.2	  of	  the	  Alien	  Act	  explains	  how	  this	  national	  labour	  situation	  will	  be	  defined	  and	  
assessed.	  It	  states:	  
The	   national	   labour	   situation	  will	   be	   determined	   by	   the	   Public	   Service	   of	   State	   Employment	  
[Servicio	   Público	   de	   Empleo	   Estatal]	   with	   the	   information	   provided	   by	   the	   autonomous	  
communities	   and	  with	   the	   information	   derived	   from	   official	   statistical	   indicators	   and	  will	   be	  
reflected	   in	   the	   Catalogue	   of	   Occupations	   Hard	   to	   Fill	   [Catálogo	   de	   Ocupaciones	   de	   Difícil	  
Cobertura].	  This	  catalogue	  will	  contain	  a	   list	  of	   jobs	  that	  could	  potentially	  be	  covered	  through	  
the	   hiring	   of	   foreign	   workers	   and	   will	   be	   approved	   through	   consultation	   with	   the	   Tripartite	  
Labour	  Commission	  on	  Immigration.	  
	  
Just	   as	  nations	  are	   imagined	   communities	   resulting	   from	  historical	  processes	  of	   identity	  
building	  (Anderson	  [1983]	  2006),	  subjects	  and	  spaces	  are	  also	  not	  naturally	  national	  (Hage	  
[1999]	   2000;	   Sharma	   2006,	   2008;	   Thobani	   2007).	   Ghassan	   Hage	   ([1999]	   2000)	   explains	  
that	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  number	  of	  immigrants	  as	  “too	  many”	  or	  “just	  enough”	  based	  
on	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  threshold	  always	  presupposes	  a	  space	  imagined	  as	  limited	  and	  thus	  relies	  
on	   “categories	   of	   spatial	   management”	   (p.38).	   The	   spatial	   dimension	   of	   immigration	  
governing,	   especially	   as	   it	   relates	   to	   the	   circulation	   of	   flows	   and	   the	   management	   of	  
populations,	   is	   well	   analyzed	   by	   Foucault	   ([2004]	   2007,	   [2004]	   2008).	   But	   while	   it	   is	  
important	  to	  decentre	  the	  state	   in	  analyses	  of	   immigration	  governing,	  we	  should	  not	  be	  
oblivious	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   spaces	  and	  populations	   that	  are	  being	  governed	  are	  often	  
understood	  primarily,	  albeit	  not	  exclusively,	  as	  national.	  	  
Indeed,	   it	   is	   through	   the	   nationalization	   of	   space	   that	   subjects	   who	   consider	  
themselves	  nationals	  feel	  entitled	  to	  an	  opinion	  about	  the	  types	  and	  numbers	  of	  migrants	  
that	   can	   circulate	   through	   this	   space.	   Hage	   ([1999]	   2000
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expressing	   any	   opinion	   about	   the	   kinds	   and	   numbers	   of	   immigrants	   that	   are	   desirable	  
“assume[s],	   first,	   an	   image	   of	   a	   national	   space;	   secondly,	   an	   image	   of	   the	   nationalist	  
himself	   or	   herself	   as	   master	   of	   this	   national	   space	   and,	   thirdly,	   an	   image	   of	   the	  
‘ethnic/racial	   other’	   as	   a	   mere	   object	   within	   this	   space”	   (p.28).	   This	   principle	   of	  
“empowered	  spatiality,”	  he	  claims,	  applies	  to	  the	  good	  and	  tolerant	  nationalists,	  as	  much	  
as	  to	  the	  evil,	   intolerant	  ones.	  While	  they	  may	  be	   in	  strong	  disagreement	  over	  where	  to	  
place	   the	   threshold	   of	   tolerance	   and	   on	   how	   to	   assess	   the	   benefits	   of	   immigration,	   all	  
nationalists	  assume	  that,	  as	  nationals,	  they	  have	  a	  right	  to	  say	  how	  the	  space	  framed	  as	  
national	  should	  be	  managed.	  Drawing	  from	  Hage,	  Sharma	  (2006)	  extends	  this	  analysis	  to	  
inquire	   into	   the	   logics	   of	   inclusion	   and	   exclusion	   at	   play	   in	  what	   she	   calls	   “nationalized	  
labour	  markets.”	  Sharma	  (2006)	  explains:	  
Nationalist	  ideological	  practices	  contribute	  greatly	  to	  the	  creation	  and	  restructuring	  of	  national	  
labour	  markets	  and	  the	  differential	  categorization	  of	  various	  groups	  of	  workers	  within	  the	  state	  
.	   .	   .	   The	   reproduction	   of	   labour	   markets	   as	   national	   is	   an	   important	   part	   of	   nation-­‐building	  
exercises	   that	   assists	   in	   the	   reproduction	   of	   not	   only	   the	   state	   but	   also	   global	   capitalism.	  
Nationalized	   labour	   markets,	   then,	   are	   as	   much	   ideological	   boundaries	   between	   different	  
‘imagined	  communities’	  of	  people	  as	  they	  are	  material	  boundaries	  between	  different	  physical	  
spaces	  controlled	  by	  national	  states	  (P.49).	  
	  
The	   nationalization	   of	   space	   and	   the	   labour	   market	   does	   not,	   however,	   foreclose	   the	  
possibility	   of	   their	   appropriation	   at	   other	   levels.	   As	   the	   territorial	   dimension	   of	  
jurisdictions	   clearly	   illustrate,	   identity-­‐based	   captures	   of	   space	   are	   often	   contested	   and	  
multi-­‐layered.	   Indeed,	  while	   the	   referent	   object	   of	   labour	  migration	   regulation	   in	   Spain	  
has	   always	   been	   the	   nationalized	   labour	   market,	   considered	   at	   the	   central	   level	   of	  
government	  as	  the	  Spanish	  labour	  market,	  regional	  and	  local	  territories	  and	  markets	  have	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always	  been	  taken	  into	  consideration.	  For	  instance,	   in	  the	  1990s,	  the	  countrywide	  quota	  
was	   presented	   as	   a	   total	   of	   the	   amalgamated	   quotas	   of	   each	   autonomous	   community.	  
Continuing	  in	  this	  tradition,	  the	  “national	  labour	  situation,”	  as	  defined	  in	  the	  LOE	  4/2000,	  
is	  constructed	  as	  an	  amalgamation	  of	  regional	  and	   local	   labour	  market	  needs.	   In	  fact,	  as	  
demonstrated	   by	   the	   cases	   of	   mayors	   who	   claim	   the	   right	   to	   restrict	   or	   facilitate	   the	  
settlement	   of	   irregular	   migrants	   on	   their	   town’s	   territory,	   the	   scale	   of	   the	   territory	  
imagined	  as	  one’s	  own	  can	  vary	  dramatically.68	  	  
However,	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  “national	  labour	  situation”	  should	  not	  
be	   underestimated.	   Its	   relevance	   is	   not	   due	   to	   the	   novelty	   of	   considering	   the	   labour	  
market	  as	  a	  national	  entity,	  but	   rather	   is	  derived	   from	  the	  efforts	  made	  to	  circumscribe	  
this	   object	   and	   analyze	   its	   dynamics	   and	   characteristics	   as	   a	   means	   to	   govern	   labour	  
migration	  flows.	  While	  in	  previous	  years	  the	  objective	  had	  been	  to	  intervene	  at	  the	  level	  
of	  migration	   to	   have	   an	   impact	   on	   the	   labour	  market,	   now	   the	   idea	   is	   that	   the	   labour	  
market	   itself	   can	   be	   the	   dependant	   variable	   to	   help	   steer	   labour	  migration.	   As	   a	   close	  
collaborator	  of	   the	   Socialist	   secretary	  of	   state	   for	   immigration	  and	  emigration	  Consuelo	  
Rumi	  (2004-­‐10)	  told	  me,	  “When	  we	  got	  to	  power	  in	  2004,	  immediately,	  the	  first	  problem	  
that	  we	  had	  to	  face	  was	  the	  problem	  of	  irregularity.	  And	  we	  understood	  that	  what	  attracts	  
irregular	   immigration	  is	  the	  existence	  of	   irregular	  hiring,	  and	  this	   is	  where	  we	  needed	  to	  
intervene	  .	  .	  .	  we	  wanted	  to	  be	  able	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  trade	  unions	  and	  the	  business	  
                                                
68	  Some	  of	  these	  cases	  are	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  7.	  
 172	  
associations	   so	   that	   we	   could	   have	   an	   impact	   on	   irregular	   migration.”69	   During	   the	  
interview,	  he	  repeatedly	  expressed	  his	  conviction	  that	  understanding	  the	  national	  labour	  
situation	   and	   creating	   openings	   in	   certain	   sectors	   in	   collaboration	   with	   unions	   and	  
employers	   associations	   were	   the	   only	   ways	   the	   government	   could	   actively	   “channel	  
migration	  flows.”	  	  
New	  Quotas	  After	  2000	  
Despite	   the	   Socialists’	   insistence	   that	   2004	   marked	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   true	  
labouralization	   of	   immigration,	   the	   process	   had	   in	   fact	   started	   earlier.	   A	   shift	   in	   policy-­‐
making	   already	   emerged	   around	   the	   year	   2000.	   According	   to	   the	   previously	   cited	   high-­‐
level	  official,	  who	  negotiated	  the	  quotas	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  contributed	  to	  the	  transition	  to	  
the	  new	  quota	  system	  developed	  in	  the	  early	  2000s,	  the	  process	  started	  even	  before	  this	  
policy	  instrument	  was	  modified	  by	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  Alien	  Act	  in	  2000.	  According	  to	  this	  
official,	  the	  first	  attempt	  at	  using	  the	  contingent,	  not	  to	  regularize	  irregular	  migrants	  but	  
to	  steer	  labour	  migration	  flows,	  occurred	  in	  1999.	  He	  explained:	  
In	  reality,	  this	  was	  our	  bet	  that	  we	  could	  work	  with	  businessmen,	  make	  sure	  that	  they	  commit	  a	  
number	  of	  jobs	  to	  us,	  and	  that	  we	  could	  use	  these	  as	  a	  way	  to	  organize	  the	  migration.	  It	  worked	  
until	   the	   crisis,	   because	   without	   jobs	   you	   can’t	   steer	   migration.	   So	   the	   bet	   we	   made,	   I	  
remember	  of	  the	  first	  meetings	  [in	  1999],	  in	  Andalusia,	  with	  business	  associations,	  was	  to	  say:	  
“Don’t	  worry	  about	  the	  number	  of	  work	  permits,	  you	  will	  get	  as	  many	  as	  you	  want,	  we	  only	  ask	  
one	   thing:	   That	   you	   tell	   us	   what	   are	   the	   needs	   that	   you	   foresee,	   that	   you	   commit	   to	   order	  
[encuadrar]	  immigration,	  and	  that	  you	  provide,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  agriculture,	  decent	  housing.”	  Just	  
like	  they	  did	  with	  us	  in	  other	  countries	  [in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s].70	  	  
	  
                                                
69	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  November	  7,	  2012.	  
70	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  September	  26,	  2012.	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When	   I	   told	   him	   that	   this	   looked	   exactly	   like	   the	   contingent	   system	   that	   was	   used	  
throughout	   the	  1990s,	  he	   replied	   that	   they	  decided	   to	   include	  a	   clause	   that	   limited	   the	  
recruitment	  to	  those	  outside	  the	  country:	  
That	  was	  precisely	  the	  idea,	  that	  it	  could	  not	  be	  used	  to	  regularize	  irregular	  migrants.	  We	  had	  
the	  experience	  of	  managing	  contingents	   like	  this.	  The	  first	  contingents	  were,	  despite	  our	  best	  
intentions,	  saturated	  by	  irregular	  immigrants	  because	  it	  was	  a	  nominative	  system	  with	  workers	  
presenting	  their	  requests	  directly	  to	  employers.	  And	  NGOs	  got	  involved,	  various	  lobbies,	  etc.	  So	  
what	  we	  do	  now	  for	  the	  contingent	  is	  that	  those	  responsible	  say:	  “If	  you	  have	  needs,	  tell	  me	  for	  
how	  many,	  and	  give	  me	  [job]	  offers,	  but	  you	  have	  to	  give	  me	  an	  open	  offer.	  You	  can’t	  give	  me	  
names,	  identities.	  What	  I	  can	  guarantee	  is	  a	  mechanism	  that	  ensures	  that	  the	  people	  that	  come	  
here	  will	   be	   ready,	   and	   you	  will	   even	   do	   the	   selection,	   but	   you	  will	   select	   them	   outside	   the	  
country,	  with	   the	   intervention	   of	   the	   country	   of	   origin,	  with	   the	   intervention	   of	   the	   Spanish	  
administration,	   and	   therefore	   these	   people	   that	   will	   come	  won’t	   be	   people	   that	   had	   to	   pay	  
bribes,	  and	  they’ll	  come	  at	  low	  cost	  [to	  them]	  because	  you’ll	  pay	  for	  the	  trip.	  And	  that’s	  how	  it	  
worked,	  mainly	  for	  seasonal	  work.	  
	  
This	  system	  is	  precisely	  what	  became	  law	  in	  2000.	  Article	  37	  of	  the	  LOE	  4/2000	  stated	  that	  
the	  government	  was	  to	  establish	  a	  contingent	  every	  year,	  a	   formulation	  that	  seemed	  to	  
leave	   little	   room	   for	   discretion	   in	   the	   decision	   whether	   or	   not	   to	   use	   this	   policy	  
instrument,	   and	  did	  not	   specify	   the	  origin	  of	   the	  migrant	  workers.	   In	   the	   text	   emerging	  
from	  the	  counter-­‐reform	  of	  the	  Alien	  Act	  (LOE	  8/2000)	  a	  few	  months	  later,	  the	  restrictions	  
were	  made	  clear.	  Article	  39	  of	  the	  LOE	  8/2000	  stated	  that	  the	  government	  would	  establish	  
a	  contingent	  annually	  “as	  long	  as	  labour	  shortage	  exists,”	  the	  numbers	  and	  characteristics	  
of	   the	   job	   offers	   would	   be	   established	   in	   consultation	   with	   autonomous	   communities,	  
trade	   unions,	   and	   business	   associations,	   and,	   significantly,	   the	   positions	   would	   only	   be	  
available	  to	  foreign	  workers	  who	  were	  not	  in	  Spain,	  and	  who	  were	  not	  Spanish	  residents.	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Table	  9:	  Quotas	  Announced	  in	  the	  Contingent	  Program	  Since	  2002	  	  
Year	   Seasonal	   Stable	   Total	  
2002	   21,195	   10,884	   32,079	  
2003	   13,672	  +	  9,910	   10,575	   34,157	  
2004	   20,070	   10,902	   30,972	  
2005	   Collective	  regularization	  process:	  No	  new	  permits	  offered	  
2006	   	   16,878	   16,878	  
2007	   	   27,034	   27,034	  
2008	   	   15,731	   15,731	  
2009	   	   901	   901	  
2010	   	   168	   168	  
2011	   	   14	   14	  
2012	   No	  new	  quota	  –	  2011	  extended	  
2013	   No	  new	  quota	  –	  2011	  extended	  
2014	   No	  new	  quota	  –	  2011	  extended	  
Source:	   Resolutions	   and	   Orders	   announcing	   the	   annual	   contingent	   agreements,	   published	   in	   the	   Boletín	  
Oficial	   del	   Estado.	   The	   numbers	   do	   not	   include	   the	   visas	   that	   allow	   foreigners,	   especially	  
descendants	   of	   exiled	   Spaniards,	   to	   enter	   Spain	   in	   search	   of	   work.	   The	   numbers	   reflect	   the	  
announced	  quotas,	  not	  the	  numbers	  of	  actual	  permits	  issued.	  	  See	  BOE	  2002,	  No	  11;	  BOE	  2003,	  No	  
14;	  BOE	  2003,	  No	  313;	  BOE	  2005,	  No	  11;	  BOE	  2006,	  No	  14;	  BOE	  2007,	  No	  8;	  BOE	  2008,	  No	  11;	  BOE	  
2009,	  No	  6;	  BOE	  2009,	  No	  313;	  BOE	  2010,	  No	  317;	  BOE	  2012,	  No	  6;	  BOE	  2013,	  No	  1;	  BOE	  2013,	  No	  
312.	  
	  
The	  same	  system	  that	  had	  been	  used	  throughout	  the	  1990s	  as	  a	  means	  to	  regularize	  
irregular	  migrants	  was	  thus	  being	  transformed	  into	  a	  tool	  to	  continue	  fulfilling	  the	  needs	  
of	   the	   labour	   market,	   while	   limiting	   the	   jobs	   available	   to	   undocumented	   workers.	   The	  
Popular	   Party	   government	   also	   attempted	   to	   restrict	   all	   recruitment	   of	   foreign	  workers	  
through	  nominative	  work	  permit	  applications	  outside	  of	  the	  contingent,	   leaving	  only	  the	  
generic	  application	  and	  limiting	  it	  to	  people	  outside	  the	  country.	  This	  strategy,	  included	  in	  
the	  Agreement	  for	  the	  2002	  contingent,	  was	  further	  developed	  in	  an	  internal	  memo	  sent	  
by	   the	   General	   Directorate	   for	   the	   Ordering	   of	   Migrations	   (Dirección	   General	   de	  
Ordenación	   de	   Migraciones)	   to	   the	   delegations	   and	   sub-­‐delegations	   of	   the	   central	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government,	   instructing	   bureaucrats	   not	   to	   process	   any	   request	   made	   outside	   of	   the	  
contingent	  system	  through	  the	  so-­‐called	  “general	  regime.”	  The	  idea	  behind	  only	  allowing	  
recruitment	   through	   the	   contingent	   regime	   was	   that	   officials	   could	   use	   this	   quota	   of	  
generic	   job	  offers	   to	  control	  migrant	  workers’	   input	  and	  their	  distribution	  by	  region	  and	  
sector.	   The	   Spanish	   Supreme	   Court	   eventually	   cancelled	   this	   provision	   in	   2004	   and	   the	  
nominative	   recruitment	   of	   foreign	   workers	   has	   now	   resumed	   as	   a	   complement	   to	   the	  
generic	  contingents.71	  
The	  shift	  in	  policy	  represented	  an	  attempt	  at	  reducing	  the	  number	  of	  jobs	  available	  
to	  undocumented	  workers	  by	  filling	  vacancies	  with	  temporary	  seasonal	  workers	  coming	  to	  
the	   country	   through	   the	   contingent	   and	   leaving	   after	   their	   contracts	   ended.	   In	   an	  
appearance	   before	   the	   Senate	   Special	   Commission	   on	   Immigration	   and	   Foreigners	   on	  
October	  30,	  2002,	  then	  secretary	  of	  state	  for	  foreigners	  and	  immigration	  Ignacio	  González	  
expressed	  this	  position	  clearly:	  
Precisely,	  one	  of	  the	  basic	  questions	  on	  which	  we	  all	  agreed	  when	  we	  made	  some	  modifications	  
to	   the	   current	   regulation	   is	   that	   we	   cannot	   use	   the	   covert	   regularization	   through	   the	   old	  
conception	   of	   the	   contingent	   so	   that	   persons	   who	   are	   working	   here	   illegally	   find	   a	   form	   of	  
regularization	  through	  this	  path	  because,	  precisely—and	  I	  believe	  we	  all	  agree	  on	  that—this	  is	  
what	  produces	  an	  indirect	  negative	  effect	  that	  encourages	  illegal	  immigration	  and	  we	  can’t	  put	  
those	  who	  come	  illegally	  in	  a	  better	  position	  than	  those	  who	  want	  to	  do	  so	  legally.	  If	  they	  find	  a	  
formula	   through	   which,	   while	   being	   here	   illegally,	   they	   can	   achieve	   regularization	   only	   by	  
having	  a	  job	  offer,	  by	  finding	  a	  job,	  we	  wouldn’t	  be	  acting	  well,	  considering	  that	  [it	  is]	  the	  effect	  
that	  we	  try	  to	  avoid,	  [we	  want]	  to	  fight	  illegal	  immigration.72	  
	  
                                                
71	  Tribunal	  Supremo,	  Sala	  de	  lo	  Contencioso.	  STS	  2343/2004.	  	  
72	  Diario	  de	  Sesiones	  del	  Senado,	  Legislature	  VII,	  No	  357,	  October	  30,	  2002,	  p.	  14.	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The	   use	   of	   contingents	   resumed	   in	   2002,	   but	  with	   very	   limited	   numbers,	   until	   virtually	  
disappearing	  with	  the	  economic	  crisis,	  trickling	  down	  to	  a	  symbolic	  901	  posts	  in	  2009,	  168	  
in	  2010,	  and	  14	   in	  2011,	  most	  of	  them	  for	  highly	  qualified	  professionals.	  Since	  then,	  the	  
government	  has	  announced	  each	  year	  that	  it	  will	  renew	  the	  quota	  of	  14	  posts	  authorized	  
for	   2011.	   When	   there	   is	   a	   need	   for	   seasonal	   agricultural	   labour,	   the	   government	   now	  
tends	   to	   sign	   less	   binding	  memoranda	   of	   understanding	   with	   nearby	   countries	   such	   as	  
Morocco.	  
Another	   key	   policy	   innovation	   of	   the	   mid-­‐2000s,	   part	   of	   the	   process	   of	  
labouralization,	   is	   the	   addition	   of	   a	   new	   requirement	   for	   regularization.	   Most	   of	   the	  
regularization	  programs	  required	  that	  unauthorized	  immigrants	  present	  a	  legitimate	  work	  
offer	  to	  obtain	  a	  residence	  and	  work	  permit,	  but	  no	  one	  verified	  if	  they	  later	  worked	  for	  
this	  employer.	  During	  the	  2005	  regularization	  program,	  not	  only	  were	  employers	  the	  ones	  
responsible	   for	   “normalizing”	   their	  workers,	   the	  permits	   could	  be	   revoked	   if	   regularized	  
migrants	   and	  employers	  did	  not	  make	   their	   contributions	   to	   social	   security.	  Around	   the	  
same	  time,	   inspectors	  enforcing	   labour	  regulations	  were	  required	  to	   identify	  workplaces	  
that	  employed	  immigrants	  irregularly.	  
Labour	  Inspection	  and	  Contribution	  to	  Social	  Security	  
The	   2004	   election	   of	   the	   Socialist	   government	   led	   to	   the	   transfer	   of	   responsibility	   for	  
immigration	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Labour	  and	  Social	  Affairs,	  
renamed	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Labour	  and	  Immigration	  in	  2008.	  A	  former	  high-­‐level	  bureaucrat	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of	   this	  ministry	   explained	   that	   “The	   institutional	   change	  was	   based	   on	   a	   desire	   to	   give	  
visibility	  to	  the	  change	  of	  orientation,	  but	  also	  so	  that	  we	  would	  be	  able	  to	  negotiate	  with	  
unions.	  Between	  [the	  Ministry	  of	  the]	  Interior	  and	  unions	  there	  are	  no	  contacts,	  but	  they	  
exist	  with	  [the	  Ministry	  of]	  Labour.”73	  The	  nomination	  of	  Consuelo	  Rumí,	  a	  long	  time	  high-­‐
ranking	   member	   of	   the	   national	   union	   General	   Union	   of	   Workers	   (Unión	   General	   de	  
Trabajadores	   –	   UGT),	   as	   secretary	   of	   state	   for	   immigration	   and	   emigration	   also	   set	   the	  
tone.	  According	  to	  her	  head	  of	  staff,	  Rumí	  “understood	  very	  well	  that	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  
build	  an	  institutional	  space	  to	  negotiate	  with	  unions	  and	  business	  associations	  on	  matters	  
of	   immigration,	   starting	  with	   the	   normalization	   of	   2005.”	   Interestingly,	   normalization	   is	  
the	  name	  given	  by	  the	  Socialist	  government	  to	  the	  2005	  regularization	  process,	  a	  program	  
that	   issued	   578,375	   new	   permits	   to	   irregular	   migrants	   (83.6%	   of	   all	   applications)	   and	  
favoured	  mostly	  Latin	  Americans	  and	  Romanians	  (Aja	  2012:86;	  Finotelli	  and	  Arango	  2011).	  
This	   time,	   it	   was	   employers	   who	   regularized	   their	   workers,	   and	   the	   permits	   were	   only	  
valid	   once	   the	   worker	   was	   registered	   and	   started	   contributing	   to	   the	   regime	   of	   social	  
security.	  
While	   the	   process	   of	   labouralization	   contributed	   to	   framing	   migrants	   as	   workers	  
with	   rights	   and	   deserving	   of	   solidarity,	   it	   also	   portrayed	   irregular	  migrants	   as	   economic	  
cheats	  and	  queue	  jumpers.	  Indeed,	  by	  focusing	  on	  migrants’	  contribution	  to	  social	  security	  
as	   a	   strategy	   for	   both	   integration	   and	   control,	   irregular	   immigration	  was	   reframed	   as	   a	  
problem	  of	   tax	   fraud,	   rather	   than	  a	  problem	  of	   security.	   Labour	   inspections	  came	   to	  be	  
                                                
73	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  November	  7,	  2012.	  The	  following	  quote	  is	  also	  from	  this	  interview.	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understood	  as	  a	  way	  to	  catch	  fraudulent	  employers	  and	  workers,	  and	  convince	  businesses	  
to	  declare	  their	  workers.	  However,	   in	  a	  country	  where	  undeclared	  work	   is	  common,	  this	  
reframing	  of	  immigrants	  working	  under	  the	  table	  as	  queue	  jumpers	  and	  economic	  cheats	  
who	  fail	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  social	  security	  system	  is	  not	  a	  central	  component	  of	  populist	  
anti-­‐immigration	   discourses,	   unlike	   in	   other	   countries	   (Cruickshank	   1999;	   Gelber	   2003;	  
Pratt	   2005;	  Pratt	   and	  Valverde	  2002).	   This	  discourse	  does	  not	   tend	   to	   crystalize	   around	  
the	   figure	  of	   the	  undeserving	   individual	  who	  exploits	   the	  system,	  but	   rather	  around	   the	  
idea	  of	  irregular	  migration	  and	  the	  irregular	  employment	  of	  immigrants	  as	  a	  widespread,	  
structural	  problem	  that	  should	  be	  addressed	  by	  teaching	  Spaniards	  and	  immigrants	  alike	  
about	  the	  social	  harm	  it	  is	  seen	  to	  cause.	  
As	   a	   civil	   servant	  working	   in	   the	   labour	   inspection	   department	   of	   the	  Ministry	   of	  
Labour	  explained	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  irregular	  employment	  of	  immigrants:	  	  
It’s	  a	  matter	  of	   social	  mentality.	   It’s	  hard	  because	   in	  Spain	   the	  harm	  that	   fraud	  causes	   to	   the	  
equality	  of	  opportunity	   is	  not	  well	  acknowledged.	   Irregular	   immigration	  is	  a	  fraud	  with	  regard	  
to	   the	   equality	   of	   opportunity	   because	   it	   favours	   the	   person	   that	   doesn’t	   respect	   the	  
regulations	  and	  penalizes	  the	  person	  that	  is	  patiently	  waiting	  to	  see	  if	  he	  or	  she	  gets	  a	  contract	  	  
.	  .	  .	  in	  this	  situation	  of	  course	  the	  contract	  will	  never	  materialize.74	  
	  
While	  labour	  inspections	  primarily	  target	  employers,	  resulting	  in	  fines	  when	  employers	  do	  
not	   comply	   with	   the	   regulation,	   inspections	   in	   the	   countryside	   often	   involve	   the	  
deployment	   of	   police	   officers	   to	   catch	   irregularly	   employed	   workers,	   many	   of	   them	  
migrants,	   who	   try	   to	   escape.	   As	   the	   table	   below	   shows,	   the	   period	   between	   2003	   and	  
                                                
74	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  September	  26,	  2012.	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2008	  is	  marked	  by	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  proportion	  of	  irregularly	  employed	  foreigners	  caught	  
by	  labour	  inspectors,	  a	  trend	  that	  ends	  with	  the	  economic	  crisis.	  
Table	  10:	  Infractions	  Detected	  by	  Labour	  Inspectors	  (1998-­‐2013)	  
Year	   Foreigners	  Irregularly	  Employed	  
(Without	  Work	  Permit)	  
Total	  Irregularly	  Employed	  Workers	  
(Foreigners	  and	  Nationals)	  
1998	   2,533	   42,606	  
1999	   2,952	   51,914	  
2000	   4,229	   45,385	  
2001	   6,813	   53,551	  
2002	   8,413	   55,836	  
2003	   10,152	   45,007	  
2004	   13,800	   54,035	  
2005	   9,535	   46,467	  
2006	   10,981	   52,201	  
2007	   11,637	   46,421	  
2008	   12,453	   55,804	  
2009	   7,220	   55,984	  
2010	   5,821	   72,793	  
2011	   4,993	   70,787	  
2012	   5,386	   77,688	  
2013	   4,809	   79,483	  
Source:	  Dirección	  General	  de	  la	  Inspección	  de	  Trabajo	  y	  Seguridad	  Social	  (2006:127,	  2007:205,	  2014:	  162).	  	  
	  
It	   is	   impossible	   for	   me	   to	   verify	   what	   proportion	   of	   these	   immigrant	   workers	  
suffered	   immigration-­‐related	  consequences	  as	  a	  result	  of	   labour	  violations,	  but	  this	  type	  
of	  inspection	  shows	  that	  the	  labouralizing	  logic	  should	  not	  be	  understood	  simply	  as	  a	  shift	  
from	  control	  to	  integration,	  as	  Socialist	  officials	  often	  suggest.	  In	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  policies	  
targeting	   the	   hiring	   of	   irregular	   migrants,	   which	   is	   very	   much	   in	   synch	   with	   official	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government	   analyses,	   Rosa	   Aparicio	   Gómez	   and	   José	   María	   Ruiz	   de	   Huidobro	   (2010)	  
explain	  the	  multi-­‐dimensional	  rationale	  for	  focusing	  on	  irregular	  employment:	  
First,	   because	   irregular	   employment	   keeps	   workers	   in	   a	   situation	   of	   social	   precariousness,	  
makes	   them	   the	   victims	   of	   abuse	   and	   employment	  malpractice,	   and	  makes	   it	   impossible	   for	  
them	  to	  claim	  their	   legitimate	   rights	  as	  workers,	  giving	   rise	   to	   judicial	  discrimination.	  Second,	  
because	  the	  exclusion	  that	  irregular	  employment	  leads	  to	  hinders	  the	  social	  integration	  of	  the	  
immigrants,	  which	  is	  considered	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  safeguard	  social	  peace	  and	  the	  security	  
of	  all	  citizens	  [sic],	  both	  Spaniards	  and	  immigrants.	  Third,	  it	  is	  due	  to	  the	  serious	  malfunctioning	  
provoked	   by	   the	   underground	   economy	   as	   regards	   unfair	   competition	   in	   the	  markets,	  which	  
entails	   the	   loss	   of	   financial	   contributions	   to	   sustain	   the	  burdens	  of	   the	  welfare	   state.	   Finally,	  
regulating	   the	   flow	   of	   immigrants	   is	   considered	   necessary	   in	   order	   to	   make	   the	   necessary	  
provisions	  for	  carrying	  out	  the	  policies	  for	  the	  social	  integration	  of	  immigrants	  (P.26).	  
	  
Using	   these	   arguments,	   officials	   have	   also	   sought	   the	   collaboration	   of	   third	   countries,	  
linking	   the	   labouralization	   of	   migration	   flows	   to	   the	   willingness	   of	   these	   partners	   to	  
control	  irregular	  emigration	  toward	  Spain.	  Indeed,	  since	  2002,	  the	  recruitment	  of	  migrant	  
workers	   has	   been	   reoriented	   to	   favour	   countries	   that	   have	   signed	   comprehensive	  
migration	  agreements	  with	  Spain,	  agreements	  that	  often	  include	  an	  obligation	  to	  control	  
irregular	   migration	   and	   facilitate	   the	   deportation	   of	   their	   nationals	   living	   in	   Spain	  
irregularly.	  	  
The	  Politics	  of	  the	  Carrot:	  Negotiating	  Migration	  Agreements	  
Since	  the	  labouralizing	  logic	  is	  strongly	  informed	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  steer	  migration	  flows	  and	  
relies	   on	   job	   offers	   as	   a	   variable	   that	   can	   be	   mobilized	   to	   order	   migration,	   it	   is	   not	  
surprising	   that	   the	  new	  contingent	  system	  has	   favoured	  countries	  with	  whom	  Spain	  has	  
signed	   comprehensive	   migration	   agreements.	   The	   Plan	   GRECO	   (for	   2000-­‐04)	   already	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contained	  provisions	  for	  the	  negotiation	  of	  such	  agreements,	  and	  these	  policy	  orientations	  
were	  made	  into	  law	  in	  the	  2003	  reform	  of	  the	  Alien	  Act.	  Indeed,	  Article	  39	  relating	  to	  the	  
contingent	  of	   foreign	  workers	   stipulates	   that	   “The	   jobs	  offered	   through	   the	   contingents	  
will	  be	  oriented	  preferably	  to	  countries	  with	  whom	  Spain	  has	  signed	  agreements	  relative	  
to	  the	  regulation	  of	  flows”	  (LOE	  4/2000	  as	  modified	  by	  LOE	  14/2003;	  Art.	  39.6).	  	  
In	  fact,	  during	  the	  two	  years	  between	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  Plan	  GRECO	  and	  the	  LOE	  
14/2003,	  the	  government	  had	  already	  ratified	  four	  such	  agreements	  with	  the	  Dominican	  
Republic,	  Ecuador,	  Colombia,	  and	  Morocco.	  Since	  the	  beginning	  of	  these	  negotiations,	  the	  
objective	  was	   to	   use	   jobs	   as	   a	   bargaining	   chip	   to	   gain	   the	   support	   of	   third	   countries	   in	  
controlling	   irregular	   migration.	   The	   first	   agreement	   was	   signed	   with	   Ecuador	   after	   the	  
death	  of	  twelve	  Ecuadorian	  workers	  in	  an	  accident	  in	  Lorca	  (Murcia),	  as	  a	  way	  to	  calm	  the	  
anger	  of	  the	  Ecuadorian	  government	  and	  Ecuadorians	  living	  in	  Spain,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  strategy	  
to	  reduce	  irregular	  migration.	  As	  Gabriel	  Alou,	  the	  Spanish	  consul	  in	  Ecuador,	  explained	  at	  
the	  time,	  the	  bilateral	  agreement	  was	  put	  forth	  because	  “we	  have	  to	  regulate	  migration	  
flows	  in	  an	  ordered	  manner.	  Spain	  needs	  labour,	  but	  what	  we	  can’t	  do	  is	  open	  the	  doors	  
in	  an	   indiscriminate	  manner	  and	  provoke	  a	  pull	  effect,	  a	   stampede	  of	   illegal	   immigrants	  
that	  arrive	  to	  Spain	  hoping	  to	  be	  regularized”	  (cited	  in	  El	  País,	  see	  Relea	  2001).	  
The	  first	  set	  of	  agreements,	  the	  “agreements	  relative	  to	  the	  regulation	  and	  ordering	  
of	   labour	   migration	   flows,”	   includes	   those	   with	   Colombia	   (2001),	   Ecuador	   (2001),	   the	  
Dominican	   Republic	   (2001),	   and	   Morocco	   (2001).	   Followed	   by	   Peru	   (2004),	   Mauritania	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(2007),	  and	  Ukraine	  (2009).	  At	  the	  time,	  agreements	  were	  also	  signed	  with	  Poland	  (2002),	  
which	  subsequently	  joined	  the	  EU	  in	  2004,	  as	  well	  as	  Romania	  (2002)	  and	  Bulgaria	  (2003),	  
which	  joined	  in	  2007.	  Unless	  prior	  readmission	  agreements	  already	  existed,	  a	  clause	  about	  
this	   obligation	   was	   included.	   After	   2004,	   these	   labour	   migration	   agreements	   were	  
followed	  by	  what	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  “new	  generation	  agreements”	  (acuerdos	  de	  nueva	  
generación),	   at	   a	   time	   when	   the	   Socialist	   Party	   was	   insisting	   on	   its	   new	   labouralizing	  
approach	   to	   migration	   management.	   These	   new	   agreements	   did	   not	   focus	   solely	   on	  
labour	  migration	  flows,	  but	  adopted	  a	  more	  global	  approach,	   linking	  this	  ordering	  to	  the	  
granting	   of	   development	   aid	   to	   fund	   programs	   to	   alleviate	   poverty,	   as	   well	   as	   an	  
obligation	  for	  third	  countries	  to	  tighten	  border	  and	  immigration	  control.	  	  
Ruth	  Ferrero	  Turrión	  and	  Ana	  López	  Sala	   (2009)	   suggest	   that	   the	   turning	  point	   for	  
this	  strategy	  was	  the	  collective	  irregular	  crossing	  of	  hundreds	  of	  migrants	  into	  Ceuta	  and	  
Melilla	   in	   2005,	   and	   the	   “crisis	   de	   los	   cayucos,”	   when	   boats	   started	   arriving	   in	   great	  
numbers	  on	  the	  coasts	  of	  Andalusia	  and	  the	  Canary	  Islands	  in	  2006.	  While	  this	  is	  true	  with	  
respect	  to	  diplomatic	  efforts	  oriented	  toward	  sub-­‐Saharan	  African	  countries,	  Morocco	  had	  
started	   increasing	   its	   collaboration	   as	   early	   as	   2000,	   exercising	   border	   controls	   in	  
exchange	   for	   development	   aid	   and	   a	   substantial	   proportion	   of	   the	  work	   permits	   issued	  
annually	  through	  the	  contingents.	  Indeed,	  after	  the	  Summit	  of	  Tampere	  in	  1999,	  a	  special	  
action	   plan	   for	   Morocco	   was	   devised	   as	   part	   of	   the	   High	   Level	   Working	   Group	   on	  
Migration	  and	  Asylum.	  Half	  of	  the	  measures	  contained	  in	  this	  plan	  were	  aimed	  at	  fighting	  
irregular	  migration.	  Morocco	  was	  also	  an	  early	  beneficiary	  of	  aid	  distributed	  through	  the	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Euro-­‐Mediterranean	   Partnership	   (MEDA	   I	   and	   MEDA	   II	   programs)	   and,	   in	   exchange,	  
adopted	   a	   law	   in	   2003	   that	   criminalized	   irregular	   emigration,	   a	   measure	   contrary	   to	  
international	   law	   (Belguendouz	   2005;	   El	   Qadim	   2010,	   2014;	   Krienbrink	   2007;	   Mekki-­‐
Berrada	  et	  al.	  2013;	  Rodríguez	  Mesa	  2007).	  	  
In	   fact,	   as	   the	   head	   of	   staff	   for	   Consuelo	   Rumí	   explained,	   the	   crisis	   at	   Ceuta	   and	  
Melilla	   and	   at	   sea	   in	   2005-­‐06	   was	   partly	   seen	   as	   the	   result	   of	   this	   new	   strategy	   of	  
externalizing	  border	  control:	  	  	  	  	  
Around	   2005,	   there	   is	   a	   boom	   of	   African	   migration	   in	   Ceuta	   and	   Melilla	   because	   the	   co-­‐
operation	  with	  Morocco	   starts	   to	  work.	  We	  went	   to	  Morocco	   twice,	   in	  April	   [2004]	  with	   the	  
president	  of	  the	  government	  [and	  the	  secretary	  of	  state	  for	  immigration	  and	  emigration]	  who	  
said	  at	  the	  table	  “We	  want	  you	  to	  help	  us	  fight	  irregular	  migration.”	  And	  in	  June	  we	  went	  back,	  
we	  had	  a	  meeting	  and	  set	  the	  bases.	  The	  Moroccans	  feel	  well	  treated	  by	  us	  and	  we	  start	  to	  co-­‐
operate.	  Of	  course,	  from	  the	  Gibraltar	  Strait	  .	  .	  .	  and	  from	  the	  South—those	  were	  the	  two	  main	  
points—as	  they	  started	  to	  control,	  [migrants]	  started	  to	  jump	  the	  fences,	  and	  when	  we	  could,	  
with	  the	  co-­‐operation	  from	  Morocco,	  reduce	  the	  crossing	  of	  the	  fences,	  then	  they	  went	  down	  
to	  Senegal,	  because	  back	  then	  there	  was	  nothing	  with	  Senegal.	  So	  it	  took	  us	  six	  months	  to	  start	  
setting	  the	  co-­‐operation	  until	  they	  stopped	  coming—because	  now	  they	  don’t	  come	  anymore—
but	  this	  temporary	  increase	  was	  the	  bad	  side	  of	  our	  effectiveness.75	  
	  
During	  our	  interview,	  this	  high-­‐level	  official	  insisted	  that	  the	  success	  of	  the	  government’s	  
approach,	  from	  2004	  onward,	  was	  due	  to	  its	  ability	  to	  negotiate	  simultaneously	  on	  issues	  
of	  labour,	  border	  control,	  and	  international	  co-­‐operation.	  While	  he	  was	  trying	  to	  highlight	  
the	   importance	   of	   an	   integrated	   strategy,	   his	   representation	   of	   the	   negotiation	   process	  
clearly	   indicates	   that	   granting	   work	   permits	   was	   also	   a	   trade-­‐off	   in	   a	   carrot-­‐and-­‐stick	  
policy	  aimed	  at	  obtaining	  a	  better	  collaboration	  regarding	  border	  control.	  He	  explained:	  
                                                
75	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  November	  7,	  2012.	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Every	  6	  months	  we	   [from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Labour]	  were	  going	   to	  Morocco	  or	   they	  came	  here,	  
and	  at	  the	  meetings	  there	  were	  always	  the	  secretary	  of	  state	  for	  security	  from	  [the	  Ministry	  of	  
the]	  Interior,	  and	  a	  high-­‐level	  official	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs.	  If	  there	  hadn’t	  been	  
good	   relations	   between	  us	   and	   Interior,	   it	  wouldn’t	   have	  worked.	   But	   the	   two	   secretaries	   of	  
state	   got	   along.	  We	  wouldn’t	   have	   been	   able	   to	   face	   the	   crisis.	   The	  Moroccans	  were	   at	   the	  
same	  table	  with	  all	  the	  interlocutors.	  And	  we	  said:	  “Collaborate	  and	  we	  will	  facilitate	  the	  arrival	  
of	  Moroccan	   immigrants	   to	   the	  whole	   south	   of	   Spain,	   to	   the	   strawberry	   [greenhouses].	   The	  
only	  topic	  on	  which	  we	  couldn’t	  get	  an	  agreement	  was	  the	  issue	  of	  minors,	  because	  they	  had	  a	  
lot	  of	  difficulties.76	  But	  what	   I	  want	  to	  tell	  you	   is	  that	   it	   is	  very	   important	  the	  methodology	  of	  
the	  negotiation.	  We	  didn’t	   go	  each	   separately,	   Interior,	   Foreign	  Affairs,	   Immigration,	  etc.	  No.	  
The	   highest	   officials	   of	  Morocco	   and	   Spain	  would	   get	   together	   and	   on	   the	   Spanish	   side	   you	  
would	   always	   see	   the	   people	   from	   Interior,	   Foreign	   Affairs	   and	   the	   secretary	   of	   state	   for	  
immigration	  .	  .	  .	  And	  like	  this,	  we	  went	  on	  negotiating	  with	  various	  countries	  as	  the	  [migration]	  
pressure	  moved.77	  
	  
The	   first	   step	   taken	   to	   limit	   the	   recruitment	   of	   migrant	   workers	   to	   countries	   that	   had	  
signed	   “agreements	   relative	   to	   the	   regulation	   and	   ordering	   of	   labour	   migration	   flows”	  
(2000-­‐04)	   led	  to	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  “agreements	  of	  co-­‐operation	   in	  matters	  related	  to	  
migration”	   in	   which	   conditional	   development	   and	   co-­‐operation	   aid	  money	   became	   the	  
new	  carrot	  (since	  2004).	  	  
Despite	   the	   insistence	  by	  commentators	  close	   to	   the	  Socialists	   that	   their	  arrival	   to	  
power	   in	   2004	   marked	   a	   shift	   away	   from	   the	   security	   discourse	   championed	   by	   the	  
Popular	  Party	  since	  2000,	  and	  toward	  labouralization,	  these	  two	  logics	  are	  in	  fact	  closely	  
intertwined.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   by	   framing	   irregular	   migrants	   as	   workers	   who	   deserve	  
rights,	  this	  orientation	  certainly	  portrayed	  migrants	  in	  a	  more	  positive	  light	  and	  limited	  the	  
rise	   of	   racism	   fuelled	   by	   the	   populist	   and	   xenophobic	   rhetoric	   of	   the	   Popular	   Party	  
government.	  The	  second	  half	  of	  the	  2000s	  also	  saw	  the	  development	  of	  the	  first	  serious	  
                                                
76	  An	  agreement	  on	  the	  readmission	  by	  Morocco	  of	  minors	   living	   in	  Spain	   irregularly	  was	  finally	  ratified	   in	  
2007	  and	  came	  into	  effect	  in	  2011	  (see	  Chap.	  6).	  
77	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  November	  7,	  2012.	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integration	   programs	   linking	   cultural	   and	   social	   inclusion	   to	   the	   integrating	   role	   of	  
employment.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  since	  deploying	  technologies	   to	  steer	   labour	  migration	  
was	   also	   seen	   as	   a	   strategy	   to	   curb	   irregular	   migration,	   the	   period	   marked	   by	   a	  
labouralization	   of	   immigration	   policies	   was	   also	   a	   period	   of	   a	   heightened	   fight	   against	  
irregular	  migrants.	  While	  labouralizing	  logics	  and	  practices	  may	  appear	  at	  first	  sight	  to	  be	  
at	   odds	   with	   the	   securitizing	   ones,	   they	   are	   in	   fact	   complementary	   and	   coeval.	   When	  
labour	  becomes	  one	  of	  the	  principles	  through	  which	  irregular	  migration	  can	  be	  prevented	  
and	   through	  which	   previously	   unauthorized	  workers	   can	   be	   regularized	   and	   integrated,	  
irregular	  migration	  becomes	   framed	  as	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   labour	  market,	   and	   the	   irregular	  
employment	   of	   immigrant	  workers	   as	   an	   attack	   on	   the	   ability	   of	   authorities	   to	   protect	  
state	  sovereignty.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  on	  securitization,	  the	  third	  and	  final	  set	  
of	   logics	   and	   practices	   at	   play	   during	   this	   period,	   the	   fight	   against	   “illegal”	   and	  
“clandestine”	  migration	  flows,	  also	  included	  the	  ratification	  of	  bilateral	  labour	  agreements	  
as	  leverage	  to	  secure	  better	  collaboration	  from	  third	  countries	  on	  border	  control	  and	  the	  
readmission	   of	   deportees.	   This	   once	   again	   demonstrates	   that	   labouralization	   and	  
securitization	  are	  closely	  intertwined.	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Chapter	  6	  






While	   there	   has	   been	   an	   increase	   and	   intensification	   since	   2000	   of	   border	   control	  
initiatives	  and	  the	  scope	  of	   immigration	  detention	  and	  deportation,	   the	  securitization	  of	  
irregular	  migration	   is	  not	  a	  new	  phenomenon	   in	  Spain.	   Indeed,	  migrants	   trying	   to	  enter	  
the	  country	   irregularly	  or	   residing	   in	  Spain	  without	  authorization	  have	  been	   framed	  and	  
governed	  as	  potential	  threats	  to	  both	  public	  safety	  and	  national	  security	  since	  the	  1980s,	  
as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  early	  debates	  linking	  the	  “illegality”	  of	  irregular	  migrants	  to	  problems	  
of	  public	  order.	  During	  this	  period,	  politicians	  often	  coupled	  irregular	  migration	  and	  crime,	  
referring	  for	  instance	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  “undesirable	  foreigners,	  dedicated	  to	  delinquency	  
and	  more	   precisely	   to	   drugs”	   (III	   –	   161/000070).	   Similarly,	   the	   early	   representations	   of	  
irregular	  migrants	  as	  a	  cause	  of	   insecurity	  and	  the	  association	  of	  “terrorism,	  clandestine	  
immigration,	   and	   .	   .	   .	   drugs”	   (III	   –	   184/013932)	   show	   that	   the	   framing	   of	   irregular	  
migration	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  security	  is	  not	  new.	  More	  recently,	  the	  recriminalization	  of	  street	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vending	  in	  2014—an	  activity	  mainly	  performed	  by	  irregular	  immigrants,	  especially	  in	  times	  
of	  economic	  crisis—is	  a	  good	  reminder	  that	  the	  framing	  of	  irregular	  migrants	  as	  criminals	  
and	  threats	  to	  public	  safety	  continues	  today.	  However,	  the	  heyday	  of	  the	  securitizing	  logic	  
lasted	  from	  1995	  until	  2006,	  a	  period	  that	  roughly	  coincides	  with	  the	  first	  two	  terms	  of	  the	  
Popular	   Party.	   The	   beginning	   of	   this	   decade	   of	   securitization	   was	   also	   marked	   by	   the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  Schengen	  Agreement	  in	  1995,	  garnering	  public	  interest	  during	  the	  
debates	  surrounding	  the	  reform	  and	  counter-­‐reform	  of	  the	  Alien	  Act	  in	  2000	  (LOE	  4/2000	  
and	   8/2000),	   and	   culminating	   with	   the	   crisis	   de	   los	   cayucos	   (boats)	   and	   the	   collective	  
climbing	  of	  the	  border	  fences	  in	  Ceuta	  and	  Melilla	  in	  2005-­‐06.	  
In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   look	   at	  what	   I	   call	   “securitizing	   logics	   and	  practices.”	   This	   notion	  
encompasses	  all	  measures	  governing	   irregular	  migrants	  and	  migration	  flows	  as	  potential	  
threats	   to	   national	   security	   and	   public	   safety.	   Therefore,	   this	   chapter	   also	   includes	  
elements	   that	   typically	   fall	   more	   neatly	   under	   the	   umbrella	   of	   criminalization.	   This	  
inclusion	  is	  not	  uncommon.	  As	  Ana	  Aliverti	  (2013:159,	  n.4)	  explains,	  political	  scientists	  and	  
international	  relations	  scholars	  often	  include	  in	  their	  study	  of	  securitization	  processes	  that	  
sociologists	   and	   criminologists	   tend	   to	   study	   as	   criminalization.	   However,	   the	   two	  
categories	   should	   not	   be	   conflated.	   Traditionally,	   the	   governing	   of	   security	   and	   the	  
governing	   of	   crime	   differ	   in	   their	   targets	   but	   also	   in	   their	   temporality,	   with	   security	  
practices	  oriented	  toward	  pre-­‐emption	  and	  anticipation,	  and	  crime	  control	  focused	  mostly	  
on	  responding	  a	  posteriori	  to	  the	  breaking	  of	  laws.	  But	  the	  temporalities	  and	  technologies	  
involved	   in	  prevention	  and	  punishment	  are	  often	  deployed	  jointly	  (Dubber	  and	  Valverde	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2006).	   Indeed,	   national	   security	   policies	   also	   include	   a	   dimension	   of	   deterrence	   and	  
incapacitation,	  while	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system’s	  reliance	  on	  actuarial	  technologies	  of	  risk	  
management	  has	   increased	   in	  many	   countries	   since	   the	  1980s	   (Feeley	  and	  Simon	  1992;	  
Gilbert	   2009;	   Pratt	   2005;	   O’Malley	   1999).	   Furthermore,	   over	   the	   past	   twenty	   to	   thirty	  
years,	  the	  blurring	  of	  security	  and	  criminality	  issues	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  internal	  and	  external	  
policing	   (Bigo	   2000;	   Pratt	   2005,	   2011;	  Weber	   2013)	   justifies	   that	  we	   look	   at	   crime	   and	  
security	  in	  tandem	  when	  studying	  immigration	  governance.	  Indeed,	  as	  Anna	  Pratt	  (2005)	  
explains	  in	  the	  Canadian	  context:	  
The	  very	  category	  of	  security	  has	  come	  to	  include	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  criminal	  threats	  to	  
the	   population	   that	   are	   judged	   to	   have	   a	   significant	   international	   dimension	   .	   .	   .	   This	   crime-­‐
security	  nexus	  coupled	  with	  distinctly	  neoliberal	  preoccupations	  with	  certain	  kinds	  of	  fraud	  and	  
system	  abuse	  has	  produced	  a	  powerful	  hybrid	  rationale	  for	  the	  policies	  and	  practices	  of	  border	  
control	  and	  immigration	  penality	  (P.2).	  
 
While	   neoliberal	   preoccupations	  with	   fraud	   and	   reliance	   on	   punishment	   in	   immigration	  
governance	   in	   Spain	   are	   less	   important	   than	   in	   many	   Anglo-­‐Saxon	   countries,	   concerns	  
about	   crime	   and	   security	   also	   converge	   to	   inform	   the	   treatment	   of	   irregular	  migration.	  
While	   distinguishing	   between	   the	   two	   categories,	   this	   chapter	   considers	   them	   together	  
under	  the	  broad	  category	  of	  securitization.	  
The	  chapter	  starts	  by	  engaging	  with	  the	  literature	  on	  securitization	  in	  international	  
relations,	  addressing	  some	  of	   its	   limits,	  and	  adapting	  the	  concept	   to	  make	   it	  compatible	  
with	   the	   framework	   that	   informs	   this	   research.	  Decentering	   the	  analysis	   from	   the	  usual	  
discussion	   of	   parliamentary	   debates,	   the	   chapter	   first	   explores	   securitizing	   logics	   and	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practices	   as	   they	   become	   more	   significant	   on	   the	   national	   scene,	   after	   immigration	  
becomes	   a	   political	   issue	   in	   the	   border	   towns	   of	   Ceuta	   and	  Melilla	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1990s.	   I	  
analyze	   this	   first	   period	   of	   securitization	   at	   the	   physical	   land	   borders	   separating	   Spain	  
from	  Morocco,	   the	   European	  Union	   from	  Africa.	   I	   examine	   the	   process	   of	  wall-­‐building	  
between	  1995	  and	  2005,	  when	  an	  immigration	  crisis	  took	  place	  at	  these	  borders,	  followed	  
by	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  peculiar	  type	  of	  border	  fence	  in	  Melilla	  that	  created	  a	  “no-­‐man’s	  
land”	  between	  Morocco	  and	  Spain	  where,	  through	  a	  jurisdictional	  fiction,	  migrants	  can	  be	  
trapped	  between	  national	  territories.	  	  
Moving	  from	  this	  very	  limited	  form	  of	  extra-­‐territorialization	  of	  control,	  I	  inquire	  into	  
the	  institutional	  strategies	  deployed	  to	  intercept	  transiting	  migrants.	  In	  contrast	  with	  the	  
regulatory	   features	   of	   labouralization,	   this	   strategy	   of	   blocking	   all	   irregular	   migration	  
routes	   relies	   upon	   an	   (inevitably	   unsuccessful)	   attempt	   to	   exert	   strict	   control	   over	  who	  
enters	  the	  country,	  a	  project	  defended	  in	  the	  name	  of	  national	  sovereignty.	  I	  then	  move	  
from	  this	  extra-­‐territorialization	  of	  migration	  controls	  to	  look	  at	  an	  increasing	  tendency	  to	  
govern	   irregular	   migration	   using	   instruments	   developed	   to	   combat	   crime.	   The	   chapter	  
ends	  with	  a	  more	  theoretical	  section,	  presenting	  occurrences	  of	  securitization	  as	  attempts	  
to	  assert	  state	  sovereignty	  and	  enact	  a	  fantasy	  of	  control,	  in	  a	  context	  where	  globalization	  
and	  migration	  transform	  people’s	  confidence	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  state	  officials	  to	  perform	  this	  
sovereignty.	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   uninhibited	   violence	   and	   widespread	   violation	   of	   human	  
rights	  and	  legal	  principles	  at	  the	  Spanish-­‐Moroccan	  border	  need	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  this	  
context.	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Processes	  of	  Securitization	  
When	  it	  emerged	  within	  critical	  security	  studies	  in	  the	  1990s,	  the	  concept	  of	  securitization	  
promoted	  a	  constructivist	  conception	  of	  security	  in	  a	  field	  still	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  Cold	  
War	  realism	  (Buzan,	  Wæver,	  De	  Wilde	  1998).	  While	  studies	  of	  securitization	  in	  the	  domain	  
of	  migration	  have	  proliferated	  in	  recent	  years,	  the	  concept	  often	  lacks	  a	  clear	  definition,	  
or	   is	   used	   in	   lieu	   of	   empirical	   analysis	   (Boswell	   2007;	   Bourbeau	   2011).	   In	   this	   section,	   I	  
review	  some	  incarnations	  of	  the	  concept	  to	  address	  important	  lacunae	  and	  to	  articulate	  it	  
within	  the	  broader	  framework	  of	  this	  research.	  
From	  Speech	  Act	  to	  the	  Governmentality	  of	  Unease	  
When	  introduced	  by	  Øle	  Wæver	  in	  the	  1990s,	  securitization	  was	  understood	  as	  a	  speech	  
act	   that,	   when	   performed	   by	   authorized	   individuals	   in	   the	   proper	   context	   and	   for	   a	  
receptive	   audience,	   could	   successfully	   transform	   a	   normal	   social	   issue	   into	   a	   security	  
problem.	  Challenging	  realist	  conceptions	  of	  security,	  Barry	  Buzan,	  Øle	  Wæver,	  and	  Jaap	  De	  
Wilde	  (1998)	  explained:	  
The	  way	  to	  study	  securitization	  is	  to	  study	  discourse	  and	  political	  constellations:	  When	  does	  an	  
argument	  with	  this	  particular	  rhetorical	  and	  semiotic	  structure	  achieve	  sufficient	  effect	  to	  make	  
an	  audience	  tolerate	  violations	  of	  rules	  that	  would	  otherwise	  have	  to	  be	  obeyed?	  If	  by	  means	  of	  
an	  argument	  about	  the	  priority	  and	  urgency	  of	  an	  existential	   threat	   the	  securitizing	  actor	  has	  
managed	  to	  break	  free	  of	  procedures	  or	  rules	  he	  or	  she	  would	  otherwise	  be	  bound	  by,	  we	  are	  
witnessing	  a	  case	  of	  securitization	  (P.25).	  
	  
By	  this	  definition,	  the	  concept	  points	  to	  the	  discursive	  framing	  of	  an	  issue	  as	  an	  existential	  
threat,	  justifying	  exceptional	  measures	  that	  would	  otherwise	  not	  been	  seen	  as	  acceptable	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by	  the	  audience.	  The	  problem	  with	  such	  a	  framework	  is	  that	  it	  tends	  to	  be	  linear,	  always	  
starting	  with	   the	   utterance,	   and	   failing	   to	   consider	   how	   the	   responses	   to	   the	   supposed	  
threat	  also	  play	   into	  the	  securitization	  dynamics.	   It	  also	   locates	  security	  measures	   in	  the	  
realm	   of	   exceptionality,	   understood	   as	   a	   legal	   and	   normative	   space	   outside	   of	   normal	  
politics	  (Huysmans	  2011;	  Moffette	  2012).	  	  
From	  a	  Foucauldian	  perspective,	  Didier	  Bigo	  ([1998]	  2002,	  2005)	  and	  Jef	  Huysmans	  
(2006)	  suggest	   that,	   instead	  of	   looking	   for	  speech	  acts,	   it	   is	  more	  useful	   to	   identify	  how	  
various	   domains	   of	   insecurity	   converge	   on	   particular	   objects	   such	   as	   immigration	   and	  
contribute	  to	  their	  securitization.	  Huysmans	  (2006:150)	  explains:	  
The	   notion	   of	   ‘domains	   of	   insecurity’	   .	   .	   .	   emphasizes	   the	   importance	   of	   looking	   at	   security	  
framing	  as	  a	  multidimensional	  process	  in	  which	  various	  policy	  questions	  are	  knitted	  together	  by	  
means	   of	   security	   technologies,	   skills,	   expert	   knowledge	   and	   discourses.	   Speech	   acts	   of	  
insecurity	   are	   less	   important	   in	   securitization	   than	   various	   social	   and	   political	   processes	   that	  
govern	  migration	  and	  asylum	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  logics	  of	  insecurity	  (i.e.	  security	  rationality).	  	  
	  
Following	  a	  similar	  approach,	  Bigo	  ([1998]	  2002)	  describes	  a	  “governmentality	  of	  unease,”	  
in	  which	  securitization	   is	  conceived	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  converging	  practices	  
and	   knowledges	   that	   contribute	   to	   the	   objectification	   of	   threats	   to	   security,	   broadly	  
defined	  and	  encompassing	  public	  safety,	  economic	  well-­‐being,	  and	  cultural	   identity.	  Bigo	  
([1998]	  2002)	  contends	  that:	  
the	  securitization	  of	  immigration	  then	  emerges	  from	  the	  correlation	  between	  some	  successful	  
speech	   acts	   of	   political	   leaders,	   the	  mobilization	   they	   create	   for	   and	   against	   some	   groups	   of	  
people	   and	   the	   specific	   field	   of	   security	   professionals	   .	   .	   .	   It	   comes	   also	   from	   a	   range	   of	  
administrative	   practices	   such	   as	   population	   profiling,	   risk	   assessment,	   statistical	   calculations,	  
category	  creation,	  proactive	  preparation	  (P.62).	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In	  both	  cases,	  the	  authors	  shift	  the	  analysis	  from	  the	  emission-­‐reception	  model	  suggested	  
by	  Wæver	   (1995)	   to	  a	  more	  Foucauldian	  analysis	  of	  politics	  and	   securitization	   (Foucault	  
[1975]	   1995).	   Adapting	   this	   framework,	   I	   consider	   securitization	   as	   a	   set	   of	   historically	  
specific	   problematizations	   that	   pretend	   to	   define	   and	   act	   upon	   irregular	   migrants	   and	  
migration	   flows	  as	  potential	   threats	   to	  public	  safety	  and	  national	   security.	  Securitization	  
intersects	   with	   culturalization	   and	   labouralization	   in	   the	   multi-­‐scalar	   and	   multi-­‐
dimensional	  governing	  of	  irregular	  migration	  in	  Spain.	  
Mobilizing	   the	   concept	   of	   securitization	   with	   a	   Foucauldian	   analytic	   of	  
governmentality	   also	   allows	   me	   to	   avoid	   the	   claims	   of	   exceptionality	   that	   often	   reify	  
securitization	   processes	   as	   political	   ruptures,	   and	   to	   instead	   consider	   the	   practices	   of	  
securitization	  as	  a	  feature	  of	  everyday	  governance.	  In	  the	  post-­‐September	  11	  context,	  the	  
scholarship	  on	  the	  securitization	  of	  immigration,	  influenced	  strongly	  by	  Giorgio	  Agamben’s	  
([1995]	   1998,	   [2003]	   2005)	   work	   on	   exception,	   tends	   to	   highlight	   the	   exceptionality	   of	  
security	   measures	   (C.A.S.E.	   Collective	   2006;	   Neal	   2010:	   Chap.	   5).78	   But	   the	   political	  
significance	  of	  securitization	  does	  not	  lie	  in	  its	  actual	  exceptional	  character,	  but	  rather	  on	  
the	   ways	   in	   which	   it	   allows	   for	   claims	   to	   exceptionality	   to	   be	   mobilized	   in	   everyday	  
governance.	  It	  is	  thus	  important	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  what	  Huysmans	  (2011:371)	  calls	  “little	  
security	   nothings,”	   but	   also	   to	   how	   claims	   to	   exception	   allow	   certain	   practices	   to	   take	  
place.	  Indeed,	  instead	  of	  insisting	  on	  the	  exceptional	  rupture	  that	  supposedly	  provokes	  a	  
                                                
78	  For	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  reification	  of	  exceptionality	  and	  bare	  life	  in	  Agamben’s	  work,	  see	  Agier	  2008	  (Chap.	  
10),	  Muhle	  2007,	  and	  Rahola	  2007.	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return	  to	  sovereign	  power	  à	   la	  Agamben	  ([1995]	  1998,	  [2003]	  2005),	   it	   is	  more	  useful	  to	  
follow	  Judith	  Butler’s	   (2004:	  Chap.	  3)	  analysis	  of	  sovereignty	  as	  part	  of	  governmentality,	  
and	   study	   police	   officers’	   and	   politicians’	   claims	   to	   exceptionality	   as	   technologies	   of	  
government.	  This	  allows	  us	  to	  study	  how	  the	  suspension	  or	  ignorance	  of	  the	  law	  is	  used	  at	  
the	   individual	   and	   institutional	   levels	   as	   one	   governmental	   tactic	   among	   others.	   Just	   as	  
Foucauldian	   socio-­‐legal	   studies	   allow	   for	   an	   analysis	   of	   discretionary	   decisions	   as	   an	  
integral	  part	  of	  the	  working	  of	  law	  (Pratt	  1999,	  2005;	  Pratt	  and	  Sossin	  2009),	  such	  a	  move	  
opens	  up	  space	  for	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  deployment	  of	  diffused	  and	  mundane	  claims	  of	  
exceptionality	  in	  everyday	  governmental	  practices	  (Rosas	  2006).	  
Securitization	  and	  Racial	  Governance	  
A	   major	   weakness	   of	   the	   scholarship	   on	   securitization	   generated	   in	   the	   field	   of	  
international	   relations,	   including	   even	   those	   works	   specifically	   concerned	   with	   the	  
securitization	  of	  immigration	  or	  anti-­‐terrorism	  measures,	  is	  the	  almost	  systematic	  absence	  
of	   race	   in	   the	   analysis	   (Amin-­‐Khan	   2012;	  Moffette	   and	   Vadasaria	   2014).79	   And	   yet,	   the	  
concept	  of	  securitization,	   in	   its	  speech-­‐act	  and	  Foucauldian	   iterations,	  seems	  to	  demand	  
it.	  Indeed,	  if	  we	  follow	  Thierry	  Balzacq’s	  argument,	  developed	  within	  the	  securitization-­‐as-­‐
speech-­‐act	   approach,	   that	   “securitization	   is	   a	   sustained	   strategic	   practice	   aimed	   at	  
convincing	  a	  target	  audience	  to	  accept,	  based	  on	  what	  it	  knows	  about	  the	  world,	  the	  claim	  
that	  a	  specific	  development	  .	  .	  .	  is	  threatening	  enough	  to	  deserve	  an	  immediate	  policy	  to	  
                                                
79	   Indeed,	   although	   Bigo	   ([1998]	   2002)	   and	  Huysmans	   (2000,	   2006)	   analyze	   the	   framing	   of	  migrants	   as	   a	  
threat	   to	   national	   culture,	   they	   do	   not	   really	   engage	   with	   race.	   For	   some	   theoretical	   discussions	   on	   the	  
concept	  of	  securitization	  that	  seriously	  engage	  with	  race,	  see	  Amin-­‐Khan	  2012	  and	  Ibrahim	  2005.	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alleviate	  it”	  (2005:173;	  my	  emphasis),	  we	  need	  to	  consider	  this	  knowledge	  seriously.	  Here,	  
although	  securitization	  is	  understood	  as	  a	  process	  built	  upon	  already	  established	  grids	  of	  
intelligibility,	  the	  racial	  dimension	  of	  these	  grids	  is	  rarely	  acknowledged.	  The	  failure	  of	  this	  
approach	  to	  consider	  “what	  race	  means	  in	  a	  particular	  discursive	  practice	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  
which	  both	   social	   structures	   and	  everyday	  experiences	   are	   racially	  organized”	   (Omi	   and	  
Winant	  [1986]	  1994:56)	  limits	  its	  usefulness	  in	  providing	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  framing	  
of	  some	  migrants	  as	  threats.	  
Similarly,	   governmentality	   scholars	   working	   on	   security	   encourage	   us	   to	   “see	  
security	   as	   an	   interlocking	   system	   of	   knowledge,	   representations,	   practices,	   and	  
institutional	  forms	  that	  imagine,	  direct,	  and	  act	  upon	  bodies,	  spaces	  and	  flows	  in	  certain	  
ways”	  (Burke	  2002:2);	  that	  is,	  as	  a	  particular	  problematization	  located	  within	  a	  broader	  set	  
of	   power	   relations	   and	   discursive	   formations.	   Accordingly,	   to	   account	   for	   the	  mundane	  
use	  of	  claims	  to	  exceptionality	  as	  a	  political	  technology	  deployed	  within	  liberal	  governance	  
to	   authorize	   the	   use	   of	   violence	   by	   “petty	   sovereigns”	   (Butler	   2004)	   against	   irregular	  
border	   crossers	   in	   a	   defence	   of	   society	   (Foucault	   [1997]	   2003),	   we	   need	   to	   analyze	  
securitization	  as	   taking	  place	  within	   the	   context	  of	  modern	   racial	   governance	   (Goldberg	  
1993,	   2009;	   Moffette	   and	   Vadasaria	   2014).	   Indeed,	   beyond	   the	   scholarship	   on	  
securitization	   theory,	  many	   scholars	  who	   analyze	   security	  measures	   and	  what	   could	   be	  
considered	  processes	  of	  securitization	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  these	  processes	  are	  always	  
deeply	  informed	  by	  race	  (Elbe	  2005;	  Jiwani	  2011;	  Kapoor	  2011;	  Oikawa	  2012;	  Pratt	  2011;	  
Razack	   2007;	   Richter-­‐Montpetit	   2014).	   This	   is	   how	   I	   engage	   with	   securitization	   in	   this	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chapter,	   showing	  how	   the	   first	  bold	  occurrences	   in	  Ceuta	  and	  Melilla	   in	  1995	  and	  1996	  
cannot	  be	  understood	  without	  a	  consideration	  of	  racial	  projects,	  and	  analyzing	  how	  claims	  
to	   exceptionality	   facilitate	   the	   exercise	   of	   violence	   against	   irregular	   migrants	   at	   the	  
border.	  	  
Building	  Walls	  and	  Blocking	  Routes	  
The	  period	  surrounding	  the	  reform	  and	  counter-­‐reform	  of	  the	  Alien	  Act	  in	  2000	  marked	  a	  
shift	   in	   the	  politicization	  of	   immigration	   in	  Spain.	  The	   rhetoric	   centred	  on	   the	  argument	  
that	   progressive	   immigration	   policies	   risked	   creating	   a	   “call-­‐effect”	   that	   would	   lead	   to	  
“hordes	  of	  illegal	  immigrants”	  flooding	  the	  borders.	  While	  the	  legislative	  debates	  focused	  
on	   access	   to	   social	   services	   and	   other	   domestic	   policies,	   the	   objects	   of	   concern	   of	   the	  
securitization	  of	  immigration	  tended	  to	  crystallize	  around	  borders	  and	  questions	  of	  state	  
sovereignty.	  	  
Huysmans	   (2000)	   has	   shown	   that	   the	   securitization	   of	  migration	   in	   the	   European	  
Union	  centres	  on	  three	  categories	  of	  threat:	  physical	  threats	  to	  internal	  security,	  cultural	  
threats	   to	   national	   identity,	   and	   economic	   threats	   to	   the	   welfare	   state	   or	   the	   labour	  
market.	  In	  this	  sense,	  this	  set	  of	  logics	  and	  practices,	  which	  I	  gather	  under	  the	  category	  of	  
securitization,	  is	  intertwined	  with	  the	  ones	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  two	  chapters.	  But	  as	  I	  
explained,	  while	   debates	   about	   the	   hijab	   or	   irregular	  migrants’	   access	   to	   social	   services	  
can	  sometimes	  be	  framed	  using	  the	   language	  of	  threat,	  debates	  about	  culture	  are	  more	  
often	   presented	   and	   governed	   through	   technologies	   and	   discourses	   of	   integration	   and	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preference,	   and	   concerns	   about	   the	   economy	   are	   translated	   into	   programs	   that	   are	  
primarily	  regulatory	  in	  nature.	  Whereas	  the	  project	  of	  labouralizing	  migration	  flows	  is	  the	  
most	   representative	   of	   the	   liberal	   regulatory	   practice	   of	   steering,	   the	   securitization	   of	  
irregular	  migration	   at	   Spain’s	   southern	   borders	   reflects	   a	  will	   to	   reassert	   a	   fading	   state	  
sovereignty	  in	  the	  face	  of	  what	  appear	  to	  be	  ungovernable	  phenomena.	  
The	  Crisis	  of	  El	  Ángulo:	  Ceuta,	  1995	  	  
Not	  surprisingly,	  one	  of	  the	  first	  occurrences	  of	  blunt	  securitization	  related	  to	  immigration	  
in	  Spain	  centered	  on	  the	  crossing	  of	  irregular	  migrants	  into	  the	  Spanish	  enclaves	  of	  Ceuta	  
and	  Melilla	  in	  1995,	  the	  year	  the	  enclaves	  effectively	  became	  part	  of	  the	  Schengen	  zone.	  
When	   hundreds	   of	   migrants	   from	   the	   Maghreb	   and	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   entered	   these	  
Spanish	  enclaves,	  located	  on	  the	  coast	  of	  northern	  Morocco,	  crossing	  what	  had	  become	  a	  
Schengen	   border,	   the	   first	   Spanish	   “border	   crisis”	   occurred.	   Local	   politicians,	   police	  
officers,	   and	   other	   security	   professionals	   panicked	   as	   they	   realized	   that	   they	   were	  
unprepared	  for	  the	  Schengen	  era.	  As	  Wendy	  Brown	  (2010)	  observed	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  
post-­‐Westphalian	  order,	  “This	   landscape	  signifies	  the	  ungovernability	  by	   law	  and	  politics	  
of	  many	  powers	  unleashed	  by	  globalization	  and	  late	  modern	  colonization,	  and	  a	  resort	  to	  
policing	  and	  blockading	  in	  the	  face	  of	  this	  ungovernability”	  (p.24).	  Securitizing	   logics	  and	  
practices	  emerged	  at	  various	  sites	  and	  were	  relayed	  across	  various	  levels	  of	  government,	  
but	   in	   the	   Spanish	   context,	   politicians,	   police	   officers,	   and	   other	   security	   professionals	  
located	   in	   EU	  borderlands	   (Ceuta,	  Melilla,	   Canary	   Islands,	   the	   Strait	   of	  Gibraltar)	   played	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and	  continue	   to	  play	  a	   central	   role	   in	   the	   securitization	  of	   immigration.	   For	   this	   reason,	  
this	  analysis	  begins	  not	  with	  parliamentary	  debates,	  but	  at	  the	  borders	  of	  Ceuta.	  
In	   October	   1995,	   ten	  months	   after	   the	   Convention	   on	   the	   Implementation	   of	   the	  
Schengen	  Agreement	  came	  into	  effect,	  an	  incident	  occurred	  that	  residents	  of	  Ceuta	  called	  
“the	   crisis	   of	  El	  Ángulo.”	   As	   little	   pieces	  of	   Schengenland	   (Walters	   2002)	   on	   the	  African	  
continent,	   Ceuta	   and	   Melilla	   emerged	   as	   desirable	   points	   of	   entry	   for	   migrants	   who	  
wanted	   to	   reach	   Europe.	   The	   first	   transiting	  migrants	   hoping	   to	   cross	   the	   strait	   started	  
arriving	   in	  Ceuta	  and	  Melilla	   in	  1992	  (Gold	  2000;	  Pérez	  González	  2005).	  At	  this	  time,	  the	  
border	  fences	   in	  both	  cities	  were	  mostly	  symbolic:	  some	  signposts	  and	  low,	   intermittent	  
old	  fences	  marked	  the	  separation	  between	  the	  enclaves	  and	  Morocco.80	  	  
Technically,	  the	  Schengen	  border	  is	  located	  south	  of	  Ceuta	  and	  Melilla,	  but	  the	  most	  
effective	   control	   in	   1995	   occurred	   at	   the	   moment	   of	   crossing	   the	   Strait	   of	   Gibraltar.	  
Indeed,	   Ceuta	   and	   Melilla	   benefit	   from	   a	   special	   clause	   in	   the	   Convention	   on	   the	  
Implementation	   of	   the	   Schengen	   Agreement	   that	   allows	   Moroccans	   from	   the	  
neighbouring	   provinces	   of	   Tetouan	   and	   Nador	   to	   enter	   the	   enclaves	   to	   work	   or	   shop	  
without	   a	   Schengen	   visa,	   as	   long	   as	   they	   do	   not	   cross	   the	   strait.81	   For	   this	   reason,	  
systematic	   identity	   checks	   occur	   at	   the	   ferry	   terminal	   heading	   to	   mainland	   Spain.	  
Therefore,	  as	   it	  was	  easier	   in	  1995	  to	  sneak	   into	  the	  city	   than	  to	  continue	  onward	  or	   to	  
obtain	  refugee	  status,	  the	  population	  of	  transiting,	  irregular	  migrants	  started	  to	  grow,	  and	  
                                                
80	  Despite	  border	  infrastructure	  being	  slowly	  built	  since	  1992	  (see	  V	  –	  184/008927).	  81	  See Agreement on the Adhesion of the Kingdom of Spain to the Convention on the Application of the 
Schengen Agreement; Final Act, Declaration III-1.	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ended	  up	   stuck	   in	  border	   cities	   located,	   for	   all	   intents	   and	  purposes,	  between	  Morocco	  
and	  the	  European	  Union.	  According	  to	  the	  local	  government	  in	  Ceuta,	  in	  September	  1995	  
around	  300	  migrants	  were	  living	  in	  the	  streets	  near	  the	  old	  walls	  of	  the	  city	  at	  El	  Ángulo	  
(the	  corner),	  a	  few	  hundred	  metres	  from	  downtown	  Ceuta	  (Aznar	  1995a).	  	  
On	  October	   2,	   a	   group	   of	  more	   than	   70	   Kurdish	   asylum	   seekers	   started	   a	   hunger	  
strike	   in	  front	  of	  the	  Delegation	  of	  the	  Central	  Government	  (Delegación	  del	  Gobierno)	   in	  
Ceuta	  to	  give	  weight	  to	  their	  demand	  for	  regularization	  and	  transfer	  to	  continental	  Spain.	  
The	   city	   government	   also	   became	   impatient	   and	   requested	   that	  Madrid	   find	   a	   solution	  
that	  would	   (1)	   force	  the	  migrants	  and	  asylum	  seekers	   to	   leave	  the	  city;	   (2)	  prevent	  new	  
ones	   from	   crossing	   the	   border;	   and	   (3)	   deploy	   the	   military	   to	   control	   the	   border	   if	  
necessary	   (El	   Faro	  de	  Ceuta	   1995a).	   The	   same	  week,	   the	  Kurds	  were	  arrested	  and	   later	  
transferred	   to	  Malaga,	   in	   continental	   Spain,	   to	  be	  deported.	   In	   the	   following	  days,	   local	  
journalists	  from	  Ceuta	  depicted	  these	  migrants	  as	  liars	  and	  stated	  that	  some	  of	  them	  had	  
been	   previously	   deported	   from	   Germany	   for	   “antisocial	   conduct	   and	   offences”	   (Aznar	  
1995b:6).	   Journalists	   also	   published	   articles,	   based	   on	   local	   police	   statements,	   about	  
Moroccan	   migrants	   being	   arrested	   without	   proper	   documentation	   and	   detained	   for	  
begging,	   digging	   through	   trash	   containers,	   stealing	   money	   from	   a	   car,	   and	   driving	   a	  
motorcycle	  without	  a	  license,	  before	  being	  deported	  to	  Morocco	  (El	  Faro	  de	  Ceuta	  1995b;	  
Peña	  1995).	  Similarly,	  the	  local	  congressman	  for	  Ceuta,	  Sergio	  Gómez-­‐Alba	  Ruiz,	  insisted	  in	  
Congress	  on	  the	  rise	  of	  delinquency	  in	  Ceuta,	  linking	  it	  directly	  to	  the	  increased	  presence	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of	  “illegal	  immigrants,”	  despite	  police	  records	  showing	  no	  significant	  increase	  in	  reported	  
crime	  in	  the	  1984-­‐94	  period	  (V	  –	  184/010029).	  
On	   the	   day	   the	   Kurds	   were	   transferred	   to	   continental	   Spain	   to	   be	   deported,	   a	  
rumour	  spread	  among	  sub-­‐Saharan	  African	  migrants.	  They	  thought	  that	  the	  Kurds’	  cases	  
were	  being	  processed	  and	  that	  they	  were	  finally	  accessing	  Europe.	  Angry	  about	  having	  to	  
stay	  behind,	  and	  not	  knowing	  that	  the	  Kurds	  were	  being	  deported,	  many	  African	  migrants	  
started	  to	  riot.	  At	  least,	  this	  is	  how	  Ceutíes	  with	  whom	  I	  spoke,	  and	  the	  local	  media,	  recall	  
the	  events.	  As	  a	  large	  segment	  of	  the	  police	  force	  was	  out	  of	  the	  city,	  busy	  deporting	  the	  
Kurds,	  many	  Ceutíes	   took	   it	  upon	  themselves	   to	  “defend	  the	  city.”	  The	  riot	   lasted	  many	  
hours	  until	  every	  migrant	  had	  been	  arrested.	  Some	  were	  freed	  the	  same	  day,	  when	  police	  
became	  certain	  they	  had	  not	  taken	  part	  in	  the	  riot;	  some	  were	  detained	  and	  later	  charged;	  
and	  others	  were	  detained	  without	  charge.82	  	  
This	   event	  marked	  a	   turning	  point	   in	   the	  way	  Ceutíes	   considered	   the	   “problem	  of	  
immigration.”	   Migration	   had	   already	   started	   to	   be	   framed	   as	   a	   security	   issue	   by	   local	  
politicians	   and	   journalists	   in	   the	   months	   prior	   to	   El	   Ángulo	   but	   the	   first	   calls	   for	  
exceptional	  measures	  emerged	  in	  1995.	  In	  the	  weeks	  following	  this	  crisis,	  the	  migrants	  of	  
El	   Ángulo	   and	   all	   non-­‐European	   migrants	   were	   regularly	   depicted	   in	   the	   media	   as	  
unworthy	  of	  the	  “generous	  hospitality”	  of	  the	  people	  of	  Ceuta;	  “They	  are	  nationals	  of	  war-­‐
torn	   countries	   and	   they	   carry	   this	   reality	   along	   with	   them,	   even	   if	   most	   of	   them	   are	  
                                                
82	  The	  reconstitution	  of	  these	  events	  is	  based	  on	  articles	  published	  in	  the	  local	  newspaper	  El	  Faro	  de	  Ceuta	  
on	  October	  12	  and	  13,	  1995	  as	  well	  as	  on	  information	  gathered	  during	  fieldwork	  conducted	  in	  Ceuta	  in	  2008.	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generally	   peaceful,”	   a	   person	   told	   me	   during	   fieldwork.	   This	   image	   of	   refugees	  
contaminated	   by	   the	   violence	   of	   war,	   which	   builds	   upon	   racist	   characterizations	   of	  
uncivilized	  Africans	  (Agier	  2002),	  thrived	  in	  the	  weeks	  following	  the	  event.	  
On	  October	  13,	  1995,	  a	  well-­‐known	  cartoonist	  at	  the	  least	  sensationalist	  of	  the	  two	  
local	   daily	   papers,	   El	   Faro	   de	   Ceuta,	   drew	   a	   full-­‐page	   storyboard	   depicting	   the	   riot.	   He	  
represented	   the	  migrants	   as	  mad	   individuals	   (with	   big	   noses,	   thick	   lips,	   and	   protruding	  
eyes)	  screaming	   in	   front	  of	   the	  Delegation	  of	   the	  Central	  Government	  building	   in	  Ceuta:	  
“We	   not	   care	   die,	   not	   have	   nothing	   to	   lose!	  We	   fed	   up.	   Entire	   world	   will	   know!”	   and	  
starting	   to	   throw	   rocks	   (Álvarez	  Martínez	   1995).	   On	   the	   previous	   day,	   he	   had	   drawn	   a	  
character	  who	   demanded:	   “Solution	   now!!	  Not	   even	   one	   illegal	   in	  our	   city!”	   This	   visual	  
representation	   of	   African	   irregular	   migrants	   as	   dangerous	   relied	   heavily	   on	   colonial	  
iconography	   of	   violent,	   irrational,	   and	  monstrous	   characters,	   a	   symbolic	   repertoire	   that	  
also	  appeared	  in	  political	  speeches.	  This	  illustration	  bluntly	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  framing	  
of	  migrants	  as	  threats	  is	  informed	  by	  broader	  processes	  of	  othering	  that	  rely	  on	  race	  as	  a	  
grid	  of	  intelligibility	  central	  to	  colonial	  and	  post-­‐colonial	  modernity	  (Moffette	  2010,	  2013).	  
All	  local	  political	  parties	  called	  for	  two	  measures	  to	  protect	  citizens:	  the	  expulsion	  of	  
the	   migrants	   from	   the	   city	   (either	   by	   transferring	   them	   to	   continental	   Spain	   or	   by	  
deporting	  them),	  and	  the	  sealing	  of	  the	  border	  to	  prevent	  new	  migrants	  from	  entering	  the	  
city.	   In	   an	   “extraordinary	   and	   urgent”	   assembly	   of	   the	   local	   government	   days	   after	   the	  
events,	   political	   parties	   unanimously	   adopted	   a	   motion	   demanding	   that	   the	   central	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Spanish	   government	   (responsible	   for	   border	   and	   immigration	   issues)	   act	   to	   protect	  
Ceuta’s	   residents.83	   The	  mayor	   even	   issued	   an	   ultimatum	   to	   the	   central	   government	   in	  
Madrid,	  threatening	  to	  use	  illegal	  procedures	  to	  personally	  transfer	  migrants	  to	  mainland	  
Spain	   “in	   the	   eventuality	   that	   [the	   government]	   does	   not	   expel	   the	   migrants	   and	  
guarantee	  the	  safety	  of	  Ceutíes”	  (cited	  in	  El	  Faro	  de	  Ceuta,	  see	  De	  Juan	  1995).	  Eventually,	  
most	   migrants	   who	   were	   transferred	   to	   the	   Spanish	   peninsula	   either	   ended	   up	   in	  
immigration	  detention	  centres	  or	  were	  deported.	  Other	  migrants	  who	  did	  not	   face	   legal	  
charges	   after	   the	   riot	   were	   transferred	   to	   Calamocarro,	   an	   open	   space	   outside	   Ceuta,	  
where	  the	  Red	  Cross	  and	  other	  NGOs	  attended	  to	  their	  basic	  needs.	  	  
While	  Ceutíes	  did	  not	  succeed	  in	  expelling	  the	  migrants,	  they	  did,	  however,	  secure	  
tighter	  control	  of	  the	  borders.	  In	  the	  days	  following	  the	  events,	  some	  110	  members	  of	  the	  
Guardia	  Civil	  and	  a	  helicopter	  were	  sent	  to	  patrol	  the	  border,	  while	  soldiers	  installed	  a	  1.8	  
metre	   high	   fence	   composed	   of	   three	   spirals	   of	   barbwire.	   This	   was	   announced	   as	   a	  
temporary	  measure	  to	  stop	  migrants	   from	  entering	  pending	  the	  completion	  of	  a	  project	  
aimed	   at	   definitively	   sealing	   the	   8.3	   kilometre	   border.	   Between	   1995	   and	   1999,	   the	  
government	   built	   a	   border	   patrol	   route	   lined	  by	   two	  2.5	  metre	   fences.	   It	  was	   not	   even	  
completed	  when	  a	  new	  project	  began	   in	   1999	   to	  build	   two	  more	  3.1	  metre	   fences	   and	  
seventeen	   watch	   towers,	   complete	   with	   spotlights	   and	   cameras,	   to	   better	   control	   the	  
border.84	   The	   delegate	   of	   the	   central	   government	   in	   Ceuta	   presented	   this	   project	   as	   an	  
                                                83	  See	  Actas	  de	  la	  sesión	  pública	  extraodinaria	  y	  urgente,	  celebrada	  en	  primer	  convocatoria	  por	  la	  Asemblea	  
de	  la	  Ciudad	  de	  Ceuta	  el	  día	  diecisiete	  de	  octubre	  de	  mil	  novecientos	  noventa	  y	  cinco	  (October	  17,	  1995).	  
84	  Interview,	  Ceuta,	  July	  16,	  2008.	  See	  also	  articles	  by	  Cué	  (1999)	  and	  González	  (1999)	  in	  El	  País.	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attempt	  at	  building	  a	  border	  wall	  like	  the	  one	  in	  Hong	  Kong,	  “one	  of	  the	  hardest	  borders	  
that	   ever	   existed	   and	   that	   nobody	   could	   pass”	   (cited	   in	   El	   Faro	   de	   Ceuta,	   see	   Echarri	  
1999:6).	  
Indeed,	   officials	   called	   for	   the	   “sealing”	   (impermeabilización)	   of	   the	   border	  
(Moffette	  2010).	  The	  first	  stages	  of	  the	  “sealing”	  of	  the	  border	  were	  thus	  clearly	  related	  to	  
this	  first	  migration	  crisis	  and	  the	  subsequent	  local	  securitization	  of	  migration.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  
say	   that	   these	   measures	   were	   undertaken	   solely	   as	   a	   result	   of	   a	   local	   process	   of	  
securitization.	   As	   Huysmans	   (2006)	   and	   Bigo	   ([1998]	   2002,	   2005)	   have	   shown,	  
securitization	   is	   not	   a	   linear	   process	   and	   there	   are	   always	   a	   multitude	   of	   actors	   and	  
institutions	   involved	   in	   it.	   This	   local	   problematization	   of	   migrants	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   public	  
safety,	   and	   the	   corollary	  demand	   for	  developing	   a	  more	  effective	  border	  dispositif	   took	  
place	  within	  a	  wider	  Spanish	  and	  European	  context.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  local	  dynamics	  of	  El	  
Ángulo	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  enhancement	  of	  border	  controls	  shortly	  after	  the	  
implementation	  of	   the	  Schengen	  Agreement.	   In	   fact,	   the	  Fifth	   Legislature	  ended	   shortly	  
thereafter,	  and	  all	  initiatives	  related	  to	  Ceuta	  that	  had	  been	  submitted	  to	  Congress	  were	  
made	   void,	   and	   no	   further	   debate	   took	   place	   that	   year.	   It	   was	   only	   when	   the	   newly	  
elected	  minister	  of	   the	   interior	  authorized	   the	  deportation	  of	  103	  migrants	   from	  Melilla	  
the	   following	  year	   that	   the	   securitizing	   logic	  became	  a	  central	   feature	  of	   the	   framing	  of	  
irregular	  migration	  in	  the	  capital.	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The	  Southern	  Borders	  as	  a	  National	  Problem:	  Melilla,	  1996	  	  
Despite	  pressures	  on	  Spain	  from	  the	  EU	  to	  increase	  control	  of	  its	  southern	  borders,	  it	  was	  
not	  until	  the	  local	  securitization	  of	  immigration	  in	  Ceuta	  and	  Melilla	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  that	  
border	   control	   became	   a	   highly	   debated	   topic	   among	   officials	   in	   Madrid.	   While	   it	   is	  
obvious	   that	  much	   of	   the	   immigration	   control	   agenda	   was	   developed	   at	   the	   European	  
level,	  the	  shift	   in	  policy	  also	  owes	  much	  to	  the	   local	  political	  dynamics	  at	  the	  borders.	  A	  
situation	   similar	   to	   that	   of	   El	   Ángulo	   occurred	   the	   summer	   of	   1996,	   when	   a	   group	   of	  
around	  40	  sub-­‐Saharan	  African	  migrants	  stranded	  in	  Melilla	  marched	  to	  the	  Delegation	  of	  
the	  Central	  Government,	  carrying	  sticks	  and	  rocks,	  to	  demand	  a	  solution	  to	  their	  situation.	  
The	   government’s	   response	  was	   bold,	   deploying	  military	   airplanes	   to	   carry	  members	   of	  
security	   forces	   to	   the	   city,	   swiftly	   transferring	   103	   irregular	   migrants	   to	   the	   detention	  
centre	   in	  Malaga,	   and	   deporting	   the	  migrants	   to	   various	   African	   countries.	  When	   NGO	  
workers,	   lawyers,	   and	   journalists	   revealed	   that	   many	   of	   the	   migrants	   had	   been	  
misidentified	   and	   quickly	   deported	   to	   third	   countries,	   and	   that	   drugs	   were	   used	   to	  
tranquilize	  many	  of	  them,	  the	   incident	  became	  an	   issue	  of	  national	   interest.	  Responding	  
to	   the	   critiques,	   the	   newly	   elected	   Spanish	   president,	   José	   María	   Aznar,	   infamously	  
answered:	  “There	  was	  a	  problem	  and	  we	  solved	  it!”	  (VI	  –	  214/000018)	  
In	  two	  appearances	  before	  the	  Justice	  and	  Interior	  Commission	  of	  the	  Congress	  (VI	  –	  
214/000018	   and	   213/000315),	  Minister	   of	   the	   Interior	   Jaime	  Mayor	  Orteja	   summarized	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the	   incident	   and	   general	   “problem”	   following	   a	   clear	   securitizing	   logic.85	   The	   minister	  
acknowledged	  that	  tranquilizers	  were	  used	  and	  that	  migrants	  were	  deported	  to	  the	  wrong	  
places,	  but	  justified	  these	  actions	  as	  absolutely	  legal	  and	  necessary	  due	  to	  the	  “singular”	  
situation	  of	  Melilla,	  the	  “menacing”	  and	  “violent”	  character	  of	  these	  migrants,	  as	  well	  as	  
their	  “illegality.”	   In	  his	  discourse,	  we	  see	  clearly	  that	   irregular	  migrants	  are	  considered	  a	  
threat	  to	  the	  safety	  of	  other	  residents	  and	  to	  public	  order.	  But	  there	  is	  a	  second	  element	  
to	  the	  securitizing	  discourse	  related	  to	  the	  threat	  to	  national	  security	  that	  these	  migrants	  
represent,	  which	   is	   precisely	   because	   the	   tensions	  occurred	   in	  Melilla.	   The	  border,	   as	   a	  
site	   of	   danger	   (Haddad	   2007),	   provides	   a	   fertile	   ground	   for	   the	   reframing	   of	   public	  
disorder	  and	  petty	  criminality	  as	  problems	  of	  national	  security	  (Pratt	  2005,	  2011).	  Indeed,	  
the	  minister	  starts	  by	  explaining	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  put	  everything	  in	  context:	  	  
Remember	  that	  a	  set	  of	  circumstances	  converge	  in	  Melilla,	  that	  without	  a	  doubt	  .	  .	   .	  denote	  a	  
situation	  of	  a	  singular	  character,	  not	  only	  because	  Melilla	  constitutes	  a	  singular	  enclave	  but	  also	  
because	  we	  are	  in	  a	  singular	  year,	  a	  singular	  anniversary,	  and	  for	  this	  reason,	  aside	  from	  all	  the	  
considerations	  that	  we	  may	  want	  to	  make	  about	   immigration	  policy,	  what	   is	  obvious	   is	  that	  a	  
series	  of	  circumstances	  that	  concur	  in	  this	  city	  results	  in	  situations	  of	  public	  disorder	  .	  .	  .	  having	  
a	  special	  gravity.	  (VI	  –	  214/000018)	  
	  
The	  minister	  was	   likely	  referring	  to	  the	  500th	  anniversary	  of	  the	   incorporation	  of	  Melilla	  
under	  the	  Spanish	  Crown	  in	  1556,	  an	  anniversary	  that	  is	  contentious	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
Moroccan	  claim	  of	  sovereignty	  over	  Ceuta	  and	  Melilla.	  Indeed,	  1996	  also	  marked	  40	  years	  
of	  Moroccan	  independence	  from	  the	  French	  and	  Spanish	  protectorates,	  and	  thus	  40	  years	  
                                                
85	  Using	  a	  critical	  discourse	  analysis	  methodology,	  Luisa	  Martín	  Rojo	  and	  Teun	  A.	  van	  Dijk	  (1997)	  developed	  
an	   extensive	   and	   detailed	   account	   of	   the	   legitimation	   process	   mobilized	   during	   the	   first	   of	   these	  
interventions.	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of	   the	   Alaouite	   king	   claiming	   sovereignty	   over	   the	   cities	   that	  Moroccan	   authorities	   call	  
“occupied	  military	  strongholds”	  (présides	  occupés).	  Like	  anything	  that	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  
provoke	   tensions	   in	   the	   precarious	   social	   ordering	   in	   Ceuta	   and	   Melilla,	   the	   crisis	  
associated	  with	  the	  presence	  of	  irregular	  migrants	  was	  considered	  a	  question	  of	  national	  
security.86	  
To	  address	   this	   issue,	   the	  National	  Police	  put	   forth	   the	  same	  two	  sets	  of	  practices	  
employed	  in	  1995:	  deporting	  migrants	  as	  soon	  as	  possible	  and	  sealing	  the	  border.	  In	  this	  
case,	   however,	   officials	   in	   the	   Ministry	   of	   the	   Interior	   took	   the	   lead	   in	   defending	   the	  
necessity	   of	   these	   practices.	   In	   an	   operation	   characterized	   by	   its	   urgency	   and	   lack	   of	  
concern	   for	   due	   process,	   police	   and	  military	   officials	   sent	   an	   airplane	   to	  Guinea-­‐Bissau,	  
deporting	  nineteen	  passengers	  who	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  Nigerians.	  In	  the	  first	  of	  two	  military	  
aircrafts	  heading	  to	  Senegal,	   there	  were	  five	  Senegalese,	   four	  Liberians,	   three	  Nigerians,	  
one	  Malian,	  and	  one	  person	  from	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	  on	  board.	  In	  the	  second	  one,	  there	  were	  
fifteen	  migrants	  from	  Zaire,	  three	  from	  Ivory	  Coast,	  and	  one	  from	  Morocco,	  who	  were	  all	  
deported	  to	  Senegal	  because,	  according	  to	  the	  minister,	  “It’s	  a	  francophone	  country	  [like	  
these	  migrants’	  home	  countries,	  and]	  because	  without	  a	  doubt	  it	   is	  the	  country	  that	  has	  
the	  highest	   level	  of	  welfare	  and	  democracy	   in	   the	  region,	  and	  provides	  us	  with	  the	  best	  
democratic	   guarantees”	   (VI	   –	   214/000018,	   p.	   849-­‐850).	   A	   fourth	   airplane	   that	   went	   to	  
Mali	  actually	  transported	  nineteen	  Malians.	  And,	  finally,	  a	  fifth	  military	  airplane	  stopped	  
                                                
86	  For	  an	  example	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  status	  of	  Ceuta	  and	  Melilla	  is	  sometimes	  framed	  as	  a	  question	  of	  
national	   security,	   see	  García	   Flórez	   1999;	   for	   a	  more	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   the	   relationships	   between	   local	  
social	  orderings	  and	  securitization	  of	  immigration,	  see	  Moffette	  2013.	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in	  Cameroon	  to	  drop	  off	  ten	  Cameroonians,	  continuing	  on	  to	  Guinea-­‐Bissau,	  where	  it	  left	  
twelve	  people	  from	  Cameroon,	  six	  from	  Guinea-­‐Conakry,	  two	  from	  Rwanda,	  one	  from	  the	  
Central	  African	  Republic,	  and	  one	  from	  Togo	  (VI	  –	  214/000018).	  	  
The	  minister	  explained	  this	  confusion	  by	  citing	  the	  necessity	  to	  act	  promptly	  and	  the	  
difficulty	  in	  distinguishing	  among	  sub-­‐Saharan	  African	  migrants.	  The	  argument	  that	  it	  was	  
logical	   to	   send	   non-­‐Senegalese	   Africans	   from	   other	   francophone	   countries	   to	   Senegal	  
simply	   because	   it	   is	   a	   safer	   country	   suggests	   that	   the	   citizenship	   status	   of	   these	  
individuals,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  their	  quality	  as	  political	  and	  legal	  subjects,	  mattered	  very	  little	  in	  
the	   decision	   to	   deport	   them.	   They	   became	   African	   bodies	   having	   to	   return	   to	   African	  
countries,	  and	  their	  differing	  nationalities	  were	  an	  obstacle	  to	  their	  swift	  expulsion.	  This	  
logic	   also	   reveals	   early	   traces	   of	   the	   notion	   of	   “burden-­‐sharing,”	   the	   idea	   that	   African	  
states	  should	  be	  made	  responsible	  for	  migrants	  and	  refugees	  from	  neighbouring	  countries	  
and	  should	  collaborate	  in	  their	  repatriation.	  
The	  other	  dimension	  of	  this	  process	  was	  the	  strengthening	  of	  the	  physical	  fence.	  The	  
Ministry	  of	  Defence	  deployed	  soldiers	  to	  both	  Ceuta	  and	  Melilla	  to	  help	  guard	  the	  borders	  
until	  both	  fences	  were	  completed	  (VI	  -­‐	  213/000380).	  The	  construction	  in	  1998	  of	  a	  set	  of	  
double	   fences,	   three	   to	   four	  metres	   high,	   complete	  with	   a	   set	   of	   cameras	   and	   acoustic	  
sensors,	  as	  well	  as	  watchtowers,	  appeared	  to	  be	  too	  big	  an	  obstacle	  for	  irregular	  migrants,	  
who	   changed	   their	   routes	   around	   that	   time	   (Fernández	   Fuertes	   1998).	   After	   2005,	   the	  
border	  apparatus	  was	  extended	  to	  stop	  migrants	  before	  they	  reached	  Melilla,	  and	  it	  now	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includes	  a	  sort	  of	  spiderweb,	  in	  which	  migrants	  get	  stuck	  before	  reaching	  the	  main	  fence,	  
and	  from	  which	  they	  are	  sent	  back	  before	  they	  officially	  enter	  the	  country.	   It	   is	   the	  first	  
step	  of	  extra-­‐territorialization,	  a	  measure	  that	  allows	  for	  the	  interception	  of	  migrants	  only	  
a	  few	  metres	  away	  from	  Spanish	  territory,	  but	  within	  the	  Spanish	  border.87	  	  
Around	   the	   same	   time,	   members	   of	   the	   Guardia	   Civil	   and	   the	   Maritime	   Rescue	  
teams	  worked	  on	   the	   installation	  of	   a	   complex	   system	  of	   radars	   and	   cameras	   to	  detect	  
pateras,	  the	  small	  boats	  that	  migrants	  used	  to	  cross	  the	  strait.	  The	  implementation	  of	  this	  
Integrated	   System	   of	   External	   Surveillance	   (Sistema	   Integrado	   de	   Vigilancia	   Exterior—
SIVE)	  started	  in	  1998,	  with	  the	  first	  command	  centres	  active	  in	  2002	  (Guardia	  Civil	  2003).	  
By	  2010,	  most	  of	  the	  Spanish	  coastline	  was	  covered.	  As	  a	  high-­‐level	  official	  at	  the	  Ministry	  
of	  the	  Interior	  explained:	  
The	  SIVE	   is	   an	   instrument	  whose	  objective	   is	   the	   control	  of	   the	  maritime	  border,	   it	   is	   not	   an	  
instrument	   primarily	   destined	   for	   the	   control	   of	   irregular	   migration	   .	   .	   .	   because	   it	   cannot	  
actually	   prevent	   it	   .	   .	   .	   What	   it	   can	   do	   is	   anticipate	   the	   arrival	   of	   an	   embarkation	   that,	   for	  
instance,	  can	  be	  carrying	  drugs,	  can	  be	  in	  danger,	  and	  provide	  the	  means	  to	  react	  and	  intercept	  
this	  embarkation,	  or	  to	  detain	  the	  people	  who	  are	  committing	  a	  crime	  .	  .	  .	  What	  happens	  is	  that	  
by	  establishing	  a	  system	  for	  controlling	  arrivals,	  it’s	  dissuasive	  .	  .	  .	  I	  put	  a	  case	  to	  you:	  a	  patera	  
that	  gets	  to	  the	  coast,	  without	  the	  SIVE,	  in	  many	  cases	  it	  could	  arrive	  without	  being	  detected,	  
disembark	  the	  immigrants,	  and	  the	  owner	  leaves.	  But	  now,	  if	  this	  type	  of	  patera	  arrives,	  it	  will	  
be	   identified,	   it	   will	   be	   detected,	   the	   immigrants	   will	   be	   intercepted,	   the	   owner	   will	   be	  
detained,	   and	   the	   sentences	   in	   the	   Spanish	   Penal	   Code	   for	   someone	   who	   promotes	   human	  
trafficking,	  like	  potentially	  the	  boat	  owner,	  are	  very	  high.	  This	  has	  had	  a	  tremendous	  dissuasive	  
effect	   for	   the	   [trafficking]	  networks	  because	   it’s	  harder	   to	   find	  a	  boat	  owner	   [willing	   to	   carry	  
migrants].	  But	  it	  intercepts	  irregular	  immigrants	  only	  once	  they	  reach	  the	  Spanish	  coasts	  .	  .	  .88	  
	  
                                                
87	  Visual	  representations	  of	  the	  Ceuta	  and	  Melilla	  border	  apparatus	  in	  2005	  can	  be	  viewed	  on	  the	  website	  of	  
El	   País	   (http://elpais.com/elpais/2005/09/29/media/1127991434_720215.html).	   The	   2014	   version	   of	   the	  
Melilla	  border	  apparatus,	  with	  the	  barbwire,	  moving	  sections,	  spiderweb	  cables,	  tear	  gas,	  and	  surveillance	  
technologies	  can	  be	  viewed	  on	  the	  website	  of	  El	  Diario	  (www.eldiario.es/desalambre/valla_de_melilla/).	  	  
88	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  October	  4,	  2012.	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The	  strengthening	  of	  the	  southern	  borders	  has	  continued	  apace	  to	  this	  day.	  With	  the	  
first	  attempts	  at	  “sealing”	  the	  Ceuta	  and	  Melilla	  borders	  (1995-­‐2000)	  and	  the	  deployment	  
of	  the	  SIVE	  in	  the	  Strait	  of	  Gibraltar	  (2002),	  irregular	  migrants	  had	  to	  find	  other	  routes.	  For	  
those	  attempting	  to	  reach	  Spain,	  this	  led	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  arrivals	  by	  boat	  to	  the	  Canary	  
Islands.	   Indeed,	   irregular	   migration	   routes	   moved	   south	   and	   became	   ever	   more	  
dangerous,	   with	   migrants	   leaving	   the	   coast	   of	   Morocco,	   Mauritania,	   and	   eventually	  
Senegal,	  to	  reach	  the	  Canary	  Islands	  in	  the	  Atlantic	  (Carling	  2007).	  The	  SIVE	  was	  eventually	  
extended	  to	  the	  Canaries	  and,	  by	  the	  mid-­‐2000s,	  Spain’s	  control	  over	  its	  own	  jurisdiction	  
had	  become	  quite	  extensive.	  But	  as	   the	  high-­‐level	  official	  at	   the	  Ministry	  of	   the	   Interior	  
explained,	   beyond	   their	   dissuasive	   effect,	   these	   measures	   did	   not	   prevent	   irregular	  
migration;	  they	  only	  intercepted	  migrants	  once	  they	  entered	  Spanish	  territory	  or	  reached	  
its	  physical	  borders.	  They	  did	  not	  prevent	  migrants	   from	  attempting	   to	  reach	  Ceuta	  and	  
Melilla	   or	   risking	   their	   lives	   on	   boats	   headed	   to	   the	   Spanish	   territory.	   Spain	   and	   the	  
European	   Union	   then	   furthered	   their	   policy	   of	   externalizing	   the	   policing	   of	   irregular	  
migration	  to	  the	  countries	  of	  transit	  and	  of	  origin	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  prevent	  migrants	  from	  
ever	  reaching	  their	  borders.	  
Plan	  Africa	  and	  Bilateral	  Agreements	  on	  Migration	  Control	  
Spanish	  diplomatic	  efforts	  started	  with	  Morocco	  and	  were	  soon	  extended	  to	  many	  other	  
countries.	   The	   number	   of	   bilateral	   state	   agreements,	   memoranda	   of	   understanding,	  
technical	  police	  co-­‐operation	  agreements,	  and	  operations	  secured	  by	  Spanish	  authorities	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since	  the	  early	  2000s	   is	  astounding.	   If	  one	  adds	  the	  multilateral,	  EU-­‐led	  negotiation	  fora	  
and	  policies,	  such	  as	  the	  Barcelona	  Process	  and	  its	  MEDA	  programs,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  Euro-­‐
Mediterranean	  Partnership	  (EUROMED),	  the	  5+5	  Dialogue	  in	  the	  Western	  Mediterranean,	  
the	  Rabat	  Process,	  the	  European	  Neighbourhood	  Policy,	  the	  Global	  Approach	  to	  Migration	  
Policy,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  immigration	  and	  border	  policing	  missions	  operating	  under	  FRONTEX	  
or	  as	  part	  of	  EUROSUR,	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  European	  diplomatic	  offensive	  is	  impressive.	  	  
Bilateral	  agreements	  that	  focus	  on	  the	  readmission	  of	  nationals	  in	  the	  eventuality	  of	  
a	   deportation,	   dubbed	   “first	   generation	   agreements,”	   are	   often	   hard	   to	   implement.	   For	  
instance,	   the	  1992	   agreement	  with	  Morocco,	   signed	   after	   sub-­‐Saharan	  African	  migrants	  
started	  arriving	   in	  Melilla,	  which	  forced	  Morocco	  to	  take	  the	  migrants	  because	  they	  had	  
transited	   through	   the	   country,	  was	  not	   implemented	  until	   2004.	   In	   comparison,	   the	   so-­‐
called	   “second	   generation”	   agreements	   offer	   something	   in	   exchange	   to	   encourage	  
implementation,	  as	   the	  head	  of	   staff	  of	  a	   former	  secretary	  of	   state	   for	   immigration	  and	  
emigration	   explained.89	   The	   labour	   migration	   agreements	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   5	   thus	  
generally	  include	  a	  clause	  on	  readmission,	  unless	  a	  readmission	  agreement	  was	  already	  in	  
place,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Morocco.	  After	  ratifying	  a	  series	  of	  labour	  migration	  agreements,	  
Spanish	   authorities	   started	   to	   engage	   actively	   in	   the	   so-­‐called	   “new	   generation”	  
agreements,	   based	   on	   co-­‐operation	   in	   matters	   of	   border	   and	   immigration	   control,	  
including	  development	  aid	  to	  alleviate	  the	  conditions	  leading	  to	  migration	  (and	  provide	  a	  
monetary	   incentive	   to	   co-­‐operate).	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Senegal	   and	   Morocco,	   these	  
                                                
89	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  November	  7,	  2012.	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negotiations	  were	  also	  the	  occasion	  to	  push	  for	  agreements	  allowing	  for	  the	  deportation	  
of	  unaccompanied	  minors.90	  	  
In	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  I	  described	  how	  the	  promise	  of	  access	  to	  the	  Spanish	  labour	  
market	   was	   used	   to	   obtain	   better	   collaboration,	   in	   a	   kind	   of	   carrot-­‐and-­‐stick	   strategy	  
aimed	  at	  regulating	  flows	  by	  intervening	  at	  a	  distance.91	  I	  showed	  how	  labouralization	  and	  
securitization	  are	   intertwined	   in	  these	  strategies	  but	  did	  not	   insist	  on	  the	   importance	  of	  
these	   programs	   in	   the	   fight	   against	   irregular	  migration.	   Indeed,	   the	  Global	   Approach	   to	  
Migration	   developed	   at	   the	   European	   level	   (Council	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   2005)	  
promotes	   the	   use	   of	   co-­‐operation	   agreements	   as	   a	   key	   strategy	   to	   curb	   irregular	  
migration.	  In	  Spain,	  the	  broader	  policy	  framework	  for	  the	  aforementioned	  agreements	  is	  
provided	   by	   Plan	   África	   2006-­‐2009,	   and	   Plan	   África	   2009-­‐2012	   (Ministerio	   de	   Asuntos	  
Exteriores	  y	  de	  Cooperación	  2006,	  2009).92	  
The	  police	  perspective	  prevailing	  at	  the	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	  differs	  from	  that	  of	  
the	  Ministry	  of	  Employment	  and	  Social	  Security,	  in	  that	  it	  views	  extra-­‐territorialization	  not	  
primarily	  as	  a	  strategy	  for	  regulating	  flows	  by	  using	  job	  offers	  to	  channel	  legal	  migration,	  
                                                
90	   Simple	   bilateral	   readmission	   agreements	   have	   been	   signed	   with	   Morocco	   (1992),	   Portugal	   (1995),	  
Romania	  (1996),	  Bulgaria	  (1996),	  Lithuania	  (1998),	  Slovakia	  (1999),	  Latvia	  (1999),	  Estonia	  (1999),	  Italy	  (1999),	  
Nigeria	   (2001),	   France	   (2002),	   Poland	   (2002),	   Algeria	   (2002),	   Guinea-­‐Bissau	   (2003),	   Mauritania	   (2003),	  
Switzerland	   (2003),	   and	   Macedonia	   (2006),	   including	   some	   specific	   to	   the	   readmission	   of	   minors,	   with	  
Romania	   (2005),	  Morocco	   (2007),	   and	   Senegal	   (2007).	   Broader	   bilateral	   agreements	   on	   labour	  migration	  
flows,	  often	  including	  a	  clause	  on	  readmission,	  currently	  exist	  with	  Colombia	  (2001),	  the	  Dominican	  Republic	  
(2001),	   Ecuador	   (2001),	   Peru	   (2004),	   Mauritania	   (2007)	   and	   Ukraine	   (2009).	   Finally,	   “new	   generation”	  
agreements	  on	  co-­‐operation,	   labour,	  and	  migration	  control	  have	  been	  ratified	  with	  Algeria	  (2003),	  Gambia	  
(2006),	   Guinea	   (2006),	   Senegal	   (2006),	   Cape	   Verde	   (2007),	   Mali	   (2007),	   Niger	   (2008),	   and	   Guinea-­‐Bissau	  
(2008).	  
91	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  November	  7,	  2012.	  
92	  For	  critical	  analyses	  of	  the	  first	  plan,	  see	  Azkona	  and	  Sagastagoitia	  2011	  and	  Romero	  2008.	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but	   rather	  as	  an	  attempt	   to	  block	  all	  possible	   routes	   for	   irregular	  migrants.	  As	   the	  high-­‐
level	   official	   I	   interviewed	   put	   it,	   it	   is	   about	   “plugging	   the	   holes.”	   He	   explained	   the	  
importance	  of	  externalizing	  immigration	  controls:	  
The	  person	  that	  is	  immigrating	  in	  a	  patera	  is	  obviously	  immigrating	  illegally,	  doing	  it	  through	  a	  
criminal	   network,	   putting	   his	   or	   her	   life	   at	   risk.	   So,	   of	   course	   we	   have	   to	   fight	   this	   illegal	  
immigration	  .	  .	  .	  Thanks	  to	  the	  co-­‐operation	  with	  other	  countries,	  to	  the	  Spanish	  deployment	  off	  
[the	   Atlantic	   coast	   of	  West	   Africa]	   and	   FRONTEX	   operations	   at	   sea	   in	   areas	   like	  Mauritania,	  
Senegal,	  etc.,	  what	  used	  to	  be	  exit	  points	  came	  to	  be	  controlled.	  And	  we	  believe	  that	  for	  this	  
type	  of	  migration,	  considering	  that	  our	  job	  is	  to	  control	  and	  prevent	  that	  from	  happening,	  the	  
best	  measure	  is	  the	  prevention	  at	  the	  source.	  Because	  once	  a	  boat	  leaves	  the	  African	  coast,	  the	  
risk	  of	  death	  occurs,	  the	  human	  trafficking	  network	  has	  been	  able	  to	  act,	  and	  the	  obligation	  to	  
react	  becomes	  very	  complex,	  through	  deportations,	  etc.	  So	  the	  work	  in	  [this	  zone]	  is	  illustrative	  
of	   what	   has	   been	   done	   to	   block	   this	   flow	   .	   .	   .	  We	   believe	   that	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	  
control	   of	   illegal	   immigration	   from	  Africa,	   it’s	   very	   important	   for	   Spain	   (and	   for	   Europe	   since	  
Spain	  is	  the	  European	  point	  closest	  to	  Africa)	  .	  .	  .	  it’s	  fundamental	  that	  we	  control	  it	  and	  that	  we	  
do	  it	  preventively.	  We	  believe	  that	  prevention	  is	  what	  works	  best.93	  
	  
With	   this	   increase	   in	   diplomatic	   efforts,	   we	   also	   see	   a	   shift	   toward	   more	   secret	  
negotiations,	   inter-­‐ministerial	   informal	   agreements,	   memoranda	   of	   understanding,	   and	  
technical	   agreements	   between	   police	   forces,	   which	   has	   made	   the	   agreements,	   and	  
especially	   their	   content,	   hard	   to	   track.	   This	   is	   not	   surprising,	   considering	   that	   these	  
agreements	   often	   aim	   to	   prevent	   emigration,	   which	   contravenes	   Article	   13	   of	   the	  
Universal	   Declaration	   of	   Human	   Rights	   protecting	   the	   right	   to	   leave	   one’s	   country	   of	  
origin,	  and	  arguably	  also	  violates	  the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐refoulement	  (Art.	  33.1)	  of	  the	  1951	  
Convention	   Relating	   to	   the	   Status	   of	   Refugees	   (Andrade	   García	   2010;	   Golash-­‐Boza	   and	  
Menjívar	  2012).	  With	  the	  rise	  in	  securitizing	  logics	  and	  practices	  comes	  a	  displacement	  of	  
responsibilities	   toward	   the	  ministries	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   and	  Defence,	   as	  well	   as	   toward	  
                                                
93	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  October	  4,	  2012.	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police	   forces	   that	  negotiate	  directly	  with	   their	   counterparts	   in	   third	  countries	  and	  make	  
bilateral	   “technical	   agreements”	   that	   are	   rarely	   made	   public.94	   In	   policies	   of	   extra-­‐
territorialization	  of	  border	  control,	  there	  is	  an	  especially	  obvious	  blurring	  of	  the	  traditional	  
demarcation	  between	  external	   and	   internal	   security,	   as	   police	   officers	   adopt	   logics	   that	  
usually	   inform	   external	   security	   work	   to	   deal	   with	   something	   that	   was,	   until	   recently,	  
mostly	   of	   internal	   concern	   (Bigo	   2000;	   Weber	   2013).	   When	   I	   asked	   him	   about	   the	  
potential	   lack	  of	   transparency	  associated	  with	   the	   signing	  of	   secret	   agreements,	   a	  high-­‐
level	   official	   at	   the	  Ministry	   of	   the	   Interior	   responded	   simply	   that	   “all	   agreements	   are	  
published	   in	   the	   Official	   State	   Bulletin.”	   When	   I	   pointed	   out	   that	   many	   of	   these	  
agreements	  are	  more	  informal	  police	  or	  ministerial	  memoranda	  unavailable	  to	  the	  public,	  
he	  explained:	  
Well,	   all	   international	  agreements	  are	   in	   the	  BOE.	  Another	   thing	  are	   the	   instruments	   like	   the	  
memoranda	  of	  understanding:	  legally	  they	  are	  not	  international	  agreements	  but	  administrative	  
ones.	  Their	  publication	  is	  not	  necessary	  because	  they	  are	  not	  norms,	  just	  administrative	  acts	  .	  .	  .	  
Some	   activities	   do	   not	   require	   an	   international	   agreement.	   We’ve	   had	   very	   important	  
operational	  missions	  with	  African	  countries,	  and	  there’s	  a	  very	  fluid	  co-­‐operation.	  For	  instance,	  
our	   current	   relation	   with	   Morocco	   is	   excellent;	   it	   would	   be	   very	   hard	   to	   combat	   irregular	  
migration	  without	   it.	   It’s	  a	  great	  co-­‐operation	  that	   is	  based	  on	  agreements,	  but	  also	  on	  other	  
                                                
94	  Memoranda	   of	   understanding	   containing	   provisions	   for	   police	   collaboration	   in	   border	   and	   immigration	  
control	   have	   been	   signed	   with	   ministries	   or	   security	   forces	   of	   the	   following	   countries:	   Morocco	   (2004),	  
Mauritania	   (2006,	   2008,	   2009),	   Senegal	   (2006,	   2009),	   Algeria	   (2007),	   Cape	   Verde	   (2008),	   Gambia	   (2008),	  
Guinea	  (2008),	  Guinea	  Bissau	  (2008),	  and	  Mali	  (2009).	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  memoranda,	  the	  Red	  Europea	  de	  
Migraciones	  (2011)	  also	  mentions	  the	  presence	  of	   liaison	  agents	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  the	   Interior	   in	  other	  
countries	  such	  as	  Cameroon,	  Egypt,	  Ghana,	  Libya,	  and	  Tunisia	  (see	  also	  Ministerio	  del	  Interior	  2006).	  Beyond	  
collaboration	   during	   FRONTEX	   missions,	   we	   also	   know	   that	   Spanish	   bilateral	   border	   policing	   operations	  
Atlantis	   and	  Cabo	   Blanco	   (with	  Mauritania,	   2006),	   Seahorse	   (with	   Cape	  Verde,	  Mauritania,	  Morocco,	   and	  
Senegal,	   2006-­‐2009)	   and	   Noble	   Centinela	   (Cape	   Verde,	   Mauritania,	   and	   Senegal,	   2006)	   led	   to	   the	  
deployment	  of	   joint	  patrols,	   liaison	  agents,	   the	   training	  of	   staff,	  and	   the	  supply	  of	   surveillance	  equipment	  
(García	  Andrade	  2010).	  The	  Spanish	  Congress	  also	  passed	  legislation	  allowing	  for	  the	  transfer	  of	  more	  than	  
€10.5	  million	  worth	  of	  material	  to	  Morocco	  for	  the	  detection	  and	  interception	  of	  irregular	  migrants,	  as	  well	  
as	  €650,000	  of	  communications	  and	  electronic	  equipment	  to	  Mauritania	  (RD	  845/2006;	  RD	  187/2007).	  See	  
also	  García	  Andrade	  2010	  and	  Ministerio	  del	  Interior	  2008,	  2009,	  2011.	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types	   of	   actions	   that	   don’t	   require	   an	   agreement,	   that	   are	   based	   essentially	   in	   the	   implicit	  
relations	  that	  inform	  international	  co-­‐operation.95	  	  
	  
Indeed,	   memoranda	   do	   not	   generate	   the	   same	   level	   of	   obligations	   under	  
international	   law	   and	   are	   therefore	   preferred	   for	   police	   interventions	   because	   they	   are	  
more	   flexible	   and	   less	   open	   to	   scrutiny	   (García	   Andrade	   2010).	   And	   when	   it	   comes	   to	  
fighting	   “the	   mafia,”	   all	   methods	   seem	   valid.	   As	   the	   secretary	   of	   state	   for	   security	  
explained	  in	  2014,	  not	  doing	  enough,	  not	  pushing	  migrants	  back	  from	  Ceuta	  and	  Melilla,	  
and	   simply	   “confirming	   the	   success	   of	   the	   mafia	   in	   the	   irregular	   entries	   would	   be	   like	  
playing	   their	   game,”	   something	   this	   official	   refuses	   to	   do	   because	   “the	   fight	   against	  
networks	   of	   organized	   crime	   and	   of	   human	   trafficking	   is	   greatly	   related	   to	   the	  
phenomenon	  of	  irregular	  migration”	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  stopped	  (X	  –	  212/000469).	  	  
Considering	   the	   strengthening	   of	   the	   border	   fences	   in	   Ceuta	   and	   Melilla,	   the	  
extension	   of	   the	   SIVE	   to	   most	   of	   the	   Spanish	   coast,	   and	   the	   number	   and	   locations	   of	  
bilateral	  and	  FRONTEX	  patrols,	  we	  clearly	  observe	  an	  attempt	  to	  saturate	  the	  geographical	  
and	  legal	  space	  with	  dispositifs	  of	  control	  that	  strive	  to	  block	  all	  routes.	  The	  use	  of	  military	  
terminology	  such	  as	  “invasion,”	  “assaults,”	  “fronts,”	  and	  “defence”	  reveals	  a	  militarization	  
of	   both	   the	   practices	   and	   logics	   at	   play	   (X	   –	   212/001517).	   The	   other	   dimension	   of	   this	  
securitization	  is	  a	  reliance	  on	  the	  Penal	  Code	  to	  prosecute	  migrants	  and	  those	  who	  make	  
irregular	  migration	   possible.	   In	   the	   following	   section,	   I	   look	   at	   this	   criminalization	   as	   it	  
occurs	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  country.	  
                                                
95	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  October	  4,	  2012.	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Criminalization:	  “It’s	  delinquents	  we’re	  after”	  
Another	   central	   element	   of	   securitizing	   logics	   and	   practices	   is	   captured	   under	   the	  
umbrella	  concept	  of	  criminalization.	  Leanne	  Weber	  (2002)	  describes	  the	  criminalization	  of	  
immigration	   as	   a	   three-­‐tiered	   phenomenon	   that	   includes	   (1)	   rhetorical	   or	   symbolic	  
criminalization	   resulting	   from	   the	  discursive	   coupling	  of	   immigration	   and	   criminality,	   (2)	  
procedural	  or	  quasi-­‐criminalization	   resulting	   from	   the	  use	   in	   immigration	  governance	  of	  
technologies	  and	  strategies	  traditionally	  associated	  with	  the	  criminal	   justice	  system,	  and	  
(3)	   formal	   or	   literal	   criminalization	   consisting	   of	   the	   criminal	   prosecution	   of	   activities	  
related	  to	  immigration	  or	  engaged	  in	  only	  by	  immigrants.	  This	  section	  discusses	  this	  three-­‐
tiered	   phenomenon.	   I	   analyze	   the	   reliance	   on	   immigration	   detention	   and	   deportation,	  
aptly	   described	   by	   Anna	   Pratt	   (2005)	   as	   “quasi-­‐administrative,	   quasi-­‐criminal	   rituals	   of	  
exclusion”	   (p.	   23)	   sanctioning	   violations	   of	   an	   administrative	   law,	   the	   discursive	  
justification	  of	  detention	  and	  deportation	  as	  tools	  used	  primarily	  to	  incapacitate	  criminals,	  
and	   the	   use	   of	   the	   Spanish	   Penal	   Code	   (Código	   Penal),	   as	  well	   as	   specific	   international	  
agreements	  related	  to	  the	  policing	  of	  crime	  to	  fight	  irregular	  migration.	  
Anti-­‐Trafficking	  Rhetoric	  and	  Laws	  
In	  the	  early	  2000s,	  the	  convergence	  of	  crime,	  terrorism,	  and	  irregular	  migration	  in	  policy	  
discourses	  and	  programs	  at	  the	  Spanish	  and	  European	  levels	  became	  more	  important.	  The	  
fight	   against	   terrorism,	   a	   favourite	   topic	   of	   President	   José	   Maria	   Aznar,	   was	   a	   central	  
element	   of	   the	   2002	   Spanish	   presidency	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   the	   European	   Union,	   and	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Spanish	  representatives	  boldly	  attempted	  to	  link	  criminality	  and	  immigration	  at	  the	  Seville	  
European	   Council,	   which	   ended	   the	   presidency.	   Although	   French	   and	   Swedish	   officials	  
pushed	  back	  against	  this	  association,	  the	  Council	  meeting	  still	   included	  a	  strong	  focus	  on	  
the	  fight	  against	  “illegal	   immigration”	  (Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  2002;	  Morata	  and	  
Fernández	   2003).	   In	   2005,	   Spain,	   Germany,	   France,	   Belgium,	   Luxembourg,	   the	  
Netherlands,	  and	  Austria	  signed	  the	  Prüm	  Convention	  “on	  the	  stepping	  up	  of	  cross-­‐border	  
cooperation,	   particularly	   in	   combatting	   terrorism,	   cross-­‐border	   crime	   and	   illegal	  
migration,”	   clearly	   highlighting	   that	   illegal	  migration	   should	   be	   combatted	   as	   a	   criminal	  
activity.	  	  
Around	   the	   same	   period,	   Spanish	   authorities	   increased	   their	   efforts	   to	   reach	   co-­‐
operation	   agreements	   with	   third	   countries	   in	   matters	   related	   to	   “delinquency.”	   These	  
agreements,	   generally	   made	   between	   the	   Spanish	   Ministry	   of	   the	   Interior	   and	   its	  
counterparts,	   all	   consistently	   begin	   by	   mentioning	   “illegal	   migration”	   and	   “human	  
smuggling,”	  and	  list	  “human	  trafficking”	  alongside	  terrorism,	  contraband,	  drug	  trafficking,	  
and	  crimes	  against	  the	  life	  and	  integrity	  of	  persons,	  all	  of	  which	  are	  portrayed	  as	  criminal	  
activities	  against	  which	  the	  parties	  will	  collaborate	  to	  fight.96	  The	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	  
signed	   such	   agreements	   first	  with	   Bulgaria	   (1998),	   Russia	   (1999),	   Slovakia	   (1999),	   China	  
(2000),	   Poland	   (2000),	   Ukraine	   (2001),	   and	   Latvia	   (2003).	   However,	   after	   Prüm	   and	   the	  
shift	  toward	  “new	  generation	  agreements”	  in	  immigration,	  the	  focus	  moved	  to	  countries	  
                                                
96	  The	  only	  exception	   is	   the	  agreement	  signed	  with	   the	  U.S.A.	   in	  2009,	  which	  does	  not	   refer	   to	  migration.	  
The	   agreement	  with	   Israel,	   ratified	   in	   2007,	   also	   differs	   since	   the	   list	   of	   criminal	   activities	   appears	   not	   in	  
Article	  1,	  but	  further	  down,	  embedded	  in	  a	  paragraph.	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with	  which	   collaboration	   had	   increased	   in	   the	   fight	   against	   irregular	  migration,	   such	   as	  
Cape	  Verde	   (2006),	   Romania	   (2006),	   Senegal	   (2006),	   Brazil	   (2007),	   Cyprus	   (2007),	   Israel	  
(2007),	  and	  Mali	  (2008).	  More	  recently,	  Albania	  (2009),	  Turkey	  (2009),	  Cameroon	  (2011),	  
Croatia	   (2011),	   Jordan	   (2011),	   Kazakhstan	   (2011),	   Serbia	   (2011),	   and	   Ivory	   Coast	   (2012)	  
also	  signed	  similar	  documents.	  
In	  2007,	  the	  Socialist	  government	  presented	  a	  bill	  to	  amend	  the	  Penal	  Code	  and	  the	  
Law	   of	   Judicial	   Power	   to	   be	   able	   to	   prosecute	   people	   involved	   in	   facilitating	   irregular	  
migration	  even	  when	  the	  “crime”	  happened	  outside	  Spain’s	  territory.	  The	  bill,	  eventually	  
adopted	  as	  Organic	  Law	  13/2007	  for	  the	  Extraterritorial	  Prosecution	  of	   Illegal	  Trafficking	  
and	  Clandestine	  Immigration,97	  adds	  these	  two	  different	  phenomena	  to	  the	  list	  of	  crimes	  
over	   which	   Spain	   claims	   universal	   jurisdiction.	   As	   a	   result,	   Article	   23.4	   of	   the	   Law	   of	  
Judicial	  Power	  (LO	  6/1985)	  states:	  
The	  Spanish	  jurisdiction	  will	  also	  have	  competence	  in	  hearing	  actions	  committed	  by	  Spaniards	  
or	   foreigners	   outside	   of	   the	   national	   territory	   when	   they	   are	   susceptible	   to	   being	   classified,	  
under	  Spanish	  criminal	  law,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  following	  crimes:	  
a)	  Genocide	  
b)	  Terrorism	  
c)	  Pirate	  activities	  and	  illicit	  take-­‐over	  of	  ships	  
d)	  Counterfeiting	  foreign	  money	  
e)	  Crimes	  related	  to	  prostitution	  and	  the	  corruption	  of	  minors	  and	  legally	  incompetent	  people	  
f)	  Illegal	  trafficking	  of	  psychotropic,	  toxic	  or	  narcotic	  drugs	  
g)	  Illegal	  trafficking	  or	  clandestine	  immigration	  of	  people,	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  are	  workers	  
h)	  Those	  relative	  to	  feminine	  genital	  mutilation,	  as	  long	  as	  those	  responsible	  are	  in	  Spain	  
i)	  Any	  other	  that,	  according	  to	  international	  conventions,	  can	  be	  prosecuted	  in	  Spain.	  
	  
                                                
97	   Ley	   Orgánica	   13/2007	   de	   19	   de	   noviembre,	   para	   la	   persecución	   extraterritorial	   del	   tráfico	   ilegal	   o	   la	  
inmigración	  clandestina	  de	  personas.	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In	  a	  recent	  reform	  of	  the	  Law	  of	  Judicial	  Power	  aimed	  at	  addressing	  questions	  of	  universal	  
jurisdiction,	   the	   crimes	   listed	   have	   been	   more	   clearly	   defined.	   “Illegal	   trafficking	   or	  
clandestine	   immigration”	   has	   been	   replaced	   by	   “human	   trafficking”	   (trata	   de	   personas)	  
and	  limited	  to	  trafficking	  by	  or	  of	  Spaniards	  or	  of	  people	  living	  in	  Spain	  (LOE	  1/2014).	  But	  
the	   amalgamation	   of	   trafficking,	   smuggling,	   and	   mere	   clandestine	   migration	   seems	   to	  
have	   been	   intentional,	   aimed	   at	   linking	   mafia	   activity,	   violations	   of	   human	   rights,	   and	  
irregular	  migration.	  As	  the	  minister	  of	  justice	  explained	  in	  defence	  of	  the	  bill:	  
The	  arrival	  of	  boats	  coming	  from	  the	  African	  coasts	  are	  being	  intercepted	  more	  successfully	  by	  
our	   patrols	   and	   that	   of	   FRONTEX,	   but	   behind	   these	   boats	   hide	   the	   authors	   of	   some	   of	   the	  
crimes	  that	  most	  need	  to	  be	  prosecuted:	  human	  trafficking	  and	  clandestine	  immigration,	  which	  
is	  nothing	  other	  than	  the	  new	  form	  of	  exploitation,	  the	  new	  slavery	  of	  the	  21st	  century.	  To	  fight	  
against	   this	   scourge,	   it	   was	   decided	   that	   we	   needed	   to	   clarify	   once	   and	   for	   all	   the	   polemic	  
around	   whether	   or	   not	   our	   tribunals	   are	   competent	   to	   hear	   these	   crimes,	   even	   when	   the	  
detention	  of	  these	  boats	  occurs	  outside	  of	  our	  territorial	  waters.	  (VIII	  –	  121/000142;	  Diario	  de	  
Sessiones	  No	  293,	  October	  18,	  2007)	  
	  
As	   with	   anti-­‐trafficking	   rhetoric	   mobilized	   in	   other	   countries,	   the	   amalgamation	   of	  
smuggling	  and	  trafficking	  by	  the	  minister	  contributes	  to	  the	  portrayal	  of	  irregular	  migrants	  
as	  victims	  who	  cannot	  exercise	  agency	  and	  need	  to	  be	  saved,	  and	  anyone	  who	  helps	  them	  
as	  being	  not	  only	  criminal	  but	  also	  immoral	  (Sharma	  2005;	  Andrijasevic	  2010;	  Kempadoo	  
2005).	   While	   parliamentary	   concerns	   about	   trafficking	   first	   emerged	   in	   debates	   about	  
immigration,	  they	  spread	  and	  were	  rearticulated	  by	  feminist	  and	  women’s	  rights	  NGOs	  as	  
well	   as	   members	   of	   Congress	   working	   on	   gender	   equality.	   To	   a	   great	   extent,	   the	  
problematizations	  of	  trafficking/smuggling	  in	  immigration	  policy,	  and	  of	  trafficking/sexual	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violence	  in	  gender	  equality	  policy	  remain	  separate.	  Debates	  in	  the	  Equality	  Commission98	  
rarely	   focus	  on	  the	  smuggling	  of	   irregular	  migrants	  and	  the	  gendered	  dimension	  of	  anti-­‐
trafficking	   discourses	   is	   not	   often	   highlighted	   in	   debates	   about	   smuggling.	  Nonetheless,	  
the	   two	   sets	   of	   policy	   preoccupations	   cross-­‐pollinated	   each	   other	   and	   converged	   on	   a	  
number	  of	   legislative	   changes	   that	   criminalized	  both	  people	   trafficking	   (with	   a	   focus	  on	  
women	  and	  girls)	  and	  the	  smuggling	  of	  immigrants.	  Indeed,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  sanctioning	  
people	  involved	  in	  these	  activities,	  the	  abovementioned	  2007	  bill	  also	  included	  a	  reform	  of	  
the	   Penal	   Code	   that	   further	   entrenched	   the	   criminalization	   of	   actions	   that	   facilitate	  
irregular	  migration.	  
	   This	  process	  of	  criminalization	  has	  been	  ongoing	  for	  years.	  The	  original	  version	  of	  
the	   Penal	   Code	   of	   1995	   stated	   in	   Article	   313.1	   that	   “Those	   who	   promote	   or	   favour	  
[favorezcan]	  by	  any	  means	  the	  clandestine	   immigration	  of	  workers	  to	  Spain”	  would	  face	  
imprisonment	   of	   six	   months	   to	   three	   years,	   and	   a	   fine	   of	   six	   to	   twelve	   months.99	   This	  
article	  was	  modified	  in	  2007	  to	  include	  EU	  countries	  as	  part	  of	  the	  extra-­‐territorialization	  
of	  the	  criminal	  prosecution	  of	  smuggling	  (LO	  13/2007).	  The	  law	  reforming	  the	  Alien	  Act	  in	  
2000	   (LOE	   4/2000)	   added	   the	   infamous	   Article	   318	   bis	   to	   the	   Penal	   Code,	   criminally	  
prosecuting	   broadly	   defined	   “smuggling.”	   Point	   1	   of	   the	   Article	   first	   read:	   “Those	   who	  
promote,	  favour	  or	  facilitate	  the	  illegal	  trafficking	  of	  people	  from,	  transiting	  through,	  or	  to	  
Spain	  will	  be	  condemned	  to	  six	  months	  to	  three	  years	  in	  prison	  and	  a	  fine	  of	  six	  to	  twelve	  
                                                
98	   The	   Equality	   Commission	   was	   previously	   named	   Commission	   on	   Women’s	   Rights	   (until	   2004)	   and	  
Commission	  on	  Women’s	  Rights	  and	  Equality	  of	  Opportunities	  (2004-­‐2008).	  
99	   Fines	   are	   calculated	   according	   to	   the	   “day-­‐fine	   system,”	   ranging	   from	   €2	   to	   €400/day	   or	   €60	   to	  
€12,000/month	  and	  decided	  based	  on	  income,	  wealth,	  and	  family	  obligations	  (Penal	  Code,	  Art.50)	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months.”	  This	  wording	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  being	  limited	  to	  trafficking—that	  is,	  moving	  
people	  without	   their	   consent—but,	   in	   2003,	   a	   law	   designed	   to	   fight	   sexual	   exploitation	  
also	   added	   “or	   clandestine	   immigration”	   after	   “illegal	   trafficking”	   and	   raised	   the	   prison	  
time	  to	  a	  four	  to	  eight	  year	  sentence,	  clearly	   indicating	  that	   irregular	  migration	  was	  also	  
targeted.	  This	  law	  also	  raised	  the	  sentence	  to	  five	  to	  ten	  years	  when	  trafficking	  is	  carried	  
out	   with	   the	   intent	   to	   commit	   sexual	   exploitation	   (LO	   11/2003).	   As	   Kamala	   Kempadoo	  
(2005)	   explains,	   national	   legislations	   based	   on	   international	   obligations	   under	   the	   2000	  
United	  Nations’	  Protocol	  to	  Prevent,	  Suppress	  and	  Punish	  Trafficking	  in	  Persons,	  Especially	  
Women	   and	   Children,	   while	   attempting	   to	   protect	   women,	   clearly	   focus	   on	   fighting	  
international	   criminal	   networks.	   In	   this	   context,	   “the	   link	   between	   policies	   to	   curb	  
trafficking	   and	   those	   for	   immigration	   control	   is	   more	   explicit	   and	   visible”	   since	  
“punishment	  of	   those	  who	  assist	   others	   to	   circumvent	  national	   immigration	   restrictions	  
and	   disrupt	   older	   patterns	   and	   flows	   of	   migration	   .	   .	   .	   stands	   at	   the	   very	   heart	   of	   the	  
contemporary	  UN	  anti-­‐trafficking	  policies”	  (Kempadoo	  2005:xiii).	  
In	   Spain,	   people	   who	   have	   tried	   to	   help	   migrants,	   sometimes	   even	   family	  
members,	  have	  been	  charged	  and	  sentenced	  under	  Article	  318	  bis	  of	   the	  Penal	  Code	   in	  
cases	  where	  it	  was	  argued	  that	  the	  harm	  caused	  was	  not	  to	  an	  individual	  person,	  but	  to	  
Spanish	   society,	   vaguely	   understood	   (see	  Martínez	   Escamilla	   2008,	   2014).	   In	   September	  
2013,	   the	   Popular	   Party	   government	   submitted	   a	   new	   bill	   to	   reform	   the	   Penal	   Code	  
(currently	  before	  the	  Senate,	  March	  2015).	  This	  bill	  proposes	  to	  exempt	  those	  who	  aid	  and	  
abet	   irregular	   migration	   for	   humanitarian	   reasons,	   but	   it	   will	   also	   criminalize	   helping	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irregular	   migrants	   circulate	   inside	   the	   country	   or	   giving	   them	   work	   (X	   –	   121/000065).	  
Although	   the	   justice	   minister	   presents	   the	   reform	   as	   offering	   nuanced	   and	   flexible	  
treatment	   of	   illegal	   migration	   (Ministerio	   de	   Justicia	   2013),	   the	   reform	   maintains	   the	  
strategy	  of	  criminalizing	  irregular	  migration.	  So	  far,	  many	  experts	  consulted	  by	  the	  Justice	  
Commission	   suggest	   this	   is	   unnecessary.	   Among	   them,	   the	   chief	   prosecutor	   for	   the	  
province	   of	   Seville,	   who	  was	   asked	   to	   testify	   about	   the	   reform	   of	   the	   Penal	   Code	   at	   a	  
Commission	  hearing	  in	  April	  2014	  and	  stated:	  
With	   respect	   to	   illegal	   immigration,	   it	   is	   true	   that	   Europe	   demands	   a	   strengthening	   of	   the	  
State’s	  efforts	  to	  avoid	  illegal	   immigration,	  but	   in	  my	  opinion,	  I	  have	  to	  say	  that	  what	  is	  being	  
criminalized	   are	   administrative	   violations	   that	   are	   already	   dealt	   with	   adequately	   in	   the	  
administrative	  order.	  I	  do	  not	  understand	  that	  it	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  make	  these	  reforms	  to	  
allow	   for	   the	   punishment	   in	   Spain	   of	   conduct	   performed	   even	   outside	   [of	   Spain],	   because	   it	  
refers	   to	   the	  whole	   territory	  of	   the	  Union.	   I	  believe	   that	   the	   fight	  against	   illegal	   immigration,	  
with	   Spain	   being	   a	   border	   country,	   is	   twofold:	   security	   and	   collaboration	   with	   neighbouring	  
countries,	   and	   criminalization,	   even	   including	   an	   absolution	   for	   those	  who	   act	  with	   altruistic	  
reasons	  and	  all,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  it	  is	  necessary,	  in	  my	  humble	  opinion.	  (X	  –	  212/001560)	  
	  
Legal	  scholars	  who	  testify	  in	  Congress	  may	  not	  consider	  criminalization	  to	  be	  a	  useful	  legal	  
measure	   in	   combatting	   irregular	   migration,	   but	   it	   does	   seem	   that	   many	   politicians	  
involved	  in	  devising	  immigration	  policies	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  have	  considered	  it	  to	  
be	  politically	  useful.	   Indeed,	  beyond	   the	  actual	  prosecution	  of	  people	  who	  aid	  and	  abet	  
migrants	   to	   enter	   or	   circulate	   in	   the	   country,	   the	   mere	   framing	   of	   these	   activities	   as	  
criminal,	   and	   the	  depiction	  of	   irregular	  migration	  as	   a	  problem	  of	   international	   criminal	  
networks,	   relies	   on	   a	   securitizing	   logic	   and	   contributes	   to	   the	   governing	   of	   irregular	  
migration	  as	  something	  dangerous.	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“Qualified”	  Deportations	  and	  the	  Criminalization	  of	  Street	  Vending	  
Using	  criminal	   law	   to	   target	   irregular	  migration	   is	  a	   strategy	  also	  mobilized	   internally	   to	  
prosecute	   migrants	   themselves	   and	   frame	   some	   of	   them	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   public	   safety	  
(seguridad	   ciudadana).	   Since	   2009,	   civil	   servants	   at	   the	   Ministry	   of	   the	   Interior	   have	  
included	  in	  their	  annual	  Report	  on	  the	  Fight	  against	  Illegal	  Immigration	  the	  proportion	  of	  
expulsions	  that	  are	  “qualified”;	  that	   is,	  deportations	  based	  not	  on	  a	  mere	  administrative	  
violation	  of	  immigration	  law,	  but	  on	  criminality.	  In	  the	  last	  few	  years,	  various	  officials	  have	  
used	   this	   argument	   to	   justify	   internment	  of	   irregular	  migrants	   in	   immigration	  detention	  
centres	   (Centros	   de	   Internamiento	   de	   Extranjeros	   –	   CIEs),	   as	   well	   as	   expulsion.	   For	  
instance,	   in	   an	   intervention	   in	   Congress	   in	   January	   2012,	  Minister	   of	   the	   Interior	   Jorge	  
Fernández	  Díaz	  claimed:	  
Furthermore,	   we	   should	   not	   lose	   sight	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   while	   the	   number	   of	   unqualified	  
expulsions	  declined	  in	  the	  last	  years,	  the	  number	  of	  qualified	  expulsions,	  that	   is,	  those	  due	  to	  
having	  a	  police	  or	  criminal	  record	  [or	  “history:”	  antecedantes],	  or	  both,	  increased	  in	  an	  obvious	  
way,	   going	   from	   57	   percent	   in	   2009	   to	   80	   percent	   last	   year.	   We	   are	   talking	   about	   forced	  
returns.	   This	  means	   that	   a	   great	   number	   of	   the	   detainees	   [in	   CIEs]	   have	   committed	   crimes,	  
which	  adds	  special	  complexity	  to	  the	  management	  of	  the	  CIEs.	  (X	  –	  214/000006)	  
	  
This	   argument	   about	   the	   increase	   in	   the	   deportation	   of	   “delinquents”	   is	   constantly	  
repeated	   in	   the	   press	   and	   in	   Congress,	   and	   has	   been	   explained	   to	  me	   by	  members	   of	  
Congress	  from	  different	  parties,	  high-­‐level	  officials	  at	  the	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	  and	  the	  
Ministry	  of	  Employment	  and	  Social	  Affairs,	   and	  a	  police	  union	   representative.	  But	  while	  
this	  may	  be	  a	   successful	  political	   argument	   to	   justify	  deportations,	   the	  numbers	   just	  do	  
not	  add	  up.	  To	  clarify	  these	  statistics,	   I	  will	  explain	  the	  different	   legal	  categories	  used	   in	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these	  yearly	  reports.	  Deportation	  or	  refusal	  of	  entry	  can	  take	  many	  legally	  defined	  forms;	  
most	  of	  them	  are	  administrative	  sanctions	  and	  are	  defined	  in	  the	  Alien	  Act.	  	  
Table	  11:	  Numbers	  and	  Types	  of	  Repatriations	  2008-­‐2013	  




Readmissions	   Expulsions	  
Qualified	  and	  Not	  
Total	  
Repatriations	  
2008	   17,317	   12,315	   6,178	   5,564	   5,052	   46,426	  
2009	   12,226	   7,526	   5,099	   7,591	   5,687	   38,129	  
2010	   9,453	   7,297	   1,959	   8,196	   3,258	   30,163	  
2011	   11,092	   7,064	   1,278	   9,114	   2,244	   30,792	  
2012	   8,647	   6,271	   1,409	   8,140	   2,015	   26,457	  
2013	   8,703	   5,002	   1,119	   7,582	   1,402	   23,889	  
Source:	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior’s	  yearly	  Informes	  sobre	  la	  lucha	  contra	  la	  inmigración	  ilegal	  (Reports	  on	  the	  
Fight	  against	  Illegal	  Immigration).	  See	  Ministerio	  del	  Interior	  2008,	  2009,	  2011,	  2012a,	  2013a,	  2014.	  
	  
A	  “refusal	  of	  entry”	  (denegación	  de	  entrada),	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  “return,”	  
occurs	  when	  the	  officer	  at	  the	  port	  of	  entry	  refuses	  to	  let	  a	  foreigner	  inside	  the	  country	  for	  
lacking	  sufficient	  monetary	  resources,	  being	  seen	  as	  a	  potential	  threat,	  being	  the	  object	  of	  
a	  prohibition	  of	   re-­‐entry	   from	  a	  previous	  offence,	  or	  other	   reasons	   (Art.	  26,	  60).	  Among	  
those	  who	  are	   refused	  are	   tourists	   lacking	   the	  proper	  visa	  and	  migrants	   turned	  away	  at	  
the	  border.	  Technically,	   these	  are	  not	  deportations,	  but	   the	  Ministry	  of	   the	   Interior	   lists	  
them	   alongside	   deportation	   in	   its	   annual	  Report	   on	   the	   Fight	   against	   Illegal	  Migration.	  
Another	  category	  that	  does	  not	   legally	  qualify	  as	  an	  expulsion	   is	  devolution.	  Devolutions	  
are	  expulsions	  of	   foreigners	  who	  have	   (1)	  entered	   the	  country	   through	  an	  unauthorized	  
channel,	  or	   (2)	  entered	  the	  country	  while	  being	  the	  object	  of	  a	  prohibition	  of	  re-­‐entry	   if	  
they	  are	  sent	  back	  within	  72	  hours	  of	  their	  entry	  (Art.	  58).	  They	  do	  not	  require	  the	  same	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judicial	  process,	  nor	   the	  same	   judicial	  protections,	  as	  expulsions	  and	  are	  not	  counted	  as	  
such.	   Most	   migrants	   entering	   the	   enclaves	   of	   Ceuta	   and	  Melilla	   who	   are	   sent	   back	   to	  
Morocco	  either	  right	  away	  or	  within	  72	  hours	  are	  counted	  as	  devolutions	  in	  the	  Ministry’s	  
statistics,	   including	   some	   of	   those	   expelled	   on	   the	   spot	   without	   any	   paperwork	   (often	  
referred	  to	  as	  “hot	  devolutions”	  or	  “hot	  returns”).	  Finally,	  the	  yearly	  reports	  also	  include	  a	  
category	  that	  does	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  Alien	  Act:	  readmission.	  Readmissions	  are	  commonly	  
understood	  as	  expulsions	  or	  transfers	  of	  migrants	  to	  third	  countries	  based	  on	  readmission	  
agreements.	  	  
By	  adding	  even	  only	  devolutions	  and	  readmissions	  to	  the	  numbers	  of	  expulsions,	  we	  
can	   see	   that	   when	   the	   minister	   and	   other	   officials	   claim	   that	   more	   than	   80%	   of	   all	  
expulsions	  are	  targeting	  delinquents	  (Ministerio	  del	  Interior	  2014),	  they	  are	  stretching	  the	  
truth.	  In	  fact,	  even	  if	  we	  remove	  the	  refusals	  of	  entry—which	  are	  not	  really	  deportations,	  
even	   though	   the	  Ministry	  of	   the	   Interior	   counts	   them	   in	   its	   repatriations	   statistics—and	  
compare	   the	   number	   of	   qualified	   expulsions	   to	   the	   total	   number	   of	   readmissions,	  
devolutions,	  and	  unqualified	  expulsions,	  we	  get	  a	  very	  different	  picture.	  The	  percentage	  of	  
qualified	  expulsions	  does	  rise	  between	  2008	  and	  2010,	  reaching	  60%,	  but	  this	  increase	  is	  
mostly	   due	   to	   a	   dramatic	   drop	   in	   the	   number	   of	   non-­‐qualified	   deportations	   and	   the	  
relative	  stability	  of	  qualified	  expulsions	  over	  the	  same	  period.100	  	  
                                                
100	  Similar	  arguments	  have	  been	  made	  by	  Martínez	  Escamilla	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  and	  by	  Moffette	  and	  Orgaz	  Alonso	  
(2015).	  	  
 224	  
Figure	  1:	  Numbers	  of	  Qualified	  Expulsions	  and	  Other	  Repatriations	  (2008-­‐2013)	  
	  	  
Source:	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior’s	  yearly	  Reports	  on	  the	  Fight	  against	  Illegal	  Immigration.	  See	  Ministerio	  del	  
Interior	  2008,	  2009,	  2011,	  2012a,	  2013a,	  2014.	  This	  graphic	  does	  not	  include	  refusals	  of	  entry.	  
	  
These	  numbers	  refer	  to	  the	  administrative	  expulsion	  of	  foreigners	  who	  are	  deemed	  
to	   be	   delinquents,	   not	   expulsion	   due	   to	   a	   criminal	   conviction.	   The	   Penal	   Code	   allows	  
judges	  to	  replace	  all	  or	  part	  of	  a	  jail	  sentence	  of	  less	  than	  six	  years	  and	  the	  last	  25%	  of	  a	  
sentence	  of	  six	  years	  or	  more	  with	  an	  expulsion	  if	  the	  person	  convicted	  is	  a	  foreigner	  (Art.	  
89).101	  But	  year	  after	  year,	  the	  proportion	  of	  foreign	  convicts	  whose	  sentence	  is	  partially	  or	  
completely	  substituted	  by	  a	  deportation	  based	  on	  Article	  89	  of	  the	  Penal	  Code	  is	  roughly	  
6%,	   suggesting	   that	   expulsions	   are	   not	   considered	   a	   proper	   sanction	   by	   criminal	   judges	  
(Brandariz	  García	  and	  Iglesias	  Skulj	  2013:258).	  
                                                







2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	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The	   Alien	   Act	   does	   not	   use	   the	   term	   “qualified	   expulsion”	   but	   considers	   that	   the	  
primary	   sanction	   against	   the	   irregular	   presence	   of	   foreigners	   should	   be	   a	   fine	   while	  
administrative	  expulsion	  can	  be	  considered	  in	  various	  circumstances	  (LOE	  Art.	  57).	  These	  
include	   simple	   administrative	   infractions,	   such	   as	   being	   in	   Spain	  with	   a	   permit	   that	   has	  
expired	  more	  than	  three	  months	  prior	  or	  working	  while	  living	  in	  Spain	  without	  a	  permit,	  as	  
well	  as	  more	  serious	  offences,	  such	  as	  involvement	  in	  human	  smuggling	  or	  other	  criminal	  
activities.	  One	  case	  when	  expulsion	  can	  be	  deemed	  appropriate	  is	  when	  a	  foreigner	  who	  is	  
in	  Spain	  irregularly	  is	  charged	  with	  a	  criminal	  or	  administrative	  offence	  that	  could	  result	  in	  
a	   sentence	   of	   less	   than	   six	   years,	   and	   the	   judge	   cancels	   the	   judicial	   process	   and	   allows	  
police	   officers	   to	   carry	   out	   an	   administrative	   deportation	   (Art.	   57.7.a).	   This	  would	  most	  
likely	   fall	   under	   the	   vaguely	   defined	   category	   of	   “qualified	   expulsion,”	   a	   situation	   that	  
becomes	   especially	   significant	  when	   economic	   activities	   performed	   only	   or	   primarily	   by	  
immigrants	  with	  precarious	  status,	  such	  as	  the	  selling	  of	  counterfeit	  products	  or	  of	  sex	  are	  
criminalized	  (Melossi	  2003).	  In	  these	  cases,	  victimless	  crimes	  of	  survival	  are	  redefined	  and	  
policed	  as	  “crimes	  of	  arrival”	  (Webber	  2006:2).	  
Indeed,	  many	  migrants	  without	  work	  permits	  survive	  by	  working	  as	  street	  vendors,	  
selling	   copied	   DVDs,	   CDs,	   and	   fake	   luxury	   purses	   and	   perfumes,	   which	   they	   display	   on	  
sheets	   on	   busy	   streets.	   Because	   of	   this	   technique	   of	   displaying	   the	   goods	   on	   blankets	  
(mantas),	   they	  are	  called	  manteros,	  a	   term	  that	  has	  come	  to	   refer	   specifically	   to	  “third-­‐
world”	  migrants	  without	  status	  who	  sell	  merchandise	  to	  survive.	  Until	   the	  reform	  of	  the	  
Penal	   Code	   in	   2010	   (LO	   5/2010),	   selling	   counterfeit	   merchandise	   in	   the	   street	   was	   a	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serious	   criminal	   offence,	   and	   the	   policing	   of	  manteros	   by	  municipal	   and	   national	   police	  
officers	  resulted	  in	  many	  deportations.	  The	  activity	  was	  mostly	  decriminalized	  as	  a	  result	  
of	  very	  effective	  migrant	  justice	  organizing.	  For	  small	  street	  vendors	  violating	  intellectual	  
and	  industrial	  property	  rights	  in	  this	  way	  (a	  violation	  of	  Article	  274.2),	  the	  Penal	  Code	  now	  
only	   considers	   fines	   (Art.	   623.5),	   and	   although	   selling	   in	   the	   streets	  without	   a	   permit	   is	  
also	  a	  violation	  of	  most	  municipal	  bylaws,	   it	   cannot	  be	   the	  basis	   for	  an	  expulsion	  under	  
Article	  89.102	  However,	  on	  March	  30th,	  2015,	  the	  Popular	  Party	  government	  passed	  a	  new	  
bill	   reforming	   the	   Penal	   Code	   (LO	   1/2015).	   As	   a	   result,	   as	   of	   July	   1st,	   2015	   the	   street	  
vending	  of	  counterfeit	  products	  will	  be	  an	  offence	  with	  a	  possible	  sentence	  of	  six	  months	  
to	  two	  years	  of	  incarceration,	  reclassifying	  the	  deportation	  of	  manteros	  charged	  with	  this	  
offence	  as	  “qualified”	  (LO	  1/2015,	  Point	  153;	  see	  also	  Martínez	  Escamilla	  2014).	  
When	  asked	  in	  Congress	  to	  clarify	  whether	  the	  2012	  statistic	  concerning	  “qualified”	  
expulsions	   included	  manteros,	   the	   written	   government	   response	   stated,	   “By	   qualified	  
expulsions	   we	   understand	   the	   repatriation	   of	   foreign	   delinquents	   with	   long	   criminal	  
and/or	   judicial	   histories	   [numerosos	   antecedantes	   penales	   y/o	   judiciales],	   linked	   to	  
terrorism,	   organized	   gangs,	   gender-­‐based	   violence,	   or	   any	   other	   particularly	   serious	  
offence	   that	  poses	  a	   threat	   to	  public	   safety”	   (X	  –	  184/027310).	  The	   listing	  of	  dangerous	  
threats	  alongside	  the	  catch-­‐all	  category	  of	  “any	  other	  particularly	  serious	  offence”	  works	  
rhetorically	   to	   present	   deportations	   as	   targeting	   only	   delinquents	   and	   leaves	   the	   door	  
                                                
102	  Although	  unpaid	  fines	  can	  eventually	  lead	  to	  imprisonment	  (Penal	  Code,	  Art.	  53),	  and	  thus	  to	  deportation	  
on	  these	  grounds.	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open	  to	   including	  any	  other	  offence	  under	  this	  category.	   In	  the	  quote	  by	  the	  minister	  of	  
the	  interior	  discussed	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  section,	  we	  also	  see	  that	  this	  statistic	  is	  not	  
only	   used	   to	   justify	   deportations,	   but	   also	   the	   internment	   in	   CIEs	   of	   irregular	  migrants	  
facing	  deportation.	   This	   claim	   is	   also	  dubious	   since	  many	  detainees	   are	  not	   successfully	  
deported	  (Fiscal	  General	  del	  Estado	  2012)	  and	  are	  therefore	  not	  counted	  in	  the	  expulsion	  
statistics,	   while	   many	   people	   facing	   deportation	   under	   Art.	   89	   of	   the	   Penal	   Code	   may	  
never	  be	  detained	  in	  immigration	  detention	  centres.	  	  
But	   this	   rhetorical	   device	   effectively	   criminalizes	   all	   irregular	   migrants	   who	   have	  
been	   detained	   or	   deported.	   The	   insistence	   on	   framing	   detention	   and	   deportation	   as	   a	  
fight	  against	  crime,	  highlighting	  that	  “it’s	  delinquents	  we’re	  after,”	  as	  a	  high-­‐level	  official	  
at	  the	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	  told	  me,103	  works	  as	  an	  ongoing	  dividing	  practice	  that	  allows	  
this	   set	   of	   securitizing	   logics	   and	   practices	   to	   operate	   alongside	   labouralizing	   and	  
culturalizing	  ones	  to	  designate	  some	  irregular	  migrants	  as	  redeemable	  and	  others	  as	  only	  
deportable.	  I	  discuss	  the	  articulations	  of	  these	  complementary	  logics	  and	  practices	  in	  the	  
everyday	   governing	   of	   irregular	   migrants	   in	   Spain	   in	   greater	   detail	   in	   the	   following	  
chapter.	   In	   the	   last	   section	   of	   this	   chapter,	   I	   return	   to	   the	   border	   where	   I	   located	   the	  
emergence	  of	   the	   securitizing	   logic	   in	  1995	  and	  where	   it	   is	   still	   deployed	  with	   the	  most	  
force	  today.	  	  
	  
                                                
103	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  October	  4,	  2012.	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Claims	  of	  Exceptionality	  and	  Violence	  against	  Migrants	  
The	   securitization	   of	   immigration	   often	   develops	   around	   questions	   of	   borders	   and	   the	  
defence	   of	   Spanish	   territory.	   This	   is	   the	   case	   not	   because	   borders	   are	   the	   epitome	   of	  
security,	  turning	  Europe	  into	  a	  fortress.	  Indeed,	  border	  dispositifs	  work	  primarily	  as	  filters,	  
selecting	  who	  can	  circulate,	  how,	  and	  for	  what	  purposes;	  they	  are	  but	  one	  element	  in	  the	  
broader	   regulation	   of	  movement	   (Moffette	   2013;	   Rumford	   2006;	   van	   Houtum	   and	   van	  
Naerssen	  2002;	  Walters	  2006).	  And	  yet,	  as	  Brown	  (2010)	  explains,	  it	  is	  at	  borders	  that	  the	  
fading	  sovereignty	  of	  states	  is	  most	  evident,	  and	  it	   is	  there	  that	  attempts	  to	  reassert	  the	  
right	   to	  defend	   the	  country	  against	  people	   seen	  as	   invaders	  are	  commonly	  manifest.	  At	  
play	  here	   is	  not	  only	  the	  real	   failure	  at	  regulating	  migration	  flows	   in	  a	  way	  that	  appears	  
optimal	   for	   European	   policy-­‐makers,	   but	   also	   the	   politics	   of	   representing—through	  
“invasion	  maps”	   and	   other	   devices	   (van	   Houtum	   2010:965)—the	   complex	   relationships	  
between	   irregular	   migration	   and	   European	   borders	   as	   a	   situation	   of	   siege.	   Faced	   with	  
what	  Boaventura	  de	  Sousa	  Santos	  (2007)	  calls	  the	  “return	  of	  the	  colonial”	  (p.6),	  through	  
the	  figure	  of	  the	  irregular	  migrant,	  policy-­‐makers	  and	  other	  actors	  involved	  in	  immigration	  
governing	  insist	  on	  reaffirming	  “abyssal	  lines,”	  dividing	  “social	  reality	  into	  two	  realms,	  the	  
realm	  of	  ‘this	  side	  of	  the	  line’	  and	  the	  realm	  of	  ‘the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  line’”	  (p.1).	  
The	  desire	  to	  assert	  state	  sovereignty	  and	  hold	  the	  defensive	  line	  is	  evident	  in	  most	  
parliamentary	  and	  public	  discourses	  put	  forward	  by	  representatives	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  the	  
Interior	  in	  support	  of	  measures	  used	  to	  guard	  and	  defend	  the	  Ceuta	  and	  Melilla	  borders.	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One	  such	  example	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  secretary	  of	  state	  for	  security's	  recent	  appearance	  
before	   the	   Interior	   Commission	   of	   Congress	   in	   October	   2014.	   Responding	   to	   questions	  
about	  the	  dubious	  legality	  of	  pushing	  migrants	  back	  at	  the	  border	  with	  force,	  and	  handing	  
those	  who	  get	  into	  Ceuta	  and	  Melilla	  over	  to	  Moroccan	  officers	  without	  taking	  the	  time	  to	  
process	  asylum	  claims,	  he	  justified	  these	  actions	  based	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  state	  sovereignty.	  
Says	  the	  secretary	  of	  state	  for	  security:	  
Unlike	   at	   other	   borders,	   in	   Ceuta	   and	  Melilla	   there	   is	   a	   necessity	   for	   years	   now	   to	   avoid	   the	  
illegal,	   clandestine,	   often	   violent,	   massive	   entries	   that	   happen	   in	   a	   way	   that	   breaches	   the	  
security	   apparatus	   of	   the	   border	   perimeter.	   I	   believe	   that	   no	   one	  would	   ever	   expect	   a	   state	  
governed	  by	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  to	  passively	  witness	  acts	  that	  violate	  the	  legality	  of	  our	  borders,	  and	  
by	  extension	  the	  European	  legality	  .	  .	  .	  Therefore,	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Guardia	  Civil,	  the	  actions	  of	  
the	   Security	   Forces	   and	   Corps	   of	   the	   State,	   performed	   in	   compliance	   with	   the	   law,	   when	  
pushing	  back	   those	  who	  try	   to	  enter	   illegally,	  enjoy	   full	   legal	   coverage	  since	   it	   is	  nothing	  else	  
than	  the	  very	  consequence	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  border	  and	  its	  intrinsic	  legality,	  that	  forbids	  the	  
existence	  of	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  a	  right	  to	  enter	  irregularly.	  At	  times,	  stopping	  them	  from	  entering	  
means	  opposing	  violent	  assaults,	  motivated	   in	  many	  cases—I	  don’t	  doubt	   it—by	  desperation,	  
that	   can	   only	   be	   aborted	   effectively	   through	   the	   physical	   coercion	   of	   people	   .	   .	   .	   (X	   –	  
212/000469)	  
	  
This	  type	  of	  justification	  is	  interesting	  in	  that	  it	  claims	  the	  legality	  of	  defending	  the	  border	  
against	   illegal	   invaders,	  marking	   the	   abyssal	   line	   between	  European	   legality	   and	  African	  
chaos,	  but	  it	  does	  so	  as	  a	  means	  of	  justifying	  the	  exceptionality	  of	  practices	  that	  in	  other	  
contexts	   would	   not	   be	   acceptable,	   such	   as	   the	   “hot	   returns”	   of	   migrants	   to	  Moroccan	  
authorities	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐refoulement.	  The	  logic	  at	  play	  here	  is	  that	  as	  
the	   site	  of	  defence	  of	   European	   legality,	   the	  border	  has	   to	   authorize	  extra-­‐legal	  or	  not-­‐
quite-­‐legal	  practices.	  Within	  this	  logic,	  the	  double	  bind	  of	  internal/external	  sovereignty	  is	  
rearticulated	   in	   a	   way	   that	   echoes	   Santos’s	   (2007)	   analysis	   of	   the	   “abyssal	   divide”	   of	  
concerns	   for	   regulation/emancipation	   in	   the	   colonial	   metropole	   and	   a	   rule	   based	   on	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appropriation/violence	  on	   the	  other	   side	  of	   the	   colonial	   divide.	  As	  he	  explains,	   “On	   the	  
basis	   of	   these	   legal	   and	   epistemological	   abyssal	   conceptions,	   the	   universality	   of	   the	  
tension	   between	   regulation	   and	   emancipation,	   applying	   on	   this	   side	   of	   the	   line,	   is	   not	  
contradicted	   by	   the	   tension	   between	   appropriation	   and	   violence	   applying	   on	   the	   other	  
side	  of	   the	   line”	   (2007:n.p.).	   Similarly,	   the	   take	  on	   sovereignty	   in	   securitizing	   logics	   and	  
practices	   involves	  both	   the	   liberal	  understanding	  of	   sovereignty	  as	   the	  condition	   for	   the	  
autonomy	  of	  the	  state	  and	  its	  people	  under	  the	  rule	  of	   law,	  and	  a	  notion	  of	  sovereignty	  
that	  involves	  “the	  right	  to	  kill,	  to	  allow	  to	  live,	  or	  to	  expose	  to	  death”	  (Mbembe	  2003:12;	  
Foucault	  [1997]	  2003).	  
The	  justification	  for	  exposing	  people	  to	  death	  within	  biopolitical	  governmentality	  is,	  
as	  Michel	  Foucault	  ([1997]	  2003)	  explains,	  tied	  to	  the	  desire	  to	  optimize	  populations	  and	  
regulate	  flows.	  The	  death	  of	  irregular	  migrants	  is	  mostly	  understood	  as	  collateral	  damage	  
of	  the	  regulatory	  character	  of	  what	  William	  Walters	  (2002)	  calls	  “the	  biopolitical	  border”	  
(p.562).	  However,	  the	  imposition	  of	  violence,	  the	  reliance	  on	  military	  techniques,	  and	  the	  
use	  of	  wartime	  analogies	  in	  narrating	  the	  fight	  against	  irregular	  migration	  reminds	  us	  that	  
sovereign	  power	  is	  also	  at	  play.	  Explaining	  the	  beating	  of	  irregular	  migrants	  by	  Moroccan	  
forces,	   and	   the	  death	  by	  drowning	  of	  15	   individuals	  who	  were	   trying	   to	   circumvent	   the	  
Ceuta	  border	  fence	  while	  Spanish	  police	  forces	  were	  firing	  rubber	  bullets	  close	  to	  them	  in	  
February	  2014,	  the	  secretary	  of	  state	  for	  security	  described	  a	  scene	  of	  war.	  He	  discussed	  
early	   detection,	   lines	   of	   defence,	   the	   sealing	   of	   the	   border,	   and	   surveillance	   through	  
camera	  systems.	  He	  cited	  intelligence	  information	  stating	  that	  40,000	  sub-­‐Saharan	  African	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migrants	   were	   in	   Morocco,	   waiting	   to	   jump	   the	   fences	   into	   Ceuta	   and	   Melilla.	   He	  
explained	  how	  40	  agents	  of	  the	  Guardia	  Civil	  fired	  145	  rubber	  bullets	  near	  the	  intruders,	  
including	  when	   they	  were	   in	   the	  water,	  potentially	   contributing	   to	   their	  deaths.	  And	  he	  
described	  how	  Spanish	  agents	  detained	  anyone	  who	   succeeded	   in	  entering	  and	  handed	  
them	  back	  to	  Moroccan	  agents,	  once	  again	  without	  any	  processing	  of	  asylum	  claims.	  His	  
presentation	  depicted	  a	  situation	  of	  siege	  and	  violent	  clashes.	  Fifteen	  people	  died	  but	  the	  
secretary	  of	  state	  reassured	  Congress	  that	  they	  died	  on	  the	  Moroccan	  side,	  and	  that	  the	  
Guardia	   Civil	   had	   no	   responsibility.104	   Not	   only	   do	   hundreds	   of	   migrants	   die	   each	   year	  
trying	  to	  reach	  Spain,	  on	  various	  occasions	  these	  deaths	  are	  related	  to	  confrontation	  with	  
police	  forces.105	  	  
Foucault’s	  account	  of	  the	  decline	  of	  sovereign	  power	  sometimes	  suggests	  that	  this	  
modality	  of	  power	  is	  being	  replaced	  by	  disciplines	  and	  the	  biopolitics	  of	  populations,	  but	  
as	   many	   authors	   have	   suggested	   (Butler	   2004;	   Lippert	   2004,	   2005;	   Mbmebe	   2003;	  
Mezzadra	  and	  Neilson	  2013;	  Pratt	  2001),	   the	   rise	  of	   governmentality	  does	  not	  preclude	  
the	   deployment	   of	   a	   sovereign	   type	   of	   power.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   “hot	   returns”	   at	   the	  
border,	  performed	  despite	  being	  in	  violation	  of	  international	  and	  national	  laws,	  “the	  law	  is	  
suspended	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  ‘sovereignty’	  of	  the	  nation,	  where	  ‘sovereignty’	  denotes	  the	  
task	  of	  any	  state	  to	  preserve	  and	  protect	   its	  own	  territoriality.	  By	  this	  act	  of	  suspending	  
                                                
104	   The	   appearance	   of	   the	   secretary	   of	   state	   for	   security	   resulted	   from	   various	   parliamentary	   initiatives,	  
including	   X	   –	   212/001517.	   It	   is	   worth	   reading	   in	   its	   entirety:	   see	   Diario	   de	   Sesiones,	   Comision	   Interior,	  
Legislature	  X,	  No	  525,	  March	  19,	  2014.	  
105	  For	  yearly	  estimates,	  see	  Asociación	  Pro	  Derechos	  Humanos	  de	  Andalucía	  2006,	  2008,	  2009,	  2010,	  2011,	  
2012,	  2013,	  2014.	  Other	  estimates	  include	  Carling	  2007,	  United	  Against	  Racism	  2009	  and	  van	  Houtum	  2010.	  
Accounts	  of	  the	  deaths	  at	  the	  Ceuta	  border	  in	  2005	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Blanchard	  and	  Wender	  2007.	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the	   law,	   the	   state	   is	   further	   disarticulated	   into	   a	   set	   of	   administrative	   power”	   (Butler	  
2004:55),	   that	   is,	   governmentalized.	   When	   the	   law	   is	   in	   the	   way	   of	   effective	   border	  
control,	   officials	   simply	   do	  not	   respect	   it,	   or	   they	   attempt	   to	   change	   it.	   For	   instance,	   in	  
response	   to	   legal	   challenges	  against	   the	  use	  of	   “hot	  devolutions”	   to	  expel	  migrants,	   the	  
government	   included	   a	   clause	   in	   its	   new	   Law	   of	   Citizen	   Safety	   (Ley	   de	   Seguridad	  
Ciudadana)	   to	   legalize	  a	  practice	  performed	   illegally	  every	  day.	  This	   legislative	  change—
effective	   as	   of	   July	   1st,	   2015—creates	   a	   “special	   regime”	   for	   Ceuta	   and	   Melilla	   that	  
legalizes	   the	   “rejection”	   (rechazo)	   of	   migrants	   at	   the	   border	   (LOPSC	   4/2015;	   First	   Final	  
Disposition).	  This	  move	  will	  not	  make	  the	  practice	  legal	  with	  regard	  to	  international	  or	  EU	  
law,	   but	   the	   Ministry	   of	   the	   Interior	   claims	   that	   European	   representatives	   who	   have	  
concerns	   about	   the	   legality	   of	   these	   practices	   are	   hypocritical.106	   The	   refoulement	   of	  
potential	  asylum	  seekers	  at	  the	  border	  and	  the	  collaboration	  with	  Moroccan	  forces,	  who	  
regularly	  transport	  those	  expelled	  from	  Ceuta	  and	  Melilla	  to	  the	  desert	  between	  Morocco	  
and	  Algeria	  and	   leave	  them	  there	  to	   fend	   for	   themselves	  or	  die	   (Blanchard	  and	  Wender	  
2007),	   are	   instances	   of	   a	   suspension	   of	   the	   application	   of	   the	   law	   as	   a	   response	   to	   a	  
situation	  deemed	  exceptional.	  
The	   non-­‐application	   of	   laws	   in	   the	   name	   of	   European	   legality	   is	   justified	   through	  
claims	   of	   exceptionality.	   References	   to	   the	   peculiar	   and	   special	   situation	   of	   Ceuta	   and	  
Melilla	  and	  the	  state	  of	  siege	  under	  which	  Spain	  is	  placed	  are	  used	  to	  present	  the	  situation	  
as	   exceptional.	   The	   governing	   of	   migrants	   as	   either	   security	   threats	   or	   humanitarian	  
                                                
106	  For	  a	  legal	  opinion	  on	  the	  practice	  of	  hot	  devolutions,	  see	  Martínez	  Escamilla	  et	  al.	  2014.	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victims,	  not	  as	  political	  subjects,	  is	  informed	  by	  this	  exceptionalism,	  which	  serves	  to	  justify	  
the	  deployment	  of	  sovereign	  power	  in	  liberal	  societies.	  But	  to	  understand	  how	  claims	  to	  
exceptionality	  are	  used	   in	  processes	  of	  securitization	  to	   justify	   the	  use	  of	  measures	   that	  
may	  be	  not	  be	  acceptable	   in	  other	  circumstances,	  we	  must	  be	  careful	  not	   to	  ontologize	  
this	   exception	   as	   Agamben	   ([1995]	   1998,	   [2003]	   2005)	   does.	   In	   line	   with	   the	   analyses	  
developed	   by	   Butler	   (2003)	   and	   others	   (Brown	   2006;	   Mezzadra	   and	   Neilson	   2013),	   I	  
consider	   that	   securitizing	   logics	   and	   practices	   do	   not	   operate	   in	   a	   generalized	   state	   of	  
emergency	  that	  is	  now	  the	  norm.	  Instead,	  they	  are	  part	  of	  broader	  historical	  processes	  of	  
racial	   governance	   (Goldberg	   1993,	   2009),	   contributing	   to	   them	  by	  marking	   the	   limits	   of	  
liberal	   tolerance	   and	   justifying	   the	   suspension	  of	   law	  and	   the	  use	  of	   violence	   (Moffette	  
and	  Vadasaria	  2014).	  	  
Claims	  to	  exceptionality,	  fed	  in	  part	  by	  a	  real	  sense	  of	  being	  under	  siege	  and	  further	  
by	  a	  position	  of	  empowered	  spatiality	  (Hage	  [1999]	  2000),	  enable	  citizens	  and	  members	  of	  
police	  forces	  to	  act	  as	  petty	  sovereigns,	  disregard	  the	   law,	   inflict	  violence	  upon	   irregular	  
migrants,	   and	   push	   them	   back	   into	   the	   space	   beyond	   Europe.	   In	   their	   most	   acute	  
manifestations	  at	   the	  border,	   securitizing	   logics	  and	  practices	   treat	   irregular	  migrants	  as	  
non-­‐persons	   (Dal	   Lago	   [1999]	   2009),	   either	   as	   racialized	   victims	   or	   as	   foreign	   threats.	  
Claims	  to	  exceptionality	  do	  appear	  to	  produce	  a	  qualitative	  shift	  in	  the	  continuum	  of	  racial	  
governmentality,	  activating	  a	  right	  to	  kill	  or	  expose	  to	  death,	  but	  we	  should	  be	  careful	  not	  
to	  ontologize	   the	  exception	  or	   the	  baring	  of	   life	  as	  homo	  sacer	   (Agamben	   [1995]	  1998),	  
remembering	   that	   the	   supposed	   “voicelessness	   of	   the	   refugee	   .	   .	   .	   is	   the	   effect	   of	   the	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refugee	  discourse,	  not	  the	  refugee’s	  essence	  or	  the	  particularity	  of	  the	  refugee’s	  existence	  
in	   life”	   (Soguk	   1999:9).	   Borderlines	   are	   sites	   of	   struggle	   and	   conflict	   where	   migrants’	  
desires	   and	   need	   to	   move	   are	   met	   by	   state	   officials’	   attempts	   at	   regulating	   who	   can	  
circulate,	  how,	  and	  for	  what	  purposes.	  Not-­‐quite-­‐illegal,	  extra-­‐legal	  and	  potentially	  lethal	  
means	   associated	   with	   securitization	   are	   mobilized	   as	   a	   supplement	   to	   the	   smooth	  
governmental	  regulation	  of	  flows.	  	  
I	   have	  mentioned	   that	   the	   labouralizing	   logic	   is	   the	   one	  most	   congruent	  with	   the	  
regulatory	  dimension	  of	  migration	  governance,	   insisting	  as	   it	  does	  on	  steering	  flows	  and	  
working	   with	   the	   market,	   and	   that	   the	   securitizing	   logic	   tends	   to	   insist	   on	   risk	  
management	  but	  also	  on	  control	  and	  a	  sovereign	  defence	  of	  territoriality.	  While	  they	  are	  
often	   presented	   as	   contradictory,	   these	   two	   sets	   of	   logics	   and	   practices	   are	  
complementary	   parts	   of	   the	   regime	   for	   governing	   irregular	   migration	   in	   Spain.	   To	   use	  
Sandro	  Mezzadra	  and	  Brett	  Neilson’s	  (2013)	  words:	  	  
The	   fantasy	   of	   a	   just-­‐in-­‐time	   and	   to-­‐the-­‐point	   migration	   effectively	   produces	   a	  
governmentalization	  of	   the	  border	   regime	   .	   .	   .	  But	   this	   is	   just	  a	   fantasy,	   although	   it	  produces	  
very	   real	   effects.	   To	   fill	   the	   gap	   between	   the	   fantasy	   and	   the	   reality	   .	   .	   .	   a	   different	   form	  of	  
power	  is	  required,	  often	  entering	  the	  state	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  militarization	  of	  the	  border	  (P.302).	  
	  
The	  regulatory	  tendency	  of	  labouralization	  is	  complemented	  by	  the	  control	  and	  defence-­‐
oriented	  approach	  of	  securitization.	  Security	  measures	  are	  justified	  in	  the	  name	  of	  liberty	  
and	  free	  circulation.	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As	  I	  conclude	  this	   last	  chapter	  on	  the	  three	  sets	  of	   logics	  and	  practices	  that	  inform	  
the	  governing	  of	   irregular	  migration	  in	  Spain,	   I	  want	  to	  insist	  on	  the	  complementary	  and	  
fragmented	  dimensions	  of	  these	  logics,	  which	  may	  otherwise	  appear	  as	  contradictory	  and	  
monolithic	   ensembles.	   In	   Chapter	   4,	   I	   began	   the	   analysis	   by	  mapping	   out	   the	   uncertain	  
emergence	   of	   irregular	   migration	   as	   an	   object	   of	   policy	   in	   the	   1980s,	   insisting	   on	   the	  
hesitant	  problematizations,	  contestations,	  and	  confusion.	  I	  then	  worked	  my	  way	  through	  
the	   three	   main	   logics	   informing	   Spanish	   immigration	   policy,	   summarizing	   them	   in	   an	  
artificially	  orderly	  manner	  to	  highlight	  their	  specificities.	  However,	  this	  strategy	  should	  not	  
lead	  the	  reader	  to	  consider	  them	  as	  three	  radically	  different	  logics.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	  
jump	   back	   into	   the	   “messy	   actualities”	   of	   governance	   (O’Malley,	   Weir,	   and	   Shearing	  
1997:504)	  through	  an	  engagement	  with	  the	  many	   layers	  and	  multiple	  dimensions	  of	  the	  
multi-­‐scalar	   and	   multi-­‐actor	   governing	   of	   irregular	   migration	   as	   it	   operates	   in	  
contemporary	  Spain.	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Chapter	  7	  
Multi-­‐Scalar	  Governing:	  	  







The	   previous	   chapters	   presented	   culturalization,	   labouralization,	   and	   securitization	  
separately	   for	   analytic	   purposes,	   but	   they	   are	   anything	   but	   discrete	   categories.	   This	  
chapter	   looks	  at	  the	   intersections	  between	  these	  sets	  of	   logics	  and	  practices	  as	  they	  are	  
deployed	  in	  the	  everyday	  governance	  of	   irregular	  migration.	  Based	  on	  the	  picture	  I	  have	  
painted	   so	   far,	   it	   appears	   that	   the	   culturalization	   logic	  decreased	   somewhat	   after	  2000,	  
and	   that	   despite	   an	   interest	   in	   labouralizing	  migration	   flows	   after	   2004,	   the	   temporary	  
policy	   settlement	   that	   stabilized	   at	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   twenty-­‐first	   century	   prioritized	   the	  
securitization	  of	   irregular	  migration.	   Indeed,	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  new	  millennium	  was	  
marked	  by	  a	  dramatic	  increase	  in	  surveillance	  and	  interceptions	  at	  the	  southern	  borders,	  
and	   this	   violent	   response	   to	   irregular	   migration	   led	   many	   scholars	   to	   insist	   on	   this	  
“Fortress”	   logic.	   While	   this	   linear	   representation	   accounts	   for	   some	   of	   the	   changes	   in	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policy	   preference,	   it	   is	   also	   simplistic.	   Indeed,	   while	   Spanish	   authorities	   were	   erecting	  
higher	   border	   fences	   in	   Ceuta	   and	   Melilla	   (Ferrer-­‐Gallardo	   2008;	   Moffette	   2010),	  
implementing	  the	  Integrated	  System	  of	  External	  Surveillance	  (SIVE)	  in	  the	  Gibraltar	  Strait	  
and	   the	   coasts	   of	   the	   Canary	   Islands	   (Carling	   2007),	   and	   participating	   in	   bilateral	   and	  
FRONTEX	  patrols	  at	  sea	  (Belguendouz	  2005;	  García	  Andrade	  2010),	  they	  were	  also	  leaving	  
a	   door	   open	   for	   irregular	  migrants	   by	   applying	   rather	   lax	   entry	   policies	   at	   international	  
airports.	   Indeed,	   lacking	   an	   effective	   recruitment	   strategy	   and	   wanting	   to	   satisfy	   the	  
demand	   for	   immigrant	   labour,	   Spanish	   authorities	   have	   facilitated	   the	   entry	   of	   (mostly)	  
Latin	   American	   “tourists”	   for	   years,	   knowing	   that	   many	   were	   entering	   the	   country	   to	  
reside	  and	  work	  irregularly	  (Izquierdo	  Escribano	  2012).	  
This	   strategy	   is	   one	   of	   displacing	   the	   borderwork;	   that	   is,	   a	   strategy	   of	   rescaling	  
much	  of	  the	  filtering	  work	  performed	  by	  borders	  and	  immigration	  selection	  across	  space	  
and	   time.	   In	   this	   context,	   the	   most	   extensive	   borderwork	   actually	   happens	   inside	   the	  
country:	   through	   the	   evaluation	   of	   irregular	   migrants’	   files	   when	   applying	   for	  
regularization	  years	  after	  crossing	  the	  border;	  through	  the	  constant	  policing	  of	  migrants	  in	  
the	   streets;	   and	   through	   the	   threat	   of	   deportation.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   follow	   this	  
borderwork	   as	   it	   moves	   inward	   and	   extends	   over	   time.	   I	   argue	   that	   facilitating	   entry,	  
policing	   the	   streets,	   regularizing	   “deserving	   immigrants,”	   and	   deporting	   “undesirable	  
foreigners”	  are	  complementary	  dimensions	  of	  a	  diffuse	  and	  flexible	  regime	  for	  governing	  
migration.	   I	   suggest	   that	   these	   practices	   amount	   to	   a	   form	   of	   governing	   that	   we	   can	  
conceptualize	  as	   the	  governing	  of	   immigration	   through	  probation.	  Despite	   the	  apparent	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contradictory	   logics	   informing	   these	   varied	   practices,	   they	   work	   together	   and	   create	   a	  
regime	   of	   migration	   management	   based	   on	   a	   long	   probationary	   period	   during	   which	  
migrants’	  desirability	  can	  be	  assessed	  and	  policed	  using	  many	  of	  the	  criteria	  described	  in	  
previous	   chapters.	   The	   governing	   of	   immigration	   through	   probation	   is	   a	   regime	   that	  
implies	  three	  interrelated	  dimensions:	  a	  spatial	  and	  temporal	  rescaling	  of	  borderwork;	  the	  
deployment	   of	   a	   zone	  of	   legal	   liminality	   that	   increases	   irregular	  migrants’	   deportability;	  
and	   the	   multi-­‐scalar	   use	   of	   discretion	   in	   the	   assessment	   of	   contested	   criteria	   of	  
desirability.	  
Spatial	  and	  Temporal	  Rescaling	  of	  Borderwork	  
The	  model	   for	   governing	  migration	   in	   Spain	   has	   always	   been	   a	   reactive	   one,	   organized	  
around	   the	  management	  of	   irregular	  migration	   (Cachón	  Rodríguez	  2009;	  Calavita	  2005).	  
Antonio	   Izquierdo	  Escribano	   (2012)	  dubbed	   it	   a	   “system	  of	   tolerated	   irregularity”	   (p.49)	  
but	   it	   is	   more	   accurate	   to	   call	   it	   a	   regime	   of	   encouraged	   “institutional	   irregularity”	  
(Calavita	   2005:45)	   since	   irregularity	   is	   not	   a	   residual	   consequence	   of	   an	   otherwise	  
effective	  immigration	  policy	  but	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  the	  regime.	  Indeed,	  Lorenzo	  Cachón	  
Rodríguez	   (2009)	  explains	   that	  “the	   legal	  channels	  are	   too	  narrow	  and	  slow	  to	  allow	  for	  
the	  circulation	  of	  the	  immigration	  needed	  by	  the	  labour	  market	  and	  [that]	  this	  leads	  to	  the	  
construction	  of	  a	  model	  based	  on	  the	  entry	  of	  immigrants	  …	  as	  undocumented	  that	  is	  later	  
‘compensated’	  by	  processes	  of	  regularizations”	  (p.117).	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Policy-­‐makers	   I	   interviewed	   also	   explained	   that	   all	   attempts	   at	   designing	   effective	  
recruitment	   programs	   throughout	   the	   1990s	   had	   failed.	   As	   discussed	   in	   the	   chapter	   on	  
labouralization,	  the	  main	  tool	  used	  then	  was	  the	  “Contingent	  of	  Authorizations	  for	  Foreign	  
Workers,”	   a	   quota	   for	   the	   recruitment	   of	   migrant	   workers	   set	   annually	   by	   the	  
government.	  From	  1993	  to	  1999	  however,	  it	  functioned	  as	  a	  means	  to	  regularize	  a	  yearly	  
average	  of	  20,000	  workers	  already	  living	  in	  Spain	  without	  the	  proper	  documentation,	  not	  
to	  attract	  new	   immigrants	   (Cachón	  Rodríguez	  2009).	  The	  model	  has	  always	  been	  one	   in	  
which	  migrants	  entered	  Spain,	  generally	  as	   tourists,	   lived	  and	  worked	   in	  Spain	   for	  years	  
avoiding	   detention	   and	   deportation,	   and	   potentially	   obtained	   temporary	   residence	   and	  
work	  permits	  through	  one	  of	  the	  avenues	  for	  regularization.	  According	  to	  policy-­‐makers	  I	  
interviewed,	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1990s	   many	   of	   their	   colleagues	   considered	   that	   border	   and	  
immigration	  controls	  were	  ineffective,	  that	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  gap	  between	  Spain’s	  attempt	  
at	  ordering	  migration	  flows	  and	  the	  result	  on	  the	  ground	  (Cornelius	  2004;	  Cornelius	  and	  
Tsuda	   2004),	   that	   the	   state	   was	   losing	   control	   (Sassen	   1996).	   This	   period	   saw	   the	  
development	  of	   the	  three	  complementary	  approaches	  to	   irregular	  migration	  analyzed	   in	  
this	  dissertation.	  	  
The	  debates	   that	   led	   to	   the	  adoption	  of	  a	  new	  and	  more	   liberal	  Alien	  Act	   in	  2000	  
(LOE	   4/2000),	   followed	   a	   few	   months	   later	   by	   a	   conservative	   counter-­‐reform	   (LOE	  
8/2000),	  can	  be	  read	  as	  a	  political	  struggle	  over	  the	  proper	  way	  to	  deal	  with	  this	  perceived	  
lack	  of	  control	  (Ruiz	  de	  Huidobro	  2006;	  Zapata-­‐Barrero	  2009).	  The	  electoral	  victory	  of	  the	  
Popular	  Party	   in	  2000,	  secured	  through	  calls	  for	  better	  border	  control	  and	  a	  hard	  stance	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on	  so-­‐called	  “illegal	  immigrants,”	  marked	  a	  clear	  shift	  toward	  a	  securitizing	  agenda,	  which	  
echoed	   a	   similar	   tendency	   at	   the	   European	   level	   and	   led	   to	   an	   exponential	   increase	   in	  
border	  and	  immigration	  controls	  (Calavita	  2003;	  Carling	  2007;	  Ferrero-­‐Turrión	  and	  López-­‐
Sala	   2012;	   Huysmans	   2006).	   This	   spectacular	   securitization	   of	   the	   Euro-­‐Mediterranean	  
border	  makes	  the	  metaphor	  of	  “Fortress	  Europe”	  compelling,	  but	  despite	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  
control,	  Spanish	  borders	  continue	  to	  work	  primarily	  as	  filters,	  selecting	  who	  can	  circulate,	  
how,	   and	   under	   what	   conditions	   based	   on	   an	   actuarial	   calculation	   of	   risks	   (Huysmans	  
2006;	  Rumford	  2006,	  2008;	  Walters	  2006).	   In	   fact,	   at	   the	  height	  of	   the	   securitization	  of	  
borders,	   the	  mesh	  of	   this	   filter	   at	   Spanish	   international	   airports	  was	   set	   rather	  wide	   to	  
facilitate	   the	   entry	   of	   irregular	   migrant	   workers,	   mainly	   Latin	   Americans	   travelling	   as	  
tourists.	  While	  the	  entry	  of	  hundreds	  of	   thousands	  of	  migrants	  as	  “tourists”	   in	   the	  early	  
2000s	  could	  be	  viewed,	  as	  a	  congressman	  put	  it	  to	  me,	  as	  “a	  total	  lack	  of	  control,”	  I	  argue	  
that	   it	   is	   more	   useful	   to	   study	   it	   as	   a	   rescaling	   of	   borderwork,	   a	   displacement	   that	  
contributes	   to	   the	   deployment	   of	   a	   spatial	   and	   temporal	   zone	   of	   probationary	   legal	  
liminality.	  
Displacing	  the	  Border:	  Multi-­‐Scalar	  Borderwork	  
It	  is	  now	  commonly	  accepted	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  that	  borders	  are	  not	  fixed	  lines	  in	  the	  
sand,	  and	  that	  if	  they	  ever	  were	  located	  at	  the	  limits	  of	  states’	  territories,	  they	  have	  now	  
been	  displaced.	  The	  rather	  extensive	  use	  of	  Étienne	  Balibar’s	  (2002)	  expression	  “borders	  
are	  everywhere”	  (p.80)	  as	  a	  shortcut	  gives	  an	  idea	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  notion	  has	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spread.	  Mark	  B.	  Salter	  (2008)	  is	  right	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  claim	  is	  exaggerated	  and	  we	  should	  
be	   careful	   not	   to	   lump	   together	   inspections	   performed	   at	   state	   border	   points	   by	  
authorized	  agents,	  surveillance	  technologies,	  and	  self-­‐governing.	  While	  I	  agree	  with	  Salter	  
(2008)	   that	   it	   is	   important	   to	   recognize	   that	   specific	   “border	   functions	   occur	   at	   specific	  
sites”	   (p.371),	   I	   think	  we	  also	  need	  to	  acknowledge	   that	   these	  sites	  have	  multiplied	  and	  
shifted,	   and	   are	   now	   diffuse	   and	   dispersed.	   There	   is	   an	   ever-­‐growing	   literature	   on	   the	  
extra-­‐territorialization	  of	  border	  controls	  (through	  visa	  regimes,	  bilateral	  and	  multilateral	  
patrols,	  interception	  technology,	  carrier	  sanctions,	  offshore	  processing	  of	  asylum	  seekers)	  
and	   internalized	   border	   and	   immigration	   control	   (border	   patrols	   within	   the	   national	  
territory,	   immigration	   raids,	   gatekeepers	   preventing	   access	   to	   services).107	   While	   it	   is	  
important	   to	   distinguish	   them	   analytically	   and	   discuss	   their	   empirical	   specificities,	   I	  
contend	  that	   it	   is	  useful	   to	  consider	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  practices	  as	  contributing	   to	  various	  
forms	  of	  borderwork.	  
Another	  well-­‐established	  thesis	  in	  border	  studies	  is	  that	  borders	  do	  not	  act	  as	  walls,	  
but	   as	   filters	   selecting	   who	   and	   what	   can	   circulate,	   how,	   and	   for	   what	   purposes	  
(Huysmans	  2006;	  Berg	  and	  Ehin	  2006;	  Rumford	  2006,	  2008).	  For	  Chris	  Rumford,	  this	  has	  
an	  implication	  for	  how	  we	  analyze	  borders.	  He	  claims	  that	  “seeing	  borders	  as	  ‘asymmetric	  
membranes’	  allows	  us	  to	  study	  borders	  as	  diffuse,	  differentiated	  and	  networked	  and	  is	  a	  
prerequisite	  for	  understanding	  the	  dynamics	  of	  borderwork”	  performed	  by	  various	  actors,	  
                                                
107	  The	  literature	  on	  this	  topic	  is	  vast.	  For	  a	  general	  overview,	  see,	  among	  others,	  Lahav	  and	  Guiraudon	  2000,	  
Rumford	  2006,	  and	  Weber	  2006.	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at	  various	  scales	  (Rumford	  2008:3).	  This	  proposition	  is	  important,	  because	  by	  focusing	  on	  
the	  borderwork	  performed	  by	  various	  actors	  dispersed	   through	  space	  and	   time,	  we	  can	  
move	   away	   from	   a	   conception	   of	   borders	   as	   objects	   to	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   complex	   and	  
dynamic	   articulations	   of	   bordering	  practices.	   Indeed,	   as	   geographers	   Henk	   van	  Houtum	  
and	   Ton	   van	   Naerssen	   (2002)	   have	   argued,	   “the	   word	   ‘borders’	   unjustly	   assumes	   that	  
places	  are	  fixed	  in	  space	  and	  time,	  and	  should	  rather	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  bordering,	  
as	   .	   .	   .	   ongoing	   strategic	   effort[s]	   to	  make	   a	   difference	   in	   space”	   (p.126).	   Following	   this	  
research	  agenda,	   some	  scholars	  working	  within	  a	   relational	   framework	  have	   shifted	   the	  
attention	   away	   from	   the	   formal	   filtering	   work	   performed	   by	   borders	   and	   immigration	  
selection	  to	  questions	  of	  cultural	  and	  personal	  bordering,	  and	  to	  a	  focus	  on	  what	  borders	  
mean	   for	   people	   (Berg	   and	   van	  Houtum	  2003;	   Linde-­‐Laursen	   2010;	   Paasi	   2013).	  Others	  
have	   kept	   the	   focus	   on	   the	   borderwork	   itself,	   but	   extended	   the	   analysis	   to	   non-­‐state	  
actors	  such	  as	  private	  corporations	  and	  citizens	  (Rumford	  2008).	  	  
The	  main	  contribution	  of	  the	  critical	  border	  studies	  scholarship	  for	  an	  understanding	  
of	  the	  governing	  of	  immigration	  through	  probation	  is	  its	  claim	  that	  in	  order	  to	  account	  for	  
borders	  as	  diffuse,	  networked	  and	  differentiated,	  we	  need	  to	  go	  beyond	  an	  examination	  
of	  the	  changing	  location	  of	  borders,	  and	  ask	  who	  performs	  the	  borderwork,	  where,	  when,	  
and	   according	   to	   what	   logics	   (Rumford	   2008).	   As	   I	   have	   explained,	   since	   the	   Spanish	  
authorities	   have	   facilitated	   the	   entry	   of	   some	   migrants	   travelling	   as	   ‘tourists’	   at	  
international	  airports,	  and	  since	  other	   irregular	  migrants	  get	   in	  by	  other	  means,	  most	  of	  
the	  filtering	  work	  performed	  by	  borders	  and	  immigration	  selection	  takes	  place	  inside	  the	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country.	  This	  borderwork	  is	  performed	  at	  various	  sites	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  actors	  according	  to	  
various	  and	  at	  times	  contradictory	  logics.	  	  
As	  we	  will	   see	   in	  detail	  below,	  these	  actors	   form	  a	  broad	  network:	  National	  Police	  
officers	  who	  work	  at	  borders	   and	  decide	  whether	  or	  not	   someone	  entering	  as	   a	   tourist	  
should	   be	   let	   in,	   municipal	   civil	   servants	   who	   judge	   whether	   an	   immigrant’s	   proof	   of	  
address	   is	   sufficient	   to	   be	   registered	   on	   the	  municipal	   registry,	  municipal	   civil	   servants	  
who	   assess	   an	   immigrant’s	   integration	   at	   the	   moment	   of	   writing	   their	   report	   for	  
regularization,	   civil	   servants	  at	   the	   level	  of	   the	  autonomous	   community	  who	  assess	   this	  
report,	   civil	   servants	   at	   the	   Ministry	   of	   the	   Interior	   who	   have	   the	   final	   word	   on	  
regularization,	  National	  Police	  officers	  who	  patrol	  the	  streets	  and	  conduct	  identity	  checks,	  
judges	  who	  rule	  on	  internment	  and	  on	  whether	  a	  deportation	  order	  is	  valid,	  and	  National	  
Police	   officers	   working	   in	   immigration	   detention	   centres	   (Centros	   de	   Internamiento	   de	  
Extranjeros	  –	  CIEs).	   To	   these,	  we	   could	  add	  other	  actors	   such	  as	  employers	  who	  decide	  
whether	  or	  not	  to	  employ	  someone	  irregularly	  during	  the	  first	  few	  years	  that	  they	  have	  to	  
work	  without	  a	  permit,	  the	  same	  or	  other	  employers	  who	  later	  decide	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  
provide	  an	  official	  work	  offer	  to	  help	  migrants	  regularize	  their	  status,	  NGOs	  and	  cultural	  or	  
religious	  organizations	  that	  might	  write	  a	   letter	  or	  certificate	  to	  help	  an	   immigrant	  get	  a	  
favourable	   integration	   report,	   and	  many	  more.	   This	   rescaling	   of	   borderwork	   at	   various	  
sites	  inside	  the	  country	  is	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  legal	  liminality	  and	  differential	  inclusion	  of	  
immigrants,	   and	   this	  differential	   inclusion	   is	   conversely	  actively	   reproduced	   through	   the	  
continuous	  and	  dispersed	  assessment	  of	  desirability.	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Temporal	  Rescaling:	  Bordering	  a	  Probationary	  Period	  
Each	  of	  these	  sites	  where	  borderwork	  occurs	  can	  also	  be	  analyzed	  temporally.	  Indeed,	  as	  
expressions	   such	   as	   “over-­‐staying	   a	   visa,”	   “expiration	   of	   a	   work	   permit”	   or	   “maximum	  
period	   of	   detention	   before	   release”	  make	   explicit,	   the	   blurring	   of	   legality	   and	   illegality	  
involved	   in	   legal	   liminality	   also	   has	   an	   important	   temporal	   dimension	   (Mezzadra	   and	  
Neilson	   2013).	   Yet,	   the	   spatial	   dimension	   of	   migration	   has	   often	   over-­‐shadowed	   the	  
temporal	  dimension	  in	  migration	  studies,	  despite	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  
generational	  aspect	  of	   integration	  and	  some	  work	  on	   the	  periodization	  of	   the	  history	  of	  
international	  migrations	   (Griffiths	  et	  al.	  2013).	  There	   is	  a	  growing	   interest	   in	  considering	  
time	   in	  migration,	  but	   the	   research	  often	   focuses	  on	   the	   temporalities	  of	  mobilities	  and	  
migration	   journeys,	   or	   time	   as	   experienced	   by	  migrants.	  Within	   this	   literature,	  Melanie	  
Griffiths’	  (2013a)	  analysis	  of	  the	  lived	  experience	  of	  frenzied,	  decelerating,	  and	  suspended	  
time	  by	  failed	  asylum	  seekers	  and	  detained	  migrants	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  is	  particularly	  
insightful	   for	   a	   conceptualization	  of	   probation.	   So	   is	   the	   literature	  on	   the	  experience	  of	  
waiting	   (Jeffrey	   2008;	   Kobelinsky	   2010;	   Makaremi	   2011),	   and	   on	   temporariness	   and	  
uncertainty	   (Bailey	   et	   al.	   2002;	   [Bridget]	   Anderson	   2010;	  Griffiths	   2013b;	  Hyndman	   and	  
Giles	  2011;	  Mountz	  2011;	  Mountz	  et	  al.	  2002;	  Simmelink	  2011).	  	  	  
Indeed,	  temporariness	  and	  suspended	  or	  decelerating	  time	  are	  two	  central	  aspects	  
of	   probation.	   In	   line	   with	   the	   older	   literature	   on	   waiting	   in	   general	   (Schwartz	   1974;	  
Sellerberg	   2008),	   research	   on	  migration	   and	   suspended	   time	   provides	   insights	   into	   the	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impact	   of	   these	   dimensions	   of	   time	   on	   migrants	   (the	   experience	   of	   “being	   stuck,”	   of	  
“wasting	  time”),	  but	  it	  rarely	  considers	  this	  slowing	  down	  of	  time	  as	  a	  governmental	  tactic.	  
In	   fact,	   slowness,	   delays,	   and	   bureaucratic	   “red-­‐tape”	   are	   often	   seen	   as	   organizational	  
problems	  due	  to	  the	  complexity	  of	  modern	  democracies,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  technologies	  of	  
government	  deployed	   intentionally.	   If	  we	  are	   to	  understand	   the	  use	  of	  probation	   in	   the	  
governing	  of	  migration,	  we	  need	  to	  grasp	  the	  ways	  slowness	  and	  suspended	  time	  operates	  
as	  a	  tactic	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  residual	  effect.	  	  
Roos	   Pijpers	   (2011)	   looks	   at	   slowness	   in	   this	   light.	   Studying	   how	   “labour	   pools	   of	  
migrant	  workers”	   from	  new	  European	  member	   states	  are	  organized	  by	   temporary	  work	  
agencies	   that	   specialize	   in	   providing	   “just-­‐in-­‐time”	   workers	   to	   corporations,	   she	   (2011)	  
suggests:	  	  
A	   perhaps	   provocative	   but	   nonetheless	   important	   question	   to	   ask,	   bearing	   in	   mind	   the	  
observed	   inertia	  and	  bureaucratic	   slowness,	   is	  whether	   the	  migration	  state	  actually	   functions	  
by	  virtue	  of	  waiting.	  Is	  waiting	  just	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  state	  institutions	  and	  bureaucracies	  or	  might	  
it	  be	  a	  tactic,	  a	  management	  technique	  that	  is	  not	  outside	  but	  fully	  part	  of	  the	  state,	  struggling	  
as	  it	  does	  to	  strike	  a	  balance	  between	  sedentarist	  and	  flexible	  ideologies?	  (P.432)	  
	  
Building	  from	  a	  segmented	  labour	  market	  approach	  (Massey	  et	  al.	  1993),	  she	  argues	  that	  
in	   the	  management	  of	  migrant	  workers,	  we	  need	   to	  consider	  both	  spatial	  and	   temporal	  
bordering.	  This	  temporal	  dimension	  of	  bordering	  is	  made	  obvious	  in	  the	  increase	  of	  states’	  
reliance	  on	  temporary	  foreign	  workers	  (Anderson	  2007;	  Goldring	  and	  Landolt	  2013)	  who	  
are	  authorized	  to	  cross	  the	  border	  and	  work	  in	  a	  country	  for	  only	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time.	  
But	  temporal	  bordering	  can	  also	  be	  used	  when	  workers	  are	  already	  inside	  the	  country.	  For	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instance,	   Xiang	   Biao	   (2006)	   discusses	   the	   practice	   of	   “benching”	   whereby	   information	  
technology	  consultant	   firms	   in	   India	  regularly	  take	  some	  of	  their	  workers	  off	   the	  market	  
for	  a	  certain	  period	  of	   time	  to	  create	  a	  demand	  and	   increase	  the	  price	   for	   their	  service.	  
Not	   unlike	   the	   workers	   studied	   by	   Pijpers,	   these	   information	   technology	   workers	   are	  
“benched,”	  that	  is,	  kept	  aside	  as	  a	  pool	  of	  reservist	  workers.	  Mezzadra	  and	  Neilson	  (2013)	  
discuss	   this	  practice	  as	  a	   case	  of	   temporal	  bordering	  understood	  as	   “the	  deployment	  of	  
technologies	   of	   temporal	   delay	   and	   filtering	   [that]	   has	   become	   central	   to	   the	   spatial	  
functioning	  of	  many	  of	  the	  world’s	  most	  contested	  borders	  [but	  that	  does]	  not	  necessarily	  
coincide	  with	  territorial	  borders	  and	  their	  various	  extensions	  and	  extra-­‐territorializations”	  
(p.138).	   They	  analyze	  not	  only	   temporary	  work	  permits	   and	   flexible	  employment	   in	   this	  
light,	   but	   also	   immigration	   detention	   as	   a	   decompression	   chamber	   that	   allows	   for	   the	  
“benching”	   of	   illegalized	   migrant	   workers	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   needs	   of	   the	   labour	  
market	  (Mezzadra	  and	  Neilson	  2003,	  2013).	  
While	  this	  claim	  may	  be	  hard	  to	  prove	  in	  most	  places,	  and	  I	  certainly	  do	  not	  have	  any	  
empirical	   evidence	   to	   suggest	   that	   detention	   is	   used	   as	   a	   decompression	   chamber	   in	  
Spain,	  the	  practice	  of	  allocating	  temporary	  work	  permits	  to	  regularized	  migrants	  in	  Spain	  
can	  usefully	  be	  studied	  through	  Mezzadra	  and	  Neilson’s	  framework.	  Indeed,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
regularization	  through	  arraigo	  social,	  irregular	  migrants	  need	  to	  spend	  at	  least	  three	  years	  
surviving	  without	  residence	  or	  work	  permit	  before	  they	  can	  present	  an	  official	  work	  offer	  
valid	  for	  at	  least	  one	  year	  as	  a	  partial	  condition	  for	  regularization.	  After	  an	  apprenticeship	  
in	  “illegality”	  (De	  Genova	  2002)	  of	  three	  years,	  they	  move	  to	  a	  less	  precarious	  position	  as	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temporary	   legalized	   workers,	   but	   their	   regularized	   status	   beyond	   the	   first	   year	   is	  
contingent	  on	  the	  renewal	  of	  the	  work	  offer	  for	  another	  two	  years,	  and	  then	  two	  more.	  
The	  capacity	  to	  retain	  a	  status	  as	  authorized	  immigrant	  worker	  is	  thus	  contingent	  on	  one’s	  
utility	  to	  the	  labour	  market.	  	  
My	  interest	  in	  conceptualizing	  the	  use	  of	  a	  temporal	  rescaling	  of	  borderwork	  in	  the	  
flexible	   governing	   of	   immigrants	   does	   not,	   however,	   solely	   lie	   in	   its	   usefulness	   for	   the	  
labour	   market.	   It	   is	   not	   so	   much	   temporal	   bordering	   as	   a	   means	   to	   create	   a	   new	  
temporally	   and	   spatially	   bounded	   reserve	   army	   of	   labour	   (Balibar	   2009;	  Mezzadra	   and	  
Neilson	   2013)	   that	   interests	   me.	   Rather,	   my	   focus	   is	   on	   the	   temporal	   extension	   of	  
borderwork	   beyond	   the	   territorial	   border,	   creating	   a	   space-­‐period	   of	   probation	   that	  
literally	   gives	   time	   and	   space	   for	   various	   institutional	   actors	   to	   engage	   in	   an	   in-­‐depth	  
assessment	   of	   desirability	   based	   on	   a	   variety	   of	   legal,	   cultural,	   social,	   and	   economic	  
criteria.	  And	  while	  this	  temporal	  dimension	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  risk	  management	  has	  been	  the	  
object	   of	   research	   on	   externalized	   and	   pre-­‐emptive	   control	   (see	   [Ben]	   Anderson	   2010;	  
Rumford	   2006;	  Weber	   2006),	   the	   temporality	   of	   what	   we	   could	   call,	   albeit	   awkwardly,	  
post-­‐emptive	  or	  post	  factum	  screening	  is	  less	  often	  the	  object	  of	  scrutiny.	  The	  governing	  
of	   immigration	   through	   probation	   in	   Spain	   makes	   use	   of	   this	   spatial	   and	   temporal	  
rescaling	  of	  borderwork.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  decisions	  involved	  in	  selecting	  or	  rejecting	  a	  
candidate	  for	  immigration	  happens	  not	  mainly	  pre-­‐emptively	  and	  externally	  through	  visas	  
or	  immigration	  applications	  completed	  in	  the	  country	  of	  origin,	  nor	  primarily	  at	  the	  border	  
check	   point	  when	   and	  where	   documents	   and	   intents	   are	   scrutinized,	   but	   internally	   and	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after	   crossing	   the	  border.	   The	   risk	  management	   logic	  of	   governmental	  power	   is	  not	   the	  
sole	  prerogative	  of	  future-­‐oriented	  anticipatory	  action	  and	  vision	  ([Ben]	  Anderson	  2010);	  
it	   is	   also	  enacted	   through	   the	   continuous	   assessment	  of	   performance	  and	   risks	   and	   the	  
management	   of	   population	   in	   the	   present.	   This	   is	   certainly	   the	   case	   in	   contemporary	  
Spain,	  where	  a	  relative	  facility	  of	  entry	  for	  some	  migrants	  at	  international	  airports	  and	  the	  
displacement	  of	  much	  of	  the	  work	  performed	  by	  borders	  and	  immigration	  selection	  across	  
space	  and	  time	  contribute	  to	  the	  governing	  of	  migration	  through	  probation.	  
Facilitating	  Entry	  and	  Extending	  Borderwork	  
It	   is	   hard	   to	   know	   whether	   the	   Spanish	   authorities	   deliberately	   chose	   to	   facilitate	   the	  
entry	   of	   Latin	   American	   irregular	   migrants.	   Interviews	   I	   conducted	   with	   high-­‐level	  
bureaucrats	  suggest	  that,	  in	  the	  early	  2000s,	  the	  decision	  to	  postpone	  the	  imposition	  of	  a	  
short-­‐stay	   visa	  on	   the	  hundreds	  of	   thousands	  of	   Ecuadorian	   (and	  other	   Latin	  American)	  
“tourists”	  who	  were	  known	  to	  be	  migrants	  was	  based	  on	  a	  series	  of	  factors.	  Among	  these,	  
the	   failure	   to	   anticipate	   such	   important	  migration	   flows	   and	   the	  diplomatic	   difficulty	   of	  
imposing	  visas	  on	  citizens	  of	  former	  colonies	  appear	  central.	  But	  interviewees	  also	  pointed	  
to	   the	   Popular	   government’s	   desire	   to	   lower	   the	   proportion	   of	   Moroccan	   immigrants	  
(historically	  the	  most	  numerous	  group),	  and	  the	  necessity	  to	  provide	  immigrant	  labour	  to	  
the	  booming	  economy	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  effective	  recruitment	  program.	  As	  a	  high-­‐level	  
bureaucrat	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	  explained:	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You	  can’t	  simply	  pass	  from	  zero	  control	  to	  full	  control	  without	  creating	  a	  crisis.	  Even	  when	  we	  
cracked	   down	   on	   illegal	   employment	   in	   agriculture	   after	   the	   deaths	   of	   Ecuadorians	  workers,	  
and	  everyone	  agreed	  it	  was	  a	  good	  thing,	  well	  this	  led	  to	  workers	  leaving	  the	  fields,	  and	  we	  had	  
to	  regularize	  them	  to	  compensate	  for	  stricter	  control	  otherwise	  the	  harvest	  would	  have	  been	  
threatened.108	  
	  
His	   explanation	   of	   what	   he	   referred	   to	   as	   “difficulties	   in	   putting	   order	   in	   immigration”	  
exposes	   a	   contradiction	   common	   to	   other	   countries:	   the	   need	   to	   satisfy	   a	   conservative	  
electoral	  base	  that	  supports	  a	  tough	  stance	  on	  irregular	  migration,	  while	  not	  upsetting	  the	  
employers	   who	   rely	   heavily	   on	   immigrant	   labour	   (for	   various	   cases,	   see	   Calavita	   1989;	  
Cornelius	  and	  Tsuda	  2004;	  López-­‐Sala	  2005;	  Wihtol	  de	  Wenden	  1992).	  To	  a	  great	  extent,	  
this	  contradiction	  is	  why	  Spanish	  authorities	  waited	  to	  lobby	  the	  European	  Commission	  for	  
the	   imposition	   of	   a	   Schengen	   visa	   on	   Ecuador	   (2003)	   and	   Bolivia	   (2007),	   the	   two	  main	  
sources	  of	  irregular	  migration	  at	  the	  time.	  
What	  is	  certain	  is	  that	  the	  government	  was	  aware	  that	  these	  “tourists”	  provided	  the	  
bulk	   of	   Spain’s	   new	   immigrants.	   An	   Ecuadorian	   consul	   to	   Spain	   shared	   this	   view,	  
explaining:	  
The	   Ecuadorian	   population	   arrived	   by	   air	   at	   the	   Barajas	   Airport,	   this	   is	   to	   say	   there	   was	   an	  
opening.	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  authorities	  were	  aware	  of	  what	  was	  happening,	  but	  because	  of	  the	  
conditions	  of	  the	  labour	  market	  .	  .	  .	  the	  need	  for	  workers	  .	  .	  .	  the	  fact	  that	  various	  sectors	  of	  the	  
Spanish	   society	   would	   allow	   the	   presence	   of	   this	   group,	   this	   led	   to	   facilitating	   the	   entry.	  
Otherwise,	   you	   cannot	   explain	   that	   3	   or	   4	   planes	   arrived	   everyday	   and	   left	   empty	   .	   .	   .	   It’s	  
possible	  that	  they	  said	  that	  there	  was	  control	  while	  knowing	  that	   in	  fact,	  about	  1100	  persons	  
entered	  daily	  from	  Ecuador,	  and	  of	  these	  only	  20	  or	  30	  left	   .	   .	   .	  There	  were	  zones	  where	  they	  
                                                
108	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  October	  4,	  2012.	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needed	  this	  labour	  force	  and	  where	  it	  was	  essential	  to	  be	  able	  to	  count	  on	  this	  contribution.	  I	  
think	  this	  is	  what	  permitted	  the	  entry	  of	  these	  [Ecuadorian]	  citizens.109	  
	  
Yearly	  statistics	  available	  at	  the	  time	  confirm	  these	  assertions.	  As	  I	  explained	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  
we	   can	   estimate	   the	   number	   of	   irregular	   migrants	   living	   in	   Spain	   by	   subtracting	   the	  
number	  of	  foreigners	  with	  residence	  permits	  from	  the	  total	  of	  all	  non-­‐EU	  nationals	  on	  the	  
municipal	  registry.	   In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Ecuadorians	  alone,	  this	  method	  reveals	  an	  increase	  
of	  around	  100,000	  new	  irregular	  residents	  from	  1999	  to	  2000,	  67,000	  more	  in	  2001,	  and	  
another	   100,000	  more	   by	   January	   of	   2002,	   and	   this	   despite	   two	   collective	   processes	   of	  
regularization	  held	   in	  2000	  and	  2001	  (Izquierdo	  Escribano	  2012:87).	   In	  addition	  to	  these	  
statistics,	   Spanish	   authorities	   also	   had	   access	   to	   police	   reports	   estimating	   that	   in	   2002	  
alone	   101,432	   Ecuadorians	   entered	   the	   country	   and	   only	   874	   left	   (Rodríguez	   2003).	   By	  
November	   2002,	   the	   numbers	   were	   so	   high	   that	   the	   government	   decided	   to	   ask	   the	  
European	   Commission	   to	   impose	   a	   Schengen	   visa	   on	   Ecuadorians,	   a	   policy	   that	   was	  
implemented	   in	   the	   summer	   of	   2003	   and	   led	   to	   a	   drastic	   decrease	   in	   the	   number	   of	  
entries.	   Indeed,	   the	   European	   Migration	   Network	   estimated	   that	   while	   the	   monthly	  
average	   of	   entries	   in	   the	   6	   months	   prior	   to	   the	   imposition	   of	   the	   visa	   was	   of	   12,132	  
Ecuadorians,	   this	  number	  dropped	   to	  4,903	   in	   the	  6	  months	   following	   the	   imposition	  of	  
the	  visa	  (Red	  Europea	  de	  Migraciones	  2011).	  	  
                                                
109	   I	   would	   like	   to	   thank	   Antonio	   Izquierdo	   for	   granting	   me	   access	   to	   the	   transcription	   of	   this	   interview	  
conducted	  in	  2007	  by	  members	  of	  the	  Equipo	  Sociológico	  sobre	  las	  Migraciones	  Internacionales	  (ESOMI)	  at	  
the	  Universidade	  da	  Coruña.	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But	  why	  not	  target	  other	  Latin	  American	  countries?	  After	  all,	  according	  to	  the	  same	  
police	  estimates,	   it	  was	  not	  only	  Ecuadorians	  who	  entered	  as	  tourists	  and	  did	  not	   leave.	  
For	   all	   Latin	   Americans,	   there	   were	   86,000	   departures	   for	   550,000	   entries	   (Rodríguez	  
2003).110	   For	   a	   government	   that	   securitized	   immigration	   and	   prided	   itself	   on	   its	   strict	  
border	   control	   and	   aggressive	   expulsion	   policies,	   this	   is	   somewhat	   surprising.	   However,	  
considering	   that	   stricter	   immigration	   control	   at	   the	   border	   would	   need	   to	   be	  
complemented	   by	   a	   functioning	   recruitment	   strategy,	   this	   policy	   appears	   less	  
contradictory.	   Indeed,	   in	   the	   same	   period,	   the	   annual	   quotas	   to	   legally	   recruit	   foreign	  
workers,	  the	  contingents,	  were	   incredibly	   low.	   In	  1999,	  the	   last	  year	  that	  the	  contingent	  
could	  be	  used	  to	  regularize	  workers	  already	  in	  Spain,	  the	  quota	  was	  16,264.111	  In	  2000	  and	  
2001,	  because	  there	  were	  already	  collective	  processes	  of	  regularization	  underway,	  not	  a	  
single	   permit	  was	   granted	   through	   the	   contingent.	   Then	   in	   2002,	   the	   quota	  was	   set	   at	  
31,979,	   of	  which	  21,095	  were	   to	  be	   attributed	   for	   short	   duration	   seasonal	  work,	   but	   in	  
fact	   only	   11,064	  workers	  were	   eventually	   incorporated	   in	   the	  workforce	   through	   these	  
permits,	   almost	   all	   of	   them	   seasonal.	   This	   situation	  was	   repeated	   in	   2003	  when	   34,157	  
permits	  were	  announced,	  69%	  of	  which	  were	  seasonal	  permits,	  but	  later	  only	  18,075	  were	  
finally	  issued,	  82%	  of	  them	  seasonal	  (Cachón	  Rodríguez	  2009:185-­‐189).	  	  
                                                
110	   It	   is	  not	   known	  whether	   the	  86,000	  departures	   came	   from	   the	  550,000	  entries.	   It	   is	   also	  possible	   that	  
some	  of	  the	  tourists	  who	  entered	  the	  European	  Union	  through	  Spain	  left	  through	  another	  country,	  but	  this	  
is	   as	   likely	   as	   tourists	   entering	   through	   another	   country	   and	   leaving	   through	   Spain,	   and	   this	   possibility	  
cannot	  account	  for	  such	  an	  important	  gap.	  
111	  Since	  2000,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  turn	  the	  quota	  system	  into	  a	  real	  recruitment	  tool,	  foreign	  workers	  can	  only	  
apply	  for	  a	  permit	  from	  outside	  the	  country.	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After	  the	  election	  of	  a	  Socialist	  government	  in	  2004,	  the	  possibility	  of	  entering	  Spain	  
with	   residence	   and	   work	   permits	   in	   hand	   increased	   slightly.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	  
reintroduction	   of	   the	   General	   Regime	   (Régimen	   general)	   allowed	   employers	   to	   recruit	  
individual	  migrant	  workers	   abroad	   to	   take	  on	  positions	   classified	   as	   “hard	   to	   fill”	   in	   the	  
Catálogo	   de	   puestos	   de	   trabajo	   de	   difícil	   cobertura	   (provided	   that	   employers	   know	   of	  
potential	  migrants	  abroad	  willing	   to	   take	   this	   job).112	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	  number	  of	  
permits	   attributed	   through	   the	  quota	   system	  also	   increased	   slightly,	   although	   it	   did	  not	  
become	   significant	   until	   2007,	   and	   permits	   are	   still	   attributed	   mainly	   for	   short-­‐term	  
seasonal	  work	  (Cachón	  Rodríguez	  2009:185-­‐189).	  	  
During	  this	  period	  of	  economic	  boom,	  this	  was	  highly	  insufficient.	  As	  a	  result,	  other	  
“tourists,”	   mainly	   Bolivians	   and	   Argentines,	   but	   also	   by	   then	   Romanians,	   replaced	  
Ecuadorians	   as	   incoming	   irregular	   migrants,	   and	   soon	   enough	   airplanes	   of	   Bolivian	  
“tourists”	  started	  landing	  full	  and	  leaving	  empty,	  reaching	  a	  peak	  of	  several	  flights	  per	  day	  
in	  the	  weeks	  prior	  to	  the	  delayed	  imposition	  of	  a	  short-­‐stay	  visa	  on	  Bolivians	  in	  2007.	  As	  a	  
result,	   the	   total	   number	   of	   Bolivians	   on	   the	   municipal	   registry	   grew	   from	   28,432	  
individuals	   in	   2003	   to	   242,496	   in	   January	   2008,	   before	   going	   down	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	  
imposition	  of	  the	  visa,	  and	  the	  gradual	  access	  of	  Bolivians	  to	  regularization	  and	  eventually	  
citizenship	   (Instituto	   Nacional	   de	   Estadísticas	   2013).	   Carmen	   González-­‐Enríquez	   (2009)	  
estimated	   that,	   “At	   the	   beginning	   of	   2008	   those	   from	   Argentina,	   Bolivia,	   Brazil,	   Chile,	  
Colombia,	   Mexico,	   Paraguay,	   Uruguay	   and	   Venezuela	   entailed	   two	   thirds	   of	   the	   whole	  
                                                
112	  The	  Catalogue	  of	  Jobs	  Hard	  to	  Fill	  is	  a	  yearly	  assessment	  of	  the	  needs	  for	  foreign	  workers	  per	  sector.	  
 253	  
irregular	  immigration”	  (p.27).	  She	  adds	  that	  Bolivians	  and	  Argentines	  contribute	  the	  most	  
to	   this	   number	   at	   the	   time,	   with	   165,000	   and	   99,000	   individuals	   in	   administrative	  
irregularity	   respectively	   in	   2008.	   This	   represents	   a	   level	   of	   irregularity	   of	   70%	   among	  
Bolivians	  and	  51%	  among	  Argentines.	  In	  absolute	  numbers,	  they	  were	  followed	  by	  79,000	  
Brazilians	   residing	   without	   permits	   (67%	   of	   all	   Brazilian	   residents),	   52,000	   Paraguayans	  
(79%	  of	   all	   Paraguayan	   residents),	   30,000	  Uruguayans	   (49%	  of	   all	  Uruguayan	   residents),	  
and	   27,000	   Venezuelans	   (45%	   of	   all	   Venezuelan	   residents)	   (González-­‐Enríquez	   2009:27-­‐
28).113	  	  
Many	   officials	   I	   interviewed,	   as	   well	   as	   conservative	   politicians	   and	   journalists	  
promoting	   anti-­‐migrant	   legislations	   in	   the	  media,	   tend	   to	   frame	   this	   situation	   as	   a	   total	  
lack	  of	  control.	  For	  instance,	  when	  asked	  why	  he	  thought	  visas	  were	  not	  imposed	  on	  more	  
countries	   earlier,	   a	   spokesperson	   for	   the	   Sindicato	  Unificado	   de	   Policía	   (SUP),	   the	  main	  
police	  union	  whose	  members	  include	  officers	  working	  at	  airport	  customs,	  claimed:	  	  
The	  government	  was	  acting	  impulsively.	  We	  took	  action	  on	  immigration	  depending	  on	  how	  was	  
the	   economy,	   depending	   on	   the	   political	   situation,	   on	   third	   countries.	   And	   this	   is	   not	   the	  
appropriate	   way.	   I	   mean,	   you	   can’t	   combat	   migration	   flows	   through	   improvisation.	   That	   is:	  
today	  it’s	  convenient	  to	  bring	  in	  people,	  we	  let	  them	  in	  to	  do	  what	  they	  want,	  later	  we	  end	  up	  
with	  a	  big	  pocket	  of	  irregular	  immigrants	  .	  .	  .	  and	  we	  regularize	  them.	  There	  was	  no	  strategy,	  no	  
effective	  control.114	  
	  
But	  whether	  the	  relative	  facility	  of	  entry	  by	  air	  for	  some	  migrants	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  policy	  
design	  or	  a	  policy	  failure—and	  the	  data	  shows	  that	  it	  is	  a	  mix	  of	  both—these	  practices	  do	  
                                                
113	   The	   ratio	   of	   irregularity	   among	   Bolivians	   is	   particularly	   striking	   considering	   that	   many	   of	   those	   with	  
residence	  permits	  have	  obtained	  them	  through	  regularization	  in	  2005	  and	  before	  (see	  Finotelli	  and	  Arango	  
2011).	  
114	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  November	  5,	  2012.	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not	  amount	  to	  a	   lack	  of	  control.	  Rather,	   they	  are	  premised	  upon	  the	   logic	  of	  temporally	  
and	  spatially	  displacing	  control	  by	  letting	  many	  migrants	  in	  as	  “tourists”	  and	  tackling	  the	  
issue	  of	  immigration	  enforcement	  later	  and	  elsewhere	  through	  two	  distinct	  strategies:	  on	  
the	  one	  hand,	  the	  constant	  policing	  of	  immigrant	  neighbourhoods,	  preventive	  detention,	  
and	  attempts	  at	  deportation	  that	  force	  irregular	  migrants	  to	  live	  in	  fear,	  act	  discreetly,	  and	  
self-­‐police;	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   various	   paths	   to	   regularization	   that	   provide	   reasonable	  
prospects	  of	  obtaining	  residence	  and	  work	  permits	  for	   immigrants	  who	  live	  their	   lives	   in	  
an	  exemplary	  way,	  fulfilling	  the	  requirements	  set	  by	  the	  various	  levels	  of	  government.	  This	  
strategy	   effectively	   creates	   a	   regime	   of	   migration	   management	   based	   on	   a	   lengthy	  
probationary	  period	  during	  which	  migrants’	  desirability	  can	  be	  assessed	  and	  policed.	  The	  
buffer	  zone	  that	  the	  rescaling	  of	  borderwork	  creates	  is	  not	  only	  spatial	  but	  also	  temporal.	  
By	   simultaneously	   giving	   some	  migrants	   a	   chance	   to	   get	   in	   and	   try	   to	   prove	   that	   they	  
deserve	  to	  stay,	  and	  enabling	  border	  controls	  to	  occur	  beyond	  the	  time	  and	  space	  of	  the	  
physical	   border	   crossing,	   the	   rescaling	   of	   borderwork	   becomes	   instrumental	   in	   the	  
(re)production	  of	  this	  space-­‐time	  of	  probation.	  	  
Multi-­‐Scalar	  Assessment	  and	  the	  Multi-­‐Directionality	  of	  Immigration	  Governing	  
While	  I	  have	  thus	  far	  focused	  on	  the	  spatial	  and	  temporal	  dimensions	  of	  the	  rescaling	  of	  
borderwork,	   this	   rescaling	   also	   has	   a	   legal	   dimension.	   Indeed,	   the	   lengthy	   probationary	  
period	   is	  one	  characterized	  by	  what	   I	  have	  described	   in	  Chapter	  3	  as	   legal	   liminality	  and	  
inclusion	  through	   illegalization.	   In	   that	  chapter,	   I	  had	  discussed	  the	   legal	  construction	  of	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illegality	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   first	   Alien	   Act	   and	   had	   argued	   that	   liminal	  
legality	   should	   not	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   characteristic	   of	   individuals,	   but	   rather	   as	  
something	  that	  is	  deployed	  as	  a	  technology	  of	  government	  and	  is	  better	  described	  as	  legal	  
liminality.	  Here,	  I	  want	  to	  highlight	  the	  role	  that	  this	  legal	  liminality	  plays	  in	  the	  governing	  
of	  migrants	  through	  probation	  by	  keeping	  them	  in	  a	  situation	  of	  protracted	  deportability	  
and	  linking	  their	  ability	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  country	  to	  the	  administrative	  and	  juridical	  decisions	  
of	  various	  actors.	  
De	  Genova’s	  (2002,	  2004)	  concept	  of	  deportability	  points	  precisely	  to	  this	  situation	  
of	   precariousness	   that	   is	   created	  at	   the	  point	  of	   junction	  where	   legal	   liminality	   and	   the	  
possibility	   of	   border	   and	   immigration	   enforcement	   meet.	   For	   him,	   deportability	   and	  
precariousness	   are	   what	   characterizes	   what	   he	   calls	   the	   apprenticeship	   in	   “illegality.”	  
Indeed,	   he	   explains	   that	   the	   “legal	   production	   of	   ‘illegality’	   provides	   an	   apparatus	   for	  
sustaining	  .	  .	   .	  migrants’	  vulnerability	  and	  tractability—as	  workers—whose	  labour-­‐power,	  
inasmuch	  as	  it	  is	  deportable,	  becomes	  an	  imminently	  disposable	  commodity”	  (2004:161).	  
While	   this	   is	   true,	   I	   argue	   that	   we	   need	   to	   pay	   more	   attention	   to	   the	   term	  
“apprenticeship”	  and	  suggest	  that	  this	  apprenticeship	  in	  “illegality,”	  along	  with	  probation	  
more	  broadly,	  should	  be	  understood	  primarily	  as	  a	  period	  during	  which	  the	  desirability	  of	  
each	  migrant	  can	  be	  assessed	  and	  policed.	  This	  idea	  of	  assessment	  is	  key	  in	  providing	  an	  
account	   of	   precariousness	   and	   liminality	   that	   goes	   beyond	   the	   valid	   but	   obvious	  
argument,	   demonstrated	   in	   many	   instances,	   that	   “undocumented	   workers	   provide	  
capitalist	  economies	  with	  a	  source	  of	   labour	   that	   lacks	   the	  power	  of	  domestic	   labour	   to	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exact	  concessions	  from	  employers,”	  as	  Kitty	  Calavita	  (2003:400)	  has	  deplored.	  Indeed,	  the	  
notion	   of	   apprenticeship	   does	   not	   simply	   convey	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   mandatory	   period	   of	  
illegality	  or	  liminal	  legality,	  this	  legally	  produced	  precariousness	  allowing	  for	  exploitation,	  
although	  it	  is	  certainly	  the	  case	  in	  Spain	  (Cachón	  Rodríguez	  2009;	  Romero	  2010).	  It	  is	  also,	  
just	  like	  any	  internship,	  a	  moment	  of	  examination,	  a	  period	  of	  probation.	  The	  assessment	  
of	  the	  relative	  desirability	  of	  migrants	  during	  this	  period	  can	  be	  helpfully	  understood	  as	  a	  
dimension	  of	  borderwork	  performed	  at	  various	  sites	  by	  a	  range	  of	  actors	  wider	  than	  those	  
readily	  identifiable	  as	  border	  security	  professionals.	  	  
This	   internal	  borderwork	   is	  deployed	   in	  Spain	   through	   two	  sets	  of	   complementary	  
technologies	   of	   government	   that,	   following	   Jonathan	   X.	   Inda	   (2006),	   we	   can	   organize	  
analytically	   into	   two	   types:	   “technologies	   of	   citizenship”	   and	   “anti-­‐citizenship	  
technologies”	   (p.19).	   Inda	  explains	   that	  “technologies	  of	  citizenship”	  are	   technologies	  of	  
inclusion	   “that	   endeavour	   to	   reinsert	   the	   excluded	   into	   circuits	   of	   responsible	   self-­‐
management,	   to	   reconstitute	   them	   through	   activating	   their	   capacity	   for	   autonomous	  
citizenship”	   (p.19).	  Alongside	   these	  are	  “anti-­‐citizenship	   technologies	   .	   .	   .	   that	  deem	  the	  
exclusion	   of	   certain	   anti-­‐citizens	   to	   be	   unavoidable,	   and	   endeavor	   to	   regulate	   these	  
individuals	  .	  .	  .	  through	  operations	  that	  seek	  to	  contain	  the	  threats	  they	  and	  their	  actions	  
pose”	   (p.19-­‐20).	   In	   the	   governing	   of	   irregular	   migration	   in	   Spain,	   technologies	   of	  
citizenship	   include	   practices	   associated	   with	   municipal	   registration,	   regularization,	   and	  
integration,	   and	   are	   framed	   as	   being	   oriented	   toward	   inclusion.	   The	   assessment	   of	  
desirability	  through	  these	  practices	  is	  purportedly	  meant	  to	  select	  in	  responsible	  prudent	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migrants,	   while	   leaving	   the	   undesirable	   in	   their	   current	   situation.	   Conversely,	   identity	  
controls	  in	  the	  street,	  and	  even	  more	  so	  detention	  and	  deportation,	  are	  framed	  as	  ways	  of	  
casting	  out	  those	  deemed	  dangerous	  and	  irresponsible,	  while	  leaving	  those	  who	  are	  not	  a	  
threat	  in	  their	  current	  situation.	  During	  their	  apprenticeship	  in	  “illegality”	  and	  throughout	  
the	  entire	  probationary	  period,	  migrants	  have	  to	  govern	  themselves	   in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  
meet	  various	  authorities’	  expectations	  of	  the	  prudent	  desirable	  subject,	  walking	  a	  fine	  line	  
between	  the	  prospect	  of	  regularization	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  deportation.115	  	  
While,	  these	  two	  sets	  of	  practices	  are	  often	  presented	  as	  belonging	  to	  two	  distinct	  
logics,	  they	  are	  in	  fact	  complementary	  and	  coeval	  dimensions	  of	  the	  regime	  that	  governs	  
irregular	  migrants.	  For	  instance,	  for	  many	  bureaucrats	  at	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Employment	  and	  
Social	   Services	   or	   in	   autonomous	   communities,	   regularization	   is	   the	   ideal	   and	   primary	  
strategy.	  As	  a	  bureaucrat	  at	  Catalonia’s	  General	  Office	  for	  Immigration	  explained:	  “at	  the	  
level	   of	   autonomous	   communities,	   our	   role	   is	   to	   do	   all	  we	   can	   to	   facilitate	   integration,	  
because	  we	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  live	  with	  [immigrants]	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  But	   in	  some	  cases,	  
                                                
115 It	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  that	  the	  binary	  opposition	  between	  these	  technologies	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  a	  
clear	   division	   between	   citizenship	   and	   anti	   (or	   non)	   citizenship	   as	   a	   legal	   status	   or	   a	   political	   condition.	  
Neither	   does	   the	   distinction	   between	   technologies	   of	   citizenship	   and	   anti-­‐citizenship	   entail	   that	   they	   are	  
radically	  different	  or	  antithetical.	  As	  Mariana	  Valverde	  (2010)	  rightly	  explains,	  “particular	  legal	  technologies	  
can	  be	  seen	  as	  enacting	  various	  logics	  simultaneously—thus	  avoiding	  sterile	  debates	  about	  whether	  law	  X	  is	  
essentially	  inclusionary	  or	  exclusionary,	  good	  or	  bad”	  (p.227).	  Methodologically,	  we	  must	  thus	  assume	  that	  
the	  result	  of	  the	  use	  of	  these	  technologies	  is	  indeterminate.	  Therefore,	  the	  binary	  opposition	  refers	  neither	  
to	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  position	  of	  migrants,	  nor	  to	  an	  essential	  conceptual	  opposition	  between	  the	  two	  types	  of	  
technologies.	   Instead,	   it	   refers	   to	   the	   alleged	   function	   of	   these	   technologies	   of	   government	   organized	  
around	  dividing	  practices	  that	  are	  “actively	  involved	  in	  producing	  and	  naturalizing	  a	  highly	  racialized	  division	  
between	  the	  prudent	  and	  the	  anti-­‐prudent,	   the	  autonomous	  and	  the	  dependent,	   the	  citizen	  and	  the	  anti-­‐
citizen,	  and	  the	  ethical	  and	  the	  unethical”	  (Inda	  2006:18;	  see	  also	  Rose	  1999:Chap.	  7).  
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for	  instance	  for	  criminals,	  it’s	  a	  problem	  if	  they	  stay.”116	  On	  the	  contrary,	  at	  the	  Ministry	  of	  
the	   Interior,	   and	   among	   police	   officers	   responsible	   for	   implementing	   the	   Alien	   Act,	  
regularization	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  means	  of	  last	  resort.	  As	  a	  high-­‐level	  bureaucrat	  at	  the	  Ministry	  
of	  the	  Interior	  argued,	  for	  them	  the	  possibility	  of	  regularization	  “comes	  out	  of	  a	  practical	  
necessity	  to	  provide	  a	  solution	  in	  the	  cases	  where	  the	  first	  response,	  expulsion,	  the	  logical	  
juridical	   consequence	   .	   .	   .	   of	   irregularity,	   could	   not	   be	   enforced”.	   He	   added:	   “In	   these	  
cases,	  it’s	  essential	  to	  provide	  a	  way	  out	  of	  irregularity	  .	  .	  .	  but	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  done	  in	  a	  way	  
that	   is	  coherent	  with	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  the	   immigration	  policy:	   fighting	   irregular	  
migration	   and	   promoting	   orderly	   and	   legal	   immigration.”117	   These	   preferences	   are	   not	  
stable	  however,	  and	  on	  the	  ground,	  a	  plethora	  of	  actors,	  each	  enjoying	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  
discretion,	   intervenes	   to	   decide	   who	   deserves	   to	   access	   the	   inclusion	   stream	   and	   who	  
ought	   to	   be	   put	   on	   the	   exclusion	   tract,	   often	   with	   the	   effect	   of	   prolonging	   the	  
probationary	  period	  of	   liminality.	   Indeed,	   the	  result	  of	  every	  encounter	   is	   indeterminate	  
and	  decisions	  by	   institutional	  actors	  can	  all	  potentially	   lead	  migrants	   in	  one	  direction	  or	  
the	   other.	   In	   fact,	   the	   tension	   between	   the	   two	   types	   of	   technologies	   is	   central	   to	   the	  
notion	   of	   targeted	   governing	   (Moore	   and	   Hannah-­‐Moffat	   2005;	   Valverde	   and	   Mopas	  
2004)	  based	  on	  multi-­‐scalar	  and	  continuous	  assessment,	  but	  also	  often	  contribute	  to	  an	  
extension	  of	  the	  space-­‐time	  of	  legal	  liminality.	  
                                                
116	  Interview,	  Barcelona,	  October	  1st,	  2012.	  
117	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  October	  4,	  2012.	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In	   their	   analysis	   of	   probationary	   statuses	   in	   Canadian	   immigration	   policies,	   Luin	  
Goldring	   and	   Patricia	   Landolt	   (2012,	   2013)	   compare	   the	   situation	   of	   migrants	   in	  
probationary	  periods	  with	   that	  of	  players	   in	   a	   game	  of	   chutes	   and	   ladders.	   They	   (2012)	  
find	  this	  metaphor	  useful,	  because	  
it	   reframes	   the	   orderliness	   and	   unidirectionality	   of	   [previous	   models]	   by	   recognizing	  
multidirectional	   movement	   between	   tracks.	   [It]	   invites	   attention	   to	   the	   role	   of	   policies	   and	  
institutional	   actors	   in	   precipitating	   movement	   along	   or	   across	   tracks.	   Policy	   changes	   may	  
redraw	   the	   boundaries	   of	   immigration	   categories	   and	   change	   the	   rights	   associated	   with	  
categories.	   Front-­‐line	  workers,	   teachers,	   landlords,	   doctors,	   legal	   consultants,	   employers	   and	  
other	  institutional	  actors	  may	  act	  as	  catalysts,	  moving	  people	  from	  one	  legal	  status	  category	  to	  
another,	  and	  toward	  more	  or	  less	  secure	  status	  (P.10)	  
	  
This	  metaphor	   brilliantly	   captures	   the	   situation	   of	   irregular	  migrants	   in	   Spain:	   the	   ever-­‐
shifting	  character	  of	  their	  legal	  status,	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  institutional	  chutes	  and	  ladders,	  
and	  the	  tremendous	  impact	  that	  decisions	  by	  a	  myriad	  of	  actors	  can	  have	  on	  them	  moving	  
closer	   to	   regularization	  or	   closer	   to	  deportation.	  Most	   importantly,	   it	  highlights	   the	   fact	  
that	   the	   duration	   of	   the	   probationary	   period	   is	   undetermined,	   since	   a	   chute	   such	   as	  
immigration	  detention	  will,	  when	  not	  leading	  to	  deportation,	  cast	  migrants	  back	  to	  square	  
one,	  forcing	  them	  to	  spend	  many	  more	  years	  going	  over	  the	  same	  steps	  again	  in	  the	  hope	  
of	  achieving	  regularization.	  
The	  regime	  that	  results	  in	  this	  chute	  and	  ladder	  model	  may	  therefore	  not	  amount	  to	  
a	   well-­‐defined	   system	   developed	   intentionally	   by	   policy-­‐makers,	   but	   it	   nonetheless	  
defines	   how	   irregular	   migrants	   are	   actually	   governed	   in	   practice.	   Indeed,	   as	   Giuseppe	  
Sciortino	   (2004)	   explains,	   “the	   life	   of	   a	   regime	   is	   the	   result	   of	   continuous	   repair	   work	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through	  practices”	  (p.32).	  I	  thus	  analyze	  the	  governing	  of	  immigrants	  through	  probation	  as	  
a	  regime	  to	  capture	  “the	  flexible,	  multi-­‐scalar	  nature	  of	  the	  processes	  of	  governmentality	  
and	   governance	   .	   .	   .	   as	   well	   as	   the	   heterogeneity	   of	   their	   actors	   and	   the	   growing	  
intertwining	   of	   knowledge	   and	   power	   that	   characterizes	   them”	   (Mezzadra	   and	   Neilson	  
2013:179).	   The	   use	   of	   discretion	   by	   a	  multiplicity	   of	   actors	   involved	   in	   the	  multi-­‐scalar	  
assessment	  of	  desirability	  is	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  this	  regime.	  While	  its	  importance	  appears	  
to	  be	  the	  result	  of	  the	  patchwork	  approach	  to	  immigration	  policy-­‐making,	  it	  cannot	  simply	  
be	   understood	   as	   a	   residual	   category.	   The	   governing	   of	   immigration	   through	   probation	  
relies	   as	  much	  on	   the	  use	  of	   administrative	  discretion	   in	   the	  multi-­‐scalar	   assessment	  of	  
migrant	  desirability	  as	  it	  does	  on	  the	  spatial	  and	  temporal	  rescaling	  of	  borderwork	  and	  the	  
extension	  of	  a	  space	  of	  legal	  liminality.	  
In	  the	  following	  sections,	  I	  discuss	  the	  complementary	  governing	  strategies	  deployed	  
at	   various	   levels,	   and	  describe	   the	   logics	   and	  practices	   of	   policy-­‐makers,	   police	   officers,	  
judges,	   and	   bureaucrats.	   In	   doing	   so,	   I	   pay	   attention	   to	   the	   role	   that	   discretion	   and	  
competing	  institutional	  interests	  play	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  desirability.	  By	  insisting	  on	  the	  
complementarity	   of	   seemingly	   unrelated	   actions,	   I	   wish	   to	   illustrate	   the	   cumulative	  
character	  of	  discretionary	  power.	  As	  Anna	  Pratt	   (1999)	  has	  demonstrated	   in	   the	  case	  of	  
immigration	  detention	  in	  Canada,	  “The	  ultimate	  decision	  to	  detain,	  or	  to	  release,	  is	  not	  a	  
single	   event.	   The	   ‘case’	   is	   constructed	   over	   time	   and	   is	   contributed	   to	   by	   a	   myriad	   of	  
discretionary	   decisions,	   made	   by	   different	   agents	   at	   different	   points	   in	   the	   process”	  
(p.218).	  The	  same	  is	  true	  in	  the	  Spanish	  context,	  where	  a	  myriad	  of	  seemingly	  unrelated	  or	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even	   contradictory	  actions	  have	   the	   cumulative	  effect	  of	  moving	   irregular	  migrants	   into	  
the	  inclusion	  stream	  or	  setting	  them	  on	  the	  exclusion	  one,	  often	  effectively	  keeping	  them	  
in	  a	  protracted	  space-­‐time	  of	  legal	   liminality.	  For	  analytical	  clarity,	  these	  varied	  practices	  
have	   been	   organized	   according	   to	   a	   general	   distinction	   between	   technologies	   of	  
citizenship	  and	  anti-­‐citizenship	  technologies.	  	  
Regularizing	  “Desirable	  Immigrants”	  
For	   irregular	   migrants	   living	   in	   Spain,	   there	   has	   always	   been	   a	   reasonable	   prospect	   to	  
eventually	   obtain	   temporary	   residence	   and	   working	   permits,	   although	   it	   has	   become	  
harder	   in	  recent	  years.	   I	  have	  already	  mentioned	  the	  annual	  quota	  of	  work	  permits	  that	  
has	  worked	  as	  a	  disguised	  regularization	  measure	  from	  1993	  to	  1999.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  
until	   2005	   regularization	   occurred	   mainly	   through	   occasional	   but	   frequent	   (although	  
officially	   dubbed	   “exceptional”)	   collective	   processes	   of	   regularization.	   Such	   processes	  
occurred	  in	  1985/86,	  1991,	  1996,	  2000,	  2001	  and	  2005	  and	  granted	  a	  total	  of	  1,162,979	  
residence	  permits	   (Cachón	  Rodríguez	  2009;	  Finotelli	   and	  Arango	  2011).	  Generally,	   these	  
processes	   issued	  an	   initial	   renewable	  permit	   valid	   for	   a	   year	  and	  were	  only	  available	   to	  
migrants	   without	   criminal	   records	   who	   were	   able	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   they	   had	   been	  
living	  in	  Spain	  before	  a	  set	  date.118	  In	  2007,	  following	  pressures	  from	  the	  European	  Union,	  
Spain	  forbade	  the	  use	  of	  collective	  processes	  of	  regularization.	  Since	  then,	  the	  only	  means	  
of	  regularization	  is	  an	  individual	  path	  known	  as	  arraigo,	  or	  rootedness,	  briefly	  discussed	  in	  
                                                
118	   In	   the	   2005	   regularization,	   the	   initial	   permit	   was	   valid	   for	   two	   years,	   making	   it	   somewhat	   easier	   to	  
prepare	  for	  its	  renewal.	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Chapter	  4.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  describe	  the	  long	  process	  that	  can	  lead	  to	  regularization	  
through	  the	  category	  of	  arraigo	  social	  and	  discuss	  how	  various	  individuals	  intervene	  in	  this	  
process,	  performing	  what	  amounts	  to	  a	  form	  of	  multi-­‐scalar	  internal	  borderwork.	  
Limiting	  and	  Facilitating	  the	  Inscription	  to	  the	  Municipal	  Registry	  
Upon	  arriving	  in	  Spain,	  often	  as	  tourists,	  migrants	  look	  for	  work	  and	  a	  place	  to	  stay.	  When	  
regularization	   through	   arraigo	   social	   is	   the	   objective,	   the	   first	   key	   step	   to	   take	   is	   to	  
register	   as	   resident	   on	   a	  municipal	   registry	   (padrón)	   to	   be	   able	   to	   later	   document	   two	  
years	  of	  residency	  in	  Spain.119	  This	  should	  be	  simple	  since	  the	  law	  makes	  it	  mandatory	  for	  
municipalities	  to	  register	  everyone	  who	  reside	  within	  their	  jurisdiction,	  regardless	  of	  their	  
immigration	  status.120	  And	  yet,	  discretionary	  power	  (legal	  or	  not)	  makes	  the	  experience	  far	  
from	  standard.	  	  
In	  extreme	  cases,	  municipal	  authorities	  have	  refused	  to	  register	  immigrants	  without	  
residence	  permits	  even	  though	  the	  law	  demands	  only	  that	  they	  verify	  a	  person’s	  identity	  
(through	  an	   identity	  document),	   as	  well	   as	   a	  one’s	   address	   (through	  a	   lease,	  ownership	  
certificate,	   electricity	   bill,	   etc.).	   For	   instance,	   the	  municipal	   governments	   in	   the	   Spanish	  
enclaves	   of	   Ceuta	   and	   Melilla	   situated	   in	   Northern	   Morocco	   have	   always	   refused	   to	  
register	   irregular	  migrants	  arguing	   that,	  because	  of	   their	   situation	  as	  border	   towns,	   this	  
                                                
119	   Registration,	  which	   is	  mandatory	   for	   anyone	   living	   in	   Spain,	   also	   allows	   irregular	   immigrants	   to	   access	  
services	  including,	  until	  September	  2012,	  health	  care,	  thus	  making	  it	  very	  advantageous	  to	  register.	  
120	   The	  main	   legislation	   is	   the	  Ley	  7/1985	  de	  abril	   Reguladora	  del	  Regimen	   Local,	  Art.	   15-­‐17.	   See	  also	   the	  
legal	   opinion	  of	   the	   state	   attorney	  on	   the	   illegality	  of	  municipal	   actions	  preventing	   registration	   (Abogacía	  
General	  del	  Estado	  2010).	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policy	   would	   lead	   to	   abuses	   if	   implemented.	   In	   2010,	   the	   conservative	   mayor	   of	   Vic	  
(Catalonia)	   announced	   that	   his	   town	   would	   not	   register	   migrants	   without	   residence	  
permits,	  while	  the	  town	  of	  Torrejón	  de	  Ardoz	  (Madrid)	  only	  registered	  residents	  who	  lived	  
in	  apartments	  with	  a	  minimum	  of	  20m2	  per	  person,	  two	  strategies	  aiming	  at	  reducing	  the	  
number	  of	  immigrants	  living	  in	  their	  municipalities	  (Clota	  2010;	  Gimeno	  2010).	  In	  the	  town	  
of	  Robledo	  de	  Chavela	  (Madrid),	  the	  mayor	  recently	  defended	  his	  policy	  of	  not	  registering	  
immigrants	  without	  working	  permit,	   claiming	  his	   right	   to	   control	  who	  can	   reside	  on	   the	  
town’s	  territory.	  He	  explained:	  “I	  don’t	  care	  if	  people	  like	  it	  or	  not.	  Immigrants	  who	  don’t	  
work,	  they	  can’t	  come	  here	  to	  scrounge.	  It’s	  as	  simple	  as	  that.”	  And	  when	  reminded	  that	  
his	  actions	  were	  illegal,	  he	  responded:	  “What	  can	  they	  do	  to	  me?	  If	  no	  one	  here	  applies	  
this	  legislation…”	  (Otero	  2013:n.p.).	  	  
While	  these	  cases	  were	  very	  politicized,	  similar	  cases	  occasionally	  make	  the	  news.	  In	  
a	   2008	   report	   based	   on	   a	   survey	   conducted	   with	   Catalan	   municipal	   authorities,	   the	  
ombudsman	  of	  Catalonia	  noted	  that	  municipalities	  with	  a	  greater	  immigration	  population	  
are	   now	  more	   restrictive,	   and	   denounced	   that	   they	   are	   in	   fact	   using	   their	   registration	  
power	  to	  control	  immigration.	  The	  report	  notes,	  for	  instance,	  that	  while	  municipalities	  can	  
choose	  to	  accept	  pieces	  of	  identification	  other	  than	  a	  passport	  or	  a	  Spanish	  identity	  card,	  
municipalities	  with	  more	  immigrants	  tend	  not	  to	  accept	  any	  other	  document.121	  A	  similar	  
tendency	  appears	  in	  relation	  to	  rejection	  based	  on	  the	  number	  of	  individuals	  living	  in	  the	  
                                                
121	  Indeed,	  towns	  whose	  immigrant	  population	  represents	  5-­‐10%	  or	  more	  than	  10%	  of	  the	  total	  population	  
refuse	   any	   other	   document	   96.6%	   and	   86.4%	   of	   the	   time	   respectively,	   while	   those	  with	   less	   than	   5%	   of	  
immigrant	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  generous	  and	  will	  refuse	  other	  documents	  only	  in	  63.2%	  of	  the	  cases	  (Síndic	  de	  
Greuges	  2008).	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same	  house,	   or	   the	   number	   of	   individuals	   per	   square	  meter,	   a	  measure	   used	  mainly	   in	  
municipalities	  with	  more	  immigrants	  to	  limit	  their	  registration	  (Síndic	  de	  Greuges	  2008).	  
However,	   migrants	   also	   share	   tips	   about	   welcoming	   municipalities	   that	   accept	  
affidavits	   from	   religious	   figures	  or	   social	  workers	   to	   confirm	  a	  person’s	   identity,	   or	   that	  
find	  creative	  ways	  to	  verify	  a	  person’s	  address	  when	  documentation	   is	  missing	   (see	  also	  
Síndic	  de	  Greuges	  2008).	  Some	  do	  so	   for	  humanitarian	  reasons,	  but	  other	  municipalities	  
facilitate	   registration	   to	   increase	   their	   population	   and	   access	   governmental	   funding	  
available	  only	  to	  municipalities	  over	  20,000.	  As	  a	  high-­‐level	  official	  of	  the	  Catalan	  General	  
Immigration	   Office	   explained:	   “You	   have	   everything:	   cases	   like	   Vic	   who	   stalled	  
registration,	   but	   I	   also	   know	   mayors	   who	   tell	   me	   ‘We’re	   only	   200	   residents	   short	   of	  
20,000,	  so	  we	  do	  all	  we	  can	  to	  register	  everyone’	  or	   ‘we	  were	  23,000	  and	  5,000	  left	  but	  
we	  can’t	  afford	  to	  take	  them	  off	  the	  registry’.”122	  
These	   institutional	   disparities	   result	   from	   local	   political	   decisions	   and	   are	   often	  
established	  as	  a	  means	  for	  facilitating	  or	  limiting	  the	  settlement	  of	  immigrants	  at	  the	  local	  
level.	  This	  strategy	   is	  representative	  of	  the	  multi-­‐scalar	  governing	  of	   immigrants	  and	  can	  
be	  considered	  a	  form	  of	  municipal	  borderwork	  aiming	  at	  filtering	  who	  can	  and	  cannot	  live	  
in	   the	   community	   based	   on	   local	   and	   largely	   discretionary	   assessments	   of	   their	  
desirability.123	  Indeed,	  while	  critics	  were	  right	  in	  arguing	  that	  the	  mayor	  of	  Robledo	  and	  Vic	  
                                                
122	  Interview,	  Barcelona,	  October	  1st,	  2012.	  
123	  Cases	  of	  municipal	  borderwork	  similar	  to	  this	  have	  been	  documented	  in	  many	  other	  countries,	  including	  
Canada	  (Gilbert	  2009),	  Italy	  (Ambrosini	  2013),	  France,	  Germany,	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  (Guiraudon	  and	  Lahav	  
2000)	  and	  the	  United	  States	  (Armenta	  2012;	  Gilbert	  2009;	  Varsany	  2008a,	  2008b,	  2011).	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expressed	  xenophobic	  attitudes,	  racism	  itself	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  explain	  this	  assessment	  of	  
desirability.	   As	   Ghassan	   Hage	   ([1999]	   2000)	   explains,	   “Generally	   speaking,	   the	  
classification	  of	  an	  object	  as	  ‘undesirable’	  always	  assumes	  a	  space	  where	  the	  undesirable	  
is	  defined	  as	  such	  .	  .	  .	  Consequently,	  categories	  such	  as	  ‘too	  many,’	  while	  embodying	  some	  
form	  of	  ‘racist’	  belief,	  are	  primarily	  categories	  of	  spatial	  management”	  (p.38).	  Considering	  
the	  assessment	  of	  migrants’	  desirability	  as	  a	  multi-­‐scalar	  technique	  of	  space	  management	  
helps	  us	  understand	  why	  the	  capacity	  to	  define	  criteria	  and	  perform	  this	  assessment	  is	  the	  
object	  of	  power	  struggles	  between	  local,	  regional,	  and	  central	  governmental	  institutions.	  
In	   this	   sense,	   the	   rescaling	   of	   borderwork	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	   is	   not	   the	  
result	  of	  a	  planned	  decision	  to	  govern	  immigration	  through	  probation.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  part	  of	  
a	  regime	  for	  governing	  migrants	  that	   is	   largely	  the	  result	  of	  ongoing	  struggles	  over	  what	  
level	   of	   government	   should	   be	   able	   to	   manage	   the	   presence	   of	   immigrants	   on	   their	  
overlapping	   jurisdictions	   (Rumford	  2008;	  Zapata-­‐Barrero	  and	  Pinyol	  2008).	  This	  situation	  
invites	   us	   to	   question	   the	   “Russian	   doll”	   model	   of	   jurisdictions	   and	   scales	   as	   nested	  
hierarchies,	   and	   look	   instead	   at	   jurisdictions	   as	   flexible	   technologies	   that	   can	   allow	  
municipal	  employees,	  for	  instance,	  to	  use	  municipal	  bylaws	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  city,	  but	  on	  
a	  space	  imagined	  as	  national	  (Brenner	  2004;	  Ford	  1999;	  Valverde	  2009,	  2015).	  	  
The	   cases	   discussed	   here	   are	   informed	   by	   institutional	   guidelines	   provided	   by	  
mayors	   and	   reflect	   assessments	   of	   desirability	   often	   applied	   to	   an	   entire	   population	   of	  
irregular	  migrants,	  rather	  than	  that	  of	  particular	   individuals.	  But	  NGO	  workers,	  migrants,	  
and	  immigration	  lawyers	  I	  talked	  to	  also	  denounced	  the	  difficulties	  that	  immigrants	  face	  in	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their	   interactions	   with	   individual	   frontline	   bureaucrats	   who	   have	   to	   use	   discretionary	  
power	   to	   assess	   what	   counts	   as	   proper	   documentation	   and	   can,	   to	   a	   certain	   extent,	  
choose	  to	  facilitate	  or	  hinder	  registration.	  The	  importance	  of	  administrative	  discretion	  in	  
the	  assessment	  of	  desirability	  appears	  even	  more	  clearly	  in	  the	  sets	  of	  practices	  discussed	  
next:	  the	  evaluation	  by	  street	   level	  bureaucrats	  of	  the	   level	  of	   integration	  of	   immigrants	  
applying	   for	   regularization.	  As	  we	  will	   see,	   the	  ability	   to	  define	  and	  assess	   integration	   is	  
also	  the	  object	  of	  political	  struggles	  between	  various	  levels	  of	  government.	  
Assessing	  Rootedness	  and	  Integration	  at	  the	  Local	  Levels	  
Once	  registered	  on	  the	  padrón,	  irregular	  immigrants	  are	  able	  to	  access	  many	  services	  and	  
to	  document	  the	  length	  of	  their	  stay	  in	  Spain	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  regularization.	  Under	  the	  
current	   legislation,	   they	  have	   to	   spend	   three	  continuous	  years	   residing	   in	  Spain	  without	  
authorization	  before	  they	  can	  apply	  for	  regularization	  based	  on	  arraigo	  social.	  During	  this	  
apprenticeship	  in	  “illegality,”	  they	  have	  to	  avoid	  deportation,	  keep	  their	  distance	  from	  any	  
criminal	  activities	   to	  avoid	  getting	  a	  criminal	   record,	  gather	  proof	  of	   their	   integration	   to	  
obtain	   a	   favourable	   social	   insertion	   report,	   and	   work	   in	   the	   underground	   economy	   in	  
precarious	  conditions,	  ideally	  trying	  to	  please	  their	  employers	  so	  that	  they	  will	  eventually	  
agree	   to	   provide	   them	   with	   the	   one	   year	   legal	   work	   offer	   they	   will	   need	   to	   apply	   for	  
regularization.	   As	   mentioned	   in	   Chapter	   4,	   regularization	   through	   arraigo	   social	   is	  
accessible	  to	  “foreigners	  who	  can	  demonstrate	  a	  continuous	  stay	  in	  Spain	  for	  a	  period	  of	  
at	  least	  three	  years,”	  providing	  that	  they	  “do	  not	  have	  a	  criminal	  record	  in	  Spain,	  in	  their	  
 267	  
country	  of	  origin,	  or	  in	  any	  country	  where	  they	  lived	  within	  the	  last	  five	  years,”	  that	  they	  
have	  a	  “work	  contract	  signed	  by	  the	  worker	  and	  employer	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  the	  request	  
and	  whose	   duration	   should	   not	   be	   for	   less	   than	   a	   year,”	   providing	   that	   they	   can	   prove	  
“family	   relations	  with	   foreigners	  with	   residence	   permits”	   (husband,	  wife,	   child,	  mother,	  
father)	  or	   “present	  a	   report	  of	   social	   insertion	  provided	  by	   the	  autonomous	   community	  
where	  they	  reside.”124	  	  
While	   the	   work	   contract	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   criminal	   record	   are	   obvious	   means	   to	  
distinguish	   between	   “desirable	   employable	   and	   responsible	   immigrants”	   and	   those	  
deemed	   “undesirable	   foreign	   delinquents,”	   the	   social	   insertion	   report	   is	   a	   more	  
interesting	   and	   subjective	   means	   through	   which	   migrants’	   desirability	   is	   assessed.	   The	  
legislation	  provides	   general	   guidelines,	   but	   the	  means	  of	   assessment	   vary	   depending	  of	  
the	  jurisdiction.	  For	  instance,	  in	  Madrid,	  applicants	  need	  to	  complete	  a	  course	  titled	  Know	  
the	  Laws	  and	  pass	  a	  Spanish	  language	  test	  if	  it	  is	  not	  their	  first	  language,	  while	  many	  other	  
municipal	  offices	  assess	  this	  knowledge	  only	  through	   interviews.	  Furthermore,	  while	   the	  
new	   Regulation	   of	   the	   Alien	   Act	   (RD	   557/2011)	   makes	   autonomous	   communities	  
responsible	  for	  the	  emission	  of	  the	  report,	  in	  most	  places	  it	  is	  still	  municipalities	  that	  write	  
them,	  making	  the	  discrepancies	  even	  greater.125	  	  
                                                
124	  The	  conditions	  for	  the	  arraigo	  social	  are	  described	  in	  Title	  V,	  Chapter	  I,	  Art.	  124.1	  of	  the	  latest	  Regulations	  
of	  the	  Alien	  Act	  (RD	  557/2011).	  
125	   In	  the	  autonomous	  cities	  of	  Ceuta	  and	  Melilla,	  as	  well	  as	   in	  the	  autonomous	  communities	  of	  Catalonia,	  
Canaries,	  Madrid	  and	  Euskadi	  (Basque	  Country),	  local	  governments	  produce	  the	  final	  integration	  report.	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In	   the	   Autonomous	   Community	   of	   Catalonia,	   where	   it	   is	   the	   Catalan	   government	  
who	  ultimately	  submits	   it	   to	  the	  central	  government,	  the	  report	   is	  still	  produced	  first	  by	  
the	   municipality	   where	   the	   immigrant	   resides.	   Frontline	   municipal	   employees	   collect	  
documents	   provided	   by	   immigrants	   and	   interview	   them	   to	   assess	   their	   level	   of	   social	  
integration	  (indicators	  of	   integration	  include:	  use	  of	  municipal	  services,	   interactions	  with	  
neighbours,	   membership	   in	   sport	   clubs	   or	   local	   associations,	   and	   participation	   in	  
educational	   and	   integration	   programs),	   as	   well	   as	   their	   knowledge	   of	   the	   Spanish	   and	  
Catalan	   languages.	   They	   then	   grade	   the	   integration	   as	   acceptable	   or	   unacceptable	   and	  
transfer	  the	  report	  to	  the	  Catalan	  government,	  which	  makes	  the	  final	  recommendation	  to	  
the	  central	  Spanish	  government.126	  In	  2011,	  Catalan	  nationalist	  politicians,	  always	  trying	  to	  
gain	  more	  autonomy	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Madrid,	  secured	  the	  responsibility	  of	  producing	  the	  report	  
as	   an	   attempt	   to	   better	   control	   immigration.	   As	   a	   bureaucrat	   of	   the	   Catalan	   General	  
Immigration	  Office	  explained:	  
We	  have	  no	  control	  over	  visas,	  over	  matters	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	  such	  as	  expulsion	  of	  
course,	  but	  thanks	  to	  the	  work	  of	  some	  Catalan	  members	  of	  Congress	  we	  obtained	  the	  right	  to	  
assess	   integration	   for	   the	   arraigo	   social.	   We	   also	   tried	   to	   have	   a	   mandatory	   report	   at	   each	  
renovation	  of	   the	   residence	  permits,	   so	  we	  could	  have	  our	  word	  heard	  not	  only	   for	   irregular	  
immigrants	  but	   for	  all	   immigrants.	  But	  without	   success	   .	   .	   .	  Having	   the	  evaluation	   centralized	  
here	  is	  important,	  because	  if	  we	  do	  all	  the	  work	  of	  integration,	  we	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  select	  our	  
immigrants.	   And	   of	   course,	   language	   is	   key	   for	   us.	   For	   now,	   the	   municipal	   staff	   does	   an	  
interview	  and	  decides	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  immigrant’s	  language	  skills	  are	  good	  enough.	  But	  it’s	  
very	  subjective:	  maybe	  if	  the	  staff	  is	  a	  Catalan	  nationalist	  he’ll	  be	  more	  demanding,	  while	  if	  he’s	  
more	  Spanish-­‐speaking	  he	  will	   think	  that	  knowing	  two	  words	  of	  Catalan	   is	  good	  enough.	  Now	  
that	  we	  have	  this	  power,	  we’re	  slowly	  trying	  to	  get	  a	  consensus	  on	  criteria.	  To	  get	  a	  favourable	  
report,	   immigrants	   don’t	   need	   to	   know	  Catalan	  well;	   all	   we	   ask	   is	   that	   they	   prove	   that	   they	  
made	  an	  effort	  to	  learn	  it.	  So,	  for	  now,	  if	  in	  an	  interview	  someone	  cannot	  understand	  Catalan,	  
                                                
126	  The	  procedures	  for	  the	  emission	  of	  the	  report	  can	  be	  found	  in	  written	  instruction	  sent	  to	  municipalities	  
by	   the	   Catalan	   General	   Immigration	   office	   on	   March	   20,	   2012	   (Instrucció	   1/2012)	   and	   updated	   in	   2013	  
(Instrucció	  DGI/BFS/1/2013).	  
 269	  
we	  ask	  that	  he	  proves	  that	  he	  has	  taken	  20	  hours	  of	  language	  class,	  but	  we’re	  thinking	  of	  being	  
more	  strict	  in	  the	  future,	  maybe	  asking	  45	  hours.127	  	  
	  
Individual	  regularization	  through	  arraigo	  social	   is	  thus	  a	  means	  developed	  by	  the	  central	  
Spanish	  government	   to	  select	   irregular	   immigrants	  based	  on	  their	  desirability,	  a	   filtering	  
tool	   that	   is	   the	   object	   of	   power	   struggles	   between	   municipalities,	   autonomous	  
communities,	  and	   the	  central	  government.	  At	  all	   levels,	   the	  assessment	  of	  desirability	   is	  
intimately	  tied	  to	  immigrants’	  capacity	  to	  convince	  civil	  servants	  that	  they	  are	  integrating,	  
hard-­‐working,	  law-­‐abiding	  immigrants	  who,	  after	  an	  apprenticeship	  in	  “illegality”	  of	  three	  
years,	  finally	  deserves	  to	  be	  put	  on	  a	  track	  toward	  integration.	  This	  inclusion	  stream	  offers	  
few	   guarantees	   however:	  while	   it	   temporarily	   limits	   the	   threat	   of	   deportation,	   the	   first	  
residence	  and	  work	  permit	   is	  only	  valid	  for	  one	  year	  and	  has	  to	  be	  renewed	  twice	  (each	  
time	  for	  two	  years)	  before	  one	  can	  apply	  for	  permanent	  residency	  and	  eventually	  Spanish	  
nationality.	  The	  apprenticeship	  in	  “illegality”	  of	  three	  years	  is	  thus	  extended	  by	  a	  period	  of	  
five	   years	   of	   probationary	   status,	   based	   on	   temporary	   permits,	   renewable	   only	   on	   the	  
condition	   that	   one	   continues	   to	   be	   a	   legally	   employed,	   law-­‐abiding	   resident.	   Not	  
surprisingly,	   the	  economic	   crisis	  has	   strongly	   impacted	   immigrants	  and	  other	  precarious	  
workers,	  and	  preliminary	  statistics	  on	  the	   levels	  of	  success	   for	   regularization	  and	  permit	  
renewal	  suggest	  they	  are	  diminishing	  (Sabater	  and	  Domingo	  2012).	  	  
Regularization	  through	  arraigo	  social	  thus	  works	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  citizenship	  technology,	  
opening	   a	   very	   precarious	   yet	   essential	   inclusion	   stream	   for	   those	   deemed	   responsible	  
                                                
127	   Interview,	   Barcelona,	  October	   1st,	   2012.	   As	   of	   September	   2013,	   the	   criterion	   is	   indeed	   of	   45	   hours	   of	  
Catalan	  language	  class	  (Instrucció	  DGI/BFS/1/2013).	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and	  desirable	  based	  on	  an	  assessment	  of	   the	  way	   they	  conduct	   themselves	  during	   their	  
apprenticeship	  in	  “illegality.”	  While	  it	  is	  clearly	  part	  of	  a	  project	  of	  inclusion,	  this	  program	  
operates	  primarily	  as	  a	   filter	   that	  divides	   irregular	   immigrants	  between	  “a	  majority	  who	  
can	   and	   do	   ensure	   their	   own	   well-­‐being	   and	   security	   through	   their	   own	   active	   self-­‐
promotion	  and	  responsibility	  .	  .	   .	  and	  those	  who	  are	  outside	  this	  nexus	  of	  activity”	  (Rose	  
1999:257-­‐258).	  To	  get	  into	  this	  inclusion	  stream	  and	  stay	  in	  it,	  immigrants	  know	  that	  they	  
have	   to	   conduct	   themselves	   in	   such	   a	   way	   as	   to	   build	   a	   record	   that	   matches	   the	  
administrative	   criteria	   of	   desirability	   and	   responsibility.	   And	   they	   do	   so	   by	   acting	   in	   a	  
prudent	   fashion,	  maybe	  participating	   in	  a	   football	   club	  or	  a	   cultural	  organization,	   taking	  
language	   lessons,	  or	  volunteering	  at	  a	   local	  charity,	  and	  making	  sure	   to	  document	  all	  of	  
this.	   They	   govern	   themselves	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   access	   this	   inclusion	   stream,	   but	   also	   to	  
avoid	  the	  coeval	  exclusion	  one,	  since	  they	  are	  well	  aware	  that	   this	   internal	  border	  work	  
takes	   other	   forms	   that	   are	   more	   exclusionary.	   Indeed,	   this	   technology	   of	   citizenship	   is	  
coextensive	  with	  anti-­‐citizenship	  technologies,	  those	  “technologies	  that	  deem	  the	  ethical	  
reconstruction	   of	   marginal	   subjects	   unlikely	   and	   therefore	   work	   principally	   through	  
practices	  of	  containment”	   (Inda	  2006:52).	  These	   include	   intensive	  and	  continuous	  police	  
control,	   prohibitive	   fines,	   internment,	   and	   deportation—all	   measures	   that	   “have	  




Policing	  the	  Streets	  and	  Detaining	  “Undesirable	  Foreigners”	  
The	  distribution	  of	  police	  tasks	  among	  various	  police	  bodies	  intervening	  at	  various	  levels	  
also	   affects	   the	   role	   of	   the	   police	   in	   migration	   management.	   While	   the	   Guardia	   Civil	  
polices	   external	   borders,	   advises	   third-­‐country	   security	   forces	  on	  migration	   control,	   and	  
takes	   part	   in	   patrols	   at	   sea,	   and	   local	   police	   bodies	   are	   often	   seen	   policing	   immigrant	  
street-­‐vendors	  potentially	  contravening	  municipal	  bylaws,	  the	  National	  Police	   is	  officially	  
the	   sole	   institution	   responsible	   for	   controlling	   the	  presence	  of	   foreigners	   in	   Spain.	   I	  will	  
thus	  focus	  only	  on	  this	  last	  body	  here.	  	  
There	   is	  no	  distinct	  border	  and	   immigration	  agency	  as	   in	  many	  countries:	  National	  
Police	  officers	  staff	  all	  specialized	  units	  policing	  foreigners.128	  This	  means	  that	   its	  officers	  
are	   responsible	   for	   controlling	   the	   entry	   of	   foreigners	   at	   authorized	   points	   of	   entry,	  
guarding	  immigration	  detention	  centres,	  and	  deporting	  irregular	  immigrants,	  but	  also	  for	  
fulfilling	   all	   other	   police	   functions	   such	   as	   the	   everyday	   policing	   of	   the	   streets.	   Police	  
officers	  working	  at	  the	  border	  and	  in	  immigration	  detention	  centres	  belong	  to	  specialized	  
immigration	  units,	  while	  those	  policing	  the	  streets	  do	  not.	  However,	  they	  are	  all	  members	  
of	   the	   same	   police	   institution,	   can	   easily	   transfer	   from	   one	   post	   to	   another,	   and	   co-­‐
operate	  closely.	  Because	  of	  this	  institutional	  unity,	  the	  transition	  from	  the	  policing	  of	  the	  
actual	  border,	  to	  the	  streets,	  and	  to	  the	  detention	  centres	  is	  fluid.	  	  
                                                
128	   These	  units	  are	   the	  Central	  Border	  Unit,	   the	  Central	  Unit	  of	  Expulsion	  and	  Repatriation,	  as	  well	   as	   the	  
Central	  Unit	  on	  Illegal	  Networks	  and	  Documental	  Fraud.	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Police	  Identity	  Checks	  as	  Border	  Control	  
“Borders	  are	  everywhere	  in	  our	  city.	  Immigration	  identity	  controls	  happen	  everywhere,	  all	  
the	  time:	  at	  subway	  station,	  in	  the	  plazas,	  in	  soup	  kitchens,”	  explained	  a	  volunteer	  for	  the	  
Madrid-­‐based	   Neighbourhood	   Brigades	   for	   the	   Observation	   of	   Human	   Rights,	   an	  
association	  patrolling	  the	  streets	  and	  documenting	  what	  they	  call	  “discriminatory	  identity	  
controls”	   and	   “racist	   raids.”129	   Police	   identity	   checks	   that	   appear	   to	   be	   based	   on	   racial	  
profiling	  and	  informed	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  control	  immigration	  status	  are	  so	  common	  on	  the	  
streets	   of	   Madrid	   that	   anyone	   living	   in	   an	   immigrant	   neighbourhood	   witnesses	   them	  
(and/or	   is	   targeted	   by	   them)	   daily.	   Seeing	   an	   increase	   in	   these	   apparently	   illegal	   police	  
practices,	  and	  being	  unable	  to	  obtain	  statistics	  from	  the	  Police	  Head	  Office	  or	  the	  Ministry	  
of	   the	   Interior,	   various	   local	  NGOs	  now	  document	   these	  controls	   (Brigadas	  Vecinales	  de	  
Observación	  de	  Derechos	  Humanos	  2012	  –	  BVODH).	  
In	   February	   2009,	  written	   instructions	   distributed	   to	   police	   officers	   in	   the	  Madrid	  
district	  of	  Villa	  de	  Vallecas	  and	  establishing	  a	  weekly	  quota	  of	  35	  detentions	  of	  foreigners,	  
were	   leaked	   to	   the	   media.	   The	   internal	   document	   explicitly	   prioritized	   the	   arrest	   of	  
Moroccans	  because	  they	  are	  easier	  to	  deport	  and	  mentioned	  that	  “if	  [the	  35	  detentions]	  
are	   not	   there,	   you	   go	   find	   them	   outside	   our	   district”	   (Berdié	   2009).	   Eventually,	   the	  
minister	  of	  the	  interior	  admitted	  that	  similar	  quotas	  had	  been	  established	  “in	  four	  or	  five	  
police	   stations,”	   but	   that	   these	   practices	   were	   going	   to	   stop	   (El	   País	   2009:	   n.p.).	  
                                                
129	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  November	  6,	  2012.	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Representatives	  of	  the	  Sindicato	  Unificado	  de	  Policía,	  in	  contrast,	  claimed	  that	  this	  was	  a	  
common	  practice	   in	  many	  police	  stations	  because	  of	   the	   idea	  that	  effectiveness	   is	   to	  be	  
measured	   by	   the	   number	   of	   detentions.	   They	   opposed	   this	   statistical	   measurement	   of	  
productivity	   and	   denounced	   the	   fact	   that	   police	   officers	   who	   did	   not	   co-­‐operate	   faced	  
sanctions	  such	  as	  relocation	  or	  the	  loss	  of	  their	  annual	  productivity	  bonus	  (El	  País	  2012).	  A	  
spokesperson	  of	  the	  union	  explained	  the	  logic:	  
The	  justification	  is	  that	  every	  year	  the	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	  presents	  its	  data	  of	  criminality	  in	  
front	  of	   the	  parliament,	   in	   front	  of	  society.	  And	  they	  want	  more	  detention	  this	  year	   than	   last	  
year.	   They	   want	   to	   be	   able	   to	   say	   “This	   year	   we’re	   better	   because	   we	   conducted	   more	  
detention”	  and	  the	  police	  chiefs	  need	  to	  provide	  good	  statistics,	  and	  they	  pressure	  the	  low-­‐rank	  
police	   officers.	   And	   a	   detention	   is	   a	   detention,	   whether	   it’s	   for	   a	   car	   robbery	   or	   an	  
administrative	   violation	   like	   irregular	   stay.	   So	   what	   do	   they	   do?	   They	  make	   use	   of	   irregular	  
immigration	  to	  make	  their	  numbers	  look	  better.	  And	  when	  they	  ask	  us	  to	  do	  that,	  which	  is	  what	  
we’ve	  been	  denouncing	  as	  a	  union,	  well	  we	  have	  to	  do	  it.	  And	  if	  you	  go	  to	  a	  soup	  kitchen	  one	  
day,	   and	   you	   identify	   them	   and	   you	   take	   ten	   detainees,	   this	   was	   considered	   good.	   It	   was	  
statistics	  pure	  and	  simple.130	  	  
	  
The	   use	   of	   arrests	   for	   bureaucratic	   purposes,	   not	   for	   what	   street-­‐level	   police	   officers	  
consider	  its	  legitimate	  public	  safety	  function,	  offended	  this	  spokesperson.	  He	  added:	  
But	  it’s	  absurd:	  chances	  are	  they	  won’t	  be	  deported.	  So	  you’re	  doing	  a	  work	  that	  isn’t	  real.	  We	  
should	  target	  drug	  traffickers,	  those	  who	  smuggle	  illegal	  people	  in	  our	  country	  to	  make	  money,	  
or	  for	  prostitution.	  This	  makes	  sense,	  but	  the	  poor	  man	  who’s	  going	  to	  work	  with	  his	  sandwich	  
under	  the	  arm	  and	  wait	   for	  him	  at	  the	  subway	  gate	  to	  detain	  him	  because	  he’s	   irregular,	  this	  
shouldn’t	  be	  our	  work	   .	   .	   .	  But	  those	  were	  the	   instructions,	  and	  they	  put	  our	  members	  at	  risk	  
because	   in	   some	   cases	   we’re	   saying	   they	   might	   have	   approached	   illegality.	   Some	   of	   the	  
instructions	  contained	  in	  Memorandum	  1/2010	  were	  illegal,	  and	  that’s	  why	  we	  opposed	  it.131	  
	  
                                                
130	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  November	  5,	  2012.	  
131	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  November	  5,	  2012.	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The	  memorandum	  he	  refers	  to	  (Circular	  1/2010)	  was	  published	  by	  the	  Police	  Directorate	  
of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	  in	  2010.132	  It	  contained	  instructions	  for	  police	  action	  based	  
on	  the	  Directorate’s	  erroneous	  interpretation	  of	  the	  new	  Alien	  Act	  (LOE	  2/2009)	  and	  the	  
Citizen	   Safety	   Protection	   Act	   (LOPSC	   1/1992).	   This	   memorandum,	   which	   has	   been	  
condemned	  by	  more	  than	  400	  NGOs	  in	  Spain	  and	  was	  criticized	  by	  Spain’s	  ombudswoman,	  
suggested	   that	   since	   foreigners	   are	   legally	   required	   to	   (1)	   identify	   themselves,	   and	   (2)	  
have	   documentation	   proving	   that	   they	   are	   in	   Spain	   legally,	   and	   since	   the	   Citizen	   Safety	  
Protection	   Act	   allows	   police	   to	   preventively	   detain	   individuals	   who	   do	   not	   provide	  
identification	  documents	  in	  order	  to	  verify	  their	  identity,	  police	  could	  detain	  migrants	  who	  
cannot	  prove	  that	  they	  are	  in	  Spain	  regularly	  (El	  País	  2011).	  This	  was	  a	  misinterpretation	  
of	   the	   legislation,	  which	  only	  permits	  preventive	  detention	   to	  verify	   someone’s	   identity,	  
not	  his	  or	  her	  immigration	  status	  (Martínez	  Escamilla	  and	  Sánchez	  Tomás	  2011).	  It	  is	  hard	  
to	  measure	  the	  quantitative	  impact	  of	  these	  instructions	  since	  the	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	  
releases	  only	  partial	  statistics,	  but	  we	  know	  that	  on	  four	  “random”	  days	  in	  February	  2012	  
for	   which	   the	   SUP	   obtained	   numbers,	   the	   National	   Police	   detained	   370	   individuals	   for	  
“illegal	  stay”	  in	  Madrid	  alone,	  a	  number	  representing	  just	  over	  47%	  of	  all	  detentions	  made	  
that	  weekend	  in	  the	  capital	  (Sindicato	  Unificado	  de	  Policía	  2012:18).	  	  
Eventually,	   the	   detailed	   documentation	   of	   police	   immigration	   controls	   by	   the	  
BVODH	   and	   other	   organizations,	   the	   revelation	   that	   a	   memorandum	   instructed	   police	  
                                                
132	   Circular	   1/2010	   Instrucciones	   sobre	   determinadas	   actuaciones	   policiales	   derivadas	   de	   la	   nueva	   Ley	  
2/2009,	  de	  11	  de	  diciembre,	  que	  modifica	   la	  L.O.	  4/2000,	  de	  11	  de	  enero,	  de	  Extranjería	  y	   recordatorio	  de	  
otras	  actuaciones.	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officers	   to	   illegally	   detain	   migrants	   preventively,	   claims	   by	   the	   SUP	   that	   quotas	   of	  
detention	   are	   common,	   and	   the	   condemnation	   of	   these	   practices	   by	   Spain’s	  
ombudswoman	  (Defensor	  del	  Pueblo	  2012)	  and	  the	  European	  Commission	  against	  Racism	  
and	  Intolerance	  (2011)	  forced	  the	  publication	  of	  new	  instructions	  in	  May	  2012.	  Implicitly	  
acknowledging	  the	  existence	  of	  immigration	  raids,	  the	  new	  memorandum	  (Circular	  Letter	  
2/2012)	  clearly	  states	  that:	  
The	   implementation	   of	   [police	   plans	   related	   to	   irregular	  migration]	   has	   to	   avoid	   any	   type	   of	  
practice	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  the	  undue	  privation	  of	  the	  rights	  and	  liberties	  of	  immigrants,	  being	  
forbidden	   for	   this	   reason	   the	   establishment	   of	   quotas	   for	   the	   identification	   or	   detention	   of	  
foreigners	   by	   any	   unit	   of	   the	   National	   Police	   [as	  well	   as]	  massive	   or	   indiscriminate	   practices	  
based	  only	  on	  ethnic	  criteria.133	  
	  
This	  shift	   in	  policy	  seems	  to	  have	  reduced	  the	  number	  of	  raids	  and	  unlawful	  “preventive	  
detentions”	   of	   irregular	   immigrants,	   but	   it	   did	   not	   significantly	   reduce	   the	   number	   of	  
identity	  checks.	  During	  my	  stay	  in	  Madrid	  in	  2012,	  I	  witnessed	  hundreds	  of	  identifications	  
of	  foreigners	  in	  the	  streets	  and	  plazas	  of	  the	  immigrant	  neighbourhood	  of	  Lavapiés	  where	  
I	   lived,	   and	   immigrants	   I	   talked	   to	   all	   agreed	   that	   while	   there	   was	   a	   decrease	   in	   the	  
spectacular	   character	   of	   control	   through	   raids,	   “routine”	   identifications	   of	   immigrants	  
continued.	   The	   BVODH	   (2012)	   arrived	   at	   similar	   conclusions,	   arguing	   that	   since	   the	  
publication	  of	  the	  new	  memorandum,	  the	  most	  notable	  change	  on	  the	  streets	  has	  been	  
“that	   identifications	   are	   performed	   in	   a	   more	   concealed	   way	   .	   .	   .	   the	   proportion	   of	  
undercover	   officers	   has	   increased	   –	   and	   that	   they	   are	   justified	   by	   officers	   claiming	   that	  
their	  work	  has	  no	  other	  objective	  than	  ‘preventing	  crimes’	  or	  ‘finding	  delinquents’”	  (p.31).	  
                                                
133	  Circular	  2/2012	  de	  la	  Dirección	  General	  de	  Policía	  sobre	  identificación	  de	  ciudadanos.	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Recent	   statistics	  provided	  by	   the	  government	   seem	   to	   confirm	   this	   interpretation.	  
Responding	   to	   a	   request	   by	   opposition	   congressmen	   Ricardo	   Sixto	   Iglesias,	   the	   Spanish	  
government	   provided	   numbers	   on	   police	   identity	   controls	   conducted	   during	   the	   five	  
months	   prior	   to	   Circular	   2/2012	   and	   the	   eight	   months	   following	   its	   publication,	   with	  
indication	   of	   the	   nationality	   of	   the	   individuals	   controlled.134	   There	   is	   a	   discrepancy	  
between	  the	  official	  numbers	  released	  to	  Sixto	  Iglesias	  and	  those	  published	  in	  the	  Ministry	  
of	   the	   Interior’s	   2012	   Statistical	   Yearbook,	   suggesting	   that	   the	   data	   that	   includes	  
references	  to	  nationality	  is	  collected	  in	  a	  less	  systematic	  way.135	  Nonetheless,	  the	  numbers	  
recently	   released	   to	  Sixto	   Iglesias	  are	   interesting	   since	   they	  are	   the	  only	  official	  ones	   to	  
offer	   a	   breakdown	   per	   nationality	   (information	   that	   is	   not	   available	   in	   the	   Statistical	  
Yearbooks).	   They	   suggest	   a	   significant	   decrease	   in	   the	   number	   of	   monthly	   identity	  
controls	  after	  the	  adoption	  of	  Circular	  2/2012,	  and	  a	  slight	  decrease	  in	  the	  control	  of	  non-­‐
European	   Union	   third	   country	   nationals	   (TCNs)	   from	   41.6%	   to	   38.3%	   of	   the	   total	   (see	  
Table	   12).	   The	   data	   does	   not	   specify	   the	   proportion	   of	   these	   foreigners	   who	   are	  
immigrants	  living	  in	  Spain	  and	  those	  who	  are	  tourists.	  But	  if	  we	  consider	  that	  the	  number	  
of	  non	  European	  Union	  TCNs	  regularly	  or	  irregularly	  residing	  in	  Spain	  in	  2012	  amounted	  to	  
only	  6.7%	  of	  the	  Spanish	  population	  (Instituto	  Nacional	  de	  Estadísticas	  2013),	  the	  fact	  that	  
                                                
134	  Written	  response	  from	  the	  government	  (submitted	  to	  the	  Congress	  on	  March	  14,	  2013,	  ref.	  51055)	  to	  the	  
written	  question	  (X	  -­‐	  184/13841)	  presented	  by	  Ricardo	  Sixto	  Iglesias	  on	  January	  10,	  2013.	  
135	   Indeed,	  the	  numbers	  released	  to	  Sixto	   Iglesias	  suggest	  a	  total	  of	  49,295	   identity	  checks	   in	  the	  thirteen-­‐
month	   period	   (an	   average	   of	   4,108/month)	   while	   according	   to	   the	   Ministry	   of	   the	   Interior,	   7.95	   million	  
identity	  controls	  took	  place	  in	  2012	  (a	  monthly	  average	  of	  663,211)	  (Ministerio	  del	  Interior	  2013b:269).	  The	  
numbers	  published	  in	  the	  Statistical	  Yearbooks	  account	  for	  “routine”	  identity	  checks	  performed	  by	  all	  police	  
forces	  (National	  Police,	  Guardia	  Civil,	  regional	  and	  local	  police	  forces),	  while	  the	  numbers	  provided	  to	  Sixto	  
Iglesias	   concern	  only	   the	  National	  Police,	  which	   represents	   just	  over	  a	   third	  of	   all	   officers.	   Even	  assuming	  
that	   only	   one	   third	   of	   the	   731,155	   monthly	   identifications	   were	   conducted	   by	   the	   National	   Police,	   the	  
discrepancy	  remains.	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they	  are	  the	  object	  of	  38.3%	  of	  all	  identity	  checks	  reveals	  a	  disproportionately	  high	  level	  of	  
control.	  	  
Table	  12:	  Monthly	  Police	  Identity	  Controls	  by	  Country	  of	  Origin	  
Nationality	   5	  months	  prior	  to	  
Circular	  Letter	  2/2012	  
Total	  ID	  checks	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  %	  
8	  months	  after	  
Circular	  Letter	  2/2012	  
Total	  ID	  checks	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  %	  
Total	  number	  of	  
residents	  in	  Spain	  
	  
Total	  pop.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  %	  
All	   22,188	  
4,438/month	  
100%	   27,107	  
3,388/month	  
100%	   47,265,321	  
	  
100%	  
Spaniards	   9,716	  
1,943/month	  
43.8%	   12,680	  
1,585/month	  
46,8%	   41,529,063	  
	  
87.86%	  




41.6%	   10,376	  
1,297/month	  





19.8%	   4,509	  
1,585/month	  






12%	   2,686	  
336/month	  
9.9%	   1,570,634	   3.32%	  
Source:	  Government’s	  written	  response	  on	  March	  11,	  2013	  to	  the	  question	  X	  -­‐	  184/13841	  presented	  in	  
Congress	  by	  R.	  Sixto	  Iglesias	  on	  January	  10,	  2013	  and	  National	  Institute	  of	  Statistics	  data	  of	  the	  
number	   of	   non-­‐Spanish	   nationals	   inscribed	   on	   any	   municipal	   registry	   (padrón)	   by	   January	   1,	  
2012.	  
	  
While	   these	   controls	   based	   on	   racial	   profiling	   cannot	   anymore	   lead	   to	   unlawful	  
“preventive	  detention”	  as	  argued	   in	  Circular	  1/2010,	   they	  can	   still	   lead	   to	  arrests,	   fines,	  
transfers	   to	   a	   detention	   centre,	   and	   deportations,	   as	   we	   will	   see	   in	   the	   next	   section.	  
Fighting	   irregular	  migration	   is	  one	  of	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  National	  Police,	  and	  low-­‐
rank	   officers	   patrolling	   the	   streets	   contribute	   to	   this	   work	   alongside	   their	   colleagues	  
assigned	   to	   controlling	   entries	   at	   international	   airports,	   or	   guarding	   migrants	   put	   on	  
planes	   for	   deportation.	   Irregular	   immigrants	   thus	   move	   in	   Spanish	   cities,	   carefully	  
selecting	  where,	  when,	  and	  how	  they	  circulate,	  all	  too	  conscious	  of	  the	  risks	  that	  contact	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with	  police	  officers	   represents	   for	  many	  of	   them.	  Their	  variable	  degrees	  of	  deportability	  
inform	  the	  way	   they	  act,	   the	   risks	   they	   take	   to	  work,	  and	   the	   level	  of	   fear	   they	  endure.	  
They	   know	   that	   street-­‐level	   police	   officers	   are	   the	   most	   common	   gateway	   into	   the	  
exclusion	  stream,	  a	  stream	  “that	  follows	  a	  fragmented	  process	  in	  which	  diverse	  juridical,	  
police,	   and	   administrative	   institutions	   act,	   a	   situation	   that	   allows	   for	   irregularities	   and	  
arbitrariness	  as	  well	  as	  gaps	  in	  the	  application	  of	  the	  legislation”	  (Jarrín	  Morán,	  Rodríguez	  
García,	  and	  de	  Lucas	  2012:4).	  
An	  (In)effective	  Detention-­‐Deportation	  Dispositif	  
Indeed,	  it	  is	  generally	  through	  an	  encounter	  with	  street-­‐level	  police	  officers	  that	  irregular	  
migrants	   are	   brought	   into	   the	   detention-­‐deportation	  dispositif.	  Circular	   2/2012	   clarified	  
that	   officers	   cannot	   detain	   someone	   solely	   for	   irregular	   stay	   “as	   long	   as	   this	   person’s	  
identity	   had	   been	   verified	   through	   an	   official	   document	   or	   other	   document	   that	   is	  
considered	   valid	   and	   sufficient	   and	   indicates	   a	   home	   address	   that	   is	   susceptible	   to	   be	  
verified.”	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  migrant	  is	  not	  detained	  on	  the	  spot	  (after	  all,	  irregular	  stay	  is	  a	  
“serious	  administrative	  offense,”	  not	  a	  crime),	  but	  the	  officer	  will	  report	  this	  violation	  and	  
the	   migrant	   will	   likely	   receive	   a	   notice	   of	   sanction	   by	   mail	   (fine	   or	   order	   to	   leave	   the	  
country).	  	  
However,	   as	   the	   new	  memorandum	  makes	   clear,	   officers	   enjoy	   key	   discretionary	  
power	   in	   deciding	   whether	   the	   proof	   of	   identity	   and	   address	   suffices.	   Circular	   1/2010,	  
which	  is	  only	  clarified	  and	  not	  over-­‐ridden	  by	  the	  new	  memorandum,	  mentions	  that	  one	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of	   the	   reasons	   to	   consider	   not	   detaining	   an	   irregular	   migrant	   is	   the	   proof	   of	   a	   ‘stable	  
home’	   and	   specifies	   that	   it	   is	   where	   “since	   one’s	   entry	   to	   Spain,	   one	   has	   lived	  
uninterruptedly	  and	  with	  persons	  united	  with	   family	   ties,	   such	  as	  partner,	   forbearers	  or	  
descendants	   .	   .	   .	   In	   those	   cases,	   if	   there	   are	   no	   other	   negative	   circumstances,	   the	  
procedure	   to	   follow	   is	   the	   normal	   one,	   since	   in	   principle	   there	   are	   no	   elements	   that	  
evidence	  a	  risk	  of	  not	  appearing	  or	  avoiding	  deportation.”	  In	  an	  encounter	  with	  the	  police,	  
a	   migrant’s	   capacity	   to	   present	   a	   certificate	   of	   municipal	   registration	   (certificado	   de	  
empadronamiento)	  and/or	  documentation	  that	  regularization	  is	  underway	  is	  very	  helpful,	  
tying	  the	  result	  of	  this	  encounter	  with	  police	  to	  previous	  decisions	  made	  by	  municipal	  and	  
regional	   bureaucrats.	   Nevertheless,	   most	   immigrants’	   homes	   do	   not	   fit	   these	   strict	  
criteria,	   and	   the	   risk	   of	   detention	   on	   this	   ground	   is	   still	   high	   even	   without	   other	  
“aggravating	  circumstances.”	  
If	  detained,	   irregular	  migrants	  are	  brought	  to	  the	  police	  station	  for	  up	  to	  72	  hours	  
and	  informed	  by	  the	  investigative	  officer	  (instructor	  de	  policía)	  on	  duty	  that	  proceedings	  
have	  been	  initiated	  against	  them.	  According	  to	  the	  Alien	  Act	  this	  can	  be	  done	  through	  the	  
normal	   procedure	   (imposition	   of	   a	   fine,	   or	   order	   of	   expulsion)	   or	   the	   extraordinary	  
procedure	  (forced	  expulsion).	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  ruled	  on	  several	  occasions	  clarifying	  
that	  the	  main	  sanction	  should	  be	  the	  fine,	  not	  the	  expulsion.136	  Nevertheless,	  when	  street-­‐
level	   police	   officers	   detain	   someone,	   it	   is	   because	   they	   believe	   there	   are	   “aggravating	  
factors”	  (lack	  of	  permanent	  address,	  risk	  of	  avoiding	  expulsion,	  working	  without	  a	  permit,	  
                                                
136	  For	  the	  list	  of	  relevant	  jurisprudence,	  see	  Defensor	  del	  Pueblo	  2012	  (Section	  5.7.2.3).	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criminal	   activities,	   etc.)	   and	   regularly	   recommend	   a	   sanction	   of	   expulsion	   to	   the	  
investigative	  officer.	  The	   lawyer	  representing	  the	  detained	  migrant	  then	  has	  48	  hours	  to	  
argue	  for	  a	  fine	  instead	  by	  presenting	  documents	  demonstrating	  that	  their	  client	  is	  a	  law-­‐
abiding,	   integrated	  resident	  (for	   instance,	  that	  regularization	  through	  arraigo	   is	   likely,	  or	  
that	   there	   are	   guarantees	   that	   the	   individual	   will	   be	   easily	   localized)	   and,	   if	   this	   is	  
unsuccessful,	  can	  appeal	  the	  order	  of	  expulsion	  in	  front	  of	  an	  administrative	  judge	  (juez	  de	  
lo	   contencioso	   administrativo),	   often	   obtaining	   that	   the	   sanction	   be	   changed	   to	   a	   fine	  
(Defensor	  del	  Pueblo	  2012:291;	  Jarrín	  Morrán,	  Rodríguez	  García,	  and	  de	  Lucas	  2012).137	  	  
In	   the	   meantime,	   however,	   if	   expulsion	   is	   the	   chosen	   sanction,	   the	   investigative	  
officer	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  case	  decides	  whether	  to	  let	  the	  migrant	  go	  with	  an	  order	  to	  leave	  
the	   country,	   or	   to	   ask	   a	   local	   lower	   court	   judge	   (juez	   de	   instrucción)	   to	   authorize	   its	  
preventive	   detention	   in	   an	   immigration	   detention	   centre	   (Centro	   de	   Internamiento	   de	  
Extranjeros	  –	  CIE),	   pending	   the	   resolution	  of	   the	   expulsion	  proceedings.	   This	   decision	   is	  
informed	  by	  the	  report	  of	  street-­‐level	  officers	  who	  arrested	  the	  migrant,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  
level	  of	  occupancy	   in	  the	   local	  CIE.	  As	  a	  representative	  of	  a	  police	  union	  explained:	  “We	  
usually	  call	  the	  CIE	  and	  ask:	  So	  do	  you	  have	  any	  room?	  And	  they	  usually	  say	  no,	  they	  are	  
often	  too	  full,	  but	  if	  there’s	  room	  we	  may	  ask	  a	  judge	  to	  consider	  the	  internment.”	  In	  fact,	  
although	  internment	  is	  legally	  framed	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  last	  resort	  to	  ensure	  that	  expulsion	  
occurs	   when	   other	   preventive	   measures	   appear	   insufficient,	   street-­‐level	   officers	  
                                                
137	  The	  legal	  basis	  of	  these	  sanctions	  is	  found	  in	  the	  Alien	  Act	  (Art.	  50-­‐66)	  and	  its	  implementing	  regulations	  in	  
the	  Real	  Decreto	  557/2011	  (Art.	  216-­‐258).	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systematically	   demand	   internment	   and	   their	   superior	   generally	   followed	   suite	   until	  
recently.	  In	  an	  interview,	  the	  Juez	  de	  Instrucción	  No	  6	  of	  Madrid	  explained	  the	  evolution	  in	  
detention	  practices,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  demands	  for	  internment	  were	  so	  important	  for	  a	  
while,	  that	  there	  must	  have	  been	  an	  unofficial	  policy	  of	  trying	  to	  get	  irregular	  migrants	  off	  
the	  streets:	  	  
Normally,	   just	   for	  being	   [here]	   irregularly,	   the	   sanction	   is	  a	   fine,	  not	  expulsion.	  But	  when	   the	  
economic	  crisis	  started,	  instructions	  became	  more	  about	  expelling	  as	  many	  as	  possible.	  This	  is	  
when	   the	   judges	   started	   to	   play	   a	   role	   of	   control	   [and	   refused	   to	   allow	   the	   internment	   of	  
migrants	  when	  they	  through	  it	  was	  legally	  unjustified].	  The	  police	  know	  that,	  so	  why	  would	  they	  
ask	   for	   internment?	   There	  must	   have	   been	   instructions,	   because	   there	   is	   jurisprudence	   that	  
makes	  it	  clear	  that	  you	  impose	  a	  fine,	  but	  they	  requested	  expulsion	  systematically.	  138	  
	  
He	  then	  specified	  that	  this	  situation	  lasted	  for	  a	  period	  that	  starts	  roughly	  with	  the	  return	  
of	   a	   Socialist	   government	   in	   2004,	   the	   reintroduction	   of	   the	   régimen	   general	   allowing	  
employers	   to	   recruit	   migrant	   workers	   abroad,	   and	   the	   last	   large	   collective	   process	   of	  
regularization:	  
So	  there’s	  a	  first	  period,	  from	  2004,	  2005	  to	  2010	  more	  or	  less	  .	  .	  .	  when	  there’s	  a	  very	  hard	  line	  
policy	  on	  expulsion.	  In	  fact	  there	  were	  even	  the	  raids	  for	  identity	  control	  based	  on	  ethnicity	  .	  .	  .	  
and	  this	  led	  to	  a	  lot	  of	  expulsion	  proceedings	  for	  mere	  irregulars,	  without	  any	  type	  of	  criminal	  
record.	  But	  now,	  from	  what	  I	  see	  in	  my	  court	  and	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Madrid,	  demands	  for	  internment	  
for	  mere	  irregular	  stay	  have	  almost	  stopped,	  and	  the	  police	  seem	  to	  dedicate	  more	  efforts	  to	  
those	  who	  have	  committed	  crimes	  .	  .	  .	  In	  this	  case,	  internment	  may	  be	  justified,	  but	  there	  are	  
many	  other	   factors	   that	  we	  need	   to	  consider	  before	  authorizing	   it	   .	   .	   .	   I’m	  not	   saying	   it’s	   the	  
same	   everywhere:	   There	   are	   judges	   who	   systematically	   impose	   detention,	   and	   after,	   what	  
happens?	  The	  majority	  of	  immigrants	  detain	  spend	  30,	  40	  days	  in	  CIEs	  and	  are	  released	  because	  
they	  can’t	  be	  deported.139	  
	  
                                                
138	   Interview,	  Madrid,	  November	  27,	  2012.	  Along	  with	  his	  colleagues	   in	  the	  courts	  No19	  and	  20,	  this	   judge	  
also	  holds	  the	  special	  function	  of	  “Judge	  of	  Control”	  of	  the	  Madrid	  CIE,	  a	  new	  figure	  responsible	  for	  ensuring	  
that	  the	  law	  is	  respected	  therein.	  In	  this	  excerpt,	  however,	  the	  “function	  of	  control”	  he	  alludes	  to	  refers	  to	  
the	  broader	  work	  of	  all	  judges	  presented	  with	  a	  demand	  for	  internment	  by	  police.	  
139	  Interview,	  November	  27,	  2012.	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The	  situation	  varies	  from	  place	  to	  place	  depending	  on	  individual	  judges’	  interpretations	  of	  
the	  law,	  but	  also	  on	  police	  officers	  decision	  to	  only	  request	  internment	  in	  cases	  that	  seem	  
legally	   justified.	   For	   instance,	   in	   Madrid	   and	   Barcelona,	   where	   most	   requests	   for	  
internment	   occur,	   judges	   authorized	   the	   internment	   in	   only	   38.33%	   and	   44.63%	   of	   the	  
cases	   respectively	   in	   2011,	   ruling	   that	   the	   grounds	   for	   internment	   were	   generally	  
insufficient.	   In	   comparison,	   the	  province	  of	  Huelva	   is	   sometimes	   cited	  as	  an	  example	  of	  
good	  practice,	   since	   the	  National	   Police	   there	   avoids	  presenting	   requests	  of	   internment	  
when	  they	  know	  that	  these	  requests	  are	  contrary	  to	  the	  standards	  set	  by	  the	  attorney	  of	  
alien	   affairs	   (Fiscal	   de	   Extranjería)	   and	   the	   general	   decisions	   of	   local	   judges	   (Fiscal	   del	  
Estado	   2012:854-­‐856).	  Questioned	   on	   this	   difference	   in	   practice	   between	   big	   cities	   and	  
the	  countryside,	  a	  spokesperson	   for	   the	  Sindicato	  Unificado	  de	  Policía	  explained	  that	  he	  
thinks	   this	  might	  be	  due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   in	  cities,	  police	  officers	  consider	   the	  significant	  
presence	  of	  irregular	  immigrants	  in	  some	  neighbourhoods	  as	  a	  public	  order	  problem,	  and	  
use	   the	   administrative	   detention	   of	   migrants	   not	   only	   to	   enforce	   the	   Alien	   Act,	   but	  
according	  to	  a	  broader	   logic	  of	  policing.140	  This	  situation	  suggests	  that	  police	  officers	  use	  
laws	  as	  flexible	  tactics	  that	  can	  be	  mobilized	  to	  intervene	  in	  a	  field	  of	  practices.	  	  	  
While	  the	  discrepancy	  may	  be	  partly	  attributed	  to	  the	  capacity	  of	  police	  officers	  to	  
anticipate	   the	   decision,	   it	   is	   sometimes	   due	   to	   the	   individual	   interpretation	   of	   judges.	  
                                                
140	  For	  instance,	  in	  a	  recent	  study,	  Margarita	  Martínez	  Escamilla	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  found	  that	  women	  involved	  in	  
sex	  work	  were	  over-­‐represented	  in	  the	  Aluche	  immigration	  detention	  centre	  in	  Madrid.	  Since	  many	  of	  these	  
women	   are	   Paraguayan	   and	   do	   not	   stand	   out	   as	   visible	  minorities	   in	   Spain,	   they	   appear	   to	   be	   targetted	  
mostly	   based	   on	   gender,	   class,	   and	   activity,	   and	   detained	   administratively	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   combat	   the	  
selling	  of	  sex.	  	  
 283	  
Indeed,	  as	  Judge	  No	  6	  suggests,	  some	  judges	  simply	  rubberstamp	  the	  police	  demands	  for	  
internment.	   In	   contrast,	   other	   judges	   take	   seriously	   the	   fact	   that	   internment	   is	   legally	  
justified	  only	  as	  a	  measure	  to	  ensure	  that	  expulsion	  takes	  place,	  and	  consider	  that	  police	  
officers	  need	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  an	  expulsion	  is	  likely	  to	  proceed	  before	  authorizing	  the	  
transfer	   to	   a	   CIE.	   This,	   according	   to	   Judge	  No	   6	   of	  Madrid,	   helps	   reduce	   the	   number	   of	  
cases	  where	  irregular	  migrants	  are	  detained	  but	  not	  deported,	  a	  situation	  that	  effectively	  
turns	  internment	  in	  a	  sanction.	  Currently,	  although	  internment	  is	  legally	  justified	  only	  as	  a	  
means	  to	  ensure	  that	  expulsion	  takes	  place,	  most	   irregular	  migrants	  sent	  to	  Spain’s	  CIEs	  
are	  not	  ultimately	  deported,	  either	  because	  a	  judge	  overrules	  the	  sanction	  of	  expulsion	  or	  
suspends	   it	   for	   exceptional	   reasons,	   or	   because	   the	   police	   is	   unable	   to	   effect	   the	  
deportation	  within	  the	  maximum	  internment	  period	  of	  60	  days.	  There	  are	  many	  causes	  for	  
this	  failure:	  the	  inability	  to	  identify	  the	  migrant	  or	  to	  secure	  a	  travel	  document	  from	  the	  
embassy	  or	  consulate	  of	  the	  country	  of	  origin,	  the	  prohibitive	  cost	  of	  some	  deportations,	  
but	   also	   sometimes	   the	   discretionary	   power	   of	   pilots	   (the	   highest	   authority	   on	   their	  
airplane)	  to	  refuse	  to	  transport	  someone	  who	  does	  not	  want	  to	  be	  deported.	  	  
The	  result	  is	  that	  almost	  half	  of	  the	  13,241	  individuals	  detained	  in	  CIEs	  in	  2011	  could	  
not	  be	  deported	   (Fiscal	  General	  del	  Estado	  2012:859)	  and	  were	  released	   in	  what	  Adrian	  
Jarrín	  Morrán,	  Dan	  Rodríguez	  García,	  and	  Javier	  de	  Lucas	  (2012:7)	  call	  a	  “juridical	  limbo.”	  
Indeed,	  the	  order	  of	  expulsion	  cancels	  all	  ongoing	  processes	  of	  regularization,	  and	  leads	  to	  
a	  prohibition	  on	  re-­‐entering	  Spain	   for	   three	  to	   five	  years	   (ten	   in	  exceptional	  cases).	  This	  
means	   that	  a	  migrant	   released	   from	   immigration	  detention	  needs	   to	   let	   this	  prohibition	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expire	  (even	   if	  this	  person	  never	   left),	  before	  applying	  for	  regularization	  through	  arraigo	  
social,	  extending	  the	  apprenticeship	  in	  “illegality.”	  In	  the	  meantime,	  if	  the	  expulsion	  order	  
is	   solved	  after	   the	  release	   from	  detention,	  or	   if	   the	  person	  was	  not	  sent	   to	   the	  CIE,	   this	  
information	  is	  kept	  in	  the	  ADEXTRA	  police	  database,	  and	  any	  other	  encounter	  with	  police	  
will	  lead	  to	  immediate	  detention	  and	  swift	  deportation.141	  This	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  “chutes	  
and	   ladders	   model”	   (Goldring	   and	   Landolt	   2012:8)	   on	   which	   the	   Spanish	   immigration	  
system	   is	  organized,	   a	  model	   in	  which	  discretionary	  decisions	  by	  a	   variety	  of	   actors	   can	  
move	  migrants	  forward	  on	  the	  path	  to	  regularization,	  but	  more	  often	  bring	  them	  back	  to	  
square	   one	   without	   succeeding	   in	   deporting	   them,	   thus	   prolonging	   their	   probationary	  
period	  of	  legal	  liminality.	  
Considering	  this	   low	  level	  of	  success,	  the	  detention-­‐deportation	  dispositif	  seems	  to	  
fail.	  But,	   to	  paraphrase	  Michel	  Foucault’s	  question	  about	  prisons,	  one	  has	   to	  ask:	   if	  CIEs	  
fail	  to	  do	  what	  they	  are	  supposed	  to	  do,	  what	  other	  functions	  do	  they	  serve,	  how	  are	  they	  
productive?	  I	  suggest	  that,	  similar	  to	  Foucault’s	  prisons,	  CIEs	  contribute	  to	  the	  governing	  
of	   irregular	   migrants	   during	   their	   apprenticeship	   in	   “illegality”	   not	   by	   attempting	   to	  
“eliminate	  offences,	  but	  rather	  to	  distinguish	  them,	  to	  distribute	  them,	  to	  use	  them.”	  They	  
“appear	  to	  be	  a	  way	  of	  handling	  illegalities,	  of	   laying	  down	  the	  limits	  of	  tolerance	  .	   .	   .	  of	  
neutralizing	  certain	   individuals	  and	  of	  profiting	  from	  others”	  (Foucault	   [1975]	  1995:272).	  
The	  notoriously	  harsh	   conditions	   in	   Spanish	  CIEs,	   the	  possibility	  of	  deportation,	   and	   the	  
                                                
141	  Interview,	  Madrid,	  November	  5,	  2012.	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legal	   consequences	   of	   an	   expulsion	   order	   (delay	   in	   the	   ability	   to	   access	   regularization)	  
contribute	  to	  the	  governing	  of	  all	  irregular	  migrants	  through	  the	  fear	  they	  instil.	  	  
While	  the	  detention-­‐deportation	  dispositif	  is	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  regime	  for	  governing	  
migration	   that	   is	   mainly	   regulatory	   in	   nature,	   the	   threat	   of	   deportation	   is	   also	   clearly	  
disciplinary	   (De	   Genova	   2013).	   In	   this	   sense,	   it	   is	   the	   possibility	   of	   internment	   and	  
deportation	  that	  is	  the	  most	  productive	  feature	  of	  this	  apparatus	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  self-­‐
governing	   of	   irregular	   migrants.	   Or,	   as	   Nathalie	   Peutz	   and	   Nicholas	   De	   Genova	   (2010)	  
explain,	   “It	   is	  deportability,	   then,	  or	   the	  protracted	  possibility	  of	  being	  deported—along	  
with	  the	  multiple	  vulnerabilities	  that	  this	  susceptibility	  for	  deportation	  engenders—that	  is	  
the	   real	   effect	   of	   these	   policies	   and	   practices”	   (p.14).	   Furthermore,	   since	   internment	   is	  
now	   being	   justified	   by	   the	   Ministry	   of	   the	   Interior	   as	   a	   means	   for	   deporting	   only	   the	  
“foreign	   delinquents,”	   the	   detention-­‐deportation	   apparatus	   also	   works	   discursively	   to	  
mark	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  “desirable”	  and	  “undesirable”	  foreigners.	  This	  distinction	  
between	   criminals	   to	   be	   deported,	   and	   good	   non-­‐citizens	   whose	   deportation	   is	   not	   a	  
priority,	  and	  the	  non-­‐enforcement	  of	  many	  expulsion	  orders	  contribute	  to	  a	  regime	  that	  
uses	   deportation	   as	   a	   tool	   that	   “allows	   for	   both	   the	   expulsion	   and	   regulation	   of	  
immigrants”	  (Chan	  2005:154).	  Therefore,	  while	  the	  policing	  of	  migrants	  in	  the	  street,	  their	  
internment,	   and	   possible	   deportation	   can	   certainly	   be	   considered	   anti-­‐citizenship	  
technologies	   aiming	   at	   the	   incapacitation	   of	   individuals	   deemed	   undesirable,	   they	   are	  
more	   effective	   as	   a	   means	   of	   governing	   all	   irregular	   migrants	   through	   the	   threat	   of	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deportation	  who	   struggle	   through	   their	   probationary	   period,	   trying	   to	   avoid	   the	   chutes	  
and	  suspecting	  that	  the	  dice	  may	  be	  loaded.	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Chapter	  8	  










The	   expression	   “governing	   through	   probation”	   is	   an	   obvious	   reference	   to	   Jonathan	  
Simon’s	   (1997,	   2007)	   famous	   phrase	   “governing	   through	   crime.”	   While,	   according	   to	  
Simon	   himself,	   the	   claim	   that	   elites	   in	   the	   United	   States	   are	   governing	   through	   crime	  
might	  be	  a	  bit	  overstated,	  he	  argues	  that	  “we	  govern	  through	  crime	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
crime	  and	  punishment	  become	  the	  occasions	  and	  the	   institutional	  contexts	   in	  which	  we	  
undertake	   to	   guide	   the	   conduct	   of	   others	   (or	   even	   ourselves)”	   (Simon	   1997:174).	   His	  
insights	  have	  proven	  successful	  in	  shedding	  light	  on	  how	  practices	  and	  logics	  traditionally	  
associated	   with	   the	   criminal	   justice	   system	   have	   come	   to	   colonize	   other	   institutions,	  
places,	  and	  issues.	  Many	  immigration	  scholars	  have	  mobilized	  Simon’s	  concept	  effectively,	  
and	  works	  on	   the	   criminalization	  of	   immigration	  abound.	  While	  not	  all	   of	   this	   literature	  
draws	   directly	   from	   Simon,	   his	   influence	   on	   this	   literature	   is	   obvious.	   It	   is	   not	   a	  
coincidence	   that	   Julie	   A.	   Dowling	   and	   Jonathan	   X.	   Inda	   (2013)	   have	   recently	   collected	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some	   of	   the	   key	   works	   on	   immigration	   governance	   published	   in	   the	   last	   decade	   in	   an	  
anthology	  titled	  “Governing	   Immigration	  through	  Crime.”	  This	  scholarship	  has	   tended	  to	  
highlight	  how	  actuarial	  practices	  of	  risk	  management	  work	  alongside	  penal	  populism	  and	  
the	   threat	   of	   incapacitation,	   and	   insisted	   on	   the	   punitive	   dimension	   of	   immigration	  
regulation	  (Guia,	  van	  der	  Woude,	  and	  van	  der	  Leun	  2013;	  Inda	  2006;	  Pickering	  and	  Weber	  
2006).	  Studying	  the	  intersections	  between	  immigration	  law	  and	  criminal	  law	  in	  the	  United	  
States,	   Juliet	  Stumpf	   (2006)	  has	  even	  coined	   the	  now	  popular	   term	  “crimmigration	   law”	  
and	   claimed	   that	   “Immigration	   law	   today	   is	   clothed	  with	   so	  many	  attributes	  of	   criminal	  
law	  that	  the	  line	  between	  them	  has	  grown	  indistinct”	  (p.376).	  	  
I	   agree	   with	   many	   of	   the	   claims	   put	   forth	   in	   this	   literature,	   and	   I	   illustrated	   in	  
Chapters	  6	  and	  7	  how	  the	  criminalization	  of	  immigration	  is	  a	  dimension	  central	  to	  the	  way	  
it	   is	   governed	   in	   Spain.	   The	   criminalization	   of	   immigration,	   whether	   understood	   as	   the	  
inscription	   of	   activities	   performed	   by	   migrants	   into	   criminal	   codes,	   the	   application	   of	  
criminal	  codes	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  immigration	  regulation,	  the	  over-­‐policing	  of	  migrants,	  or	  
the	  discursive	  framing	  of	  irregular	  migrants	  and	  asylum	  seekers	  as	  criminals	  and	  swindlers	  
(Aliverti	  2012,	  2013;	  Lacey	  2009),	   should	  continue	  to	  be	  a	   focus	  of	   research.	  However,	   I	  
think	  that	  we	  need	  to	  choose	  our	  metaphors	  carefully	  and	  remain	  attentive	  to	  what	  they	  
conceal	   as	  much	   as	   to	  what	   they	   reveal.	   Studying	   the	   intersections	   of	   criminal	   law	   and	  
administrative	  immigration	  law	  is	  of	  utter	  importance,	  but	  when	  we	  insist	  on	  documenting	  
a	  merger	  that	  leads	  to	  indistinction	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  “crimmigration	  law,”	  we	  risk	  
losing	   sight	   of	   the	   multiplicity	   of	   actors	   and	   logics,	   of	   discretionary	   practices,	   of	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contestation	   and	   negotiation,	   and	   of	   the	   jurisdictional	   games	   at	   play	   in	   immigration	  
governance.	  We	  lose	  sight	  of	  what	  Boaventura	  de	  Sousa	  Santos	  (1987)	  calls	  interlegality—
that	  is,	  the	  non-­‐synchronic,	  unequal,	  and	  unstable	  play	  between	  various	  laws,	  techniques,	  
and	  normative	  regimes.142	  
Similarly,	  the	  focus	  on	  criminalization	  and	  incapacitation	  too	  often	  prevents	  us	  from	  
seeing	   that,	   as	   Sébastien	   Chauvin	   and	  Blanca	  Garcés-­‐Mascareñas	   (2012)	   suggest,	   in	   the	  
“moral	  administrative	  economy	  of	  illegality,	  irregular	  migrants	  have	  been	  framed	  not	  only	  
as	  civic	  culprits	  to	  be	  punished,	  but	  also	  as	  civic	  minors	  to	  be	  redeemed”	  (p.253).	  As	  I	  have	  
demonstrated	  here,	  irregular	  migrants	  in	  Spain	  are	  kept	  in	  a	  space	  of	  legal	  liminality	  and	  
governed	  not	  simply	  through	  criminalization,	  but	  also	  through	  the	  simultaneous	  promise	  
of	   inclusion	   and	   the	   threat	   of	   exclusion.	   Far	   from	   drawing	   solely	   on	   criminalizing	   and	  
securitizing	   logics	   and	   practices,	   this	   regime	   also	   relies	   heavily	   on	   labouralizing	   and	  
culturalizing	  ones.	  	  
I	  devised	  the	  notion	  of	  governing	  immigration	  through	  probation	  to	  capture,	  on	  the	  
one	   hand,	   the	   interlegality	   and	   the	   multi-­‐dimensionality	   of	   immigration	   governance	   in	  
Spain	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  reliance	  on	  both	  the	  promise	  of	  inclusion	  and	  the	  threat	  
of	  exclusion.	  	  Surprisingly,	  while	  the	  criminalization	  of	  immigration	  is	  the	  object	  of	  a	  broad	  
scholarship,	  the	  importance	  of	  what	  I	  refer	  to	  as	  “probation”	   in	   immigration	  governance	  
has	  been	  overlooked	  in	  scholarly	  research.	  Probationary	  periods	  exist	  in	  immigration	  and	  
                                                
142	   For	   similar	   claims	   on	   how	   looking	   at	   the	   differentiation	   between	   immigration	   law	   and	   criminal	   law	   is	  
more	  productive	  than	  studying	  their	  merging	  as	  crimmigration	  law,	  see	  Aas	  2014;	  Pratt	  2013.	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citizenship	  legislation	  in	  various	  countries	  and	  the	  expression	  is	  commonly	  used,	  if	  not	  in	  
the	  laws	  themselves,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  media	  coverage	  of	  these	  laws.	  And	  yet,	  the	  literature	  
on	   the	   topic	   is	   limited	   and	   hardly	   engages	   in	   any	   theorizing	   of	   this	   dimension	   of	  
immigration	  management.143	  	  
Rescaling	  of	  Borderwork,	  Conditionality,	  and	  Discretion	  
This	   probationary	   regime	   results	   from	   the	   complementary,	   and	   at	   times	   contradictory,	  
deployment	  of	  cultural,	  labour,	  and	  security	  logics	  and	  practices,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rescaling	  of	  
borderwork,	  which	  allows	  for	  a	  multi-­‐scalar	  and	  multi-­‐actor	  assessment	  of	  desirability.	  As	  I	  
explained	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  the	  conditionality	  of	  migrants’	  presence	  and	  status,	  and	  the	  
discretion	   of	   civil	   servants,	   police	   officers,	   judges,	   and	   elected	   officials	   in	   choosing	   and	  
implementing	   criteria	   of	   desirability	   is	   a	   key	   dimension	   of	   this	   regime.	  What	   brings	   the	  
spatially	  and	  temporally	  dispersed	  borderwork	  together	  with	   legal	   liminality	   is	  the	  series	  
of	   decisions	   regarding	   migrants’	   fulfilment	   of	   conditions.	   A	   key	   element	   in	   the	  
actualization	  of	   the	  governing	  of	   immigration	   through	  probation	   is	   this	  multi-­‐scalar,	  and	  
thus	   multi-­‐actor,	   assessment	   of	   migrants’	   desirability.	   Indeed,	   at	   each	   of	   the	   locations	  
where	   borderwork	   occurs,	   at	   each	   of	   these	   moments,	   various	   actors,	   each	   enjoying	   a	  
certain	  level	  of	  discretion,	  make	  decisions	  about	  whether	  action	  should	  be	  taken	  to	  orient	  
                                                
143	  One	  key	  exception	  is	  Goldring	  and	  Landolt	  2012.	  In	  this	  working	  paper,	  the	  authors’	  conceptualization	  of	  
a	   chutes	   and	   ladders	   model	   of	   immigration	   management	   is	   linked	   to	   probationary	   status	   and	  
precariousness.	   More	   recently,	   however,	   Goldring	   and	   Landolt	   (2013)	   prefer	   to	   theorize	   the	   related	  
concepts	   of	   conditionality	   and	   temporariness.	   Literature	   in	   citizenship	   and	   immigration	   studies	   that	  
mentions	  probationary	   citizenship	  without	   conceptualizing	   it	   includes	  Bauböck	  2010,	  Bauböck	  and	   Joppke	  
2010;	  Chan	  2005;	  Kanstroom	  2000,	  Kostakopoulou	  2010,	  Park	  and	  Park	  2005,	  and	  Vaughan	  2009.	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a	   particular	   individual	   toward	   the	   inclusionary	   stream,	   put	   this	   individual	   in	   the	  
exclusionary	  stream,	  or	  whether	  it	  is	  better	  not	  to	  intervene	  at	  all.	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   spatial	   and	   temporal	   rescaling	   of	   borderwork,	   this	   detailed	  
discussion	   of	   the	   varied	   and	   dispersed	   practices	   involved	   in	   the	   governing	   of	   migrants	  
placed	   in	   a	   probationary	   situation	   exposed	   the	   centrality	   of	   formal	   conditions.	   More	  
significantly,	   it	   showed	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   relative	   flexibility	   that	   various	   levels	   of	  
government	  have	   in	  defining	  and	   interpreting	  these	  conditions,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  discretion	  
used	   in	   assessing	   them.	   Decisions	   whether	   to	   register	   immigrants	   on	   the	   municipal	  
registry	  or	  not,	  power	  struggles	  and	  negotiation	  over	  criteria	   that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  assess	  
integration,	  individual	  assessments	  of	  these	  criteria,	  decisions	  to	  check	  someone’s	  identity	  
papers	  or	  not,	  to	  preventively	  detain	  a	  migrant	  or	  not,	  judges’	  interpretations	  of	  the	  legal	  
criteria	   for	   internment,	  police	  decisions	   to	   release	  a	  migrant	   from	  the	  detention	  centre,	  
even	  decisions	  made	  by	  pilots	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  fly	  a	  plane	  that	  is	  deporting	  someone—
dispersed	  discretionary	  decisions	  are	  a	  central	  component	  of	  the	  governing	  of	  immigrants	  
through	  probation.	  And,	  as	  Josiah	  Heyman	  (2009)	  has	  shown	  in	  the	  context	  of	  immigration	  
policing	   in	   the	   southern	   United	   States,	   discretionary	   non-­‐actions	   are	   as	   important	   as	  
discretionary	   actions.	   For	   instance,	   Spanish	   national	   police	   officers	   often	   overlook	  
migrants’	  lack	  of	  authorization	  to	  be	  in	  the	  country	  or	  may	  choose	  not	  to	  ask,	  thus	  limiting	  
the	  possibility	   that	   someone	  be	   sent	   to	  a	  detention	   centre.	   The	  myriad	  of	  discretionary	  
decisions	   that	   contribute	   to	   a	  migrant’s	   fate	   thus	   include	   discretionary	   acts,	   as	   well	   as	  
non-­‐acts,	  which	  should	  be	  analyzed	  as	  a	  form	  of	  dispersed	  borderwork.	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While	   not	   all	   discretionary	   decisions	   are	   performed	   in	   the	   context	   of	   assessing	  
various	   conditions,	   discretion	   and	   conditionality	   are	   generally	   tied	   in	   this	   probationary	  
regime.	   Along	   with	   the	   deployment	   of	   legal	   liminality,	   the	   reliance	   on	   culturalizing,	  
labouralizing,	   and	   securitizing	   logics	   and	   practices,	   and	   the	   rescaling	   of	   borderwork,	  
conditionality	  completes	  the	  picture	  in	  making	  the	  metaphor	  of	  probation	  so	  compelling.	  
Since	  the	  literature	  on	  immigration	  probation	  is	  limited,	  I	  argue	  we	  can	  look	  productively	  
at	   the	   use	   of	   probation	   in	   other	   contexts	   to	   identify	   how	   these	   various	   elements	   are	  
interconnected.	  Obvious	  parallels	  can	  be	  drawn	  with	  probation	  as	  a	  governing	  device	   in	  
the	  criminal	  justice	  system	  and	  in	  workplaces.	  
As	   the	  Free	  Online	   Law	  Dictionary	   (2014)	   puts	   it,	   probation	   in	   the	   criminal	   justice	  
system	  is	  generally	  understood	  as:	  
The	   period	   during	   which	   a	   person,	   “the	   probationer,”	   is	   subject	   to	   critical	   examination	   and	  
evaluation.	   The	   word	   probation	   is	   derived	   from	   probatum,	   Latin	   for	   “the	   act	   of	   proving.”	  
Probation	  is	  a	  trial	  period	  that	  must	  be	  completed	  before	  a	  person	  receives	  greater	  benefits	  or	  
freedom.	  In	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system	  .	  .	  .	  Probationers	  are	  placed	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  a	  
probation	  officer	  and	  must	   fulfill	   certain	  conditions.	   If	   the	  probationer	  violates	  a	  condition	  of	  
probation,	   the	   court	   may	   place	   additional	   restrictions	   on	   the	   probationer	   or	   order	   the	  
probationer	  to	  serve	  a	  term	  of	  imprisonment.	  
	  
Of	  course	  the	  comparison	  with	  the	  use	  of	  probation	  in	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system	  is	  only	  
metaphorical;	   the	  history	  and	   logics	   informing	  the	  use	  of	  parole,	   juvenile	  supervision,	  or	  
probation	   in	   criminal	   law	   are	   much	   more	   nuanced	   (Simon	   1993).	   Nonetheless,	   the	  
comparison	  is	  useful	  in	  pointing	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  conditionality,	  supervision,	  and	  the	  
need	  to	  prove	  that	  one	  deserves	  greater	  freedom.	  In	  both	  cases,	  probationers	  are	  seen	  as	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being	   granted	   a	   favour	   (in	   the	   case	   of	   offenders,	   being	   released	   early	   on	   parole	   or	  
receiving	  a	  suspended	  sentence;	  in	  the	  case	  of	  irregular	  migrants,	  not	  being	  automatically	  
deported),	  having	  to	  fulfil	  various	  conditions	  to	  prove	  that	  they	  deserve	  to	  be	  considered	  
full,	   autonomous	  members	  of	   society,	  and	   finally,	  being	   subject	   to	  periodic	  examination	  
and	  evaluation.	  Failure	  to	  fulfill	  conditions	  might	  lead	  irregular	  migrants	  to	  be	  deported	  or	  
lose	  precarious	   status,	  while	   the	  ability	   to	   successfully	   comply	  with	   formal	  and	   informal	  
conditions	  might	  provide	  them	  with	  a	  slightly	  more	  secure	  situation.	  Probationers	  have	  to	  
demonstrate	  that	  they	  do	  not	  represent	  a	  risk	  to	  public	  safety	  and	  are	  learning	  to	  be	  law-­‐
abiding	  residents,	  but	  also	  prove	  that	  they	  are	  responsible	  economic	  and	  cultural	  subjects.	  
In	  this	  sense,	  probation	  is	  a	  technology	  of	  subject	  formation	  that	  operates	  on	  many	  levels.	  
Probation	   is	   also	   utilized	   in	   similar	   ways	   in	   workplaces,	   used	   by	   employers	   to	  
measure	  and	  assess	  performance,	  determine	  if	  an	  employee	  is	  a	  good	  fit,	  and	  monitor	  the	  
rate	  at	  which	  a	  new	  worker	   learns	   the	  necessary	  culture	  and	  skills.	  The	  probationary	  or	  
trial	  period	  is	  also	  framed	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  enhancing	  flexibility	  by	  allowing	  for	  the	  easy,	  low-­‐
cost	   termination	   of	   an	   employment	   contract	   if	   the	   employee	   does	   not	   satisfy	   the	  
requirements.	  Human	  resource	  experts	  argue	  that	  probation	  provides	  the	  employer	  with	  
a	   longer	   period	   for	   screening	   potential	   long-­‐term	   employees,	   thus	   allowing	   for	   more	  
flexibility	  and	  better	  performance.	  They	  also	   insist	  on	   the	   importance	  of	  making	  criteria	  
and	   expectations	   clear,	   developing	   tools	   for	   assessing	   and	   evaluating	   performance,	   and	  
stipulating	  who	  will	  conduct	  this	  assessment,	  while	  acknowledging	  as	  a	  common	  practice	  
the	  use	  of	  vague	  criteria	  or	   informal	  evaluation	   tools	  by	  employers	   (see	  Caruth,	  Caruth,	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and	   Pane	   2009).	   While	   the	   comparison	   with	   probation	   in	   the	   criminal	   justice	   system	  
highlights	  the	  “not	  quite	  excluded”	  dimension	  of	  liminality,	  the	  example	  of	  workplace	  trial	  
periods	  neatly	  captures	  its	  “not	  yet	  included”	  aspect.	  
Similarly,	  the	  governing	  of	  immigration	  through	  probation	  in	  Spain	  relies	  heavily	  on	  
liminality,	   conditionality,	   and	   the	   periodic	   evaluation	   of	   performance.	   In	   this	   context,	   a	  
precarious	  migrant’s	  sense	  of	  deportability	  is	  not	  only	  a	  function	  of	  the	  internal	  rescaling	  
of	  borderwork	  and	  the	  deployment	  of	  legal	  liminality,	  but	  is	  also	  tied	  to	  conditionality	  and	  
the	   ability	   to	   prove	   that	   one	   fulfils	   the	   conditions	   set	   by	   government	   officials.	   Some	  of	  
these	  conditions	  are	  formal	  and	  do	  not	  allow	  for	  much	  discretion	  (such	  as	  the	  period	  of	  
time	  that	  a	  migrant	  has	  to	  live	  in	  Spain	  before	  being	  allowed	  to	  apply	  for	  regularization,	  or	  
the	   duration	   of	   the	   employment	   contract	   submitted	   in	   the	   regularization	   application),	  
while	   other	   criteria	   are	   more	   open	   to	   interpretation	   and	   contestation,	   and	   thus	   to	  
discretion	  (knowledge	  of	  a	  language,	  integration,	  definition	  of	  what	  qualifies	  as	  residence,	  
aggravating	  circumstances	  that	  can	  lead	  to	  an	  expulsion	  order,	  etc.).	  	  
Furthermore,	  the	  multi-­‐scalar	  and	  non-­‐linear	  character	  of	  the	  probationary	  period	  is	  
also	  a	  function	  of	  the	  various	  types	  of	  conditions,	  and	  how	  one’s	  success	  in	  fulfilling	  them	  
can	  open	  or	  foreclose	  other	  avenues.	  For	  instance,	  some	  conditions	  must	  be	  met	  to	  access	  
the	  inclusion	  path:	  language	  proficiency,	  employment	  offer,	  proof	  of	  integration,	  etc.	  The	  
officials	  who	  assess	   these	  conditions	   thus	  act	  as	  gatekeepers,	   limiting	  access	   to	   the	   few	  
ladders	  that	  exist	  on	  the	  metaphorical	  chutes	  and	  ladders	  game	  board,	  and	  granting	  them	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only	  to	  those	  whom	  they	  deem	  desirable.	  Other	  conditions	  need	  to	  be	  met	  to	  avoid	  being	  
put	   on	   the	   exclusion	   path:	   lack	   of	   criminal	   record,	   possession	   of	   a	   state-­‐issued	   identity	  
document,	  etc.	  The	  officials	  who	  evaluate	  these	  conditions	  decide	  whether	  one’s	  presence	  
should	  continue	  to	  be	  tolerated	  or	  whether	  one	  should	  be	  forced	  to	  go	  down	  one	  of	  the	  
many	   chutes	   (refusal	   of	   a	   work	   permit,	   detention,	   deportation).	   Of	   course,	   many	  
conditions	   (such	   as	   having	   a	   valid	   proof	   of	   address)	   play	   an	   important	   role	   in	   both	  
accessing	   the	   ladders	   and	   avoiding	   the	   chutes.	   Just	   like	   political	   technologies	   are	   not	  
inherently	   “good”	   or	   “bad”	   (Valverde	   2010),	   the	   assessment	   of	   the	   same	   conditions	   in	  
different	   contexts	   and	   in	   different	   hands	   can	   lead	   to	   different	   results.	   Migrants	   on	  
probation	  have	  to	  successfully	  pass	  through	  dispersed	  and	  “recurrent	  switch	  points,"	  so	  as	  
to	  "access	  the	  benefits	  of	  liberty”	  (Rose	  2000:326).	  
Finally,	   the	   links	   between	   rescaling	   borderwork	   and	   assessing	   conditions	   are	   also	  
related	  to	  various	  types	  of	  jurisdictional	  games	  (Valverde	  2015).	  In	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  
between	  the	  central,	  regional,	  and	  municipal	  levels	  of	  government	  in	  Spain,	  individual	  and	  
organizational	  discretion	  is	  a	  key	  element	  to	  ensuring	  enough	  flexibility	  in	  the	  application	  
of	  laws	  and	  regulations	  to	  satisfy	  various	  levels	  of	  government	  who	  want	  to	  intervene	  in	  
the	   spatial	   management	   of	   immigrants.	   For	   instance,	   municipalities	   can,	   to	   a	   certain	  
extent,	   establish	   their	   own	   processes	   for	   assessing	   integration,	   while	   autonomous	  
communities	  are	  allowed	  to	  add	  specific	  cultural	  and	  linguistic	  criteria	  for	  regularization.	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  Despite	   their	   relevance	   for	   the	   institutional	   dimension	   of	  multi-­‐level	   governance,	  
jurisdictional	   games	   are	   not	   limited	   to	   the	   overlapping	   territorial	   jurisdictions	   of	  
municipalities,	   autonomous	   communities,	   the	   central	   government,	   and	   the	   European	  
Union.	   Indeed,	   by	   using	   jurisdictions	   as	   flexible	   legal	   technologies,	   actors	   can	   mobilize	  
administrative	   law	   to	   intervene	   on	   crime,	   or	   criminal	   law	   to	   intervene	   on	   immigration	  
(Martínez	   Escamilla	   2008;	   Moffette	   and	   Orgaz	   Alonso	   2015;	   Pratt	   2011).	   Similarly,	  
individual	  actors	  can	  deploy	  municipal	  law	  to	  intervene	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  immigrants	  in	  
the	   city;	   that	   is,	   within	   a	   municipal	   territorial	   jurisdiction,	   but	   on	   a	   space	   imagined	   as	  
national.	   The	   displacement	   of	   borderwork	   and	   immigration	   selection	   across	   space	   and	  
time,	  by	  multiplying	  the	  number	  of	  individual	  actors	  involved	  in	  the	  process,	  thus	  provides	  
for	  greater	  flexibility	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  desirability.	  	  
Probation	  and	  Neoliberal	  Flexibility	  
In	  his	  study	  of	  parole	  in	  the	  United	  States	  between	  1890	  and	  1990,	  Simon	  (1993)	  locates	  it	  
“at	   the	   border	   between	   prisons	   and	   the	   community”	   (p.11).	   Immigration	   probation	   in	  
Spain	   is	   similarly	   located,	   legally,	   spatially,	   and	   temporally,	   at	   the	   border	   between	  
deportation	  and	  formal	  membership	   in	  the	  political	  community.	   It	   is	  a	   liminal	  space	  and	  
time	  where	  migrants	  can	  be	  governed	  simultaneously	  through	  the	  threat	  of	  deportation	  
and	  the	  promise	  of	  regularization	  and	  inclusion.	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In	  mainstream	  criminology	   literature,	   probation	   is	   often	   framed	  as	   a	   strategy	   that	  
mobilizes	   both	   the	   promise	   of	   liberation	   and	   the	   threat	   of	   punishment.	   Consider,	   for	  
instance,	  this	  description	  of	  probation:	  
A	  strategy	  of	  control	  simultaneously	  constructive	  and	  suspensive.	  Its	  controlling	  characteristics	  
are	   embedded	   in	   this	   dualism:	   probation	   is	   an	   act	   of	   kindness	   offered	   as	   an	   opportunity	   for	  
reformation,	   but	   containing	   in	   its	   fabric	   the	   possibility	   of	   overt	   punishment	   in	   the	   event	   of	  
infraction	   .	   .	   .	   Hence,	  while	   probation	   offers	   support	   and	   encouragement	   to	   those	  willing	   to	  
take	  advantage	  of	  opportunity,	  when	  faced	  with	  infraction	  or	  failure,	  officers	  are	  influential	   in	  
determining	  when	  undesirable	  behaviour	  becomes	  unacceptable.	  At	  that	  point	  it	  becomes	  their	  
duty	  to	  initiate	  coercion.	  Intrinsic	  to	  probation,	  therefore,	  are	  interwoven	  strands	  of	  liberation	  
and	  constraint	  (Harris	  1995:8).	  
	  
Again,	   this	   conventional	   view	   that	   probation	   offers	   a	   type	   of	   supervision	   that	   is	   a	   fine	  
balance	   of	   benevolent	   care	   and	   strict	   coercion	   cannot	   be	   generalized,	   since	   the	   logics	  
informing	   the	  use	  of	   probation	   vary	   greatly,	   both	  historically	   and	   geographically	   (Simon	  
1993).	  Nonetheless,	  probation	  in	  workplaces,	  criminal	  justice	  systems,	  and	  immigration	  all	  
employ,	   to	   varying	   degrees,	   forms	   of	   training,	   apprenticeship,	   rehabilitation,	   and	  
integration—all	   of	   which	   are	   promises	   of	   inclusion	   and	   liberation	   inseparable	   from	   the	  
looming	   recourse	   to	   incapacitation	   if	   the	   rehabilitation	   is	  deemed	   inadequate	   (Kemshall	  
2002;	   Moore	   and	   Hannah-­‐Moffat	   2005;	   Pratt	   2001).	   Probation	   operates	   both	   through	  
individualized	  discipline	  and	  actuarial	  logics	  of	  risk	  management	  (Feeley	  and	  Simon	  1992,	  
1994;	  O’Malley	  1999)	  	  	  
The	   form	   of	   immigration	   probation	   that	   I	   have	   described	   represents	   a	   regime	   of	  
moral	   regulation	   that	   is	   based	   on	   culturalizing,	   labouralizing,	   and	   securitizing	   logics,	  
mobilizes	   both	   the	   promise	   of	   inclusion	   and	   the	   threat	   of	   exclusion,	   makes	   use	   of	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technologies	   of	   citizenship	   and	   anti-­‐citizenship,	   and	   of	   individualized	   discipline	   and	  
actuarial	  logics,	  and	  is	  made	  possible	  through	  the	  extension	  of	  spatial,	  temporal,	  and	  legal	  
liminality.	   Borders	   act	   as	   filters,	   selecting	   who	   can	   circulate	   and	   how,	   based	   on	   risk	  
indicators	   and	   individual	  discretionary	  decisions.	   The	  governing	  of	   immigration	  prolongs	  
this	   dispositif	   far	   beyond	   the	   border,	   allowing	   for	   a	   more	   flexible	   management	   of	  
circulation	  and	  uncertainty	  according	  to	  actuarial	  logics	  and	  specific	  criteria	  of	  desirability,	  
informed	  by	  cultural,	  labour,	  and	  security	  concerns.	  
Indeed,	   legal	   liminality,	   the	   spatial	   and	   temporal	   rescaling	  of	  borderwork,	   and	   the	  
ongoing	  assessment	  of	  performance	  all	  contribute	  to	  creating	  this	  period	  during	  which—
and	  space	  where—the	  ultimate	  decision	  to	  include	  or	  exclude	  is	  suspended,	  and	  yet	  made	  
and	   unmade	   continuously	   through	   the	   ongoing	   borderwork	   of	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   actors	  
dispersed	   in	   space	   and	   time.	   It	   is	   the	   suspensive	   characteristic	   of	   probation	   that	   is	  
captured	  by	  both	  the	  rescaling	  of	  borderwork	  and	  the	  deployment	  of	  legal	  liminality,	  and	  
it	   is	  the	  ongoing	  screening	  and	  assessment	  of	  desirability	  by	  many	  actors	  that	  allows	  for	  
probation	   to	   work	   as	   a	   regime	   for	   governing	  migrants.	   The	   flexibility	   of	   the	   neoliberal	  
governing	  of	   immigration	  through	  probation,	   in	  Spain	  and	  elsewhere,	   is	   thus	  secured	  by	  
the	  extension	  of	  the	  legal	  space-­‐time	  of	  probation.	  	  
This	   form	   of	   governing	   is	   not	   unique	   to	   Spain.	   In	   fact,	   the	   multiplication	   of	  
probationary	  statuses	  (in	   immigration,	  workplaces,	  criminal	   justice	  systems)	   in	  Spain	  and	  
elsewhere	  is	  a	  key	  dimension	  of	  neoliberal	  flexibility	  (Bauböck	  and	  Joppke	  2010;	  Chauvin	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and	   Garcés-­‐Mascareñas	   2012;	   Goldring,	   Berinstein,	   and	   Bernhard	   2009;	   Mountz	   et	   al.	  
2002;	  Perlin	  2012;	  Ryan	  2009;	  Whitehead	  2010).	  Therefore,	  pursuing	  further	  research	  on	  
how	   immigrants	  are	  governed	   through	  probation	   in	  different	  contexts,	  at	  various	   levels,	  
and	  through	  diverse	  means,	  promises	  to	  help	  us	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  connections	  between	  
precariousness,	   conditionality,	   the	   intrusive	   and	   continuous	   assessment	   of	   desirability,	  
and	  disposability	  in	  neoliberal	  societies.	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  Orgánica	  10/1995,	  de	  23	  de	  noviembre,	  del	  Código	  Penal	  [LOE	  10/1995]	  
Ley	  Orgánica	  4/2000,	  de	  11	  de	  enero,	  sobre	  derechos	  y	  libertades	  de	  los	  extranjeros	  en	  España	  y	  su	  
integración	  social.	  [LOE	  4/2000]	  
Ley	  Orgánica	  8/2000,	  de	  22	  de	  diciembre,	  de	  reforma	  de	  la	  Ley	  Orgánica	  4/2000,	  de	  11	  de	  enero,	  
sobre	  derechos	  y	  libertades	  de	  los	  extranjeros	  en	  España	  y	  su	  integración.	  [LOE	  8/2000]	  
Ley	   Orgánica	   11/2003,	   de	   29	   de	   septiembre,	   de	   medidas	   concretas	   en	   materia	   de	   seguridad	  
ciudadana,	  violencia	  doméstica	  e	  integración	  social	  de	  los	  extranjeros.	  [LO	  11/2003]	  
Ley	  Orgánica	  14/2003,	  de	  20	  de	  noviembre,	  de	  Reforma	  de	  la	  Ley	  orgánica	  4/2000,	  de	  11	  de	  enero,	  
sobre	   derechos	   y	   libertades	   de	   los	   extranjeros	   en	   España	   y	   su	   integración	   social,	  
modificada	  por	  la	  Ley	  Orgánica	  8/2000,	  de	  22	  de	  diciembre;	  de	  la	  Ley	  7/1985,	  de	  2	  de	  abril,	  
Reguladora	   de	   las	   Bases	   del	   Régimen	   Local;	   de	   la	   Ley	   30/1992,	   de	   26	   de	   noviembre,	   de	  
Régimen	   Jurídico	   de	   las	   Administraciones	   Públicas	   y	   del	   procedimiento	   Administrativo	  
Común,	  y	  de	  la	  Ley	  3/1991,	  de	  10	  de	  enero,	  de	  Competencia	  Desleal.	  [LOE	  14/2003]	  
Ley	  Orgánica	  13/2007,	  de	  19	  de	  noviembre,	  para	  la	  persecución	  extraterritorial	  del	  tráfico	  ilegal	  o	  
la	  inmigración	  clandestina	  de	  personas.	  [LOE	  13/2007]	  
Ley	  Orgánica	  2/2009,	  de	  11	  de	  diciembre,	  de	  reforma	  de	  la	  Ley	  Orgánica	  4/2000,	  de	  11	  de	  enero,	  
sobre	   derechos	   y	   libertades	   de	   los	   extranjeros	   en	   España	   y	   su	   integración	   social.	   [LOE	  
2/2009]	  
Ley	  Orgánica	  1/2014,	  de	  13	  de	  marzo,	  de	  modificación	  de	  Ley	  Orgánica	  6/1985,	  de	  1	  de	  julio,	  del	  
Poder	  Judicial,	  relativa	  a	  la	  justicia	  universal.	  [LOE	  6/1985]	  
 330	  
Ley	  Orgánica	  1/2015,	  de	  30	  de	  marzo,	  por	   la	  que	  se	  modifica	   la	  Ley	  Orgánica	  10/1995,	  de	  23	  de	  
noviembre,	  del	  Código	  Penal.	  [LO	  1/2015]	  
Ley	  Orgánica	  4/2015,	  de	  30	  de	  marzo,	  de	  protección	  de	  seguridad	  ciudadana.	  [LOPSC	  4/2015]	  
ROYAL	  DECREES	  
Real	   Decreto	   845/2006,	   de	   7	   de	   julio,	   por	   el	   que	   se	   regula	   la	   concesión	   de	   una	   subvención	  
extraordinaria	   al	   Reino	   de	  Marruecos	   para	   la	  mejora	   del	   control	   de	   sus	   frontera	   y	   lucha	  
contra	  la	  emigración	  ilegal.	  [RD	  845/2006]	  
Real	   Decreto	   187/2007,	   de	   9	   de	   febrero,	   por	   el	   que	   se	   regula	   la	   concesión	   de	   una	   subvención	  
extraordinaria	   a	   la	   República	   Islámica	   de	  Mauritania	   para	   la	   mejora	   del	   control	   de	   sus	  
frontera	  y	  lucha	  contra	  la	  emigración	  ilegal.	  [RD	  187/2007]	  
Real	  Decreto	  557/2011,	  de	  20	  de	  abril,	   por	  el	   que	   se	  aprueba	  el	  Reglamento	  de	   la	   Ley	  Orgánica	  
4/2000,	  sobre	  Derechos	  y	  Libertades	  de	  los	  Extranjeros	  en	  España	  y	  su	  Integración	  Social,	  
tras	  su	  reforma	  por	  la	  Ley	  Orgánica	  2/2009.	  [RD	  557/2011]	  
Real	  Decreto-­‐Ley	  16/2012,	  de	  20	  de	  abril,	  de	  medidas	  urgentes	  para	  garantizar	  la	  sostenibilidad	  del	  
Sistema	   Nacional	   de	   Salud	   y	   mejorar	   la	   calidad	   y	   seguridad	   de	   sus	   prestaciones.	   [RD-­‐L	  
16/2012]	  
	  
Legislation	  by	  Lower	  Levels	  of	  Government	  
Ley	  15/2008,	  de	  5	  de	  diciembre,	  de	  la	  Generalitat,	  de	  integración	  de	  las	  personas	  inmigrantes	  en	  la	  
Comunitat	  Valenciana.	  [Ley	  15/2008]	  
	  
Instructions	  by	  Police	  and	  Immigration	  Head	  Offices	  
Circular	  de	  15-­‐2-­‐82,	  de	   la	  Dirección	  general	  de	   la	  policía,	  sobre	  creación	  de	  grupos	  operativos	  de	  
control	  de	  extranjeros.	  
Circular	  1/2010	  Instrucciones	  sobre	  determinadas	  actuaciones	  policiales	  derivadas	  de	  la	  nueva	  Ley	  
2/2009,	  de	  11	  de	  diciembre,	  que	  modifica	  la	  L.O.	  4/2000,	  de	  11	  de	  enero,	  de	  Extranjería	  y	  
recordatorio	  de	  otras	  actuaciones.	  
Circular	  2/2012	  de	  la	  Dirección	  General	  de	  Policía	  sobre	  identificación	  de	  ciudadanos.	  
Instrucció	  1/2012	  de	  la	  Direcció	  General	  per	  a	  la	  Immigració	  del	  Departament	  de	  Benestar	  Social	  i	  
Família	   per	   la	   qual	   s’estableixen	   els	   criteris	   generals	   per	   a	   l’elaboració	   dels	   informes	  
d’estrangeria	  competència	  de	  la	  Generalitat	  de	  Catalunya.	  
Instrucció	   DGI/BSF/1/2013	   per	   la	   qual	   s’estableixen	   els	   criteris	   generals	   per	   a	   l’elaboració	   dels	  
informes	  d’estrangeria	  competència	  de	  la	  Generalitat	  de	  Catalunya.	  	  
Escrito	  Circular	  de	   la	  Comisaría	  general	  de	  documentación	  de	  27-­‐9-­‐82.	  Sobre	  problemática	  de	   las	  
expulsions.	  
	  
	  
